This is February 1st. Mary Marshall Clark--I'm Ghislaine Boulanger, and we are here at the Northampton Public Library, and Calvin Coolidge Presidential Library, to interview Nathaniel Raymond. We're very excited to be doing this interview today. And Natty, I am going to start at the very beginning, and ask you where you were born.

Raymond: I was born in Brimfield, Massachusetts, at Bay State Medical. I grew up in Springfield, Massachusetts until I was in eighth grade; then I moved to Northborough, Massachusetts with my mom, and lived there until I went to college in 1995, at Drew University, in Madison, New Jersey. I lived here in Northampton since 2011, and most of my family is out here in western Massachusetts.

Q: And how did you get involved in this topic of human rights?
Raymond: Well, that's a big question. For me, I grew up very involved in the Episcopal Church, the Episcopal diocese of western Massachusetts, so for me, my first introduction to questions of social justice was through priests, and bishops, and lay-people. The church would have been involved in the civil rights movement; and, more than anybody, it was through my mother who, from the earliest days, on a local level—my parents were involved in town government in Brimfield, and my mom and dad started this campaign when I was six or seven years old called Stop IT, to prevent there was this company whose initial were IT, that was going to set up in farming country in western Mass. a toxic waste incinerator. So from a very early age my dad, who was chair of the board of selectmen in Brimfield, and my mom was head of the school committee—it's a town of 1,300 people—so everyone, at some point, served in local government. So I was surrounded by this idea that we were all participants in our government; that it belonged to us. So for me, and for my mom, especially my dad, but also my grandparents—who were first generation American citizens, immigrants from Lithuania, where my mother's side of the family had fled the czar—I grew up with, basically, this very strong connection not only to social and economic justice, but a very strong connection to the experience of refugees, and people who are affected by war and conflict. Because for my grandparents—they spoke Lithuanian in the house—growing up—it was a very real thing.

On my father's side—my father served in the United States Navy and the National Security Agency, before I was born, so I had these two twin influences—on my father's side, this idea...
of national service being absolutely central; then, local, community, and cultural service on my mother's side, and they came together, and sort of made the hybrid, which is me.

Q-Q-1: Let's just date this. What were your father's years of active duty?

Raymond: I don't know the exact years. It was in the very late sixties when my parents first met. So he graduated from Western New England College out here. That's where he met my mom, at an Indian New Year's Party at Clark University, in 1968 to 1969, I think. I don't know the full chronology, but my grandparents died in a car accident before my parents met—my father's parents—who lived in Cleveland, Ohio. My paternal grandfather was a commander in the U.S. Navy, who had served in the Pacific, and was an engineer. They died in a crash in upstate New York, while leaf peeping [unclear]. My father has a sister, my Aunt [Lydia], who went to live with a family friend in Japan—which is a whole other story. She ended up becoming a 1960s pop sensation in Japan, appearing on a Japanese program that had a hit with the Japanese language cover of The Lovin' Spoonful's "Happy Together." It's a true story.

But my father went to Officer's Candidate School, and ended up in naval intelligence; then was transferred over to a naval security group, which was an aspect of encryption, code protection [unclear]. That was the late sixties, early seventies, just when my parents got married. So then my mom basically made it clear that she didn't want to have children in the shadow of Fort Mead, and wanted to go back home. They moved up to Massachusetts, and my father left the
service. They had me, and then they separated and divorced in 1986, when I was about eight years old. It was about three or four years after that, that we left Brimfield—which was really hard for me. It's part of the reason I'm back here in western Mass—because this place is very much where I'm from. It was hard to move to central Massachusetts. It was good for my education and good for my mom, but I'm a rural person.

Q-1: It says here that you got your first exposure to social justice as a child. How did that carry forward into your life as an adult?

Raymond: Oh. There was a very specific incident. When I was in, I think, third grade, our teacher, Mrs. Whiten, asked us to write a letter to the president. This was right after Ronald W. Reagan called for the bombing on Libya. I don't know if you remember—Kaddafi’s young daughter was killed in the bombing. She was about my age at the time. So I wrote to President Reagan, and I said, "Now I don't pretend to understand what is required in being a president; I just don't know why that little girl had to die." I got a message back from his secretary, at that point, written on a typewriter, saying, "Listen, kid. There's a lot of complicated things going on here. We're not trying to kill six-year-old girls in Tripoli, but this is just—we're trying to avoid that, but this happens. The dishes get washed." For me—I think there's always an animating moment of outrage, where you have that origin moment of cognitive dissonance, about why the world is the way it is. The environment I was in—the entire apartheid movement, in terms of international issues, those things—that's the milieu I was stewing in, growing up.
My father was a Republican, my mom was a Democrat. My father was, in some ways, one of the most liberal individuals I've ever known. So I grew up in this very bipartisan household where my mother voted for [Michael S.] Dukakis and my father voted for [George H.W.] Bush. So I grew up with a classic liberal, working-class, Labor, Democrat background from my mother's side, and from my father's side, descended from William Tecumseh Sherman, from Cleveland blue-blood, society, Republican—-together. To understand me, you have to understand that. I grew up from two parents who made engaged in very different cultural compromises. If that makes any sense.

So for me, I had, really, the advantage of always seeing both sides of things.

MMC-Q-2: Why did you choose Religious Studies at Drew University?

Raymond: I chose it because what I really wanted to do was study—I was very affected by Joseph [J.] Campbell, very affected by Heinrich [R.] Zimmer, and very affected by Carl [G.] Jung. I wanted to study how cultures make narratives; and how those narratives create forces in the world; and how those forces, to quote [unclear] [Bartel] [Unclear], "l'âge grand réciterj'écite"—-the big stories; how they affect things. So I think how I got into human rights work was by trying to understand how big stories impact bystanders, I guess, going back to Gaddafi's daughter. I wanted to understand how the stories we tell ourselves, as ourselves, as large groups of people, create these forces in the world that have unintended consequences and intended consequences, which are unjust. In college, I was thinking about becoming an Episcopal priest, at one point, and I ended up studying comparative religion, mostly
focused on East Asia, Japan, China, Tibet— I worked at the Asia Society as an intern. So I was very interested in languages, very interested in mythologies, and very interested in actual "sumology: symbology in art.

So I studied in China, I did independent study in the Tibetan regions of Hunan Province, in 1998, and that was a formative experience because— speaking of narratives— there was the Free Tibet movement that was happening at that point, and I was seeing this disconnect between what students and pop stars in the United States were saying, and what Tibetans themselves were saying. I became very fascinated— (and this becomes a theme, I think, throughout my life— ) by moments where people with good intentions project their expectation, or from where they are, on what they think solutions are to other people's problems. In doing so, they can cause damage while trying to do good. Talking about how I got involved in [unclear] detainee issues— that's a major, recurring theme. Because after college I got a job with Physicians for Human Rights [PHR] as basically an assistant with the communications department— doing faxing, writing various press releases, the most basic level of administrative and secretarial support to the director of communications. It was within the context of that work that I became involved in the Dasht-i-Leili massacre investigation.

I was thinking about this in the shower; next to being born where I was and being raised by my parents; next to meeting my wife and falling in love with my wife, and having my life with my wife, I think those two things, those two categories of events and people, nothing has shaped or affected my life more than the Dasht-i-Leili massacre. Everything I do now, everything I've done since that moment has, in one way or another, been a direct result of what happened in that
Raymond: They sent me to Islamabad. This is four, five weeks after 9/11. They sent Dr. Lynn Amowitz, who had written a report—

Q-1: We should probably ask you to spell her last name.

Raymond: Her last name is Amowitz. A-m-o-w-i-t-z. Lynn. (I think she has a different last name now). Dr. Amowitz was sent there to promote in the aftermath of 9/11 there was a lot of focus on women's issues in Afghanistan. So [unclear to promote the new PHR], which was a study done inside Afghanistan, by Dr. Amowitz and others, to look at the health and human rights impact of the Taliban on Afghan women. So I was sent there, basically, to support the press strategy, and to basically get her in front of journalists and cameras. There was an expectation that we were going to try to get into northern Afghanistan, and she ended up making
it across. I turned around, by that point, because, for a variety of reasons, including the fact that it was almost Thanksgiving, and we had been sitting out in the field for weeks, sending a tall white guy into northern Afghanistan, to the mujahideen, at that point, didn't make sense. Also, I was a kid.

GB:Q-1: You were twenty-three, or twenty-four, or twenty-five?

Raymond: At that point I was twenty-four. I turned twenty-four on November 11th, so I was technically twenty-three.

GB:Q-1: And the war had started.

Raymond: The war had started. So we went from Pakistan to Tajikistan to try to get access from there. So we were PHR’s Team One after 9/11, into the region. It didn’t work—not a lot happened on that trip that was significant, for what would happen after. What happened that was significant was the story of the people who replaced us. So Dr. Jennifer Leaning, of Harvard University, whom I still work with to this day, Dr. Leaning, who was a founder of Physicians for Human Rights and John [W.] Heffernan, who was a long-time human rights investigator, is now, I believe, director of the Robert Kennedy Human Rights Program, and has been in the field for a lot of humanitarian organizations. The two of them went to Afghanistan. Kabul had fallen by this point. This is early 2002.
So I'm back doing my same job in Boston, at PHR, supporting communication strategy, and John and Jennifer get up to Mazar-i-Sharif, and when they get there, they hear reports of charnel house conditions at a prison called Sheberghan, outside of Mazar-i-Sharif. So they get to Sheberghan, they talk themselves through the door, and the Northern Alliance general there, (“General "Jerebay" [phonetic] [? Jerabeh ?], the prison commander at the time, lets them in), and what they see—and basically, “Jerebay” [?] General Jerabeh [?—] and I've seen it spelled every single way. Like with most Afghan names, there are five spellings—they get in there; and really, the Northern Alliance is needing help managing the fact that they have all these Al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners, who were taken after the fall of Kunduz. So while there, they're given a tip that there is a mass grave in the desert near there.

**GIR:O-1:** How did they get that tip?

Raymond: They got that tip from officials with an internet, with an IGO with an intergovernmental organization in Afghanistan. So those individuals had been monitoring the status of the prisoners; had been trying to provide assistance to the prisoners; and trying to find out where and when the rest of the prisoners who were not at that prison—where they went. Because thousands of prisoners were captured, and there were a lot of prisoners at Sheberghan, but there were a lot of unaccounted-for prisoners. So the word on the street was that they were in a mass grave.

So they went out there, and they found “detritus” on the ground. They found enough prima facie evidence to basically call back to Boston and say, "We need to send PHR's forensic team," which
Raymond had done the work for the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia [ICTY], and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR], to basically send a forensics team out there. So Bill Hagluegland and Stefan Schmidt, [phonetic]Schmitt ended up without doing two assessments, I believe, in the early part of 2002—they do a minor excavation, and find, basically, laid side-by-side, remains. The thing about these remains is that they were relatively recent, and that there were signs that they likely died of asphyxiation in a hot place, forensically. Because the team reported back that they had scratched each other. They found skin under the fingernails, that suggested they were trying to get out of somewhere, and their clothes were torn. But there were no gunshot wounds; there was no sign, from within the limits of what they could perform there, for an autopsy, in the middle of a desert, in Afghanistan, and Kabul had just fallen a couple months before given that, they realized they probably had asphyxiation. So the question is, how did that happen? As part of General [Unclear]'s investigation, at the time, they were able to understand that there was a convoy; that there were convoy container trucks; and that people allegedly had been killed in those container trucks.

That's when it comes back to me. My job was to try to find journalists who were going to follow this.

GB:Q-1: From Boston, you mean.

Raymond: From Boston. Yes. I've actually never been to Dasht-i-Leili, and probably never, ever should go to Dasht-i-Leili, because Abdul Rashid Dostum, who was the commanding general of
that section of the Northern Alliance, that, with U.S. [United States]—this is the critical thing—.Trying to capture prisoners who were captured were captured by Dostum, CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] para-militaries, and Green Beret/Special Forces A-Teams that were, including one that what was called Triple Nickel, or the 555 and the 535, which were two operational detachment alphas [unclear] that were providing security for Dostum, but also calling in U.S. air strikes. Then the CIA team that was working with them were the ones that found John [P.] Walker Lindh—–which gets to be very important. We're sort of out of chronology here.

But what begins to emerge is that whoever put those people in the ground, those alleged Taliban and Al Qaeda and Afghan conscripts, whoever reportedly put them in the ground, was likely working with the American government. So that meant we weren't just talking about a reprisal killing, within the context of "Uzbeks," [phonetics]—have you seen Pulp Fiction, where the gun accidentally goes off in the back of the car? Well, what we were trying to figure out was whether we had a Pulp Fiction situation, where they didn't mean to kill them; or we had a situation where things got out of control, and in the aftermath of the riot at Qala-i-Jangi, where John Walker Lindh was captured, with Dostum and the CIA and the Special Forces—–whether this was a reprisal. We're still trying to figure out aspects of that. But the point is that because Dostum was a U.S. ally, acting with U.S. Forces, that Forces, which meant that the Geneva Convention was in play. The Geneva Convention is always in play, but especially in play because you have the U.S. military. And the Northern Alliance, being a non-state actor, underneath international law, when the U.S. is working with a non-state actor, Geneva still applies. So the question is—–we've got to keep remembering, this is just a few months after 9/11—–the American public did not want to hear about the poor Taliban and Al Qaeda
prisoners and their status. Those living at Sheberghan, who were still alive, were living in appalling conditions, and some were dying of infectious disease. They didn't want to hear about that. They certainly did not want to hear about, maybe, Al Qaeda or Taliban prisoners who were killed with American forces, working with the guy who killed them. Because, you know, that's like, "Good." A lot of people were like, "Good."

GB:Q-1: So your job was to find newspaper people; the press who could be interested in the story.

Raymond: If we knew it was going to require a big investigation. Because even if it wasn't just after 9/11, with an issue this sensitive and this explosive, just any mass killing—take any political context out of it—you have two problems up front. One is to get the facts right, when the facts are very hard, especially when you don't have full access to the forensics—which was the case here. The other issue—putting all the politics aside—is you want to preserve the chain of custody on the grave. You don't want to rush out and cause a reaction that's going to destroy the evidence; that's going to tip everybody off, and they're going to go Code Red. Then you have nothing left. You have basically caused your own investigation to fall apart.

So you want to go in with mandate and jurisdiction. The forensics folks, Haglund and Schmidt, their follow-up to Leaning and Heffernan's visit was done as an exploratory mission by the UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan, and with oversight from the UN High Commission for Human Rights. This is fairly important, because the UNHCHR commissioner at the time was Sérgio Vieira de Mello. I don't know if that
name rings a bell. He would die on the day of my dad's funeral, in Iraq, in 2003. We'll get to that later.

So what happens is, de Mello basically creates the mandate to send the teams out. They find enough to say, "Yes, there is probably a mass grave here." So Heffernan and others suggested that—I talk to Roy Gutman.

Now Roy Gutman won the Pulitzer Prize for getting into the camps in Bosnia, where people were being held during the fighting there. If there is a Mt. Rushmore of investigative journalism, Gutman is up there. So I connected with Gutman, who was at Newsweek at the time, and a British reporter from Newsweek named John Barry. So Barry, Gutman, and a team—Donatella [Unclear]. Lorch, Stryker [Unclear]. McGuire, Babak Dehghanpisheh [Unclear], Lorch, Stryker [Unclear]. Babak [Unclear]. McGuire, Babak Dehghanpisheh [Unclear], Lorch, Stryker [Unclear].—I'm not going to try to spell Babak's [Unclear]'s name. Anyhow, they pooled from Newsweek to put an investigative team together to go deep on it. So they go back to Afghanistan and, basically, my job, at headquarters, was connecting the reporters to what we knew, and taking what the reporters found out, and try to expand what we knew to support the UN level investigation.

So this goes on for months. Babak [Unclear] and others are in the field. They talk to a large amount of witnesses, and what we begin to figure out is that the Special Forces were present at Sherberghan prison as the convoys were coming in, and that people were buried in the desert. Some were shot, because they were shooting into the containers—supposedly to create air holes—which I think in some cases was true. In some cases, they were shooting into
the containers. The convoy happened right after the Qala-i-Jangi riot, and I think it's important, then, to talk about what is the Qala-i-Jangi riot.

Qala-i-Jangi means "fortress of war," in Dari. It was an ancient fort in Afghanistan, that had been used when the Taliban controlled that area. When the Soviets controlled that area, it had whoever was in power used Qala-i-Jangi as a base of operations. So they took initial prisoners of the "Ansar" brigade—the foreign fighters from Kunduz and the Taliban, and the Afghan conscripts—they took them to Qala-i-Jangi and they started doing interrogations there. And we've got to keep remembering the timeline: This is November, 2001. So this is the first U.S. pickup after 9/11.

I'm jumping around here, but this is a really important point. I don't think the history of why the Bush administration made the "detaining" decisions it did is in any way fully understood, or accurately written yet, because no one understands how the events of the fall of 2001 created fears, forces, reactions within the Bush administration. For me, this is the big, unanswered question—Did the stuff went down at Qala-i-Jangi and the massacre that happened after that, was it in the interest of the Bush administration to make sure these people never got out? Because the survivors were witnesses, allegedly, to probably the single largest mass killing since "Herzegovina."
Raymond: Implemented by the Northern Alliance, but with the Americans there, with a CIA asset, and his people, engaging in a massive violation of the Geneva Convention and as mass killing. So it is important to determine—and it still has not been determined—what did the leaders of those [unclear A-Teams] know? Where were they? When did they know it? That has to be done.

But putting that aside—let's say they had no command and control opportunity. They still had a responsibility, as people who wear the uniform of a United States soldier, and who are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. They have to interdict. The issue is—as we get to what didn't happen—those survivors were the initial population at [unclear Gitmo]. I don't think most people understand that. I feel that Dasht-i has been put off on the side, and it's like, "There was a sad thing in Afghanistan, and then there was Gitmo." No. They are directly related.

Because the first people off the C-130, on the tarmac, many of them, were Dasht-i survivors. This is critical, because as Jim [James] Risen General [Unclear] and I learned, later, when we went back to the Dasht-i investigation—I know I'm hopping around here—when we went back to the Dasht-i investigation, the critical source was when we found "Del Spry,"[phonetic] and "Del Spry" was special agent in charge of the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigations] agents at Gitmo. So about the time I'm doing my investigation, our PHR investigation with Gutman, unbeknownst to me, at the same time, somewhere in Cuba there is an FBI team that is running into the same thing. The FBI team, as we learn later, is hearing this repeating story from detainees kept isolated from one another; that they were put in a container; that people died in the container; and that they were shooting in the container; then people were put in the desert.
Then they were put in this horrible prison—those who survived—and then they were taken by the Americans.

MMC-Q-2: What's your theory about why?

Raymond: I've heard a range of theories. Some have said—some Afghans have said it's an "amooz," [phonetic] meaning that it was a "blood payment." Because the Taliban had raped Uzbek people and Tajik people in Mazar, when they held Mazar; and that, basically, Dostum and his commanders, after Qala-i-Jangi, when they had offered them safe passage, and they violated it, in Dostum's mind, by blowing up the basement and killing Johnny Michael Spann—okay.

This is important.

A CIA operative was killed in the Dasht-i-Leili riot. Johnny Michael Spann—after, or almost during his interview with John Walker Lindh. So a CIA para-military officer, from the Special Activities [division] (SAD), is killed at Qala-i-Jangi. So you have to understand here, any good will, any safe passage that was in place at that point—I don't know what the cable traffic said but Washington is saying they've got full Geneva—let's say, hypothetically, they've got full Geneva protections—they changed very radically after you have a dead CIA agent; you have a two-day battle with either Australian or British special ops, and American special ops, coming calling in air strikes to retake Qala-i-Jangi. So what happened at Dasht-i happened after people had lost folks on both sides. By both sides, I mean the Northern Alliance and the Coalition. At that point, you could say there's an argument—"We have a security threat here. We have to lock these people up." But the point is, as you begin to explore this—
as I did with Gutman — containers are the traditional mass killing method in Afghanistan, because you leave them in the sun and they're dead. So they will do that a lot during the mujahideen period, to be able to quickly kill large amounts of your opposing force's capacity — and you can do it without wasting bullets. It's very effective.

So my theory is that what happened is that Dostum was angry, and they wanted those people out of there — because Qala-i-Jangi, at that point, was structurally unsound. It had just been bombed for two days. So he wanted to get them to Sheberghan, and they were angry, they were not caring about their well-being, they were not caring about their survival. But this is the big question — where was the United States in all this? Put it in your mind. Let's take all human rights stuff aside. Just talk about OPSEC — Operational Security and Operational Objectives. You have the largest human intelligence collect. It's 9/11. You have this massive group of Al Qaeda and Talibs. You need to talk to them. You need to understand what they know. Why did they let their human intelligence "asset" get handled that way? Why didn't they bring in the resources to secure the human intelligence "asset"? That's the big question. I think things spiraled out of control quite quickly. Then, at that point — back to the Pulp Fiction example — once the gun goes off in the back of the car, you're now — the great line — "Why am I on brain detail?" Okay. The point is, that suddenly they're shifting to being on brain detail, and they're calling the "Wolf" — the Harvey Keitel character, basically. They're figuring out, "Okay. Now that this has happened, everything about human intelligence — all that goes out the window."
If I was a policy maker and I've spoken to many of the people who were in policy positions in the Bush administration during Dasht-i, and for the State Department personnel, for [Colin L.] Powell's inner circle—they saw this as a clear, black-and-white responsibility to investigate and hold to account. On the Department of Defense [DOD] side, with was [Paul D.] Wolfowitz, and the people I've spoken to who worked directly for Wolfowitz, they said, "We're not touching this. Dostum's our guy." He was a CIA asset, according to the New York Times. He became chief of staff of the Afghan army. So by the time our investigation is under way, he's chief of staff of the Afghan army, and basically he is one of the most powerful man in the country, and he is bringing the Uzbeks, who were critical to the Coalition to hold Afghanistan together, to the table. So you go in, and you get Dostum, and you're saying "Hi CIA asset," who worked with U.S. personnel, to deliver Mazar, which was the road to Kabul, within weeks after the start of U.S. combat operations, with a bunch of commandos on horseback—now you're going to take all that PR and toss it out the windows. You're going to destabilize the Uzbeks, and they're going to rise up over any government that is bringing Dostum, who just brought them this victory, to a war-crimes trial. And then, you sell to the American people, "Hi. I'm really concerned about what happened with the Taliban and the Al Qaeda personnel." Frankly, that's the realpolitik. Frankly, the number one best thing we could have done for U.S. personnel protection is to go after him. It was an incredible moment, and I think Colin Powell and others and we'll get to this, and what happened after the Newsweek piece came out—they saw this as an opportunity to show what the rule of law meant; to show what we were about and how we were different; and to show to the Muslim world, "We're not Dostum. We're not going to roll in, we're not going to torture
your people, and we're not going to kill indiscriminately." But Powell lost, and this is important. This is important. The State Department was in the lead on this, and then they weren't.

GB:Q-1: And then they weren't?

Raymond: And then they weren't. It's there that we get the critical origin pieces of what happens later, because our article came out in August 2002.

GB:Q-1: In Newsweek.

Raymond: In Newsweek, the cover of Newsweek. I'm talking so much about the policy here that I am, as per usual, forgetting to put myself in the picture.

By this point, I'm a twenty-four-year-old kid. This is my first job after college. My father is dying of lung bone cancer. I am now investigating this massacre, with Pulitzer prize-winning journalists and forensic experts, and leading human rights investigators, and I think this is going to do something. I don't know any better. But we all think this is going to do something. We thought that you find the grave [unclear], you explain the context, but by putting boots on the ground, which is what Newsweek could do. You've got a mandate through the United Nations—which, at that point, aside, you want a mandate at twenty-four I thought "a UN mandate, that's a big deal."? That's a big [unclear] Now I think a UN mandate is like getting a call from someone who says, "If you just see our housing development, you'll get a free vacation." Those sorts of calls.
Anyhow. So the point is that we had all those things in place, and I thought you could just simply present this to the American people, and they're going to say, "Oh, my god! Oh, my god!" And that the American government will say, "Well, our laws, our values, our training, says we have to respond."

**GB:Q-1:** Beyond your sense of outrage at this, and— as we now would agree— your naïve expectations that when this came up something would happen—

Raymond: Well, I thought it was going to be a silver bullet.

**GB:Q-1:** ——what about the impact on you, personally? This was a terribly difficult time with your dad dying. [unclear]

Raymond: I was a mess. *I was a mess.* Let me put it this way. I was running ragged and running hard, trying to be able to be present for my father, who was going through, at the time, *stem cell* replacement therapy. He had multiple myelomas, diagnosed in 2000. Every three to six months we were facing losing him. To be present there, while getting my head around what we were doing with this investigation—yes. I was a kid who was way out of my league. And yes, I was dealing with it by drinking too much, by not sleeping enough. But that was managing. It's when the article came out and what happened after that— that's when I lost it. And what I mean by that is— the article comes out; Powell gets shut down. The special ambassador for war crimes was Pierre [R.] Prosper. *In not allowed by the He's now a Department of Defense*
criminalists to go north, when he's in Afghanistan. And, unbeknownst to us, the FBI had been stopped stuffed by the criminal division, "A.K.a.k.a. [? Chertoff ?], [? Churdov ?] Turnoff," [phonetic] which becomes important.

