

**RESPONDENTS'  
OPPOSITION EXHIBIT 17**

the bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act.

How about the American Osteopathic Association? The American Osteopathic Association represents the Nation's 43,000 osteopathic physicians. Eugene Oliveri, Dr. Oliveri says, "As president, I am pleased to let you know that the AOA endorses the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999. Why? Because physicians are allowed to determine medical necessity. Health plans are accountable for their actions, a fair and independent appeals process is available and the protections apply to all Americans. Employers and patients," this letter says, "are tired of not receiving the care they are promised, they pay for and they deserve, and H.R. 2723 will help bring quality back into health care."

Here I have another letter of endorsement. This is from the American Dental Association:

"On behalf of the 144,000 members of the American Dental Association, we wish to endorse H.R. 2723, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999. This is the first truly bipartisan comprehensive patient protection bill in the 106th Congress." This was a letter to Congressman NORWOOD.

"By joining forces with Representative