So the FBI stopped is stuffed. They filed witness reports, I believe, #10-180s. They're interrogating alleged terrorists, and they end up this is the thing filing "Witness to a Crime" reports, in the initial interrogations at Gitmo. That's what's important, saying people don't understand this. I often get frustrated talking to in the activist community. There's this assumption with the Bush administration that it was "thus and always thus." No. There was a moment where the FBI was doing exactly what the FBI should do; where the State Department was doing exactly what the State Department should do. If you read the cable traffic, from Powell— all cables are from Powell or to Powell, but signed off by the secretary— "Must investigate." "Secure the site." "Get them on the ground." Okay. So through FOIA [Freedom of Information Act], we've gotten the documents, and you see Powell in motion, saying to Embassy Charges d'affaires, Ambassador, Afghanistan, "Top priority. Work with the Afghans. Work with the UN. Figure out a mandate. Support the forensic team. We may be up for security." That's the tone, coming out there, in those first few months after Newsweek.

But then things changed, and back to those witnesses. Most of the witnesses we don't know how many for sure are killed immediately afterwards. So not only did Newsweek not work, everyone in it, more or less, was assassinated.
GB-Q-1: How do you know about the assassinations?

Raymond: At the time, I heard both through UN channels that a UN local staff member had gone up to check on the site (this was in the fall of 2002)—and had been captured, tortured, and sodomized by Dostum’s men. So that was the first canary in the coal mine that we lost. There was no security. The UN was not secure. Then I started hearing reports—all unconfirmed, all unspecified—that the Newsweek folks were not able to regain contact with sources. At that point, with no response, suddenly, after Powell’s public statement—"We need to investigate this," etc., suddenly, silence. And during that time of silence, Dostum was off the leash. He and his men—I know, because I spoke to an Afghan who was hunted by them, years later—that Afghan said to me (whom I can’t name, but who is now safe here, in the United States, and has asylum[unclear])—that Afghan was present at Qala-i-Jangi, and saw what happened, and remembers being in Mazar, and his family in Mazar, everyone saying they could smell—they were not allowed to come out of their houses from the convoy rolled, all through to Sheberghan—and they could smell the death everywhere.

So one day this Afghan witness goes into a shop to see his friend, and the guy says, "You need to run now."

He was like, "Why?"

"Because you were at the place in the desert." This was in the fall. Now I know firsthand what happened, now. I didn't know it in 2002. But they killed all the translators—allegedly. They
killed some of the people who were driving the container trucks; the people operating the bulldozers. Now I don't know these guys, but they spoke to *Newsweek*, they spoke to the *UN*, and this is the animating thing for me, the origin story here: I didn't know those guys, but those were my guys. I created a thing in motion, with the idea that we were going to protect them; that it was going to be one, two, three. We put *Newsweek* on the table. We get the American State Department involved; we get DOD [Department of Defense] involved; we get the *UN* Security Council involved. We will have a mandate. We get a forensic team on the ground. I was thinking if we could get in there before the cold season, then we'd be rolling out. We were with the *UN* High Commission. We were working on budgets for what we would need to deploy. So I thought we'd be there maybe by the spring of 2003. When, in fact, *Newsweek* became a blueprint for killing.

So, back to me for a second. Then there's another thing. In October—In September—October we thought we had a senate hearing coming. Unfortunately, the senator who was calling the hearing was Senator [Paul D.] Wellstone. So Wellstone dies in a plane crash in October. So Wellstone's dead. The sources are in danger if not dead. Powell is checked. The FBI is down. So back to me. I'm doing therapy at the bottom of a beer bottle, and my personal life is a mess. My father still has still got cancer, and now I'm at that moment where how could I not feel guilty? I felt tremendous guilt. And I didn't even know, then, the scope of the take-down of the witnesses. At that point it was a whisper and a wink. I just assumed the worst. Unfortunately, I was right.

So I left PHR in November of 2002, because I felt I failed. I went to [Oxfam International] because I thought I was going to work on what I called "donkeys and chickens,"
happy things. I wanted to do something that was generative, because I'd gotten thrown by events into the deep end of the pool. I was a kid in way over my head, and I wanted to feel like I was doing happy social-justice things. I wanted to be in a position where I could heal; or, at least not beat my head against that wall.

GB:Q-1: And this was quite a self-conscious move.

Raymond: Yes. Absolutely.

GB:Q-1: Now was there no one at PHR to work through this? Understand your sense of guilt?

Raymond: See, this is the thing. Everyone at PHR, even those who had worked on mass graves before, no one had ever worked on anything like this. This involved the U.S. intelligence community. Let's be blunt. This was not a mass grave that was created, like Srebrenica, "Herzegovina" [phonetic] where Dutch peacekeepers failed to do their job. This was done in the aftermath of the death of 3,000 Americans and a CIA operative dead on the ground, with paramilitaries and special forces. Everything, everyone on that PHR team— Gutman— everything, all their experience— no, t. This was the major leagues. This was the biggie. So at PHR there wasn't a sense that we had lost. It was like, "Well, the adults in the room rightfully are saying you're saying "We're going to go through these processes." We're human rights advocates. We never want to—okay? "We're going to go through these steps, and we're going to work it out." Which was absolutely the right reaction. I was reacting as a kid who had the hope that we were going to do this thing, and it was going to make all the difference. I
was being—to quote [Sir.] Isaiah Berlin and monism—I had one idea that explained the world; that we expose it; we say what it was, and that would be enough.

But it wasn't. I could go on for hours about how, in human rights and humanitarian work, we need better psycho-social support. We need critical incident PTSD [Posttraumatic Stress Disorder] counseling, day one. It shouldn't be how it is now, in so many cases, this reactive like, "Oh. X-Person is looking a little shaky. Oh, X-Person has spent too much time at the bar. X-Person is beginning to engage in drugs; drift. We're going to call this person to do a one-time consult." What you have to do is you have to have that capacity in-place, in-house, working with them the whole time. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. We don't even do cure.

We traditionally put Band-Aids, psychosocially, on [psychic] chest wounds in the human rights and humanitarian community. We do a lot of lip service about it; but, in reality, especially in humanitarian field ops, there's this very strong cultural force that you want to look like you can take it. By the fall of 2002, I knew I wasn't taking it. I knew I was a mess, and because I didn't know how to cope with the reality that this was never going to go right away—I came in thinking we could fix things. And that's what a lot of twenty-something people think; that if you just care enough, you can fix it.

GB:Q-1: So you went to Oxfam "OXCAM." [Phonetic]

Raymond: I went to Oxfam “OXCAM.” I could go on and on about what happened at OXCAM—Oxfam, which was a wonderful, absolutely wonderful time for me. I was able to do a lot of work in the field, that I think did a lot of good. That was very healing. But then in
the spring of 2004—actually, February, 2004—I was sent to Jordan. This is really important. I was sent to Jordan. I had not done anything related to Dasht-i- or detainees since I left. I was sent to Jordan to attend a meeting of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq [UNAMI], and before I left I talked to an Iraqi friend. This Iraqi friend, who is a doctor in the United States, said, "My father is a sheikh in Ramadi. I want him to cross the border from Iraq." This is February, 2004. "Cross the border from inside Iraq to meet with you, because he has something he needs to tell you, because no one will listen to him."

So at the Crowne Plaza Hotel, in Amman, Jordan, shortly before Valentine's Day—like February 4th, somewhere in there, 2004—I get this call from the desk that these two people, in traditional dress, are standing downstairs.

GB-Q-1: They should be used to them in Amman.

Raymond: Yes. Well, this was straight out of Lawrence of Arabia. This was a whole deal. So I go down there, and we order tea. I did not know how they were extremely traditional, to the point where in Amman, you can shake a woman's hand. But I put my hand out, and the wife of the sheikh recoiled. She was horrified that I tried to shake her hand. She didn't say a word the entire time. She made small, general, disapproving noises at various points, but—

GB-Q-1: This was the mother of your friend.
Raymond: This was the mother and the father of my friend. So the sheikh was begging, pleading. They had just crossed—literally. He had dust on him—they had just come off the road, in the night. It's a very weird feeling the first time it happens, when people risk their life to come and talk to you, and literally throw themselves upon you to say, "Help me."

Now I had become much more experienced—by that point. I had been working in the horn of Africa. I had gotten field experience that I didn't have the first time I went to Pakistan and Tajikistan. I knew how, at least in a basic way, to conduct these types of interviews. So I went from being the wide-eyed, first-time human rights investigator with Dasht-i, to being much more skeptical, very skeptical, of most things that were said in reference to the global war on terror.

So the sheikh says, "In my town, men and boys are being taken," and he uses the word, and I asked him—and his English was good. I don't want to identify him too much, but he had an English-language education that I knew was very good, and he said a specific word, he said, "The men and the boys are being taken to the prison and being raped."

I said, "Are you specifically saying 'rape'?" I wanted to make sure we were not having a cultural conflation here, where "rape" means "hurt," or rape means assault in some way.

He said, "No, they are raping men and the boys."
So I'm looking at him, and what he's saying is, "The Americans are raping." So I'm looking at the sheikh, and I said, "Hey. Most of my family has served in the U.S. armed forces. I have many dear friends in the U.S. armed forces. We don't set up prisons and rape people at the prisons." I said, "What do you want to do? What do you want me to do? How do we verify this?"

And he was like, "Just tell someone."

I said, "Okay. I'm going to take it to the UNC [United Nations Command] court, the U.N. Security Court [unclear]. And I'm going to have them take it to the ICR [International Committee of the Red Cross] the [unclear]."

At this point, the Taguba [Unclear] investigation was already underway. It was known that there was "no one." What he was talking about was Abu Ghraib, and he was right. Because Abu Ghraib was right on route to Ramadi [unclear]. At that point, the United Nations— the meeting in UNAMI [Unclear] that I was at was about discussing security for humanitarian operators when they go back into Iraq. We had this big plan about the reintroduction entry of humanitarian staff. I do not know the plan now, nine years later. I do not know if any aspect of the plan has been executed, but it was a lovely plan. In that room were people who had survived the U.N. bombing in August, the year before. That happened the morning I buried my dad. He died in August of 2003, from complications from bone cancer. My girlfriend at the time volunteered— (amazingly) to go pick up my father's remains from the funeral parlor. My phone started going off, over and over again, and we were about to go to the church. The phone is going off, and off, and off, and what it was, was all my colleagues calling me because U.N.
headquarters had been blown up, and Sérgio Vieira de Mello, "Damalo," who gave the mandate on Dasht-i was dead. He bled out when a rebar went through -- he was alive for several hours. They dug and dug to try to get him out, and he died there in the pile. That was pretty much the worst day of my life.

The point is, when I was at the UNAMI meeting you have to understand that some of the people in that room were survivors of the Canal Hotel bombing. The UN was terrified of a repeat. So when I went to tell the sheikh's story to the UNC court--

GB:Q-1: Where was that? Where did you do that?

Raymond: That's where I have to be very -- I'm sure they don't use this tradecraft[unclear] now, but the UN was hiding in Amman. Without being too specific, they were hiding in a doctor's office. So we would go intoing to these facilities that looked like normal Jordanian businesses. You'd go up to the third floor, and there is a police officer and a machine gun pointing down the stairs. You go up there, and you get Bonded and so forth. Aspects of the UN operation, what I'm trying to say, in Jordan, were hiding under cover, because they assumed they were a target, even in Jordan. It was during that month that there was an attempt to blow up a poisonous gas bomb in a hotel in downtown Amman, allegedly.

So just to give you a sense -- coming here to talk about this "madrighal" sheikh, who had crossed the desert during the night because I knew his son, to tell me that men and boys were being raped by Americans, and this fantastical story -- I'm talking to a UN under siege,
where everyone around me is traumatized, is scared, even in Jordan. And those who were trying to cross in and out of Iraq. Everybody's a mess.

So I go in, and I get a meeting with the Canadian—I believe he was Canadian—who was the security coordinator for the UN. I said, "I don't know what to do with this, but this man said the following." He looked at me like I had told him that it was raining, maybe I should have an umbrella, or it's forty-five [unclear] degrees out. It was like, "Whatever." Why? I don't know this for a fact, but I was late to the party. Abu Ghraib was on the grapevine big-time big time. He said, "Give me the information. I'm going to take it to ICRC. I'm going to take it to our people." It's basically like you call into the police department, "I think someone is beating up my neighbor. I think maybe there's domestic abuse," and they're like "we're going to send a cruiser by." That's the response. So you're standing by your window, and you hear, "Beep, beep," and they turn around the corner. That's basically what the UN...
girded, it was a legally structured army in the world, could have a rape camp running without it—tripping wires—I just found it, from the perspective of how hard you would have to work to take out every JAG—every judge advocate—every general—to take out the entire principle, bedrock principle of chain-of-command of responsibility—all of it. These guys get such training in the laws of war, even a private, that they know what they can and cannot take pictures of—supposedly—in terms of their training, as it relates to a violation of Geneva. So this proposition from the sheikh, that men and boys were being raped by U.S. soldiers? No. Maybe a thing had happened, where one soldier, or a couple of soldiers, had touched an Iraqi in a way that looked like—right? But even after Dasht-i, at that point, the idea that there would be a routinized policy of abuse, involving sexual abuse, including of young men—to orchestrate that inside the U.S. command structure requires such an awesome, audacious act of will, you have to want to do that! You've got to rip out all these circuit boards and wiring in the U.S. system, and rewire it. The fact that that could happen—I mean, I knew, obviously, what had happened with Geneva applicability. But Common Article #3—duh. That was my response. So when I heard that happened—well, when I heard what the sheikh claimed happened—I was entirely skeptical. I went to the U.N., and the ICRC, because he had risked, he and his wife—there was a reason they came to me, and I told their son that I would meet, and I would do what I could, with no expectations. So I did that.

GBQ-1: So you assumed, in fact, when the U.N. were going, "Yeah, yeah, right," that they were equally skeptical.
Raymond: Or that no one really knew, and if it was really like that, then it would have looked like something else. This happens all the time in human rights work, where there's a part that—okay. When this is reported, we have to go do this. That's the official part. But then there's that—yes you ask your colleagues, "Does that work?" And what I mean by that is, "Put it together for me." So you're saying this is totally hypothetical— that a Cambodian general, in the middle of the woods, has chemical weapons, and genetically engineered [unclear]eels, and a laser beam. Tell me how that goes down. Break it apart for me." So it was on that level, of saying the U.S. government is conducting a torture camp, in the middle of the Sunni triangle, and it's involving sexualized torture of men and boys, and they are being raped. [Unclear]So it was like, "There are genetically engineered [unclear]eels, and they have laser beams." But you do your due diligence, and that's what I did.

At that point, it was done, and I went on to the next thing—which was, I was sent to Ethiopia to respond to the Gambella massacre, which had happened on the Sudanese border. That is a whole other interview. But the point is, I returned from helping the New York Times and others document that massacre, that happened in the Amaik [unclear] communities, allegedly by the Ethiopian government. I returned to Addis Ababa, this is April, I walked into the hotel—and then I saw it—it was the Time Magazine cover of this. It was the Abu Ghraib image. It was the guy on the box. The moment I saw it, I started sobbing—because I knew what it was. The sheikh was right. I got that Time Magazine, I went out to the deck, and I sat down with it. He was telling the truth. That was a punch in the gut.
MMC-Q-2: Such different experiences in such a short period of time—

Raymond: Yes.

MMC-Q-2: —where you went from the believer-stance into the agnostic stance. How did you work with that, both internally and professionally, in terms of what you wanted to do next?

Raymond: That's where the "pivot" happened. I was like, "I've got to go back. This is ridiculous." Because something is happening that I don't understand. Dasht-i goes away, gets wrapped up, and put in the box—like Indiana Jones, in Raiders of the Lost Ark, it's put amongst crates, and crates, and crates, and that just happened. And now there's this. Then the Taguba revelations happened— and it's important to say that since 2008, Tony [Antonio M.] Tony—Taguba and I have been friends. We'll get more of him later. But Taguba is my Jedi master. What I mean by that is that he, at the moment where I did not have a playbook—none of us had a playbook with Dasht-i, none of us had a playbook with Ghrayb, until Taguba gave us a playbook, which is, "Listen,"—as he did with the senate—this is very clear here. We have training, we have doctrine, we have a bedrock principle of command accountability. We know what to do with this. This is what's called being an American soldier—to stop this. That's what we do— But when Taguba was picked by [Donald H.] Rumsfeld—this is an incredible story. I can't believe more people haven't told this story. When Taguba was picked by Rumsfeld, or whoever in JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] made the decision to pick Taguba—they should have read his personnel file, because they didn't know who his dad was. Do you know
who his dad was? Thomas Taguba, who was part of the Filipino scouts unit that liberated the Japanese internment camps in the Philippines. Taguba was the son of a torture survivor who was not an American, initially, but became a naturalized American and a sergeant in the U.S. Army. Thomas Taguba had survived the Bataan death march. He escaped from the Bataan death march, and met back up with the Filipino scouts, and they went back, with the Americans, to liberate them, before they were worried the Japanese were going to kill them all at the end of the war.

They picked the son of a naturalized Filipino soldier, who became an American soldier, who was formed by one of the most important moments in terms of U.S. experience with war crimes. They picked the wrong guy! [Laughs] Taguba, amongst many, many others, but Taguba was the first light shining, the first adult that showed up in the room, who had stars and bars, and said, "This is an outrage." This becomes an important theme going forward, which is a theory of change, in talking about the human rights community response. We never had, as the human rights community, a coherent theory of change—what we were going to do; what we were going to have as an intervention; to cause what change; with what expected result; to deliver what type of accountability. On organizational levels, we didn't have that coherently. Across organizations, we never had that meeting. This is the five-alarm fire of the U.S. human rights community. We never got together and said, "We need a strategy to win our World War II here. We need to have a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. We need to have a way to do this." We never had that conversation. So what happens later is you have groups pursuing individual theories of change, or not even having a theory of change but just what they thought was available to them, to do.
So Taguba's important, because it was with Taguba—the Abu Ghraib moment—that I realized that shocking the American people, even if you have 60-70%, sixty, seventy percent, which we don't—it's more like fifty-fifty, depending on what poll you look at—let's say we had overwhelming American support for accountability for torture, overwhelming American support, going on to Dasht-i, etc., etc.—the institutions and tools you would use to do that were co-opted by experts. That's the thing. There is no American broad-based political, public movement for torture accountability. Let's just take that off the table. We try to dress up in it, and we have our religious campaign against torture, we trot out as many veterans as we can—it doesn't politically matter, in terms of why politicians are making decisions for just venal, political reasons.

The point I'm getting at here is, even if you had that, you have something we've never encountered before, which is an executive branch that knew exactly where to clip the wires, to defuse the bomb of accountability. By and large, every system that was supposed to work individually clicked on. That's important to remember. The FBI—immediately, they were like hound dogs. They were, "Woof, woof, woof. Something's wrong." Immediately, both on detainee treatment and the actual enhanced interrogation program. The JAGs, at the Pentagon, immediately. You had, across the board, the lights that should have turned on, turned on. It just didn't matter, because they were all systematically stopped. The point I'm getting to is that, be that as it may, it was from Taguba, where I really saw what the strategy needed to be.

We had to be able to get the jumper cables, and have institutional accountability happen in some way. If it happened in public discourse, if it happened in a human-rights symposium—it
didn't matter. It was about bringing our institutions, of where our values live, and are enshrined—bringing them back online operationally.

So some chose what I would call an almost vigilante approach—which is, "We have to name and shame. We have to raise a ruckus, as much as possible." I'm not saying that a ruckus shouldn't have been raised. What I'm saying is that there had to be a tactical plan for how you were going to have an official form of accountability. That was Taguba's message with Abu Ghraib; that if we don't hold people to account, we are not going to learn anything. And if we don't learn anything, we're not going to prevent anything. So, for me, I wanted to find something that was going to support those inside the U.S. government, who were trying to get the accountability mechanisms that had existed, in some cases for a couple of centuries, back on line. It wasn't just about how do you make people feel this is really important. It was about how do you create something that is going to last.

GB:Q-1: So you had to find a forum in which you could do that.

Raymond: I had to find a vehicle, and the vehicle was the a psychologist.

GB:Q-1: But, also, in terms of the forum—you left OxfamCAM?

Raymond: I stayed with OxfamCAM. I was thinking about leaving OxfamCAM in 2004 to do torture work, to work on this. But then a little something happened on December 26, 2004, called the South Asian tsunami. I was deployed to Sri Lanka. I was actually going back
and forth. I was commuting from Ethiopia at that time, in the fall of 2004, and I had left my suitcase in Ethiopia, to come home for Christmas. I come home for Christmas—I'm happy to be home, happy to be eating my mom's home cooking. I wake up in my bed, in my old room, and it's the morning of December 26—my mom knocks on the door, and I'm like, "Isn't it great to be alive," and she's like, "Something just happened." I go downstairs with the blanket wrapped around me, and within hours I was speeding into Boston, and we were deploying out to Sri Lanka. So I was in Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the tsunami, for two months. Then my grandfather died—whom I was extremely, extremely, extremely close to. I came back from Sri Lanka when he was about to die. So that was the spring— that gets us to the spring of 2005. Then I was one of the coordinators of Oxfam International, Seven-Country Tsunami Response. So I got promoted very fast, because it was a job nobody wanted to do—working on communications and policy coordination across different Oxfams.

Then Katrina happens, and I get sent to Mississippi. So I was home maybe two and a half, three months in 2005—a very short period of time. Then, at the end of 2005, I was sent back to Ethiopia to do early warning—and pick up your suitcase.

GB: Q-1: and pick my suitcase. Yes. [Laughter] So I get sent back to Ethiopia at the end of 2005, because—to do early warning on potential war—return tones war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. That trip is important in the story, because I got a parasite. So I come home, it was my second in-the-field parasite, I was sick as a dog, I was losing weight, I was bleeding.
internally—it was an awful time—and that was really important in terms of what happened next, because I decided, "Okay. I'm not going back out for a while." Two thousand five 2005 was a long year. So I talked to the folks at PHR. They had released, in 2005, Break Them Down "Brighton Down," which was a very important report—the [unclear] in 2005, the first revelations, as we know from Jane [M.] Mayer's story, about the role of psychologists and psychiatrists that happened.

So at this point, now that I'm done with the disasters for the moment—I am just my own disaster with the parasites, my own complex humanitarian disaster—I go back to PHR, in the communications department, initially, then through the work with the Campaign Against Torture now we get into the part where the psychologists show up. The moment I saw it, I knew the psychologists were the way in, because it was a public interface point. Let's erase everything we know about why the psychologists were important. Let's just look at it as a new thing. You had the U.S. government thinking they were really, really important. The Bush administration was thinking they were really, really important, and it meant they were positioning them, so if you could understand why they were really, really important, and if you could demonstrate the motivation, you could repackage this not as anything about the treatment of alleged terrorists alone. You could repackage this as corruption. So the goal was to find out if the APA was just really, truly, honestly believed that this policy was the right policy, just from a whole-total objective perspective; or, if that was not the case, what was the motivating factor. If you could find that, you could win.
GB-Q-1: This policy being the APA's decision to stay in Guantánamo Bay, when everybody else was leaving. All the other health professionals were leaving.

Raymond: Well, the decision to take the Nuremberg code out of their ethics.

GB-Q-1: Let's spell that out, because it was very important.

Raymond: Well, see, this is the thing. When I got to Paul Rocklin is so important. None of what happened with the Coalition for an Ethical APA—what became the Coalition—none of what happened within the APA, none of the investigative work I did, would have been possible if Paul Rocklin hadn't been coordinating, since 2005, trying to create an indigenous APA movement. "Withhold dues" was the lone voice in the wilderness. But Paul was trying to create a movement against the PENS [Psychological Ethics and National Security] process and the PENS result. So I was assigned, basically, as a communications support for what Paul was doing. He showed me the Webster University website—this is spring of 2006—we received the name of the PENS members. At that point, in various points, people were ascribing to the members of the PENS task force—by "people" I mean, APA members who were campaigning on this, as if they were individuals; as if Morganian Banks was, "I'm going to go and share what I think." What I saw was a chain-of-command policy decision.
We should say that the PENS task force—(because we haven't said it in this interview)—was Psychological Ethics in terms of National Security.

GB:Q-1: Well named.


GB:Q-1: I have real sympathy for Olivia. This is a separate discussion. I feel that Olivia was a patsy. Olivia did not know what the real deal was. I actually find it very sad, because they used her. Was she seeing this as an opportunity for her own career advancement? I don't know. You'll have to ask her. But was the APA seeing her as the African-American female school psychologist? Could you think of a better adornment to put on what was really building a legal heat shield for the CIA and the president of the United States? She is a collateral casualty of this thing and there are many like her. The question is who were the guys who were really driving the bus at the APA?—Frankly, the people at PENS, the actual uniformed and civilian intelligence personnel in PENS are not that important—which is what I'm trying to get to here. The people in the room were there to execute an order. They were there to execute the policy of the president of the United States, who was their commander-in-chief. They were not there to play a jazz concert, or finger-paint, or explore their inner self. They were there to simply defend doctrine, and to do it on a stacked deck. It was the people, not in the emails, the people not on the task force itself, who were sitting along the walls, that are the people that really [unclear] doesn't mattered. The main person was Brandon.
Q-2: Susan Brandon?

Raymond: Susan Brandon, frankly [unclear].

GB-Q-1: I'm wondering if we should stop at this point. It's 12:15. We have to stop at 12:30.

Raymond: If you want to keep going right now, I can see if they have someone booked.

GB-Q-1: Or take a breather and come back. How do you feel, Natty? You've gone through a lot, in what you've told us.

Raymond: Is this helpful?

MMC-Q-2: Are you kidding?

GB-Q-1: It's astonishing. It's astonishing.

MMC-Q-2: I think you should say if you want to stop now, and take a lunch break.

Raymond: I'm going to use the bathroom, and I'm going to find out what their schedule is for the rest of the day. Let's re-meet [convene] in about ten minutes.
[End of Session END OF SESSION]
GB: Q-1: So, Natty, we had started to talk about the PENS task force. But, also, I was wondering if we should go back, first, to the Ethical Code #102, and set the stage with that. It's up to you to take the reins from there.

Raymond: I think the important place to start is orienting where Physicians for Human Rights was, and where the APA movement was, when I came back to PHR. Basically, PHR, under the leadership at that point of Len [Leonard S.] Rubenstein was with [Unclear], with Paul Rocklin-Rachman doing the day-to-day management, trying to organize a movement within the APA to oppose the PENS task force. They were also working on the declassified FBI FOIA documents, which resulted in the report, *Breaking Them Down*, which was the first campaign against torture report by PHR. They were also working with the American Psychiatric Association, primarily past president Steve [Steven S.] Shar [pine]. They were working with General Steve Stephen [N.] Xenakis Retired from Army Medical Corps...
[AMEDD], and they were working with the American Medical Association [AMA]. That's really important, because at the dawn of 2006, this wasn't just about the APA. The APA wasn't really seen as an outlier, to the degree it is now. Because, with the exception of PENS, the APA, the AMA, and the American Psychiatric, had all not taken strong positions on the use of health professionals. It was in the early part of 2006, with Len, and Paul, and Barbara Ayotte [Unclear], and then later, me, that we ended up getting the American Medical Association, in the summer of 2006, to clearly articulate that health professionals—AMA members—could not have a role in these interrogations. Then the American Psychiatric also, around the same time, came on board, even just a little bit before. So that is what made APA stand Out, and really be different, because it was different.

So the initial focus was on PENS, but there was, as you mentioned, an underlying difference between the APA's core ethics code—-not specific to this issue but their core ethics code had been amended in the summer of 2002, the same month that the [John C.] Yoo memorandum came into effect, based on draft language that came about in 2001, November, after 9/11. But the point is, the unique changes in that were in motion prior to 9/11. The stated reason for those changes by the APA was to protect psychologists in the service of the court, who were providing evaluations that would require them to present information about the consent of the one they were evaluating, and to present information that would technically be seen as a violation of the ethics code; and thus, #1.02 was allegedly warned.Born.

Now I just want to say, for the record, let's say that's true. The APA has definitive #1.02, even though, now, the new language of #1.02—(and I'll talk about the language in a second)—has
been—supposedly there has been precision. I've seen it. But we don't operationally know what that means. The point is, #1.02 has been rescinded. Fine. Regardless of why it existed, regardless of what its status is now, in rescission, at the time the program was going—(and by program I mean the CIA enhanced interrogation program—)#1.02 was necessary to be able to do what the Bush administration did—regardless of the reasons it came into being.

Why? #1.02 says that you can basically disregard the ethics code, if given a lawful order, or, acting consistent with U.S. law. For all intents and purposes, that's what it means. Why is that important? It means that the acts psychologists did in the program—(and we'll talk about why they're important—)did in the program—would be allowed, even if they violated the ethics code—if there was a law or legal order that they were following, that was seen as credible.

So, if they didn't have that, the enhanced interrogation program, I believe, would never have been able to happen. Why is that the case? I believe that's the case because the enhanced interrogation program was based on the Office of Legal Counsel [OLC] memos, medically supervised, not for the safety of the detainee, but in order to create a legal heat shield—a get-out-of-jail-free card—for the administration, to say that the U.S. anti-torture statute, which is based on a common standard of severe and long-lasting mental and physical pain and suffering, to constitute torture. Because of psychologists' supervision, it did not rise to that level whereby the president, underneath command responsibility, would be liable. So the monitoring act of the psychologists was the spark plug, was the thing that animated the Office of Legal Counsel members. If you didn't have the monitoring role, and it wasn't ethically allowed,
you couldn't have the OLC memos. If you didn't have the OLC memos, the president wouldn't be protected. And, the program couldn't go.

So the critical thing here is that we see the changes to the ethics code very soon after 9/11, in draft form, preceding the Yoo memo, the importance that the administration placed—and we'll get to this soon—in the research role. There is this T-shirt that I have seen people in the neighborhood I used to live in, in Boston, wear that said, "We are a drinking club with a jogging problem." [Laughter] It was a research program with a torture problem, is what I'm saying; that we focused so much on the torture that we missed how they thought of it.

Let's go back. People often talk about the torture program as if that's when the torture started—after 9/11. The torture started a long time before that. The torture started under the [William J. “Bill”] Clinton administration, through the rendition program. In the rendition program, we simply outsourced the torture, so the CIA had a problem in the late nineties where its human intelligence on Al Qaeda was based on foreign services doing the dirty work of torture for us, and we, the United States, would receive the reports but not hold the detainee. After 9/11, the critical difference is that in an allegedly national security policy directive after September 11th, the Bush administration gave the CIA control of the human intelligence program, and allowed them to hold the detainees. This is really important. If we go back to what we were discussing earlier, on Dasht-i-Leili, with that initial pickup, the CIA, with those prisoners, began doing direct interrogations—which was a new role for them—and direct detainee handling, which was a new role for them.
So, the real outrage here is often missed. They were ascribing value to intelligence received by torture before we had our own torture program. That's often missed in the chronology here.

Somehow, Big Bad George Bush showed up, and we decided to torture. Now if you look at it in sort of a sick way, there is a way to actually think to create a moral defense of this— which is, "Well, we don't want the Jordanians, and the Moroccans, and Libyans, (who will go way overboard) controlling things. Now that we've been attacked, we need to have direct access to this intelligence," their rationale will likely go, "so we're going to bring it in-house." Will likely go, has gone— They've said it publicly. "We wanted to be able to have," as [Jose A.] Rodriguez and General "Haynes" [Michael B.] Hayden said last week, "a human library." Okay. They wanted to control the human intelligence source. Great. They did not have a framework, when they let the genie out of the bottle, of torture in-house. They didn't have a framework to legally protect the chain of command and, thus, the president, the commander-in-chief and to be able to digest, and make sense of, the intel they were getting.

So there were two problems that immediately arced toward psychology. Problem one is the heat shield on the torture act, which has a mental pain and suffering component to it. You had to have a psychologist, according to the OLC, basically tell you that there was not going to be long-lasting harm. So that's one role that the psychologists needed to play. That's what the APA movement to change APA policy has been so focused on. But there's a second part. You needed to engage and this is the definition from the Office of Human Research Protection, down the line. They engage in the collection of generalizable knowledge. You needed to refine the model.
So the second role for psychologists was that of researching how to not only refine the tactics, but how to understand the product.

So, immediately, you see the APA, even before the policy ducks and the legal ducks are in a row at the White House, the APA is moving into position. Now this is the big deal. How did they know to do it? How did the APA know to move into position in the fall of 2001? There was a task force set up by the president at the time. It was Ron [F.] Levant, I believe. So Levant sets up a task force about psychology and terrorism. The head of that task force was Pat [Patrick] De Leon. Pat DeLeon was chief of staff to the now late senator and congressional medal-of-honor winner, Daniel [K.] Inouye. Now this is critical. To understand what the APA did, and the corruption of the APA, the critical question is, how did they know what was happening in a classified black budget? Okay? If you were going to position yourself to try to get federal funding for a classified program which was not publicly avowed, and its existence was likely code-word clearance, how does a civil society, 501(c)(3) tax status organization start knowing how to cook the books?

Now what it means, likely, is that someone with access to the money that was going to fund the program, if not telling the APA outright, told them, "It would be really good for you to be in a position to be able to do X and Y and Z." So Phil [Philip G.] Zimbardo has told me directly—and I'm saying this on-the-record, and I have said this to the FBI, and I have said this to James Risen of the New York Times. I have also said it to Mark Benjamin, formerly of Time Magazine, who was with me in the room with Zimbardo, in 2009, where Zimbardo confirmed it in front of me and Mark Benjamin—(Mark Benjamin will attest to this fact)—that in December 2001 a
car pulls up at Phil Zimbardo's house on Russian Hill, in San Francisco. Out of that car steps Kirk [M.] Hubbard of the Central Intelligence Agency. Kirk Hubbard, who later became chief psychologist of the CIA, was head of the Operational Assessment Division of the CIA, and had contract responsibility, in part, for managing [J.M. James E.] Mitchell and [John Bruce] Jessen, it is believed, at various points. Hubbard, according to what Zimbardo told me in the spring of 2009, as Zimbardo was president-elect of the APA, asked Zimbardo if he wanted to serve his country. Zimbardo said no. Zimbardo, however, has never specifically said what Hubbard meant by "serving his country."

Why did Kirk Hubbard think Phil Zimbardo was so important to talk to? You're talking about a senior CIA official, its scientific support director. Why does he fly out to San Francisco, weeks after 9/11, to talk to Phil Zimbardo? Because Phil Zimbardo is going to be president of the APA when they were passing the ethics code. Now Phil has changed his story, here. Phil initially said, in 2009, that Marty [Martin E.P.] Seligman and [Joseph D.] "Matarazzo," whom we'll get to in a second, called Zimbardo and said, "You should really meet with this guy." Later on, in 2009, in front of Benjamin and I, Zimbardo's story changed. Zimbardo says it was Ron [Ronald E.] Fox and "Matarazzo," and he dropped Seligman out. The story changed. Why is that important? In the summer of 2009, between when he first told the story to me, and when he repeated it in front of Benjamin, he received an award from the Positive Psychology Foundation, by Marty Seligman.

So let's get down to what really matters here. Why was Zimbardo important? Zimbardo—an APA president serves for a one-year term. They start as a president-elect. They then become a
president, and then they become a past president. In the showcase, the heart of the president's year, is the national convention. That's where any agenda that the APA president has comes up to council. That's where any program presentation the president is going to make, to demonstrate their agenda, is going to be showcased publicly. And that's where, when you're APA president, you have, for that weekend, the most power you're ever going to have. During his president year, Zimbardo was overseeing; technically, he was in charge of, the organization that was moving a revised ethics code through the system. And Hubbard, according to sources, was allegedly at the November 2001 meeting. Hubbard has said, on various occasions, that he doesn't think the APA ethics code is that important; or, as he puts it, that “it doesn't affect what they do operationally.” I think he's telling the truth. I think that there are not CIA psychologists looking at the APA ethics code, where they make a decision. That's not the point. This is the big thing.

The point of the APA ethics code is that after the Vietnam war, the code of federal regulations was amended to require that all health professionals serving in the U.S. military, and in civil service, to hold a license in a U.S. state. Why does the ethics code matter? Even if you're not an APA member, thirty-five states use the APA ethics code as the basis for state licensure. Why it matters for Mitchell and Jessen is that if the APA ethics code, even not as an APA member, prohibited their involvement, and it came to light that their involvement in torture happened, they could lose their license at the state level and, thus, not legally be allowed to contract to the United States government. What this was about was indemnification protection on the contractors. You could not run a program to protect the president legally, through the OLC memo, if you didn't have an ethics code that allowed APA, and non-APA, members to maintain state licenses, even if they violated the ethics code.
So, even if #1.02 was totally the work of people who honestly believed this was about helping little Jenny, the local clinical psychologist who got a state contract on a one-off basis, to do a court evaluation, why did Kirk Hubbard go to see Phil Zimbardo? Why was the CIA paying very close attention? They were paying very close attention because if you didn't have this, you couldn't run the program. And if you did, you'd be running without a heat shield. So what I believe occurred is that the APA was under huge pressure to pass this thing, and there is one man who would have known, and legally been allowed to know, that the pressure existed and where it was coming from. One of the biggest things, I think, that probably affected what occurred with the APA has to do with the senator from Vermont. Jim Jeffords switched parties after 9/11. Huge. Because Senator Inouye, who was in the minority party, thus becomes chair of the senate subcommittee on appropriations for defense, by November 2001. At that point, the next year's appropriation budget, with the black budget for both DOD and Central Intelligence at the Defense Intelligence Agency, was coming through his committee. DeLeon was his chief of staff.

The point I'm making here is that somebody told the APA that it made sense to pass this thing. It was either Hubbard telling Zimbardo—I have no evidence to that effect. Zimbardo won't say what they discussed; simply that he declined Hubbard's offer of service. Fine. Let's take that on face value. I'm not accusing Pat DeLeon of leaking classified information when he was chair of the Psychology and Terrorism Task Force, but also, suddenly, thrust into a position where his boss had a code-word clearance access to the black budget of the United States intelligence community. But somebody knew. Somebody knew.
So what does this mean, legally? If it is proven—what I'm alleging—that the APA knew that there was money; if psychologists could perform one of two roles: supervising interrogations, to both sanitize torture and protect the president; or, conduct research on the tactics; or the resulting intelligence that was gained from torture, the proposition was that there was likely a large amount of money that other health professions could not compete for, because they were ethically prohibited, and that this would position them well. The number-one employer of psychologists in the world is the U.S. Department of Defense. Those psychologists do very good work every day, but this was about a new type of psychology, which was operational psychology, and after 9/11 the APA moved, magically, into position. I can keep going, but—

GB: Q-1: I actually have a question to raise here. Do you know if there was any resistance to passing #1.02?

Raymond: There was—yes. There was debate at the time about #1.02, and it was passed at the convention in Chicago, in August 2002. It passed the board unanimously, I believe, but I believe during the common phase there were concerns about the fact that they were basically allowing the Nuremberg defense, and taking out the Nuremberg code. If you look at it, it surgically takes out everything that is an legacy of the U.S. trial of Nazi war criminals in World War II. But there wasn't enough. When I was obsessed with these questions several years ago, I could have rattled off all the different white papers people wrote on it, but basically it passed.
Now what's important here is that in the meeting that Mark Benjamin and I had with Zimbardo at his house on Russian Hill, and just for posterity, since I'm being recorded, here is what he made us—we flew in on the red-eye the night before. We stayed at my aunt's house. We took a cab up there, and Phil Zimbardo greets us at the door. He has this amazing house. It's incredible. He greets us with these fresh-made cappuccinos, which were delicious; then this giant bowl of fruit salad, and he told us the secret of the fruit salad is that you put kirsch in it. And, really, having alcohol in your fruit, early in the morning, about eight A.M., when you're jet-lagged, is great. So we had fresh bagels, and he went through each step of the menu, about the wonderful things he'd prepared for us. We basically got down to business and said, "Okay, Phil, I need you to tell Mark what you told me in the spring of 2009, because what you told me is that two former presidents of the APA— one Marty Seligman and the other Joseph Matarazzo, who was on the board, by the way, of Mitchell & Jensen [Associates], and this was later revealed by Jane Mayer— was on the CIA, in an article that I was quoted in, saying, "This stuff is really bad"—that Matarazzo was on the psychological ethics board of the CIA. So Zimbardo tells Benjamin and I that story again, but then he leaves out Seligman and replaces him with Fox; keeps Matarazzo. Then he says, "That wasn't the only time I met with them." Looking up from my fruit salad I was like, "That wasn't the only time you met with Hubbard?" And then he gives the second name. "I met with Hubbard and Kirk [A.] Kennedy." I didn't know who Kirk Kennedy was, at the time. Kirk Kennedy, formerly of the CIA, became chief psychologist of "CEVA" [phonetic CIFA]— Count[Unclear] Intelligence Field Activity Section, where [R.] Scott [Unclear] Shumate formerly of the CIA, was supposedly locked out of [unclear]. [Abu] Zubaydah interrogation, went to all these ex-CIA guys, who moved over to [unclear] CIA.[CIFA] inside DOD. I think, let's look at the CIA shop for Hubbard in the [OAD]."
I believe that that shop was where they were conducting their observation, and their actual tactics application.

GB: Q-1: Observation

Raymond: Observation of the interrogations, to be able to determine that it didn't surpass the harm stages. That, I believe, was running out of Hubbard's shop. I believe that the evidence shows, on the DOD side, that research related to interrogations — and I am not alleging any wrong doing. I'm saying that the research element appears to be out of CEVACIFA, because that's where Brandon goes. We'll talk about her later.

So the point here is, Zimbardo said he met with Kennedy and Hubbard and this is very important, the restaurant at the Hard Rock Café in Chicago. I said, "You met with them at the convention, right after they passed the new ethics code, Phil?" And he said, "No, it wasn't the convention year," he basically said. So I let it go by. At some time, not related to the APA ethics code and we asked him that directly and he said it wasn't related to the ethics code. But he said, very specifically, the Hard Rock Café in Chicago.

So we keep going through the interview, and one important thing happens in the interview that I just want to get on the record here which is, we show him a list of people on his think-tank, called CIPERT [Center for Interdisciplinary Policy, Education, and Research on Terrorism]. CIPERT is a counter-terrorism think-tank at the University of the Pacific. We said, "Okay. Kirk Hubbard gives you an offer of service, and you say no. Okay. Why
is he on your scholars—and you said you'd never work for him. Why is he on your scholars and practitioners list, at your think-tank, that you and Jim [James N.] Breckinridge [phonetic] run?

And then he says this: "Because that woman told Breckenridge that he wouldn't get the money if he wasn't on it."

I said, "What do you mean, 'that woman?' Do you mean Susan? Do you mean Susan Brandon?"

and he said yes. So I said, "So you're saying Susan Brandon, former White House official, told Jim 'Breckinridge, your partner, that you wouldn't get—by that 'money,' money from the Department of Homeland Security—if you didn't have Hubbard on your board." Now, Colonel [Larry] James is also on the Board of Practitioners.

So, basically, we were off-the-record in that interview. Why I'm saying this now is that Zimbardo lied in the interview, and any protection of being off-the-record is revocable when the subject is engaged in deception—and he was. Because, we walk out of there, we're in the rain, and Benjamin and I are like, "What just happened?" He just said that Susan Brandon, former APA and White House official, and National Institute of Mental Health [NIMH] official, engaged in racketeering with him; said, "I will give you a quid pro quo. I will give you Homeland Security money," which was several hundred thousand dollars if not more, "if you put who—-," and this was 2007, when he went on the board. We now know that at that time Hubbard was contracts man for Mitchell & Jensen. So I'm saying the guy who was president of the APA, who says the magical black sedan pulls up with Hubbard, and offers him service. He
Raymond says no. He meets with him again, but is not exactly sure where. But when he is sure where, which is the Hard Rock Café, he is not sure when.

So Mark—we're at the big Farmer's Market in San Francisco, down by the water, and we're going to have clam chowder at the sea to see—

GB: Q-1: [Unclear] At Embarcadero.

Raymond: Yes—to see if they can make clam chowder properly in California, which they actually can do. So he goes to call his wife and check in at home, and I'm standing out there in the rain, and I'm thinking and I'm thinking, and I have this moment where I'm like, "Oh, my god." I pull out my iPhone, and I look at it—and at that point I didn't know—the 2002 convention was in Chicago. I'm like, "What the hell was he doing with Kirk Hubbard—I mean Kirk Kennedy—at the Hard Rock Café in Chicago, not related to the convention?" Then I checked my facts right there, and I realized—that was the meaning if they had lunch at the convention, that may have been just after they passed the ethics code. So for an organization that doesn't care, why are you meeting with the president of the APA, and why is the president of the APA meeting with you, right after you pass the thing they need to run the program?

So I go running in, Benjamin is on the phone, and I'm just shaking my hands above my head, "Get off the phone! Get off the phone! The convention was in Chicago." We just sat there, looking out the window. It's not the Golden Gate, it's the Bay Bridge. The Bay Bridge is right
there, by the Farmer's Market. We're looking out the window, just sitting there, like thinking like, "Wow. If this was Zimbardo's plan, to try to throw us off, he needed to do a lot better."

Now during the interview Phil, the whole time— and anytime someone prepares a spread like that, an incredible breakfast, and then will not directly confirm the facts— and try in trying to put it on Brandon and Breckenridge— you have knowledge of what could be [unclear] fraud with federal funds, of what could be racketeering with federal funds. So when I met with the FBI in 2010, I made this very clear up front. I said, "You need to look at the issue of these conflicts of interest between the APA leadership and those who had funding control, and funding discretion, and those who were the contractors. Because they're all connected." It was really at that Zimbardo meeting that I finally understood what this was really about. What it was about was that the government cared so much about getting this right— that the line from "The Usual Suspects"— "the greatest trick the devil ever plays is convincing the world he doesn't exist."

You look at the APA here years, and the struggle with the Bush administration on these issues— they were trying so hard to say, "This isn't that important." But it was extremely important. Extremely important. Because if you didn't have this— let's look at what Bush and [Richard B. "Dick"] Cheney said in the closing days of the Bush administration. What Bush said publicly was, "Every decision I made had medical professionals behind it, and I didn't do anything that was going to cause severe and long-lasting harm." Okay. [laughs] And then Cheney said, on the Today Show, with Matt [Matthew T.] Lauer, "Oh, we had teams of health professionals."

Well, those statements were very important for the president and the vice-president to be able to make. Looking at the APA, and issues like Zimbardo, in the Hubbard context, and understanding
what that really was, is important for law enforcement, to see if the Bush administration engaged in other, ancillary, criminal acts, in order to get their legal protection. We haven't gotten into the research issues yet, but it's a snake biting its own tail. It was one criminal act. Torture always people say "that torture" as of torture is one crime. Torture is a series of crimes that happen together. And torture creates an environment of impunity, and it corrupts any system that it's in, in the way you can't catch what happened in the chamber— and this relates to what our theory of change was, in this investigation— you move from the ancillary, criminal acts created in a predictable pattern around torture, and you use that to map your way in.

So what a lot of human rights practitioners did— they were trying to nail the guy in the room who did the thing. What we realized at PHR— that wasn't the ballgame. It's important to hold them to account, but to get the chain of command we have to go back to All The President's Men playbook, which is, you need to get the cover-up, and the cover-up had one weak point— which is, they had to interact with civilians, in a non-classified environment, in order to get the APA support they needed. Those were not conversations that happened on CyperNet. They were not encrypted, and they were not protected by U.S. Secrets— law, regulation, etc. They were in the open.

The metaphor I use a lot for this— we came up with what I call throughout the "Nefud Strategy." If you've ever seen the Nefud Desert in Jordan. In Lawrence of Arabia, Lawrence has an idea, which is that the British are unable to bring their ships in through the Suez Canal, because the Turks control Aqaba. Because they have the guns facing the sea at Aqaba, British
Raymond -- 42 -- 59

Raymond: Well, we haven't seen [unreadable] yet.

GB: Q-1: I'm seeing the title here as "Crossing the Nefud."

Raymond: We can see Aqaba, if we didn't get our directions wrong.

naval power is not able to be brought to bear in the fight against the Ottoman Empire. Now the problem is that the guns facing the sea—they only face one way—have a giant desert behind them called the Nefud. So Lawrence and the Bedouin get together, and the Bedouins and Lawrence risk it, and try to go across the desert and attack Aqaba from behind—because Aqaba doesn't think it can be attacked from behind. And in doing so, the guns can't fire. That was my strategy on the APA; we had to cross the Nefud, and to do that, it meant that they thought we were coming this way, through the Suez. The point was/is to come in from behind, and being able to get, in their own words, the primary source information that showed, in fact, yes, they had built their positions are guidance from the CIA, and with the expectation of receiving money; that you could then capture Aqaba, and free up the Suez to run the British fleet of accountability right through. My strategy is just that; that we attack them from behind. We attack them in the place they think we can't access, and then we use that to create accountability, by opening up the space.

So, basically, me, and the Coalition for Ethical Psychology, tried to cross the Nefud.

GB: Q-1: And did.
So let's talk about your relationship with the ethical psychology guys, and how that came about.

Raymond: It came about because Paul had worked with Bernice "Lott: [phonetic] had worked with Linda [M.] Wolfe; had worked with you, Ghislaine; had worked with all the people on the various ends of the spectrum, within the APA movement, both at the division level, all the way to withheld dues, and we began, in preparation for the APA convention.

Mark Benjamin had released his piece, showing who the membership of the PENS Task Force was, probably for the first time. That was critical. Paul and I worked with him on getting that piece out, in the summer of 2006. That was the first time we said, "Whoa. There could be something wrong here." We saw [Steven] Reisner on Democracy Now!, and I said to Paul, "Well, this looks like the elite, Jewish, intellectual New Yorker that we've been waiting for." The joke in the human rights community is that most everyone are Jewish lawyers, psychologists, tied to Ivy league universities. The reason why that was funny at the time was that we were trying to create a broad-based coalition, and instead we ended up with the same usual suspects [Laughter]. Yes. I was surrounded by Jewish human rights lawyers, Jewish psychologists, and that's how it mostly is. We saw Reisner on Democracy Now!, and we thought he was the most eloquent and thoughtful, but also accessible, person talking about these issues. So we reached out to him. 

Brad [Bradley D.] Olson also had been working with Paul for a while, because he was the first to really start going to the meetings on this stuff. So he also became part of that group. Then I started reading Stephen Soldz's blog, when we were trying to understand what was the APA's motivation. The early thinking was
that it was about the Prescription Demonstration Project, and prescriptive privileges in DOD — and we could go on with that forever. It was something they cared about; it was just one part of a mosaic.

**GB: Q-1:** Something the APA cared about is prescription —

Raymond: Yes. But I've seen no evidence of a quid pro quo between the APA and DOD, specific to the PDP program — the Prescription Demonstration Project. It was much bigger than that. It was about the whole kit-and-caboodle relationship, and the intersection of multiple interests that related to the National Security community, with psychology, that had been going on for generations. It's like the old joke about when people in a relationship have a toilet-seat argument — it's not because the toilet seat is up; it's about the past twenty years. [Laughs] The point is, this is not a toilet-seat relationship, this was highly cemented. So the issue is, Stephen Soldz was the first one, really, publicly asking these questions.

So if you look at the initial [unclear] four, which was [unclear]. Jean Maria Arrigo — she was critical because she was in the room on PENS, and she had access to the emails; and, she had begun to raise these questions publicly. Olson was critical because he was doing the institutional footwork and actually showing up to the meetings, and engaging with APA in a formal way. Reisner was critical because he was a public leader. He could be someone to rally behind. We needed someone who could marshal a movement in a way that PHR, by itself, couldn't. Then Soldz was, at that point — (I can't overstate his importance) — he was able to begin to collect the data, to piece together a fact-based argument, at a time when so little was known. It was two
years after Abu Ghraib. In many years, what we learned since then was even more confusing, and Stephen was able to really give us a solid footing on the facts. Because he was citing everything. He was saving everything. So that is what we had, at that point, and those four—when the official history is written, they were the ones. Their individual courage is incredible. What we all did together, even more incredible. But our group achievement shouldn't overshadow what risks they took, in so many different ways. Yes.

**MMC-Q-2:** Could you elaborate on that a little bit?

Raymond: Well, first of all, Jean Maria. Jean Maria was put in a *straw man* position in PENS. She, along with Nina [K.] Thomas, was put in a position where she could be knocked down. She could be used as a fig leaf to show the involvement of a certain type of community in the process, but fundamentally, her argument would never win, because they didn't have the votes. So she could have just washed her hands of the whole thing, and walked away. She didn't. And she, at great risk to her reputation, and great risk to her professional standing, she went for it. She focused on the truth, and when Reisner and I met with her in New York, in 2006—and that was the fifth anniversary of 9/11—the night before that meeting I went down to the site and listened to the reading of the names. It was a perfect way to focus on what was important, as we began to go through Jean Maria's emails of actual PENS task force. It was there that I clearly saw the first real evidence that the fix was in—the meeting that happened between [William T?] Donovan, [Louie] Morgan Banks, and General [Kevin] Kiley.*Kiley.* [Phonetic]—That's detailed in those emails. It was astonishing.
GB-Q-1: And these emails of Jean Maria's—they preceded the PENs, or they came after the PENS?

Raymond: They were during the PENS. They were the actual off-passing of emails that occurred during the PENS process. What you see in there are four things. One, the highest levels of relevant DOD officials were directly involved in monitoring the process of PENS. That's not an independent process. Two, there were a lot of observers who were not publicly acknowledged, and had access to that email portfolio.

GB-Q-1: And were actually copied on the emails.

Raymond: Yes—including Mel Gravitz, former head of the internship program for psychologists [unclear NSA [National Security Agency]], and Susan Brandon, whose significance at that point was not clear—who is now, for the record—Susan Brandon is the head of the high-value interrogation group at The Hague, at the science section of The Hague. I don't know her official title, but she's science advisor for The Hague, and, the last I heard, succumbed to the FBI. Then, of course, very important at the time—and now, just another example of the conflicts of interest—is “Russ Newman,” [phonetic] from The Practice Directorate. His wife, Debra Dunivinorah “Donovan,” [phonetic] was allegedly a “BSCT [Behavioral Science Consultation Team]” at Guantanamo, and was at the meeting discussing, with the army surgeon general, a task force in which her husband, an APA official, was anonymously participating. You have that moment from Jean Maria's notes at the time, which is Newman saying, "The point of this task force is to put out the fires, not to start any." It was at
In the 2006 APA convention, I went to use the restroom and nearly ran into Deborah Debra Donovan Dunivin. I didn't know who she was. She was in uniform. The reason I ran into them was that we were all waiting for the arrival of Lt. General Kiley, who was going to address the APA. This was down in New Orleans. Why we were all gathered there was because he was going to walk in that way, and I wanted to see who was greeting him, from the APA. So I was sitting there, trying to look not obvious, and I looked very obvious. Then I saw this guy kiss a uniformed army officer, and that was Russ Newman. I said to Reisner and Wilson, who were there—Soldz wasn't there because he was in Australia, still, I believe, but I said to them that night—"This is important—this man is kissing an army officer, who is greeting the surgeon general, and he's hanging out with the APA leadership."

Turns out, that was Newman. That was where we began to understand, putting that moment of seeing the two of them embrace each other and kiss, together with what was in there. That is when we really started working this thing. Because I saw her patches—I saw her uniform, and she had SERE [Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape] patch. I knew what the insignia looked like, and so she had a caduceus. That afternoon, Reisner and I went to the office center at the hotel, and began trying to find out, okay, who are these people, really, who were involved in the process?

So that's why Jean Maria is so important. If we hadn't her courage, to cause the listserv to be available to us—the listserv being available to us allowed us to begin to go beyond Mark Benjamin's article about who was in the room, to understanding what were they doing in the room? Out of that came an understanding of Gerald P. Koocher. And Dr. Koocher, who is editor of the Oxford series on psychological ethics—he was the enforcer.
Raymond: And he was, at that time, the president of the APA.

GB: Q-1: What age was she?

Raymond: She was late teens, early twenties. It was basically—it was like an Uncle Phil moment.

GB: Q-1: Humanizing the—.

Raymond: I mention it for a reason, which is that Phil proceeded to speak, to ask us questions about what we thought about the APA policies, and raise issues about Gerry Koocher. But he seemed to be very good friends with Gerry Koocher, and very close to his family. Phil, at the earliest stage, was confusing, because he wrote a critique of PENS. The
critique of PENS is the most clear-eyed and really effective expression of what was wrong with PENS-- citing previous APA ethics codes. It was a tour de force. But Phil didn't want it released, publicly.

GB: Q-1. To whom did he show it?

Raymond: We got a copy of it. Paul received a copy of it in 2006, and we asked if we could post it on the PHR website, because we thought this would be a great way to generate support. He didn't want it publicly shared. When Benjamin and I were interviewing Phil, three years later, we said, "Phil--" By this time we had a real understanding of the ethics code. We had a real understanding of PENS, by the time Benjamin and I went and saw him. We said, "Okay--" because we were just learning about #1.02 in the fall of 2006. We hadn't really understood it. But by 2009, we said, "Phil, this passed on your watch. What role did you have in the ethics process on this?"

"I don't remember."

"Okay. "Did you see that it allows for revocation of consent in certain instances, for research?"

"Oh. Don't know." He wouldn't look at it. I kept trying to get him to look at it, and he wouldn't look at it. So we're pushing on that. I said, "But Phil, in 2006, you write this incredible dissection of these very issues that you now don't remember." When Benjamin was doing this investigation, (which didn't get published, for reasons totally unrelated to anything except him changing jobs),
the issue is that when this got published—sorry. It didn't get published. This is hard to do, you know. [Cross talk] [Laughter]

**GB-O-1**: It's a lot of material.

Raymond: When we were investigating what Phil said at that meeting, we went to the attorney based at "Fordham" who advised that APA on the legal process. The first call she got from Benjamin, she said, "Oh, yes. I remember Phil was there." Then in the second call, she was far less forthcoming, and then didn't return any calls. The issue is this. Phil had inside and outside knowledge of that ethics code. It was written mostly in response to Stanford prison [Experiment]. A lot of what came out in the modern ethics code was caused by the debates about Stanford prison. He knows these issues. He couldn't remember whether he was at the meetings because he had a lot of meetings going on. He couldn't remember the substance of a meeting he had with the counter-terrorism czar of the National Security Council—Susan Brandon—in June, which was in an APA organ newsletter, and the *Spin* newsletter from "Science Directorate." He couldn't remember that.

**GB-O-1**: Let's just say that the Stanford experiments were his own experiments, dealing with prisoners, of how much the guards could be dehumanized and could dehumanize the prisoners. It's the very issue.
Raymond: It was, as he himself showed, the Lucifer effect. You take the Stanford prison photos, and you put them next to Abu Ghraib, and if one wasn't in black-and-white the other wasn't in color, you wouldn't know the difference.

So the issue is that Phil—I attended a lecture Phil gave as part of The Lucifer Effect at MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology], just when the book came out—

GB: Q-1: What year was that?

Raymond: This was 2007. He saw me in the audience. He saw me standing up there, and he greeted me like an old friend. He had just had hip surgery, and at the end all these people were standing in line, adoring Phil, the legend, and he gives me his arm, and says, "Help me walk up the stairs." We walk up the stairs, and he says, "You've done such incredible work on this APA stuff. I should call Malcolm [T.] Gladwell and have him do something about you in the New Yorker." [Laughter] I was standing there, with "Uncle Phil," but something wasn't striking me quite right about that. Which is—the issue is that he was, from the beginning, trying to have it both ways. "I have unique knowledge about APA," he was saying. "I have unique knowledge about that period. But I can't remember it. But I can remember certain things. I will take positions privately which support reform, and support accountability, but publicly, I will write a preface to Larry [C.] James's book. Publicly."  

GB: Q-1: And I will flatter you into silence.
Raymond: Yes. Then when Mark and I continued the investigation—I have the email that shows it—Zimbardo threatened my reputation publicly—if I ever went public with any of the conversations that we had, that Benjamin and I had, with him. I have shared that with James Risen, and it's available, also, to anyone who wants it, including the FBI.

GB: Q-1: What about that, Natty? Do you feel you're in any danger from him?

Raymond: No. I don't. I don't feel I am in any danger from him or anybody else whatsoever. And here's why, with Phil. I did him a courtesy. I gave him every way out of this possible. In 2009, I called him—because I said, "I'm working with the Washington Post. I'm working with Jane Mayer. I have been having ongoing conversations in and support, that have been provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee. We are beginning to understand that an ethics code that was passed during your time had great relevance to the Office of Legal Counsel." And Soldz reached out for me, to Phil, and said, "It's really important you talk to Natty about this."

So he called me. I think it was April, 2009, he called me back, after Stephen Soldz encouraged him to do so, from the breakfast line at a Holiday Inn Express in Portland, Oregon, where he was giving a speech. So it was like six or seven A.M. his time, and nine or ten A.M. my time. He calls me and I say, "Phil, I need you to tell me what happened during the year you were president and the ethics code changed." He said, "Well, when I was president-elect, Kirk Hubbard came to my house," that's when he said that. Then he says Matarazzo and Seligman were the ones he should meet with Hubbard. That knocked the wind out of me.
So, why I'm not worried? I was saying to Phil, "The Senate Armed Services Committee needs to know this. The American people need to know this. You can be an anonymous source. You can walk in however you want, but we need to know what you know. Because you know things." For him, at that point, to suddenly--this is 2009, two and a half, almost three years after I first met him, and now he's saying this? So during the period between that conversation, and then in the fall, when we were finally able to go out there, it was really that meeting that I put together with Mark, was to allow Phil, off the record, to just tell the truth; to just confirm what he had said. But he made it worse. He scrambled the dates on the Hubbard meetings. He scrambled the names on who set up those meetings, or that initial meeting. And, on top of that, he basically made this incredible allegation that ended up implicating himself.

So, for me, it's tragic what happened. Because I hoped he would be the leader, that he has publicly positioned himself as. I would hope that he would be a truth teller. He wasn't, and he was given every opportunity to do so. That's not on me. I could have handled this much differently; in the sense that, okay, we're not going to give you the second meeting. This is not an anonymous conversation. But the point is, it was based on the assumption of good faith.

GB-01: Let's think about where we are. We left off at 2006, at the meetings in New Orleans. We can move forward from there, or--

Raymond: There are a couple of things there. [Stephen H.] Behnke. That's where I first met Behnke. He was like the white rabbit from *Alice in Wonderland*, constantly running around,
checking his watch—places to go, places to go, things to do. So I tried to get one—on—one
time with him in New Orleans, and I totally handled that badly. He was running past where I
was—I was standing outside in the rain—and I saw him running down the hallway. I opened
the doors and I said, "Can I speak to you a second?" because I'd been trying to get his attention.
He was like, "Five minutes." So we go out there, and I said, "Listen. Tell me why this has to be
so complicated. We know what the ethics principles are. We've had them handed down from
generations. Why have they gotten all different now?" And he went into this long discussion,
basically arcing toward the third-party beneficence—you know, "Now in the post-9/11 era
there are all these things we have to balance." He never gives a straight answer. I said to him, at
that moment, "Well, this is important, because this is where I just made it my life's mission to
beat you." [Laughter] Because up until then I believed—until I looked Behnke straight in the
eye and said, "Can we talk like gentlemen here about—let's agree what the common things are:
Do no harm. Okay. Responsibility to the patient. Okay. Nuremberg. Okay. We'll go down those."

When he wouldn't have that conversation, and after what I had seen earlier that day, with
Divivine and Newman, I realized that this was no longer a negotiation. It was time for acts
of compellence. And that's important because for the APA—this is really important—for
the APA community, many were very much—Judy [Judith Van] Judy Hoorn—go
down [unclear], you can go down the list—this was just a disagreement. This was just
something we had to hash out. But for me, seeing Behnke, and that Behnke could not, as chief
ethicist to the APA, tell me what it was that was verboten, that was absolutely prohibited and
clearly stated, and that he wouldn't take the time with the PHR representative who had flown all
the way down here—when this was in the pages of national newspapers—to take a
moment to say, "Okay, what can we hash out for an agreed negotiation here?" I was basically saying, "We have an opportunity—we're making your life miserable. Tell me what you agree on, and we will stand with you, and we will say that." There have been some moments, tactically, where the APA has done that, but never ever saying core principles.

So that's where, for the coalition, we were all at that moment, and that's what made it different than so many of the other groups that were like, "Let's all, just calmly, in a classic psychoanalytical way, all get in a room and just be free to be you and me." But at that point I was like, no. This is war. It's war. And we have to admit it. That's what was so important about Reisner, Soldz, Olson, and Arrigo. We said, "Okay. We have to force them to do this now. Because they're not going to give it up. There was a reason they went in this way. There's an interest we don't understand, and there's a mechanism that is protecting it, that is not fully clear."

MMC—Q-2: What is their interest, in the whole?

Raymond: This is where this process of giving this oral history, for me, is very important for both emotional reasons and for history. It does not replace a meaningful law-enforcement investigation. [Laughs] What I'm saying here is that, so—I just want to say—I don't know the history yet to tell you. Which is that I know they had an interest. I know that that interest was based on the expectation of funding. That's clear. I would say that up, down, and all around, that it was based on a relationship that was critical to the profession of psychology's survival, as certain members of APA saw it, both, historically, how it had survived, and how it would
continue to. But this is where law enforcement has to answer the question, which is who was driving the bus within APA that got everyone to jump? Because in looking at the materials I've looked at, and studying this as long as I've studied it, Behnke was — I have to put it bluntly — he was an errand boy.

GB: Q-1: BehnkeLackey.

Raymond: He was executing an agenda he was given. Olivia Moorehead Slaughter was executing an agenda she was given. Looking at Geoffrey Mumford and Susan Brandon — they, however, were very clear about what was going on. They were directly speaking to officials in the intelligence community. They coordinated — (and I've seen the emails where they coordinate) — the workshops between the CIA, RAND, APA. The point is, following Brandon and Mumford is where you see the intersection. But where were they within the chain of command within APA? Where was Lonnie Norman Anderson? If Seligman, and Matarazzo, and DeLeon, had that access, and contacts, and positions, and motives, and opportunities that they had to have, many of them were on the board during that time. I don't believe that Phil Zimbardo was driving this agenda; I believe he was swept up in it, and I believe he fell victim to many of the same forces of social control that he studied in the Stanford prison experiment.

GB: Q-1: Guys, it's half past, and you have to make a call.

MMC: Q-2: We can take a break if you like. Is that good for you?
Raymond: Yes. Is this productive for—

GB-Q-1: I want to help us refocus a bit. And you were looking a bit glazed to me.

Raymond: Just saying some of these—I wasn't in any way trying to be provocative in saying—I'm just experiencing that my old whole feeling again—and I think this is important to say before we take a break—it shouldn't have come down to us having to do this.

GB-Q-1: Well, absolutely.

Raymond: This is what I'm saying. We, in terms of this—this is such an important history, but it is happening in the absence of an official legal history; in the absence of the release of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence [SSCI] report, that we have all contributed to in various ways. It's happening in the absence of meaningful, public, law-enforcement investigation of what are crimes against the Constitution and crimes against federal code, and can constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. It's what you're detecting, that what you're detecting as I pester [unclear]—that comes with just saying that we shouldn't have been the ones who had to go save Christmas for the townsfolk. Okay? It's so often is the case that you have these moments in history where you have to have a reckoning with yourself, and that was what was so important about the coalition; that we were able to be each other's support group. We were all having individual reckonings, and our finest
moments in those individual reckonings caused us to be in conflict about objective, and approach, and theory of change.

GB-Q-1: That 2007 stuff that we will talk about.

Raymond: That always happens. And how you deal with that is what makes your group survive and be good. We began to learn how to have conflict. But to go to a place, the lonely place, that is having to fight, in their case, the profession, and to fight against public perception; to fight against an actual, really, honest-to-goodness, big-time cover-up, from the present intelligence community and the White House, and to have a lot of people think you're crazy; and a lot of people think that even if you're not crazy, it's not going to work——you have to have that reckoning and commit. And to commit that way, to go to that lonely place, you have to expect that it's going to hurt. You have to expect that you're not going to win. You have to expect that it may not have been worth it. That is, for me, what Reisner, and Soldz, and Arrigo/“Arrigo,” [phonetic] and Olson were about; that we allowed each other to be alone together.

MMC-Q-2: Beautiful place to stop. Thank you.

[INTERUPT]

GB-Q-1: Natty, we're going to pick up at the point of the APA convention in New Orleans in 2006.
Raymond: By that point, we were going through our individual and group processes, both inside PHR and with what would become the Coalition for Ethical Psychology, to force the issue with the APA. And the initial strategy to force the issue was the disclosure of further information about what psychologists did, and how that set of actions by psychologists related to the position the APA took, simultaneously, to try to explore and better demonstrate the inherent corruption in PENS. So, out of that, Katherine Eban of *Vanity Fair* and I had been talking, and Katherine was interested in doing a story about the APA decision position for *Vanity Fair*; and, as part of that, looking at why they had taken this position. That was an outlier to the AMA, and American Psychiatric.

So it was out of New Orleans that Reisner, *Arrigo*, and I met on September 11th, in New York. PHR brought *Arrigo* down there. We paid for her. We had her at a hostel in New York. She had the actual printouts of the APA *Listserve* in her bag, and I would escort her around the city.

*GB: Q-1:* The PENS *Listserve*.

Raymond: The PENS *Listserve*. So, in Reisner’s office, we began to go through it. Then we went over, later that day, to see Katherine Eban. Initially, we were of the mind, at that point, that, wow, this is serious evidence of corruption in terms of the Newman and Donovan Dunivan issues, the whole construction of the thing; the involvement of Koocher; the observers; the involvement of DOD watching very closely. She saw that as important, but wanted more. It was...
the involvement John Sifton, from Human Rights Watch, who worked with me and with Katherine, and began— at that point, Katherine learned about Mitchell & Jensen— that James Mitchell and Bruce Jensen, former [unclear] SERE psychologists, had been critical contractors for the CIA, to re-engineer, or reverse engineer, the SERE tactics for use on agency detainees. That led to a long period of time— (now we're into 2007) — where Katherine is continuing the Mitchell & Jensen investigation, and speaking to unnamed sources, to bureau, etc. Meanwhile, Mark Benjamin; of Salon; also learns, through his own independent sources and his own independent reporting, about Mitchell & Jensen. The importance here is to get this information out in time for the APA convention in San Francisco in 2007, in August. The policy debate at that point— we really have to contextualize it here— that MCA [Military Commissions Act] passes in the fall of 2006—

GBQ: MCA—?

Raymond: The Military Commissions Act. As part of it is an amendment to the 1998 [Walter B.] Jones’ [Jr.][unclear] War Crimes Act— WCA— and that amendment changes traditional U.S. interpretation of the Geneva Convention, as it relates to what constitutes a war crimes. Additionally, it offers, basically, blanket immunity, going back even before [unclear] 9/11. The critical line that we noticed in the WCA amendments inside the MCA is that it changes the definition of research. That's where our investigation— that led to experiments in torture— really got going. Because, at that point, why does the traditional definition in Geneva— which had been in Jones, because the War Crimes Act took the Geneva Convention as it is written, and
made it a capital crime to violate the Geneva Convention, for U.S. and non-U.S. citizens; for U.S. citizens to violate it, and for non-U.S. citizens to violate it against Americans.

So the language change was, to paraphrase—what it says in Geneva is, "All biomedical experimentation not related to the hospital treatment of the subject, and with language about the subject's well-being, is prohibited." They changed it to, "Medical treatment or experimentation without an expressed or, I believe the language is, or "expressed or necessary medical purpose." Well, who defines medical purpose? The issue there, which was important, is that it began to mirror the APA changes; that you're de-linking the activities of the health professional from the well-being of the subject; and that de-linkage of what I call the Hippocratic paradigm is basically the blood in the water that helped us track what were important changes.

So we get to 2007. The MCA has occurred a curve. We are in the waiting game on the Vanity Fair article, which ends up getting pushed to publication because Salon comes out and has put Mitchell and Jensen in play. Sifton and Human Rights Watch played an important part in that investigation. During that waiting time, in April of 2007, we had been pushing at PHR very hard for release of DOD Inspector General reporting on the involvement of health professionals in detainee abuse, both at Gitmo and Abu Ghraib, etc. So we get a call back from the Senate Armed Services Committee that we should go to Washington to talk to them about it. We go to Washington, we show up and are greeted by an individual who's an investigator on the committee.
Raymond: John Bradshaw, the Washington Director of PHR, who is a former senate foreign relations staffer, who is now executive director of the Enough Project, he and myself. So we go in there expecting to have a meeting about, basically, "Please give us this report." "We can't give you this report. We can give you part of this report." We thought that was going to be a dance, about that. We go to this room in the basement, and the individual [unclear] investigator brings us in, and suddenly a parade of staffers comes in, from multiple committees, and from multiple senators' offices, including [unclear] who elements that were working for McCain. What was supposed to be a meeting about this report turns into, basically, an interrogation. I don't mean that in a bad way, but they wanted to know what I knew.

GB: Q-1: What was this like for you?

Raymond: It was like Close Encounters of the Third Kind. We're not alone in the universe anymore. Because, to think about it psychologically, where we were before, earlier in this transcript——it shouldn't have been us. Thinking back to childhood, one of the earliest lessons is, "If you see something wrong, you find a police officer," right? [Laughter] "You find a police officer, and you tell them." But, in this case, there were no cops, up into this moment. The cops were in on it, or the cops had been thwarted before they left the station——in the case of the FBI. So it was this incredible moment where it's the first time I saw U.S. government, congressional oversight personnel say, "Okay. Tell me about Mitchell & Jensen." That was incredible, from a morale perspective. It was also very scary. It was scary in the sense that you didn't know who to trust. You didn't know whether, even if it was one guy in the room, says they
know this much, to someone who cares about how much we know. So it was this balancing act of trying to say, "Yes, Mr. Police Officer, there is something nasty in the woodshed and I want to tell you about it." That was the first time I really began to understand the operational security requirements of what we were doing. It was constantly how do you assess, in the most scientific way possible, who you should trust, tactically and strategically, and how do you bet on the right horses, whether you're a-working with journalists, whether you're working with congressional staffers, whether you're working with inspector-general staffers. This becomes a repeating theme: How do you know? But, at the same time, you get to these moments in the story where you just have to take a leap.

So we made the decision to support the Senate Armed Services Committee as much as we could. It's really important to understand that this was a very divisive proposition within the human rights community. There were some who did not want any collaboration with congressional investigators. There were some who thought that we should just let them do their thing, and we should do ours. "Where and where they complemented, they were complimented. "Would complement. I believe we had a lot to teach each other, because what we understood on our side—which I think was more advanced than where Congress was at that point at that point, APA was a sideshow. APA, Mitchell & Jensen to look at, from many things I heard from editors, many things I heard from staffers, was, "Oh, that's interesting." It's like, "Oh, you have a pink-colored pony." That's great. But what we're talking about is [Manadel Al-

Jarmadi; "Giamotti; [phonetic] the dead Iraqi general at Abu Ghraib. We're talking about homicide, homicide, and we're talking about these hard-core legal issues, within the context of the detainee legal staff debate, and the post-[Hashdari; Broumediene; "Medellin; [phonetic] [v.
Bush, 2008 context, legally, at Gitmo. What I think I was able to bring to Armed Services was this understanding of the interconnectedness of the APA issues to things which seemed, to the hardcore, what we call “TRADOC” training and doctrine issues, that face those who are dealing with the military specific problems here.

It was during that period of sharing what we had that they were asking for support in helping to find where psychologists believed to have been involved worked; what bases they were at. So you got a sense, from supporting their investigation and collaborating with them, of how much they didn't know, of what types of institutional support they had such as, "Yes. Thank you. Now we are going to go get those things declassified. We have them declassified." You'd see quick movement there. Then there were other moments where it was, "Do you have the phone number for the guy who did the interrogation?" So it was very humanizing in a way, and it developed trust, because we were all dealing with different gaps in things we knew and things we didn't know.

Gay: Just a question about the dissent that this led to in the human rights community, about whether one should cooperate with the government or not. Were you all of one mind at PHR, or were there people at PHR who disagreed with this approach?

Raymond: We were all of one mind at PHR, I think. The way it was seen at PHR is that this is one avenue. This goes to Len's strategy, and I want to talk more about him. Len is one of the greatest legal minds I've ever seen. He is just seriously.
Raymond: Leonard Rubenstein, "Herbenstein." [Phonetic]

So this is Leonard Rubenstein, “Herbenstein.” [Phonetic]

Raymond: Leonard Rubenstein, “Herbenstein.” Forget about it. Willie [H.] Mays Jr. level. What he taught me—and this comes into the controversy that happened with the coalition in 2007—is, you set a very clear standard for what you can accept in a process or in a product, so you have your red button. We can't accept [Vocalizes button]. But then you have a spectrum of things you can walk away with. As he said, famously, "When you can claim victory"—and that comes from years and years of doing human rights work—"you want to always—.

He said—and we did this all the time, writing releases about APA, including the release we wrote at the convention center, the [Unclear] Moscone convention center, after the [Unclear] tactics resolution, which we will get to. Len and I were writing that, sitting on the floor, and he said, "Up front, say we wonant. Say we've got this resolution, which is a step, and then 'caveat.' Say, 'But more remains to be done in these areas.'" So for Len, who was overseeing the campaign against torture at that point, it was about all avenues now. Yes, we should be pushing the Senate Armed Services Committee. Yes, we should be continuing to work for journalists. Yes, we should be developing the coalition capacity for movement within the APA. Yes, we should be working with the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture. So that was all happening at once, and that was an important, tactical approach he brought to me, and he also, I think, brought to the APA movement. He was coaching Soldz, Reisner, Olson, "Orrigo—and Arrigo." It's okay to get half-credit. [Laughs] Because then we live to fight another day.

So the Senate Armed Services Committee approach absolutely was totally supportive. Now another movement was occurring at that time, and the sense that there was never going to be
meaningful, government-based accountability—which still is, I think, the de facto position for much of the community, and I can't say that I disagree with it. But it's not an issue of ends. This is a lesson I've learned, it's the lesson of torture, and it's the lesson of fighting against torture: The means are the ends that, after years so to think back to my experience at the beginning, in Dasht-i, the ends, were the ends, were the ends. We released the article, everyone realizes it's horrible. Things change. Joy comes to Mudville. But the lesson I've learned, now that I've been doing this since Dasht-i—it's been eleven years—I'm thirty-five now. I've been doing this for a large portion of my life. What I've learned is:

what is it that should be done? Can you provide evidence for what is it that should be done, and can you, then, support around that evidence for what it is that should be done, whether or not you win? That is the ends and the means.

So the point I'm getting to here is that we went through this evolution. We began to professionalize, as the coalition and as PHR. We began to professionalize our approach here. For others in the human rights community, because we were not coordinating—this is an important point—the economics of human rights work are never discussed. Let's talk about them. We—and when I say "we," going forward, for the next few sentences here, I'm meaning the Human Rights Watches, Human Rights First, PHR—we all compete for the same grant funding. We all compete for the same individual donors. We all compete, now, with the dawn of social media. We have more places, but we're competing for similar audiences through similar media. We all want the lead editorial in the New York Times, and we all are competing, especially, per issue for with the same policy consumers in the United States government, regardless of who is president. So if on this you're in front of Senate Armed
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Services, Senate Intelligence, and Senate Judiciary, and the House components, you're talking to them; you're talking to DOJ [Department of Justice]; you're talking to FBI; you're trying to get in the New York Times. You're funded by [George] Soros, someplace. You have Soros and a couple other funders. Then you are trying to campaign for the same several thousand people to take the same action.

What does this mean? All of us on the torture issue are fundamentally economic competitors. The person who got the worst revelation that you could put your organization's name on had an economic advantage to do so. That's the economics of the thing. So we'd have the great twilight struggle of the American human-rights community; and, fundamentally, we are built to try to — as I tell my students now, at Harvard, all the time — back to the example in Freetown, during the Sierra Leon civil war — it was all about trying to find the most pictures of the [unclear]-girl with no arms. That sounds oddawful, but it's true. The person with the most armless girls [unclear]-wins. What was happening here was you had people chasing similar sources, or similar things, so it could be "Human Rights Watch said today," in a New York Times article, that went to the president — that's the formulation. Then you put that in your grant report, from the same five or six funders, and you get sustained.

Now the funders, it is important to say, woke up to this, and it was with Proteus and Atlantic Philanthropies that began to evolve, throughout the torture years — they began to coordinate their funding. They began to try to force partnership between the funders and the grantees. That was good. They created the Rockwood National Security for Human Rights fellowship program,
of which I was one, to get all of us who were the middle managers of these investigations together.

That said—we did not have to go back to the beginning. A unified, strategic plan about the theory of change—what we were going to try to do, and how we were going to do it. So for PHR, we were seen as, "Okay, of course, you're going to be on the health professional thing because it's a boutique issue for your niche, your constituency, and your funding profile." It was the most important torture thing. It was the most important thing any organization should have been doing, but it was often seen as, "Oh, yeah. They're over there. Of course." But it's like, you know, there's that line from All the President's Men—"People say what gave [Benjamin C.] Ben Bradlee and the Washington Post a monopoly on wisdom?" Why should everyone follow what PHR is doing? Well, frankly, it was the whole ballgame. That meant that other people were taking other approaches during that time. You had John Adams [Unclear] Project begin, and the idea there was to provide support through that [unclear] the identification of the folks who were involved in the actual torture acts. This is where it comes down to a theory of change. Is that the way to go? Does that give you evidence that is going to be a difference-maker? Or is that what you do in your niche? I'm not commenting, I'm just saying there's that. And then [unclear] over here. One organization—ACLU [American Civil Liberties Union] takes its slant, etc., etc. So in the beginning we didn't know whether they were combined approaches.

But then, also, there was a proprietary matrix:nature. I had absolutely no reason whatsoever to share what I knew with other organizations. If I was in a senior management position—PHR, or any of these organizations—and I knew my investigators were like, "Here's the file of
secrets." That's your stock and trade. So at a point where we should have had a collaboration node, where we could have said, "This is such a big deal we cannot compete against each other. We cannot have things going on over here to support a legal [unclear]case in Gitmo that is going to damage us, over here———take away our credibility." There was never any of that, and we suffered because of it. Now, that said, Human Rights Watch and PHR [unclear, Sifton and I did] collaborate, and supported [unclear]Eban on that story. But it became clear by 2007 that there had to be———from our perspective———an institutional component. Why? Because so much of this was classified. It was not operationally safe to have civilian human rights organizations trying to be a “catch basin” and a pass-through for classified information. That was not how it happened, and it was not how it should have happened at PHR. What we were was a facilitator for accountability institutions, including the press, but also Congress. What we were also trying to do was find that punctuated thunder cloud. We could do the targeted research.

I'm sort of going all around here, but I just think it's important to express the cultural issues that were involved. People think of the human rights community and say we're all do-gooders who get together in a room. We're organizations that are predominately focused on how to do our mission in the context of securing our economic survival, our policy-maker access, and our attractiveness to journalists.

So that was happening on the economic side. Then the 2008 crash happened, and two of the major funders for anti-torture work———Herb Block and [? JEP [Unclear], Foundation went under. So we lost———
Raymond: ———we lost the money we had, so our money contracted down to three to five hundred, here, from five to seven. When you have the collapse in investigative journalism is a meaningful pursuit for newspapers in this country, so what you are left with is ———Mark Benjamin, Dana Priest, Jim Risen, Seymour Hersh, Jane Mayer, Adam Goldstein——you could put a few others in there. Those were among the big ones who kept "breaking it" all the time, because they were the only ones that had the beat that allowed them to do it.

So investigative journalism contracted. The money for an uncoordinated, all-over-the-place, gang—that couldn't shoot—straight sometimes human-rights community contracted. Then MCA is passed. We didn't have the "immunity written in," and the laws about which are applicable——boomaken. So back to why it was a big deal with the Senate Armed Services Committee? At least it was something. At least it was a chance to have, on official paper, "this happened." And what came out of that, at least in 2008, was the first official statement from the U.S. government that psychologists designed and supervised the texttactics. That was really important. Were there a lot of other things in there? Yes. They didn't mention the Dilawar "Delaware" case——in terms of "Bagram——once. [Unclear] Abu Ghraib? Twenty——At least a-thousand things missing, but at least——

GB-O-1: ——they acknowledge that.
Raymond: Yes. We've got a lot to cover here, but—

Raymond: We've got time. We don't have to do it all now.

MMC-Q-2: We also have more time today.

GB-Q-1: Yes. We have forty-five minutes. Would you like to go to 2007, that big watershed moment?

Raymond: Okay. So the Mitchell and Jensen stories come out. That means we are arriving into the convention in San Francisco in a unique position. We are able to say, "Wow. You have these individuals, these workshops, these allegations of what they did—we now have a specific moment. [Abu] Zubaydah. "Zubadaya." [Phonetic] That was huge. If it wasn't for the "Ivan" [Phonetic]Eban story, we would not have been able to have specifically said, "Here is a detainee who suffered this way because of this policy." So we released [italic]Leave No Marks which Paul [Rocklandin] [phonetic] and Len, and John Bradshaw were key authors of, and Scott Allen. Scott I haven't mentioned, but Scott's so important. Just assume when I'm talking anything I did at PHR past 2008, Scott Allen was in the room. Dr. Scott Allen was co-director of the Center for Prisoner Health and Human Rights at Brown University, and a Rockefeller fellow at PHR, chief medical advisor of the Campaign Against Torture. So, basically, Paul was the legal mind, Len was overall oversight, as executive director, until 2007, and Scott was medical. Then I was investigations and tactics, until I ended up leading the Campaign Against Torture in 2008.
So out of "Leave No Marks," which was looking at the risk of criminality, within the tactics we come up with the Memorandum, which is basically saying to Stephen Behnke, "Take Leave No Marks and say which of these tactics are prohibited under the ethics code," which was a great move by [unclear]. Simultaneously, was the prohibition to prohibit on the involvement of APA members, at facilities where X, Y and Z international humanitarian rights law was being violated. So we go into San Francisco pushing for both, and hoping for at least one. So what happens is, the prohibition loses. Karl Colonel James is brought onto the floor, a member of the council steps out so James can address, and he makes the famous, "If we don't have psychologists in the room, people are going to die. Not specifying which people, how, or when, but people are going to die."

GB-Q1: And we should say, this was at the board of directors of the APA, on a Sunday morning. Those of us who were there knew about yelled out "people have died!".

Raymond: Yes. That was you who said that. I was sitting in the back, next to Joe Matarazzo, who sat down right next to Brad and I. He just kept looking at me the whole time. I didn't know who he was. Brad leans over and says, "That's Joe Matarazzo."

GB-Q1: And he was looking at you to know what?

Raymond: I don't know. But he was just sitting there, and he was looking. Because by this time the story had come out in the paper in Spokane, Washington. This is not a greatly consequential
story, but I just love--this reporter, these two reporters--I think they're a husband-and-wife team in Spokane, where Mitchell & Jensen is based. After the *Vanity Fair* story--they do something called investigative reporting--which is always refreshing--and they find the corporation documents in the State of Washington for Mitchell & Jensen, and Matarazzo is on it. So you have a past APA president on the board of Mitchell & Jensen. So by that point, Matarazzo's linked. So we're sitting there, and there are so many important, just little personal moments that happened in that two-hour period. One is, Len and I were talking, and Benjamin, were talking to Scott "Schumey," who was there, from NCIS [Naval Criminal Investigative Service], formerly of NCIS, by that point. He had gone to be a consultant, but "Schumey" is a whole other conversation. But we're like, "You've got to say something. You've got to say something in support of a lot of one of these." And he sat there on the floor, Indian-style, at this point, threw his hands up, and was like, "I'm done."

*GB: Q-1:* "I'm done" meaning, "I can't say anything?"

Raymond: I don't know. It was just like, "We're done talking."

*GB: Q-1:* Oh, to you.

Raymond: Yes. It was both. "We're done talking," and "I'm not doing anything." So he's sitting there, and I didn't know how to read him. He looked like a balloon that the air went out of. What was fascinating in what happened is when we were all, of course, crestfallen but not surprised...
that I was not surprised. Other people were horrified that the prohibition lost.

**GB-Q-1:** The "amendment," as we called it.

Raymond: Yes. That the amendment to the tactics resolution lost. Okay. There was a level of political campaigning that was required in such a Byzantine organization to pass that thing, on a moment's notice, in a shotgun approach. Never going to happen. So I was okay. I wanted it to pass, but I knew it was never going to pass. So the amendment fails, but tactics goes through. Now they amended tactics in the twenty-four hours before then, to basically have the MCA to have the appendix "M" definitions referenced by the Military Commissions Act, the appendix "M" definitions of the tactics in the Army Field Manual. They wrote them right in. So basically what it means is that isolation/sleep-deprivation and temperature manipulation—

**GB-Q-1:** I don't remember. Again, I think, to be absolutely clear here—what this did was to list a number of tortures that were not permitted by APA ethics.

Raymond: Then they had the clause, "Because we've said these, it doesn't mean that other ones are not permitted, too." So they were taken directly from the SERE list, and directly from "Leave No Marks." the Army Field Manuel and directly from *Leave No Marks*. It took almost all the language from the report at PHR into it. I say "almost all," because they modified it to allow legal [unclear] knot on critical areas where they wanted to continue to use sleep-dep, and
isolation in particular, the components of the frequent flyer program that was being used at Gitmo.

**GB-Q-1:** That was modified overnight.

Raymond: Within twelve to twenty-four hours before. Now let me get to that.

So the day before, Scott and I are standing in line to get our visitor's passes, and about two to three, maybe four people behind us is a familiar face, which is Andy Morgan. Now Dr. Andy Morgan, psychiatrist—whom we'll get to more later—who is an expert in the SERE program and cortisol's human stress hormones that are created and can be measured during interrogation—suddenly happens to be there.

**GB-Q-1:** A psychiatrist at psychology meetings.

Raymond: Now he was there in mini-convention. The debate had blown up so much because of the Eban article, and so forth, and because of what happened the previous year, that a mini-convention was convened to specifically address the interrogation issues. Andy Morgan was speaking there about why traditional research prohibitions get in the way of what's needed for national security psychology.

**GB-Q-1:** Just to say that Behnke convened this mini-convention.
Raymond: Yes. But *also Olson* was part of helping to decide what was on there. But Behnke was basically the curator of the whole thing. So just to get to the important things here—There was this sea change in the negotiations around the time Morgan showed up, and there were rumors that CIA personnel had basically arrived now, unconfirmed rumors—later knowing that Andy Morgan worked for the Central Intelligence Agency made that make more sense.

But the point is this—-—that we still felt, at PHR, even with the slip-knots in there, that this was huge. Because what we could do with this was (a) press for a specific amendment—-—which we did publicly, minutes after it was passing; and we could use it as the first organization to go further, *health professional organization to slip prepare [unclear]-go further than the previous statements of AMA and [unclear]-American Psychiatric, to prohibit involvement in the techniques. So, back to Len's rule: Claim victory, put the caveat, set a benchmark for achieving that, and keep pushing it. The coalition, however—-—Reisner and Soldz, in particular—-—we had lunch, Len and Stephen and I—-—afterwards, and they were outraged. They were beyond outraged. They felt that this was the end; that basically we had—-—I think they felt as strong as we gave them a fig leaf [unclear]-covering to allow the APA to look like they did something when, in fact, they were allowing a backdoor for Central Intelligence.

Be that as it may, strategically, I think we at PHR played it absolutely right. Emotionally, it was the first big blowup, and it led to problem, as probably some of my—-—as some of my colleagues have said, basically me saying—-—I'll be specific about the language here in a second—-—but as well as Len, "[unclear] you go against the tactics resolution—"
Raymond: You, Reisner and Soldz

GB: Q-1: And Soldz

Raymond: And Soldz

GB: Q-1: Go against

Raymond: Go against the tactics resolution publicly, then we will oppose it, and we will try to stop you." As I said, in the heat of the moment, "Yes, we'll destroy you if you do that." Not meaning that we would physically destroy Soldz and Reisner, the dear Stephens. It means we would campaign against what they were doing. So that was a painful moment. It was a horribly painful moment. But the point is this: that it wasn't just about the APA, it was about what we needed for national change in detainee policy. This was highly imperfect, and it was better than what we had before. So we said clearly, in our statement, "You need to change this language and that language," and we said it in the comments made to the Post and everybody who covered it. But it represented a moment of [unclear schism], and what happened is that Soldz and Reisner, Olsen and others, began the referendum movement. You're nodding?

GB: Q-1: I'm shaking my head. The person who began the referendum was Dan Alvarez, Aalbers.

Raymond: Dan Alvarez, Aalbers. But they endorsed

GB: Q-1: They endorsed it.
Raymond: Yes. Let me be —

GB: Q-1. Sorry.

Raymond: You're absolutely right. I hadn't thought about some of these details in a while, so [unclear jot the nodding here]. But Alvarez Aalbers started it. They began to see the referendum movement in terms of having a member referendum that Alvarez Aalbers proposed, to not allow APA members to be at facilities where U.N. standards and Geneva Conventions were being violated. We supported that, but we saw the critical issue, moving into 2008, as getting tactics right, but most importantly getting #1.02 out immediately and reverting, as close as possible, to the 1986 ethics code. That's what it was really about, because at the end of the day the problem we had internally, with the referendum, is "What's your metric?" [unclear]. I think there was a feeling—I know I felt it and others did—that there was naïveté in terms of how it works in these settings. The ICRC cannot report publicly, so, based on their charter, and the laws of Geneva, there are very limited situations when they can tell you if Geneva has been violated. Then, on the U.N.-side, to have to go through the political organs of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, etc., etc., to get to a metric of violation. So the issue is that—so we said, "Yes, we're going to support this publicly. We're not against it. But in terms of how the rubber meets the road in these environments, the ethics code has got to get straightened out.

Okay. So we get this, and they do find the metric, and they do fully enforce it. Okay. We still need to get the ethics code back in line with Nuremberg, and with the World Medical
Association, etc. So it was like, yes, this is a great organizing tool. Yes, this is important. But it's still not the goal. So it meant that on the APA side, in those years, between 2007 and 2010, the focus was on chipping back and putting pressure—and that's why the Zimbardo conversations were important, because we wanted to really put the heat on #1.02, and #8.05, #8.03 research sections.

GB: Q-1: Say more about #8.05 and #8.03.

Raymond: Basically, it allowed for the revocation of consent, similar to #1.02, consent in experimentation conducted by an APA member, when allowed by law or order. It allowed for the use of deception in research, in ways that were far beyond the internationally allowed language. It allowed for there to be basically carte blanche legal exceptions for every aspect—accepted aspect—of Nuremberg principles—based research, and [Unclear] Belmont Report—based research. Anything coming out of the U.S. or international [Unclear] precedent. So what was going on during this time is me and a team of interns—Jesse Hamlin, Daniel "Scarvalone," [phonetic] and Louise "Place," [phonetic] who are amazing. They were all juniors and seniors at the same time. They're still best friends. They began to try to answer a question for me, following the 2007 convention, which they started in the fall, the fall of—was it the fall of 2006? Anyhow, -I think it was the fall of 2007.

What they were trying to answer is—I posed to them, "If the U.S. is drugging[Unclear] detainees, what would they need to change in U.S. law, in code, of federal regulations, to do it?" This is what led to experiments in torture, this question. So what happened was, Daniel, Louise,
and Jesse, around the clock, in their spare time, started combing through all— to create a map of U.S. precedent guiding anything a health professional would do, from a regulatory perspective, with a patient, any patient, not just a detainee. What they found was that there were changes that occurred around the same time as the Bush administration's "reframe" of Geneva, to the Weinberger directive, which required Nuremberg adherence, which was changed to the Wolfowitz directive requiring Nuremberg familiarity. Basically, the start of 2002. So the issue is this. We were looking at them within the allegations and investigations we were doing about "drugging." Now let's put that aside for a second. Though the point was to support [?][Unclear]'s DOJ wards? investigation on drugging [unclear]. Let's put that aside. What those three young individuals found was so important. It was so important, because you put that together with the "map-out" they did of the changes in the War Crimes Act amendment, and you begin to see something; that before the Yoo memo, the Bush administration realized it had a massive research problem, and it started [cross talk].

So what happens is, why did they start systematically attacking these things, and watering them down, and, including in the Wolfowitz, mentioning prisoners at one point? So this is the issue— that when you go to the— you look at the MCA now, and the War Crimes Act amendment, it makes perfect sense, now that we have the Office of Professional Responsibility report declassified, from the Department of Justice; now that we have parts of the Office of the Inspector General from the CIA declassified, and the OLC memos, themselves, this is what you see. In the original emails from the CIA General Counsel, or communiqués from CIA General Counsel to Yoo, he basically says, "If you can show that you tried to mitigate this standard of harm, even if you learned from past experience, and you learned from research—learned
from—publications and past experience," that's research. "A good-faith belief need not be a reasonable one." That's what CIA General Counsel, prior to John A. Rizzo said. "A good-faith belief need not be a reasonable belief."

Why is that so important? If we looked, even if the emperor has no clothes, and we looked like we were really trying and we can point to specific steps, then we show good faith to mitigate that harm. But what was incredible about it is that they didn't seem, at the time, to have done the Law Review on the monitoring act. What I believe happened, forensically, looking at these documents, is that Yoo comes up with the silver bullet, or golden shield is what they call it, to mix metaphors—silver bullet and golden shield. So Yoo says, "We have a golden legal shield," and it's saying that we are limited to severe and long-lasting harm, using psychologists—primarily because Mitchell and Jensen were psychologists—but also because they're the only ones who would play ball. There were others involved, but they were not involved in a role that required such sanctioning—because it didn't hang on the physician or the psychiatrist, to our knowledge, the same way it did on the psychologists.

So you get to the point where they've already engaged, now, in a pattern of behavior, of apparent criminality, related to the OLC memos and what they say you should do for torture. Okay. So how do you deal with that? Well, you develop a specific policy to deal with the crime you're trying to cover up, but don't develop a written policy on the cover-up for the cover-up, which is the medical monitoring—remove it from the law. [Laughs] So what you see are executive order amendments—boom, boom, boom, boom, boom. They had a road map early on, and they went bing, bing, bing. Why was Hubbard seeing Zimbardo? Why was Hubbard seeing
Zimbardo? Hubbard was seeing Zimbardo, I believe, because part of taking that out— and this is why the APA is so important to the story of the human rights movement here; why we chose it as our target—is because it's the only part the government didn't control, that was a relevant, regulatory safeguard to the actions of what would happen in the room. It was the only part that existed outside the executive umbrella. The Wolfowitz directive replacing the Weinberger directive on Nuremberg hearings and human subjects experimentation in DOD settings— executive order— OLC interpretation of extant law. Right? Anything in the code of federal regulations that was amended related to this, to relate this executive order or Congress. Okay. Fine.

In the appropriations, black budget, Senate approached Defense. But the Senate, unlike the House, does not have a separate intelligence appropriations committee, so Defense does both intel defense when the house doesn't. But the one thing that didn't exist there is the APA ethics code, which existed at the State level. So that's what people didn't understand. But the Bush administration clearly understood it, because of this forensic clue. Boumediene happens in 2006. Why are they so hot to trot on MCA? They're so hot to trot on MCA because of the status of the detainees. Why have they put the WCA rider on the MCA? Well, it makes sense because they're trying to cover all their due indemnity on their entire circle of potential legal liability. One, what type of trial they get. Two, how Geneva, applies. Three, the applicability of Geneva to the prosecution of those who may have tortured them. But that's where they show their cards. Why is the only change to the actual language, of U.S. interpretation of Geneva, to the medical experimentation section? It's because they realized that they had a legal exposure, I
believe; that they had a legal exposure on the way they were reducing their legal exposure on torture.

So what was originally an investigation of "drugging—" [unclear]—originally an investigation—...it is back to All The President's Men, when Deep Throat says to Woodward, "You're missing the overall. You think this is all Donald [H.] Segretti stealing lawn signs?" No. This wasn't just about torture. In being about torture, it was fundamentally about research, because the act to determine that you hadn't committed torture was a research act. Thus, by the time in 2009, at the end of 2009, with the declassification of the OPR report—Office of Professional Responsibility—though it did not find intentional negligence by Yoo and [Jay S.] Bybee "Bebe," [Phonetic] etc., which we can debate until the cows come home—but it showed us the process and what was in it was Yoo and the CIA counsel saying, "If we learn from this, we can say we tried to avoid this, and we need doctors to do it, and that's who we're referencing, and we need psychologists." But then you go to "Bebe" and [Steven G.] Bradbury—okay, not Bybee "Bebe," "Bebe," "Bebe," yeah, but Bradbury, in 2005—then you get the Bradbury memo, and holy Jehosaphat! They say specifically in there that "We have looked at the individual application of tactics and the combined application of tactics across X—group of detainees, and we have found that the harm resulting from does not seem to be any different between the two populations." That's the ticket. The moment I saw that—I had authorization within PHR to do experiments in torture before—I had the data—I had a theory. I said, "Listen. Give me the space, and the time, and the team to identify the holes in code that changed. Then let's begin to look back at the
Office of Inspector General, apart from CIA." But then they declassified the OPR, and at that point—that is the moment—

[interuption][INTERUPTION]

—let me finish this last part.

That's when we get to the OPR, we see Bradbury saying, "We compared them against two groups." And then "we didn't use water in the water-boarding, we used saline, to prevent hyper-natremia." Because the issue is, they were putting such a volume in—[unclear]—they developed an experimental procedure to prevent death due to sodium deficiency. Then we're going to develop a whole lot of water-boarding 2.0, in terms of procedure, tracheotomy, gurney, [unclear], and you down the list, and compare sleep-dep reactions across the population, and we're saying we're doing it with health professionals. So that's the moment where I realized—in the 8.0s—look at what Behnke said. "We're totally against torture." How about non-consensual research?

MMC-Q-2: That was the moment.

Raymond: Yes. To go back—we are a—

GB-Q-1: Have you asked him that question?
Raymond: Have I asked him that? No. I have not asked him that because it's not time yet. Soon.

But back to the line where [unclear], “We are a drinking club with a jogging problem.” where We are a research program was with a torture program problem.

[End of Session END OF SESSION]
GB-Q-1: Natty, we were going to start by asking you how you met up with Isaac.

Raymond: I met Isaac when I was living on Bay Street in Cambridge, while working for Physicians for Human Rights, in 2009. He was living in the neighborhood, and worked at the Cellar Liquor Store. I met him there, initially, while buying liquor at the liquor store. We got to know each other in the late spring, early summer of 2009. At that point, my interns at Physicians for Human Rights, who had worked with me for over a year, had graduated. At that point I didn't have research support on the work I was doing, in preparation for the Dasht-i-Leili article which would come out in the New York Times, by Jim Risen, in the summer of 2009. So I asked Isaac if he would intern with me, working on Dasht-i-Leili, supporting the investigation and the eventual release of that article. And he did. We've been working together ever since.
So Isaac— why don't you tell us about [unclear] this meeting and go into some detail about the work you've been doing [unclear] with them.

Baker: Sure. Should I start from the beginning?

MMC-Q-2: Sure. Start wherever you like.

Baker: So, as you were saying, I was in the neighborhood at the time. According to it's funny how the events unfolded— I was working at a liquor store, Cellar Wine & Spirits, on Mass Avenue, [unclear] and I had just gotten out of a pretty bad breakup where I was. I got thrown out of the apartment where I lived, and consequently lost my job in the process, and lost everything I had. So I was just kind of couch surfing at the time, and trying to get back up on my feet. So I was working in a liquor store, and reading books to pass the time of day— mostly Westerns, or spy novels, or crime novels, some type of "genre" book. If you're working ten hours at a liquor store, it's a way to kill time.

So I was reading this one book, this English spy novel called London Match, by Len [Leonard C.] Len Deighton. This guy walks in and buys a six-pack of beer, and we started a conversation.

Raymond: And cigarettes.
Baker: And cigarettes. A six-pack of beer and some American spirits. We started up a conversation, and we just hit it off, and became good friends. We had a similar sense of humor. We both kind of in crummy states tended to be [unclear] at the time but for different reasons, and we would soon find out what those reasons were. Mine was just being thrown out of my apartment, and the other guy’s was that he was investigating the cover-up of the massacre of an Afghan warlord [unclear] that was on the CIA payrolls. [Laughter]

Raymond: Different strokes for different folks.

Baker: So he offered, as we were talking—I was looking for work beyond the liquor store, and he offered me a volunteering spot where he worked, Physicians for Human Rights. So Nathaniel Raymond said, “Have you ever shot video before?”

I said, “Yes. I’ve done some things with a video digital camera.”

He said, “Would you like to come with my team down to D.C. and basically record [unclear] B-roll footage interview?”

He said, “Do you want to record interview B-roll footage for coverage of the New York Times release of Jim Risen’s article on Dasht-i-Leili?”
I said, "That would be excellent." So I went down there, we came back, and one thing led to another. I moved from doing video work to researching. I just saw the work that was going on, the investigation he was leading, and I just felt that hunger to get a taste of that. So I just basically just started researching. At this time we started working on what would become the white paper *Experiments in Torture* ([EIT]). I started researching different physicians, and people who were involved in the American Psychological Association as well as the CIA, and it just kind of catapulted into actually becoming a full-on researcher, and assistant for the Campaign Against Torture at the Physicians for Human Rights.

Raymond: Isaac played—there is some stuff I think we need to talk about in reference to what happened in Washington, and what happened right after that. But one of the critical things is that at that point, many in the human rights community had credible evidence that they, themselves, or the people they were talking to, were under surveillance. Surveillance related to "leak," investigations, surveillance related to what was happening with the John Adams project at that point, and just the general pushback, which we had some clear evidence about—the full-court press to try to stop people who knew about the program, from being able to talk about it. That took different forms—legal pressure, professional pressure. All the major public figures who had been in the administration, who had come out against the program had suffered horrible professional consequences. General Taguba's career ended. Mary [O.] McCarthy, the deputy inspector general of the CIA, was accused of leaking classified information. She was accused of multiple things, which ended up not being proven administratively.
So you have this environment where everyone was paranoid. Anyone you would talk to, anyone doing this work, assumed that there was electronic surveillance. After Dasht-i-Leili, in the fall of 2009, I wanted to check back on sources that I know had spoken to me, had spoken to Congress, had spoken, allegedly, to journalists, and people who were not sources, but were persons of interest in reference to what we were looking at, which would become experiments in torture. So I gave Isaac a list for him to check, in the fall of 2009, of people of interest, on the computer at the Cellar. Because it was a separate internet provider address from PHR.

MMC-Q-2: [Unclear] The Cellar was?

Raymond: The liquor store. So in the back of the liquor store Isaac, while he was working, was going through the hit list of people who were related to the program. So I gave him a list of the handles I used for the people, and the critical handle on there—which will come into play out of this—was California Dreaming. California Dreaming was the code phrase we used to describe Scott Geiwehr. I'll let you take it from there.

Baker: So I was at the Cellar on my laptop, and I was going through the names that he gave me. This name kept popping up with all these others, with Mumford, with Brandon, and Scott Geiwehr. While I was working, and I think he was at the office of PHR, I called them up and I said, "I'm going through all these names, and this one name keeps popping up with all the others—Scott Geiwehr. And he says, "Oh, yes, Scott Geiwehr was a source of mine." So I moved on from there. As I kept researching more about him, I found out that he died in a
motorcycle accident. I called him back up and said, "Do you know that he's dead?" Then five minutes later he comes rushing into the liquor store. "What do you mean, he's dead?" (The liquor store is right down the street from PHR.)

Raymond: That's the fastest I'd run since I did cross-country in high school. [Laughter]

GB:Q-1: How long was this after [Unclear] what was the date of his death?

Baker: The date of his death I believe was May 28th, 2008, if I'm remembering correctly.

Raymond: Yes. It was May, 2008.

Baker: So it was a little over a year after he died.

Raymond: It was about a year and a half. This was September-October, 2009.

Baker: So researching the event of his death was revealing in itself, on the lack of what was revealed. I was able to find a memorial service announcement that they made for his death, but beyond that it was pretty scarce. They did a write up of it in the L.A. Times on his accident—

Raymond:— but with no name.
Baker: —— but with no name, so the thing is that the standard that they reported was that they would report the name of the person in the obituary of the *L.A. Times*. They did not report his name, and the manner of his death was a little curious, too. He lived in L.A. at the time, the L.A. area, and he was driving his motorcycle down Sunset Boulevard.

Raymond: He lived in Santa Monica.

Baker: Santa Monica. That's right.

Raymond: Near the Rand-RAND headquarters.

Baker: He was driving down in the afternoon, on his motorcycle, and a sanitation truck was coming off an exit ramp, then drove over two lanes of traffic, ran him over, and then they shut down the scene of the accident for about five hours, even though he was pronounced dead at the scene.

Raymond: The average time he calculated, Isaac, that the L.A.P.D [*Los Angeles Police Department*], will shut down a highway after a motorcycle accident is approximately a half hour.

Baker: Yes. The good thing about working at a liquor store is that you meet all sorts of people and one of the people I knew there was an EMT [*Emergency Medical Technician*] in Santa Monica, for that district, around that time. He didn't work on that scene, but I asked him, 'If someone was run over by a truck and pronounced dead at the scene, five hours to shut down—
Raymond: Is that normal?" And he said, "That's unheard of. I've never seen anything like that." That just led to more searching, so I started keeping another file of anything I could find on his death, in a working document, with links to all the websites. Then as I started working more on EIT, [Experiments in Torture], the white paper. I would regularly go back and just check those websites, and see if any change had been made. I started noticing that the more I was looking, the more they were taking down the websites.

Raymond: The links started disappearing, in a pattern. This is the thing about it which was fascinating, that things he was looking at things that had no identifier for Scott. Similar, like things, on news websites were not going away. But things that Isaac thought were relevant to Gerwehr were disappearing, including from the APA websites.

Baker: They took down his bio from the APA website.

Raymond: And there was no external reason why Scott would become what would be seen as important then. It was consistent with whatever was in his search engine—that he was searching in a cluster of related search terms, in pattern. The material was disappearing, and the fact that the L.A. Times material from that period was going— and he called up the L.A. Times and they said, "We don't know why that article is missing."

Baker: They took down the obituary from the L.A. Times. What was curious about that, too—the obituary before him and the one after him was on the website, but the one where he fell in between on the page number, that was just taken out.
MMC-Q-2: So what size obituary? I used to work for the New York Times, so it is really odd that there's no name. That's unheard of. So what did it say?

Raymond: Well, this was an accident report. It wasn't his obit.

Baker: His actual, formal obituary was never printed. It was an accident report. But the one before his and the one after his were still on there. But his was taken down.

GB-Q-1: So I just want to go back, and just be clear about who Scott Gerwehr was. Because when you said Isaac—[Unclear]

Raymond: I never told you the story of who Gerwehr was, yes—

was told the story for [unclear] I forget where it was.

GB-Q-1: And maybe it's important to get him positioned in life before we deal with the consequences of his death. his mission in life before [unclear].

Raymond: Let's go back three years at this point, long before I met Isaac, and long before the investigation was at the point where it was in 2009. Brad Olson, who at that point was, I think, still at Northwestern—Brad Olson met, at a conference, a friend of Scott Gerwehr's. And Scott—at that point, was working for RAND Corporation, in Santa Monica, California, and had been known in the APA circles as having been part of the deception
workshops that APA did with CIA and Rand in 2003-2004, 2005. The initial, 2002, one was with the FBI. Scott was not a Ph.D. psychologist, but he was a deception detection researcher. He was interested in the science of telling whether someone was lying. So he, in his position at the Rand Corporation, was one of the conveners and coordinators of the controversial workshops that Mitchell and Jensen and others attended, that were facilitated by Brandon and Mumford. Brad gets introduced to Scott, they have a phone conversation, and Brad describes Scott as being "manic with ideas," as Brad puts it. So Scott is in this manic state of asking all these questions about interrogation, and about APA, and what Brad knows about APA and interrogation; what he thinks is going on, etc. Brad says, "Well, if you're interested in these issues you should talk to my colleague, Nathaniel Raymond."

So we're connected. We gave some emails back and forth, and then we get on the phone. The important thing to be aware of when I describe what Scott said to me is where the human-rights community was in terms of investigations at that point. What Scott said to me— not only did we not know what he said to me, we didn't know enough about what the issues were to understand how significant what he was trying to tell me was. At that point, we knew nothing about the CIA taping system, in terms of taping interrogations or the destruction of those tapes. We knew nothing about the presence of Camp No [Camp Seven] at Guantanamo, the secret CIA facility for interrogations at Gitmo. We didn't know about that. We did not know about the presence of what would come to be known as OMS—Office of Medical Services—in supervising aspects of the interrogation program. And we didn't know about what was in the inspector general's report of the CIA, or any way in which that criss-crossed with issues of health professional involvement.
So just to get the significance of what this conversation meant, you have to see it within the context of what we didn't know, and what we didn't know we didn't know.

**GB:Q-1:** That was in 2005?

Raymond: Six.

**GB:Q-1:** In 2006.

Raymond: *It was October of 2006. And that was at the time we were working hard in supporting Katherine Eban and *Vanity Fair*.*

At that point my focus was on understanding the drugging issue. What were psychologists who had prescription privileges, (many of whom were BSCTs at Guantánamo) why was that important? Were they drugging detainees? Were they doing research on their cortisol and catecholamine levels? Like they've been doing in the SERE training program itself, with Doctor Andy[M] and Morgan. I was trying to understand those issues. That was my focus.

Now one last piece of background here. In the summer of 2006, I believe it was three detainees died in what was supposedly a suicide. Later, through Scott Horton's reporting, allegations are that they died at Camp No— which are not confirmed. When those detainees died in the summer of 2006, PHR was given the opportunity to be the independent forensic consultants for
the family of one of them. I believe it was [Salah Ahmed] al-Salami. “Salemi.” [Phonetic] We ended up not taking that opportunity, and forensic pathologists from Scandinavia ended up doing that mission later. The point is, at the time they died we did not think—we didn't know to think—that there was any relationship between those deaths and the broader issues we were working on.

**GB:Q-1:** Was that why PHR declined?

Raymond: We declined due to a couple of issues. Capacity—It meant putting teams in the field to go to Yemen. It meant jurisdiction, mandate, access and access to the remains. We were doing a lot of debates at the time about whether to do it, in the sense of, "Well, our focus is on the campaigning around health professional status. Does this help or hurt our access on those issues? What, in terms of the psychosocial and family support element, are we actually going to be able to do here for the family in Yemen? Are we going to get the remains?" The issue with dead detainees is that you then have—it's different for every culture and/or ethnicity, but you have so many sensitivities in terms of burial, in terms of when you have to do it, how you have to do it, putting the whole set of remains back together—it is, from a logistical perspective, a big commitment. At the end of the day, it worked out the right way. Teams that were available ended up doing it, and we were not positioned to do it at the time.

That said, when Scott called me, I was not thinking about that case whatsoever. So we get on the phone, and he starts asking me questions about what I think is going on with the APA. At the time, I didn't know what he was getting at. I initially thought that he didn't know anything, but
was concerned about these issues as someone in the field. But as the conversation goes on, he was trying to assess my level of knowledge, to see if it was consistent with what he knew.

Then the bombshell comes. He says, "I was at Guantánamo in the summer of 2006, installing cameras at the secret CIA facility." I didn't ask that question. Scott says it.

**GB:Q-1:** Scott Horton?

Raymond: Scott Gewehr. Now we want to get to his last name in a second because his last name is very important. So Gewehr says, "I was installing cameras at the secret CIA facility that doesn't exist at Gitmo." [Laughs]

**GB:Q-1:** He said it like that?

Raymond: He said, "I was at a secret CIA facility at Guantánamo, installing cameras." He didn't say, "It doesn't exist," but he said "a not publicly known CIA facility." He said—and this is the critical phrase—he said, "And then they told me to stop installing the cameras. I don't do my deception detection work if I can't record, both for the safety of the interrogator and the safety of the detainee."

I said, "What did you do after they didn't let you do that?"

He said—and this is critical—"They didn't let me install the cameras like I did at the other sites." Like I did at the other sites. Now at that point we didn't know there was a taping system,
and that they destroyed them. So someone calls up and says, "Yes, that Martian alien UFO was different than the other Martian alien UFO," and it's like, "There was another Martian alien UFO?" [Laughter] "So you've been involved in camera installation at the other black sites!". I mean, that would make sense, wouldn't it? I didn't ask him that question, because I didn't know.

**GB-Q-1:** This was on the phone.

**Raymond:** On the phone. I was standing on the back porch at PHR, because I was chain smoking during the whole thing, and I was looking out toward the Charles River, and being like wheeze, wheeze. When he said that, I had to hold onto the balcony railing there, because he said, "Yeah. Like the other sites." Someone calls up and says, basically, I'm the cable guy for the CIA black site program. [Laughter]

**MMC-Q-2:** Time Warner!

**Raymond:** Yes. Let's see if the remote is working. Okay. All your channels are up. [Laughter] It was dumbfounding. He said, "They told me I couldn't, like at the other sites, so I left." He said it was in the summer of 2006.

At that time, I didn't get it. He was trying to find out what I think he was trying to find out what I knew about the summer in which the detainees died.

**MMC-Q-2:** Yes. Makes sense.
Raymond: I totally missed it. I missed it. I didn't think at that point of "Salemi," al-Salami, etc. Why? It's perfectly reasonable why I didn't. Because there was no indication at that point, no allegation that they had been at a secret facility. So I wouldn't have known. There were two other critical points in the conversation from there. One, as I said, I'm looking at drugging. I think that drugging was part of it. I also think that looking at issues related to what I called at the time the "harm metric," which is, were they, through oral swabbing or blood drawing, measuring the cortisol levels in the detainees, like they had done in the SERE program, to be able to have a scientific metric of harm? The Morgan studies. If they were using the Morgan studies, my theory was, as the basis for the OLC memos, then why wouldn't they use the Morgan methodology on the detainees?

So there's more on that. I'm going to leave that aside for a second, and get back to what Scott said. Then Scott says, "Well, you know, there were many tactics beyond what was authorized." He basically then said, "I read the medical section, the classified medical section of the inspector general's report." And

I'm like, "Oh, yeah. The classified medical section of the inspector general's report. Oh, the classified one?"

"Yeah." At that point, we knew the OIG [Office of Inspector General] report existed. There was maybe the first partially declassified version was out, but it was like the title, the date, and a few
sentences here and there. There were two or three iterations of the OIG report, in terms of declassification. At that point, I had no sense that there was an "OMS [Office of Mission Systems]" section to the OIG report. So, basically, GewehrGerwehr is saying that—he didn't say yes or no to drugs, and I never said he said yes or no to drugs. He said that there were "additional, unauthorized tactics." He referred to it as voodoo: "There was voodoo in there."

Now voodoo means a whole bunch of stuff—experimental tactics, things they didn't think would work, things that individual interrogators did. I don't know what he meant by voodoo, but that was sort of my sense of what he was saying; that it really harmed the detainees; that the mental and physical health status of the detainees was worse than we knew.

So, basically, within four to five questions, someone had said, "I am a CIA contractor who was bounced from a black site for trying to install cameras. I was a CIA contractor who was bounced from a black site for trying to install cameras during the time window in which the detainees died from alleged suicide. I am a CIA contractor who tried to install cameras at an unknown CIA facility, during the time when the detainees died, and I had access to the classified medical sections of the inspector general's report, and the tactics list." I said, "Wow. We've got to keep this going." I said, "Could I put you in touch with journalists?" I tried to get him to talk to Adam Zagorin of Time magazine, who did the [Mohammed al-Qahtani] story. He did meet and talk to Eban. I don't know what happened during that interview, but basically Eban said, "He didn't know anything about the drugs."
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I said, "I didn't say he knew about the drugs. I said that I think there was involvement of drugs as part of the interrogation problem."

and he said, "Yeah, there were a lot of unauthorized techniques," saying the possibility of. So, basically, that interview, that contact that happens between Eban and Gewehr goes dark on her, and he goes dark on me, and that's by January of 2007.

So, to get back to where we were here when Isaac finds that Gewehr's dead by that time point I had not had contact with him, because I thought he'd burned me. I thought he was done with me. So I hadn't been tracking him, and I hadn't been trying to set him up on dates with the Senate Armed Services Committee, or Senate Intelligence, journalists, any accountability structure. At that point, by 2007, a couple things had happened that changed my approach. I did not want to be getting information like Gewehr gave me. This was important. I didn't want to be implicated or tied into leaked classified information. That does not help anyone. I wanted anyone like that that I knew about, to be able to be a shepherd for them and say -- I want to get back to this part -- is this okay with you?

Baker: Oh, yes.

Raymond: When you have an intelligence agent who wants to become a source, you have a lamb lost in the woods. There is a range of there is a predictable arc, you learn over time, that these sources go through, and there are different arcs for different types of sources. The rarest source is a white knight, and a white knight is a guy who's coming in and
saying, "Gosh darn it," you know, the Jimmy Stewart— we'll call him the Jimmy Stewart source. "They're tryin' to build that dam down at Willow Creek, and I'm not going to stand for it." So, basically, the Jimmy Stewart is are the rarest. All of them trying to come off like the Jimmy Stewart— very [unclear]. A few of them are a Jimmy Stewart. Most of them are a musical-chair source. They realize the music is about to stop on them, and they're trying to find a chair, and they think you're there's a chair, so they're going to sit on you. Then you have the ones who are actively out-front playing you, and are clear about it. Basically, you know, saying, "Yeah, I did bad things. What can you give me?" And that's important for people to understand; that there is a whole subculture of sourcing. People were selling, trying to sell, to use news media, classified stacks. People would show up at a journalist's house with [ph] "cybernetic" [phonetic] CyperNet traffic— classified military [ph] "cybernetic" traffic, and try to sell it, from Gitmo. A guy had a [unclear] garage full of [phonetic] I didn't see it, but I was told this story— classified information.

So, in the 2006—2007 period, GewehrGerwehr was one of the first of multiple sources washing ashore, that were a range of different types of sources. I realized then that my job was not to learn what they knew, it was to shepherd them to the appropriate place for their source type. Just one last quick example on this— We had one guy, whom I met in a church parking lot during a rainstorm, and I was coordinating with the Senate Armed Services Committee [SASC]. They had a JAG-stand by to represent him, to get on a plane to fly to our location. So I went in as, basically, the "cut-up," for [SASC, ASK,] [phonetic] and I knew this guy had important information related to detainee abuse in Iraq. I knew he was going to be at this place at this time. It wasn't a set meet. I knew I could get to him. So I got to the guy and I said, "I think you know
something. The Senate Armed Services Committee needs to hear what you know. They can take classified information. We have a lawyer standing by. We will get you to a hotel room in [Unclear Weston], Virginia or wherever; a Motel 6, with a JAG, and you just download. And I disappear. I'm the shepherd. I'm not here to shear you. I'm just here to get you to the guy with the clippers." He looks me straight in the eye—and it chills me to this day. This is one of the most chilling moments—he looks me straight in the eye and he says, "I'm not cop[ing] talking to anyone until there's a different Justice Department." And he walked away. He walked off from there, in the rain, and I'm standing in this parking lot, shaking. I call up [SASKSASC] and I said, "We've got a no—go. No-go. Stand down the JAG." And that was that.

GB:Q-1: I want to ask a question. Can I ask you two questions? One, obviously we're going to get to the last name, because—

Raymond: We're getting into, and that is Isaac's story because Isaac [unclear], because I hadn't figured out why his last name was so important.

GB:Q-1: The other thing is—obviously he was not a white knight. He was [unclear] playing musical chairs, you thought.

Raymond: This is important to say. There Gerwehr could have been multiple things at once. That's the thing about the source spectrum—they wobble. They tell themselves, they identify themselves in their minds as what they are; you identify them; and then, through actions, you figure out the difference. What I think happened—and now, having seen his [unclear personal
email] — I think there was something nasty in the woodshed at Gitmo in the summer of 2006. Something spooked him. I think it affected his professional [unclear chances], what happened. Now that's what I feel confident about. He got spooked, and he was reaching out. The only reason he'd be reaching to me was he was conducting counter-intelligence to see what we knew. But why he would do a limited hangout, for a human rights investigator—you put one quarter in the jukebox and you get ten songs. It's easy, as you said. "Yeah, I've been involved in the detainee issues." "Okay. Did they do this? Did they do that? Did they do that?" And he suddenly has a full counter-intelligence assessment on me. He knows exactly what I know, without giving anything. But he gave up the freaking ship, and what was amazing about that—amazing—when this comes out publicly, everyone's going to be saying, "Well, how do we know that what Natty says GewehrGewehr told him is true?"

This is [unclear how]. I had no idea those things were relevant. They all became relevant in ways that are independently confirmed. Because by 2007, the tapes issue had come out in the Times. Until then I hadn't thought of GewehrGewehr, in the tape statement, in a major way. Why? Not because I didn't think it wasn't important—but because there was no way I could confirm it. "Well, let me call up the other taping guy for the CIA." There wasn't any of that. My point in 2007, after the Vanity Fair story was out, is [Unclear] feed SASC, feed Armed Services—because if I get a magical guy like GewehrGewehr—he's no good to me unless he's going to convert. What I mean by that is, I've got to take him through a conversion process, from "I'm going to do [unclear] limited hangouts with some twenty-something-shmo-human rights investigator," to "I'm going to convert you into a source for Congress. Then I'll let go of you." And you just send wishes and kisses out to the world. "Good luck. God speed." Because that's
where he should be. I should not be doing the job of congressional oversight and law enforcement. I should not be dealing in classified.

So, in terms of any time I had contact with a source, after GewehrGerwehr had a major source like that had come in, where or I had reached out, I had lawyers, lawyers, lawyers, and lawyers, so I was going through a bag check process to make sure that when I went into a meeting, in some cases I would have a legal brief only from counsel to PHR, saying, "Here's what you can say. Here's what you can hear. Here's what you do if they offer something, and then you stop." So that's important for people to understand, because at that point we knew there had been leak investigations into Mitchell and Jessen. Now PHR had no knowledge of who the sources were in those, but I wanted to make sure that myself and my colleagues were not carrying the bag going in.

So everything Isaac did, everything Isaac was looking at, was within the context of me constantly getting legal advice. There would be multiple calls we were on throughout what would become the GewehrGerwehr achievement issue, where we were always checking with the lawyers, and made sure we were never winging it. That's important here, because if you want to create this sort of sexy and romantic [Robert U.], Woodward and [Carl] Bernstein sort of narrative, we made sure we were never making up our interpretation of U.S. covert identity law, or classified information law.

But So let's go back to GewehrGerwehr: here. When Isaac tells me he's dead, I suddenly start—we pulled out a timeline. Among the first things I had him do was: okay, What are all
the public things we know about the timeline of the DOJ tapes investigation? Because the immediate thing—our immediate responsibility was to disambiguate whether we had a guy come in who knew something that was clear to us at the time, in relevance to the DOJ tape destruction investigation. So Isaac goes down the rabbit hole. Do you want to talk about the name?

Baker: Yes. Sure. The more you looked into him, the more of a mystery Gewehr was. So I was just trying to crack that nut.

GB:Q-1: And you were doing all this online.

Baker: Yes. Yes.

Raymond: Well, we started taking it offline, and creating paper on table tops, so once we knew we had a tradecraft problem—that someone was watching where Isaac was going, and things were disappearing off the web—

GB:Q-1: Even though you were doing that from the liquor store, and not from PHR offices.

Baker: Exactly. So, yes. Going into backdoors at the liquor store, on the computers, and basically storing everything offline. Everything would be kept on disks, on paper. The more I was digging into him, just trying to find out who he was because in 1998, there's nothing for him. Nothing before 1998 on Scott Gewehr. He's just nothing. The earliest I
Raymond: UCLA or the University of Chicago.

Baker: So I started looking into his family members, trying to put them together. When I was looking into his family, I found out that his birth name is Gerwer. He added the "h" in there, I'm guessing around the age of eighteen, because when I was checking into his social security death index, his social security number was issued to him at the age of eighteen. So when that happened, I found out that the name change that he went with was actually a German spelling for an assault rifle —-- Gewehr —--Gewehr assault rifle.

Raymond: There is no other person in the United States with the last name Gewehr spelled with the same "h."

Baker: Exactly. The way he spells it is the only way it's spelled anywhere.

Raymond: Well, let's talk intelligence tradecraft here; why this is important.

Now I don't know what I'm about to say is not conclusive in fact. What I'm saying is that the process by which someone gets an artificial cover identity in the CIA--

Baker: A "knock." "Phonetic" NOC [Non-Official Cover].
Raymond: "so to become a "knock"NOC agent, and part of a clandestine service, you get a new social security number, and you get a new name. At eighteen, for some reason, Scott Gewehr got a new name that was a one-letter difference from his previous name, and he got a new social security number, and he started running on them. He had no bachelor's degree.

Baker: Even though he was occasionally listed as a Ph.D., he never had a bachelor's degree.

MMC-Q-2: What was the occasion of He was occasionally listed as his Ph.D.?


Raymond: Yes. The point is how—and he, in his own CV [Curriculum Vitae]—which had been available at one point on the APA website—unclear—he's listed as having top secret (which is not that big a deal), but top secret, and this is a big deal, SCI [Special Compartmental Information] clearance—Special Compartmentalized, or Compartmental Information. Okay. So SCI is specific subsections of clearance, about highly, highly classified things. So he had SCI clearance since before 9/11. How does someone who had declared bankruptcy by twenty—something, change his name by one letter, and have a switch-out switch out social security number, on a one-letter name change, and no bachelor's degree—
Baker: —— not to mention being a senior analyst at Rand and at a defense contractor called the Defense Group International [DGI] [unclear].

Raymond: How did they do that? Give him SCI clearance? So the logical thing, at that point, is I remember the moment, "He's a fucking NOC!" [unclear]. I'm walking around like, "Okay. Let's weigh it on the scale. Oooh-oooh." He's a fucking NOC.

MMC-Q-2: What does that stand for?

Raymond: Non-Official Government Cover.

MMC-Q-2: Okay.

GB-Q-1: Okay. One other question, what the hell is he doing on the APA website? How does he get on the APA list?

Raymond: He's doing a lot on [unclear] the APA [unclear] website. He wrote for Spin. He was the key Rand RAND convener for APA.

Baker: He was the one who actually organized things between the CIA and the APA.

Raymond: Yes. He was the guy who put them in the room. As we later saw from [Unclear] his emails, Brandon reaches out to him, when she's working at APA, and she says, "I'm told by folks
in intel you know a lot about deception." And he's like—-you see his own email saying, "This is an exciting opportunity. I'm really glad to get going with the APA on this." Then he's introduced to Hubbard, at CIA, whom he starts working for.

So the issue is, let's say he's not a NOCG. Okay. Fine. What's up with the new social security number at eighteen? You plotted it out-—w. Why does this guy have SCI clearance?

MMC-Q-2: What do they list his Ph.D. as being earned?

Baker: I don't remember, but it was a science along the lines of a bio-science, a bio—or a chem—science. It was an early paper that he wrote. Around the time of his death, his bio at UCLA said that, I believe, he was going for his Ph.D.

Raymond: Or his master's.

Baker: Or his master's. That's right.

Raymond: Yes. But he still had credits undone on his bachelor's at the University of Chicago.

Baker: He was actually originally from Chicago.

Raymond: So the issue is, you have a guy who's reporting of his death is not coming up the right way. You have an ongoing DOJ investigation at this time into the stuff that he did.
Baker: We didn't mention Brian Humphries. Humphrey's email.

Raymond: Do you want to talk about Brian Humphreys?

Baker: Brian Humphreys was — —

Raymond: He was the chief spokesperson for LAFD [Los Angeles Fire Department] at the time of Scott's death.

Baker: The LAFD were the first responders to the scene.

GB-Q-1: The fire department.

Baker: Yes. The L.A. Fire Department. They were the first to respond — —

Raymond: Isaac [unclear] recreated a "tick-tock" of the whole, entire accident, by the way, with Google maps, weather and traffic pattern analysis. [unclear].

Baker: It was great. This is [unclear]. The interesting thing is, they would give alerts if there were traffic problems or accidents. Brian Humphreys, I think, actually did it himself. He posted an alert saying that there was this motorcycle accident, "more to follow later. Traffic will be shut down for a while." Then there was nothing else after that.
So I contacted him, and I asked him details on the accident.

Raymond: Now if you think everything up to this point is weird, get ready for this.

Baker: I didn't hear back from him for a while. A couple weeks. So I decided to follow up...wrote a follow up email. I said, "I haven't heard back from you. I was wondering if you got my last email. Could you let me know anything about this accident? It would mean a lot and what not." He responded, and he said...-

Raymond: He responded from his home email.

Baker: He responded from his home email, saying, "I'm sorry, but I can't help you. Would you please direct yourself to the coroner's office?"

Raymond: Well, there was a step before that, which was a video.

Baker: Well, he attached to the email...he attached a video to the email, a ten-second video, of guys working on a house, and the guy behind the camera says, "As you can see, it's just men working on a house, and there's nothing else to see here. Love you."

GB:Q-1: Wow.
Baker: And that was that. Never heard back from him.

Raymond: Never heard back from him.

Baker: I kept trying to email him, asking him to explain the video.

GB:Q-1: Did you ever find the house? Could you identify the house?

Baker: No.

Raymond: There's two explanations for that, okay? The one that you have to say is the least likely is that he accidentally sent a video. If there were a couple of emails from that account, and someone writes to you and you're not writing back, can you switch emails if you're ignoring them? No. Then you accidentally send a video clip to someone you don't know, when you are in a public person as the spokesperson for the fire department, about an accident.

The second thing is that there was something weird here, and he didn't know what to do about it. Now we could go on and on into all the things we learned later, and the different parts of the investigation in reference to his death. The clear conclusion is that we have no circumstantial or direct evidence to suggest that he was murdered. Right now, if someone had to answer a yes-or-no question—was Scott Gewehr murdered? I would say no, based on the preponderance of the evidence.
GB:Q-1: What do you think shutting down the freeway for so much longer—how do you understand that?

Raymond: Correlation is not causation.

GB:Q-1: I know that.

Raymond: The issue here is that I don't know. I don't know. What I know is that the investigation with Scott—what law enforcement needs to do on Scott is not—and when this comes out, there are going to be all these people on blogs; and all these people on the web: treating Scott like a Frank Olson, at [Project MKULTRA, [Unclear]]. Understandable. But let's not miss the overall here, ladies and gentlemen, which is to go investigate his life. You're not going to find new answers, most likely—sorry, got to pet a dog here—[unclear]. You're not going to find new answers—yeah, there we go. [unclear].

GB:Q-1: I neglected to say that there is a fifth member at this party, [unclear] who is June.

You’re—

Raymond: [Unclear] Yes, there is a large snoozing dog. So we need to find out if he was telling those things to me, first question: Was he a source to the Department of Justice on the “tapes case”? Was he among the animators and instigators on what [unclear] led [Michael B.] Mukasey to give the mandate that led to the [John H. [unclear] Durham] investigation? I don't know. I have no indication one way or the other. I'm saying we've got to know that. The same second thing is,
did he know about the "OID" stuff from CIA? Because he had gone to OIG. We've got to find out.

What we can see from his expense reports and tax returns that were available in the online materials we received from his family, through James Risen and the New York Times, his income goes down after the 2006 period. By the time of his death, he has lost a contract. The travel reimbursements for Langley are going down, he is traveling less frequently or not at all. What I'm trying to get to here is, what happened in 2006 to Scott Gewehr, and what did he do after it? That's the point.

GB:Q-1: That's the issue.

Raymond: That's the issue. It's not about reading the tea leaves in LAPD [Los Angeles Police Department] accident or coroner's report. That's not where this starts. It's not an investigation of a death, it's an investigation of a life. At that time, though, when you have the flash dragging from Isaac here, that Gewehr was dead, we had to start with that. That's where we had to start. Then Isaac's work led into the reconstruction of a life.

Baker: Do you want to talk about the photo you saw?
Raymond: I don't think we understood the significance at the time and Scott, and the desktop computer that was available online — the Christmas photo?

Baker: Yes. There's a blog after she died, eventually, that his friends put together. The interesting thing about his life is that, in spite of all the work he did, he was avid fan of B-movies — Buffy the Vampire Slayer. Actually, the details I found out about his accident, that weren't available in the LA Times, I found out because a friend of his, Adam Felber, who's on Wait, Don't Tell Me, a writer for HBO — I actually contacted him, and I said, "I know you were good friends with Scott Gewehr, and he is the one I have been researching, and I've been researching his line of work. He was very prominent in the stuff that he wrote, so I wondered — I was shocked to find out that he died. Could you tell me more about it?" So he was actually kind enough to give me details about his death. But yes, he was basically a nerd with his friends. They liked to have bad movies, have little film festivals —

Raymond: and play D&D Dungeons and Dragons. for real.

Baker: So there is this touching photo of him and his wife — technically not wife, partner, I would say. They actually made an agreement with each other not to get married until gay marriage was legalized. I think that was a stance that they made. So the picture was just reading something on the screen, and Scott smiling, standing behind her, with his hand on her shoulder.

GB: So they were actually a heterosexual couple, but they were taking a stand on gay rights.
Baker: Right.

**GB:Q-1**: One question I haven't asked [unclear]—in all this—

Raymond: They also they went to anti-torture rallies together.

Baker: They went to anti-torture rallies, yes.

**GB:Q-1**: How old was he when he died? [Unclear]

Baker: Was it thirty—nine? I think late '30s—thirties.

Raymond: Thirty—nine. We're probably going to have edit this out, out of respect for the family. This is a critical thing. We have agreement of the family about what we are and are not going to say publicly, not making them or Scott anymore any more than the issue than they are [unclear]probably going to be. But it's important now, in this first draft of history, that we lay it all out there. The issue is that [unclear]Isaac, you found that picture and you drawing it to my attention—remember the conversation we had, when we looked at it? And that was like, "That's it?" That's the Holy Grail. They had a desktop. It's What is on the desktop. And thus began the strategy. We had to find out what she knew. But that was actually secondary. We had to find out what day data there was. What we learned was that immediately after his death, "DGI," his employer at the time, who was his employer in
the summer of 2006, came and seized his laptop, and everything that was potentially classified immediately. What they didn't know was that when he worked from home, he downloaded all of his personal work emails onto that desktop. By the time we got use of that, we deduced that that was as a possibility, we realized we had back to the Nefud strategy we could see Aqaba. We had made it across the desert.

Now the initial thing is, we were thinking there would be government material on there, including, potentially, videos. We didn't know, but we had to go in with an assumption that it could be highest-level radioactivity. So that informed everything. It turned out that that's not what it was, but it was as if not more important that's the thing here; that everyone in the journalistic investigation community is like, "We want the tapes. We want the secret documents." What we wanted, what we wouldn't say no to getting in the hands of the FBI or the New York Times, but what we wanted more than anything was the non-classified civilian interface between APA and the intelligence community, and he was right in the middle of it. That was the trick. It turns out, that's what was in there.

GB:Q-1: And how did you get it?

Baker: This is the mad adventure.

Raymond: This is the mad adventure. This is a whole five-hour [unclear]—this part of it. Needless to say, I realized—okay using a journalist.
in the L.A. area that we thought had another source, that would cross-validate that would cross-validate.

Baker: 

Raymond: Right. So we thought that this local journalist would cross-check what Scott had said to me, potentially. That turned out not to be the case, and it was not going to work through that venue. It was a bad call, and I take responsibility for that call. We bring Risen into the picture. It was time to get very professional. Risen developed a relationship with the family. We talked to the family, but trust was hard after the initial interventions of the journalist, the other journalist. It was a bunch of guys showing up from the human rights organization and say, "I think you may have a potential ticking time bomb sitting in your house," basically. That doesn't give them a good response. It's either, "They're crazy, get away from me, don't re-open these wounds," or it's, "They're right. Oh my god! What am I going to do? How do I know to trust them?"

So that's where Risen was critical. We ended up getting Alex Whiting of Harvard Law School, former Assistant U.S. Attorney, and now a deputy prosecutor for the international criminal court. There was not a single better person in the world to give them. And this is important here. We were in a power position where we could have dictated more what happened with the family. I wanted to state this. This is about standards and ethics, which we didn't have a source and though this is the United States, the same family care issues, and psychosocial issues that you deal with a mass grave in Afghanistan apply here. So we wanted
that family to have the highest level of independent legal counsel, just for their decision making. This was a very painful process for us and for them, but I wanted them to be represented, and I wanted them to have a lawyer who could tell them to say no to us.

So what came out of it—and this took place over a year—is I ended up going in to see "Drum," Durham [phonetic] into the Department of Justice to see "Drum," Durham and the FBI, and say, "You have to look at this computer." I said to them also, "Jim Risen will probably have these materials as well." That did not make—it was like, "Ha. I’m going to tell you there’s a secret computer file. It has classified torture videos on it. Also, the New York Times, they’re in there, too. Gentlemen, start your engines." [Laughter]

GB:Q-1: Did you already have a relationship with "Drum," Durham?

Raymond: No. Through a lawyer who worked at the Justice Department I sent a message to "Drum," Durham. It was like a pirate movie—"We need to parlay." So at that point PHR says, "Okay. We've got to go through a legal process on this." And we did. So our lawyers talked to DOJ. This was done totally above board, and John Bradshaw—who was accompanying me on the initial [unclear] SASC meeting—comes with me to DOJ. I'll probably cut this part right out, but we weren't entered on the books at DOJ; we were brought in through the back door.

GB:Q-1: Tell that story anyway.
Raymond: So Bradshaw and I show up, and we go to check in at the Department of Justice. This was the day of days. To think about it from the perspective of folks who had been human rights investigators during the torture years, “Durham to our knowledge Arnott” [phonetic] had not talked to a single person from our community, and finally we had a meeting with the Wizard of Oz— as high as you could go in the accountability game. There was no higher, other than the Attorney General. I had met with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence by that point, on experiments in torture and Dasht-i. That's important for folks to know here. Every time we did a major report, we did a major report every time we had a major investigation. I went to Washington, I presented to the committees, as it was being released publicly. So I walked them through everything. And when the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said that they were taking EIT as part of their investigation, we had met with the staff writing the SSCI report. So I was used to going down and seeing the committees. I knew that doesn't do much. So going to see “Durham,” that was the bowl of cherries. That was the big leagues. To come in with that feeling of maybe we can do something here, and you go up to the lady in the white shirt, in the security uniform, and the badge, behind the glass, and she says, "Okay, what's your name?" And she says, "You don't have a meeting. You're not in the books." Bradshaw and I are looking at each other, and I was like, "Okay. I'm not going to call Isaac. I'm not going to call anyone. They're going to freak out on me. They're going to say, 'Natty, you screwed up the date and the time on this meeting.'" The woman said, "I'll call over, but I don't know what to do here."

So we sit down. Bradshaw and I are sitting there like, "Oh, man," and then— literally— the doors fling open in the entrance coming from the Hoover building— the FBI— and in
walks the man himself, with two FBI agents and another assistant U.S. attorney. And they come in and "Durham" says, "We're not putting this one on the books." Basically, we don't need to check him in. And it was both exciting and exhilarating, and also like, "What the hell is this? What happens next?" It was like, "We're going to take you down to the basement level." They take us in, and we're standing the elevator, and it's the most awkward small-talk moment in my life. You're in there, there are armed FBI agents, and you're standing there and it's like—

MMC-Q-2: --- you talk about your [unclear]?dog?

Raymond: You know, "Have you been following the Red Sox this year?"

So we went up to the situation room of the Attorney General, to the secure facility where the Attorney General communicates with the National Security Council and with the President, and we go through two sets of doors. We go into this room, this huge conference room. You're sitting there, and it's like in those baseball movies where the scout takes the prospective player out to Fenway Park, and like, "You wanna play here?" To be in that room, it's like, "Okay, I asked for you guys to be serious about this. You're being serious."

They started off immediately about what was the situation around the package in California; what did I believe the significance of the package was; how do we go get the package?

GB-Q-1: Did they use the word "package"?
Raymond: I honestly don't remember the exact words. Package—computer item, interchangeable.

“What do you think is in the item? When could we go get the package? Do you think the family would be open to it? What surveillance do you think is in play?” At that point— and I've been talking so much, I want to give this back to you—but at that point we had direct and indirect indications that there was surveillance. In 2009, after we did Dasht-i-Leili, the day before the Dasht-i-Leili article was about to go, the D.C. office, there was a forced entry at the D.C. office—

Baker:—of PHR.

Raymond:—of the PHR D.C. office, there was a forced entry. Someone had entered a magnetically sealed door without a key card going through— that night before the Dasht-i-Leili story came out. Then the morning Dasht-i went out, many people's voice-mail messages were erased at PHR, their [unclear]greeting ones. Someone had gotten entry to the PHR office—

Baker:—through the keypad, at the entrance.

Raymond: This is what we deduced. Because the phone opens the door downstairs, that someone very sophisticated had been going [vocalizes] with an algorithm, on the phones, to figure out which phone was the master on it; reset it; reset the password. So everybody had their passwords erased on their voice mail, because whoever got in there knew that the phone was activating the security lock. Nothing was taken.
MMC-Q-2: What's your theory?

Baker: Well, something was taken.

Raymond: That's the third piece. You tell that story.

Baker: So when we got back from D.C. — this was when I was first at PHR and I was shooting the videos in B-roll footage — I had a camera with me, it was PHR property, back at the apartment we were staying at on Bay Street. The apartment was me, Nathaniel, and a third fellow named [John Shawn Coleman?]. Natty was about to go do an interview with Al Jazeera, I believe, that day —

Raymond: Yes. They were coming to pick me up in an SUV, so they were outside saying goodbye to me, as I was getting into the delivery car. [unclear].

Baker: So we were actually just sitting on the front porch. He goes out, we say goodbye to him, and then me and Coleman sit on the front porch and have a cigarette, and we talk for a little bit. This car drives up to the front of the house. It looks like a delivery car, a food delivery guy, and he gets out of the car. He goes up to the house, and he's up there for a few minutes, then he goes back down, gets in the car and drives off, after he delivers the food. Then me and Coleman get back into the apartment, and we watch TV. Then I decide to just “play with” the camera,
shoot some of the leftover footage around the apartment. We're watching a Red Sox game, and I point the camera and realize it's not recording. "What's going on?" Then I realize — I open up the tape compartment, and the tape that was inside the camera is gone. It was there that morning, and now it's gone.

Raymond: So later, when I come back and they tell me this, I go prowling around and I find a recent-greasy paper bag in the trash out back, consistent with the bag the delivery man was supposedly bringing in. So, basically, it was a cover, most likely.

Then we get to 2010, during the GewehrGerwehr stuff, there was — our mail was opened.

**GB:Q-1:** At PHR or at your private home?

Baker: At our home.

Raymond: At that point we had a place in Summerville, near Porter Square, on Burnside Avenue. Our mail got opened on occasion. There were scratch marks around the keyhole, and signs of potential forced entry. Then, at various points, we saw — we drew, at one point — I said, "Have you seen these people near here you lately?" Because I'd seen them hanging around the office. I said, "You draw who you saw, and I'll draw who I saw," and we pretty much drew the same thing.
Baker: The last person. Another interesting thing, though, on the same day, he's at the PHR office, I'm back at the house in Porter Square, and I'm on my computer, and I notice that, sitting there at my computer, the mouse starts moving by itself. I try to get it to stop, and it starts opening up files. The mouse opened up the file I had on GewehrGerwehr, and started downloading off of it. I immediately shut down my computer, took it out of

Raymond: The same day, I called him, before he called me

Baker: I'm about to call him and then he calls me, and he says, "You won't believe what happened at the PHR office."

I said, "What's that?"

He said, "Our computers are getting hacked."

GB-Q-1: And this was the day that?

Raymond: This was in the middle of 2010, on the same day his computer was compromised.

GB-Q-1: I see what you're saying. The same day as [unclear].

Raymond: His computer got compromised; the PHR computers got compromised; my mom's home computer got compromised, within thirty-six hours, all from each other— boom, boom,
boom, boom, boom. I came in—and this is the thing—I came in, and the Gewehr files were open on my computer. Then he's about to call me and say, "Someone's opening my Gewehr files," but my computer had already compromised specific to the Gewehr files.

GB:Q-1: So at that point you knew there was surveillance on you.

Raymond: Yes. And we were hearing from two sources of limited credibility that there was a surveillance truck on us. Now the point is that they were pinging back and forth. I don't know what was what, but even before we were told to look for it called to [unclear] court, we were seeing clear evidence consistent with someone putting a magnifying glass right on top of us. When people hear this and say, "Oh, that's crazy," it's important to know that Risen was under "avowed" government surveillance at the time. Okay? So it's not surprising. It's like if one day you know your best friend has fleas, and one day you wake up itching—like, "Am I a hypochondriac?"

GB:Q-1: It was probably the contact with Risen rather than the contact with "Durham" that tipped them off.

Raymond: This was before we had contacted "Durham." Well, the issue is, we don't know, and I'm not even going to speculate. The whole community was under a full-court press by that point, and by community I mean everybody. You had a DOJ investigation into the human rights people. You had a DOJ investigation into the CIA. You had a DOJ investigation into Risen's
content on a source, on concealing the name of a source from the court. Everybody was under investigation. And then, in that context, you say, when there are multiple dailies—by dailies I mean daily transcripts of what you're saying flying around, within the intelligence community. You've got lots of dailies, and you're saying, "I think maybe there's a secret taping system of digital [unclear] data and we'll go find it." [laughs] We're going to pay attention to that.

I also want to make this clear— and Isaac, I want you to share what you think—I never thought our lives were in danger.

Baker: No.

Raymond: I don't think that. I don't think that at all. This is what we called a goalie position. This is about—any surveillance there was, was about preventing us from making contact with the DOJ.

GB:Q-1: From your making the connection [unclear] And from making the connections that you were making.

Raymond: Yes, it wasn't, "We need to stop them from having a thing," or, "we need to hurt them." It was, "We need to know what they're doing, to try to bring people together to share information, in proper ways, through proper channels." What's scary about it is, it wasn't about us, it was about interdicting [unclear] truth tell.
Baker: I never felt in danger for my life, but you saw what was happening. I could see what was happening, and I knew it was real. You couldn't talk about it. I figured if I told anybody—my friends, my family—they would just think I was nuts. I just remember at that point in time I kind of shut down from my friends and family. I didn't talk to them, because how could I explain it?

Raymond: We didn't talk in the house, and we didn't talk in the office.

Baker: And it was the most prominent thing going on in my life, so—

Raymond: We didn't talk on the phone. We used burner phones.

GB:Q-1: You were roommates at that point?

Baker: Yes, yes. So if somebody asked me, "How is your day going? Isaac, how is life going?" And you just went, "It's fine, I guess. Work." You can't really go beyond that, because if you go into it, people are just going to say this guy is nuts.

GB:Q-1: So how would you guys talk?

Raymond: I had different places that I would go to use pay phones and burner phones. None of that matters.
if they have voice algorithm "parroting," patterning. It doesn't matter. If you can [unclear] be calling on a Campbell's soup can, on a string attached to it, from [unclear], Timbuktu, but Isaac and I, we would go to loud bars, without our cell phones.

Baker: Food courts.

Raymond: Lots of food courts, yes. The other thing was we would walk. We spent that summer walking all the time, and we'd leave our cell phones at home. It got to the point where there wasn't anything to talk about. There wasn't anything to communicate. At a certain point, it got very quiet.

**GB:Q-1**: But once you handed the stuff off to "Durham"—

Raymond: Once I told "Durham" of its whereabouts, and we set up a process—contact points— for him to go get it.

**GB:Q-1**: So that was it. At that point you had done your advocacy, and you connected the dots. Then it was in their hands.

Raymond: Yes.

**GB:Q-1**: And that's why we're all waiting now, for Risen's to write his book.
Raymond: In 2011 they went and they got it. They got the computer from the family with the files on it. Risen received it towards the end of 2010, so he had it before DOJ got it. Then DOJ took it. But the real issue is, even before Isaac and I got our next opportunity, at the end of 2010, I knew after “Durham” it was out. That I was done, because at that point I was in a relationship with Meg [Megan Griscom]. I didn't want to keep subjecting her to this. I didn't want to subject me to this, and I didn't want to subject Isaac to this, and I didn't think there was anything we could do that we hadn't done. So at that point, by October— it’s a month afterwards— then I get a call, that is our next gig, which was from George [T.]. Clooney. [Laughter] George Clooney called and said, “Do you guys want to set up a satellite surveillance system over in Sudan?” And we did. So George Clooney gave us our out.


Raymond: Yes. It was very nice of him to let us quit this field. But there wasn't anything more. We could give all the speeches and write all the op-eds in the world, and until the thing was done on the DOJ's side, and Risen's side, there wasn't anything to do.

GB:Q-1: It's amazing because it's noon[unclear], but, Natty, what we haven't talked about is the FBI coming to you to ask you for more information about the APA. And let me just ask— how long do you think that story is?

Raymond: It's pretty quick. Can we take a break here?
Q-1: This is Ghislaine Boulanger, with Mary Marshall Clark, and we are now in our fourth—fifth [sic] session— with Nathaniel Raymond at [unclear] at—

This is our second session [sic] that includes Isaac Baker, and it’s February 2, 2013, in Northampton, Massachusetts.

Q-1: So you were going to start telling us [unclear] and I think you had a game plan about when you were contacted about the APA.

Raymond: Yes. And I just want to say one thing before that. Up until Isaac started working with me, I had a really great support network. But that support network, because of changes happening at PHR—the graduation of interns, etc.—by the time I met Isaac, with the exception of "Doc Allen," Kathleen Sullivan, my boss at PHR, by and large I was working solo. While I had the Coalition for Ethical Psychology, the things related to Gewehr, the things that were separate from the IT, I did not want to coordinate with them— for their safety. The more people who were involved at that point, when we didn't know what we were dealing with, the worse it was. So what I'm saying is that without Isaac in that investigation—I wouldn't have found the things that we later found. He found so many of the critical things, especially Gewehr being dead. I would have missed it. So I'm saying
friendship was our secret weapon, and it was doing that together that was the game-changer. So without Isaac being there, to be able to support me and for me to support him, I don't think I would have been able to get through it effectively. I just wanted to say that for the record. Because it's the truth.

Baker: Thanks.

GB-Q-1: [Unclear] Certainly with this level of stress, a buddy system is so important.

Raymond: We were constantly able to tell the other person we weren't insane.

Bake-Q-1r: Yes.

Raymond: This is a context point here, which is, in Dasht-i—Isaac was there when we got the satellite imagery from the American Association for the Advancement of Science on Dasht-i-Leili. What that showed us was that the grave got hit around the time we filed for a court order under FOIA, under the Freedom of Information Act request. So for those hearing this, and saying, "Did they suddenly wake up and get paranoid?"—we had clear evidence of a cross-section—an intersection—and a cover-up, through satellite imagery, that unexplainable synergy that the grave would be left there for years, and then get hit when it was, about the release of information that would contextualize why that grave was important. So the entire time Isaac and I were already working at that, already working under the context that that was a hot button, the president came out on CNN and said if there were violations of the laws of
war, we needed to investigate it. The Senate Foreign Relations [SFRC], in an investigation led by [? "Kariaku?" [phonetic] who was working for [unclear]SFRC at the time, under Senator Kerry — — ["Kariaku?" was investigating Dasht-i, and I was debriefed by [? "Kariaku?" in the committee. So the idea that we were in the middle of something extremely big — — that wasn't new, by the time we ran into GewehrGerwehr, and the information about that. That's an important context.

So Isaac and I go dark at the end of 2010, and for all intents and purposes, publicly walk away. We did that because, before we had the opportunities with Harvard, and Clooney, and Satellite Sentinel [Project], we knew it was done. It was in the hands of the people the jurisdiction mandates. So basically from then — — 2010 — — to September 2012, we were just letting "Durham" run. We were working a twenty-four tasking site, monitoring war crimes in the Sudan, so we were busy, and there was nothing we thought we could do. And it was in "Durham's" hands. Then we get to September of this last year — — 2012 — — and "Durham" says, "Declination of prosecution. I'm not going after anything related by mandate on the tapes underlying crime, etc." At that point — — that happened the week before I was getting married, so I made a deal with Meg, my wife, that I wasn't going to do anything the week coming up or the week after, during our honeymoon. We get back from our honeymoon that Friday, the last week of September — the beginning of October, and I call the Boston field office of the FBI, and the U.S. Attorney's office. And I say, "Guys, I need to talk to 'Durham;' or whoever you think is best for me to talk to, on evidence of racketeering separate from the mandate he had." So I contacted them first, and they said, "We need to go back on the GewehrGerwehr file." I didn't
think anything, I hoped something was going to happen, but I was in a position where I was not going to be surprised if nothing happened."

So a couple weeks go by, then I get a call from a supervisory special agent in the [unclear] public corruption unit of the FBI in October of 2012. That agent asks me to write up everything in the Gewehr file that is relevant to allegations of corruption by the APA, in terms of quid pro quo, on regulatory changes by the APA, in order to facilitate the program in the legal fieldshield, for the president.

I do that. I consult with Isaac on that. We come up with a document, we send that memo in, and I share it with Jim Risen, as well. So that goes in, and I get a call back. We have a couple more go-ins. The issue on that memo is "Durham" looks at it, and the agent, the supervisory special agent, says, "Okay. This is important. But the issue is that you need to find something that the APA did that's part of the 'refill' RICO [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations] pattern," that I laid out in the memo, "after October 2007." Because, under RICO, you have to find something that happened in the past five years, from the point you've alleged, to get an exemption on the statute of limitations on RICO, to go back many years beyond that.

So I send an addendum to that memo, which says, basically, looking at Mitchell & Jensen, and what happened with APA sending a letter to the Texas board on Mitchell, that should be looked at within the context of the fact that the changes in the APA ethics code, that were in play at the time—plus the evidence we had from the Gewehr file—of APA, having direct contact with Mitchell and Jensen personnel—and, in some cases, with Mitchell and Jensen
themselves— that needs to be looked at within the context of cover-up, of RICO\H violations.

They went back and forth and [unclear] demurred about whether or not that crossed "dropped" the bar. Also, I said the Zimbardo information, in terms of what happened with his contacts, and his role in the ethics procedure, going back to 2007— in the 2009, that needs to be looked at as well.

They were noncommittal, but they said the decision was made to refer to the Washington field office; then they gave me the official tap dance, which they're supposed to do— which is to say, "From this point forward, we can't comment on whether or not the FBI has launched an investigation, or whether or not there is an ongoing investigation. If we need you, we'll call you."

So for me, that was all I'd hoped to get out of that contact with the bureau. It was basically, "I believe, my colleagues believe, this is evidence of potential RICO\H, and that there are grounds for an investigation." They said, "We'll refer it to the proper authorities," which is the Washington field office. That's all I was going to get, whether we had the secret of the Lindbergh baby, or anything that was the best possible, and we got that. So "Durham" looked at that information, "Durham" referred, in his position as Assistant U.S. Attorney in Public Corruption, and Public Corruption referred it to the Washington field office. Now, once the emails and the book are public, we will have done all we could.

GB: Q-1: So we don't know what's going on with that investigation.

Raymond: No. And I haven't asked, and I'm not going to know.
GB:Q-1: Would they let you know if they decided to stop investigating?

At what date would they [unclear] deciding to stop investigating?

Raymond: No. The expectation I was given by the FBI is that they would come back to me if the Washington field office goes ahead, and they needed specific assistance or clarification in reference to the memo. But it's important to keep two things in mind here. Because they don't come back to me, it doesn't mean that they're not pursuing that line of investigation. It doesn't mean that they're not they have the Gewehr files themselves. It was clear that the agent was familiar with the Gewehr case, and it would have been senior standard procedure for the files intake as evidence to be available to the agent when she talked to me, and any notes or filings that came out of my conversation with [unclear] Durham and others at the FBI or DOJ in 2010. So with that memo, with the primary source itself, and the primary sources from the emails were attached. And before I transmitted it, or at the time that I mailed it, and then I went to the Netherlands, on separate business, to the International Criminal Court [ICC].

There I saw Alex Whiting, who is still in position as counsel for the family, who is a Harvard law professor colleague who is now on leave from Harvard, as a deputy prosecutor at the ICC.

So I met with Alex, and I said, "Alex, here is the scope of what the FBI asked about." He's a former U.S. attorney. "Here's the scope of what the FBI asked, and here's the scope of what I gave them. Does this represent anything that needs to be cleared through the family?" He said, "It's consistent with previous agreements." It's not about personal information about Scott, it's about the content of emails in his possession at time of death, that became property of the family,
related to alleged criminal wrongdoing by the APA, CIA, and other Bush administration officials.

So just to be clear here— in this period, post—2010, I've only acted— Isaac and I have only acted when it's been to support the DOJ mandate, or to answering questions from Jim Risen, who has the family's approval, through a lawyer, materials received by the lawyer, to write his book. That's been the scope. I've not been contacting other people. I've not been trying to create some sort of additional lines of information about this, because (a) we've had a lot to do, but (b) I've stayed very clearly in the lane. And this is important here, that if you listen to our story and my story from the beginning, you see this evolution in theory of change, and evolution in "trade-craft," and approach, which is going from the early days of Dasht-i— which is to tell the world, ring the bell, and hope they come running—to engaging from acts of notification and revelation, to acts of "compellence," to acts of support for institutions to come back online and do their responsibilities under the Constitution and international law. I think that's critical here, because you'll notice what's missing from this story is that there is no point we've been hauled going to haul them in front of a grand jury. There's no point we've been accused of any leaks, because we haven't done any leaks. We've done things in context with the law. We've done things in context with and in keeping with standards and ethics, and we've constantly been working— if you're going to expose what is arguably [unclear] as I've said in the Jane Mayer thing, in terms and of The Dark Side, the "greatest medical ethics scandal," the research ethic scandal in American history, you, yourself, need to have the highest standard of ethics, and that's what why we've worked hard— because we've had to develop it on the fly.
What else, with the time we have left, Isaac, do we want to talk about? Just in terms of putting together EIT. We haven't talked about that, in terms of what EIT was about, or more sort of color and the experience of that two-year period, from 2009 to 2010. What do you want to talk about?

Baker: That was it. That was kind of a brutal process. My best recollection of it was going through troves and troves of documents. Keep in mind, from my perspective, someone that was a musician their whole life, that never had experience reading anything like the OLC memos, or any declassified documents that were several hundred pages long—memorandums from senators; memorandums from all sorts of people—directors of government organizations—and just trying to decipher that, and trying to make the pieces fit. It was a process. It was a process, and you just had to step into the deep end and work like a machine.

So I had great guidance. I had Natty to help me make sense of it. I was also working at the time with about six or seven psychologists and physicians—


Baker: So they offered great guidance. Kathleen Sullivan, who is our boss at PHR—she was incredible. So it was just a lot of reading, literally between the big black bars, trying to make sense of what these documents said. That's my best recollection.

Raymond: What's really important is that nothing we were doing here didn't happen without approval from the people above us. Kathleen, Scott, Frank [Kincel], Donahue, and Susannah
[Sirkin], and you go to John Bradshaw, and you go down the list here—we had tremendous pressure being put on us with the EIT, because, initially, EIT was a fishing expedition. But the thing is, we knew from what was going on behind the scenes—it's like we knew—we had the needle but we had to find the haystack. [Laughter]

MMC-Q-2: You had to find [unclear]. Best line so far. [Laughter]


Raymond: So we were looking for a haystack in a pile of needles. The issue is that we had pressure to deliver in a certain timeframe, and we took, beginning in 2007, with "Leave No Marks," we did one big report every summer, [unclear], and then we did a small, usually one to two other, small with a journalist—smaller investigative stories in the beginning of the year and the end of the year. So we had this cycle we got on whereby, going into fall or winter, it was like the story of the oxx-cart man, who makes all the things through the fall and the winter, puts it together, takes it to market, and it gives him enough to get through to the next year.

So we had this oxx-cart man cycle where, by fall and winter, 2009—2010, we knew we had to start setting up for the summer blockbuster. So in 2007, it was "Leave No Marks," leading into the convention. In 2008, it was "Broken Laws, Broken Lives," leading into the convention with the [Mohamed] Jawad "Jawad" [phonetic] story in the New York Times—that was critical for the convention. That was sort of the second hit. Then we get 2009—we had Dasht-i, we had the "Diego Garcia" [phonetic] revelations later on in the fall, with Time magazine. Then, leading
in, we did "Aiding Torture," a small little piece on the declassification of the OIG report. So by beginning of 2010, we had authorization to go ahead with Experiments in Torture, and now we had to be able to get it done. We ended up releasing in June, but then we worked around the clock, from January, beginning of February, literally all the time, every day. The approval process for that was massive, which is a whole other oral history, but the critical thing, which Isaac and I was doing, is we had to read every single page, of every single declassified document, related to the FBI memos; the OPR—Office of Professional Responsibility—report; the DOD; [unclear] IG [Inspector General] and CIA IG, and then we had to match, between each of them, and this was the worst part—especially with OPR.

Baker: There were multiple drafts.

Raymond: There were multiple drafts at OPR.

**GB-Q-1: [Unclear] That they made public?**

Raymond: Yes. So you could see how the final decision by [unclear] [David] Margolis that there were no grounds for basically disbarring, or recommending a disbarment, of Yoo, and Bradbury, and Bybee. You could see the initial conclusion which was, "yes, they should be disbarred." You could see how that changed.
Raymond: There is the allegation, publicly, as it changed because if let me put it this way. I don't know why it changed. [Laughs] But let me tell you what would happen if it had changed. If it had changed, it would mean that the OLC guidance for the president was willfully—criminally, potentially—wrong. It was fraud. And if that happened, and that they [unclear] ginned the OLC memos in order to ensure the legal protection of the president, and the interrogators, and the DCI—(Director of Central Intelligence)—etc.; if they did that, then it means [unclear] can have it would open up legal liability for everybody in the program. So that's why OPR mattered.

By that point, it was already a done deal. So OPR mattered for us, from a forensic and archaeological perspective, that what we were trying to do—may I just say, as an aside here—doing that blew our minds! Blew our minds about how little anybody in the legal, or journalistic, or medical fields had paid attention to any of this. The Obama administration basically backed up the dump truck—beep, beep, beep, beep—hit the back, everything came—not everything but more—a new, less redacted version of the IG report from Central Intelligence came out. Then the tale of the tape, the DNA of the OLC memos, in OPR—no one read the whole report. So it was the end of 2009 by the time those documents were in play, right? We didn't come out until June. So we had seven to eight months where we're sitting on this gold mine of revelations, just in the Bradbury documents, about him thinking through the new OLC memos. Then the new OLC memos, themselves, from 2005.

The most important thing—and this is a moment where I did get sort of angry at the APA group for all the documents they could read, no one had read through the OPR. To be fair,
this is the issue from the torture investigations. You had to be familiar with operational intelligence procedure. You had to be familiar with operational military procedure. You had to be familiar with the laws of war; U.S. federal law on torture; U.S. federal law on obstruction of justice; U.S. federal law on war crimes. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Geneva Conventions— you had to do all that. You had to be familiar with psychology; you had to become familiar with traditional, international standards of research ethics, Nuremberg [Code], [UnclearBelmont [Report]], Tuskegee [Syphilis Study]. You had to do that. You had to be able to synthesize them all together, and you had to have research on infrastructure, to capture the cross-sections of all of that, over, by that point, an almost decade-long period of thousands and thousands of pages of declassified, let alone anything that was coming from a news story, etc.

So I don't blame people for missing it, but I'm saying—we were given, as the Obama administration itself said, "We hope you read this." That was the biggest thing. So the intelligence community freaked out, and said—probably [Unclear]publicly, Hayden said, "It was an act of betrayal," or however it was put, to release the OLC memos. They were freaking out. Well, the big deal of EIT is that it was the first report to actually convert, to spin straw into gold in terms of what was available. And what was available was evidence of a second string of criminality.

So Isaac was crucial, and at this point I had to make the overall— I was sort of the lead detective on the case— I had to make the overall theory of the crime. What Isaac was doing was picking up the shell casings all over the [unclear]abandoned lot— He was trying to
manage match the [unclear] gun. So I was saying it was clearly a .45 caliber handgun, and he's out trying to say, "Okay, what will we all let me find in this pile of shells, a .45 caliber gun?"

So it was a lot—detective work was so crucial to this, but then detective work stopped, and it was all politics. Because the release of this report—some people in our review process (who will remain nameless), very senior doctors and legal experts—two reactions about their reaction.

GB:Q-1: To EIT.

Raymond: To EIT. Those who were research ethics experts said, "Ding, ding, ding. You've got it." The professor at Wellesley College who read it afterwards, who found out—, who exposed the Guatemala, I think it was Guatemala, Nicaragua—

MMC:Q-2: Right. Guatemala I think [Unclear]

Raymond: Yes. Was it syphilis?

MMC:Q-2: I can't remember. I think it was. Yes. Syphilis.

Raymond: An intentional infection with a venereal disease, in the thirties and forties. Okay. So. Yes. "Clear case," she said, and others. But it was those, I think, who had been involved—and this is a really critical point, those who had been involved in the torture stuff, who had looked at it from the perspective of "did doctors torture?"—this is 2010, by this
point. So we're talking about at least five years of having access to information that they had been involved. We never found one instance where anyone in the human rights community had double-checked whether this violated research and health professional standards, in terms of U.S. federal law and international law. That was never an overlay on it. So our proposition, which, for some, is still controversial, said, "What is the definition under OHRP—Office for Human Research Protection—at the Department of Health and Human Services? What is the definition of research?" Okay. It's the study and collection of data, and extrapolation from that data, generalized knowledge.

MMC-Q-2: And done in a systematic—

Raymond: —— in a systematic way to inform future practice.

MMC-Q-2: That's important because everybody generalizes, but it's the obtaining of the information in a systematic manner that makes generalization what they worry about.

Raymond: So was this done in a systematic manner? Yes. Was generalizable knowledge taken from that systematic collection of data? Yes. Did it inform future practice? You're goddamn right it did.

MMC-Q-2: So who came up with it?

Raymond: That was me.
MMC-Q-2: Wow. Thank you. By the way, thank you for that.

Raymond: No problem. It was my pleasure. Well, it wasn't my pleasure. It was awful. [Laughter]

GB-Q-1: Does that EIT get into our hands? You've got that, right? Because I sent it, too. So that goes into the archive?

MMC-Q-2: [Unclear] We can talk off-tape about all of this deposit information.

Q-1: It's quarter of one and I get antsy about getting back.

Raymond: Just to close up—yes, I formulated the overall theory that became EIT, but it was the result of having an incredible team of young colleagues: Jesse "Hamlin", Daniel "Scarvalone", Louise "Place", Isaac Baker, Katrina Kate Welt, "Kate Weld", a legal intern; all the different legal folks—Kevin Vickers; students who worked on this, combined with, additionally, my initial interns from 2006, Sarah St. Vincent; [?] "Kate Hessle", [Christopher] "Shim", who is a lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps—(Semper Fidelis, Chris.)

That's important here— is that even when the establishment in the health and human rights field wasn't looking at these things, it was the kids; the outsiders; the ones who were not invited to the high orthodox human rights party; did not have the law degree; did not have the "MPH
Raymond: They were outside the culture, and they just wanted to get it right. I think what's important—Isaac's story is a microcosm of all those like him who wanted to do something substantive, against what they saw as an accidental threat to their conception of American values and American identity. That was the golden thread. That was the power under the hood. When you look at the APA movement, when you look at what happened at PHR and elsewhere, that was the transformative thing. And once people went through that step and said, "I will do whatever it takes," it was possible to do things when there seemed like not a lot to do.

MMC-Q-2: Isaac, do you want to have some final words about what it's meant to you to be involved in this way?

Baker: Yes. I think he hit the nail on the head. When I first started, I don't think I fully understood what the work was. It was a new world to me. And the more I looked into it, and the more research and investigative work I did, to see how, collectively, everyone came together in the government and the military, to basically put things into play that were wrong—that I realized were wrong—then it became clear. I felt that we're definitely better than that. As a country, we are better than that, and any step I could take to get that to stop, some way, seemed
important. Once that bug bit me, I could not look back. I just kept moving forward. I'll try to continue to do that in one way or another, until the day I die.


GB-Q-1: Okay. This has been an extraordinary interview. I think the two of you together have actually, really—which was your sense Natty—have really [unclear] enhanced the message that we’re getting to people, you’re giving to people.

Raymond: The last thing is—–there's this book by Raymond [C.] Carver—–*What We Talk About When We Talk About Love*—–I say all the time, “What are we talking about, when we talk about torture?” I don't think the American people yet have any idea about what this was about, versus what we've been told this *was* about. What I mean by that is, the great strategy of the Bush administration was to make this a debate about tactics and advocacy. No. This is about our civil society. Are we going to have a civil society? Are we going to allow the newspapers to print things? Are we going to allow individual citizens to ask for accountability on things, and do so with evidence? Are we going to have independent health professional organizations, that are going to be held to an international standard that's stronger than any national law? Are we going to have international law that exists wholly and sacredly inside U.S. law? Are we going to have a line that we don’t cross? The difference between being powerful and being righteous is that there are things you don't do, and are we going to have that line? Are we going to stop traumatizing our own service members, and intelligence operatives?
This is the last point I want to make. Yes. We went through hell. Okay. Yes, it was brutal. We had it easy. We had it easy. What we had to do was what we were paid to do. What we were paid to do was to find out the truth, and either to get published, we didn't get it into law enforcement, or get it into a congressional report. We didn't get any commercial reward for it.

So, in closing, what I want to say, regardless of whatever Scott Gewehr did or was, there were countless Scott Gewehrs. There were people who took an oath, in many cases, to serve our country. There were Tagubas, there was Alyssa Peterson, who blew her brains out—the Mormon interrogator in Utah. There is Damien Corsetti; there is Tony Lagouranis—the traumatized interrogators. We have done horrific damage to our service members, to their honor, to their mental health, and in some cases to their very lives. They were the ones that motivated me, coming from a family of service members on both sides. My step-brother, my future brother-in-law did two or three tours in Iraq. As McCain said, "This is not about them." I disagree with that. It is. It's about everybody. But included in that "everybody" is someone who is likely a terrorist; is someone who is an innocent bystander; human rights investigators; intelligence operatives; government officials. It's about everybody. The point I'm trying to make here—the people who sacrificed most to get the story out—many of them were Republicans. Many of them were people that human rights folks would never meet, know, or hang out with. They were the standard-bearers, and we were just carrying their flame. Because they were the ones who had to live with it.

We all had to live with it.
So why hasn't it happened yet? We constantly talk about the Bush administration; this political thing, that. It's about us. It's about our failure, as American people, to say that our existential DNA, that was given to us by our ancestors—who literally got off those boats at Normandy knowing they were going to die—they weren't dying so we could torture later. As the recruitment posters from World War II said that, with the person with the marks on his back and his hands chained, said, "Torture is the weapon of enemy." And the people who sat on the buses at Selma; the people who went out in the night, at Concord; the people who marched throughout American history—they gave us this, and we are stewards of it, whether we're in uniform or without.

So we can try the Bush administration until the cows come home, but someone also needs to say, "Shame on us. Shame on us." Because, at the end of the day, in a democracy, these things only change as much as everybody wants it to change and believes it should. And that's the message here. Our institutions are as fragile as we are. That's all I've got to say.

GB:Q-1: A phenomenal statement. phenomenal [unclear].

MMC:Q-2: You are still writing that letter to the president? [Unclear] Thank you all so much.

[End of Interview]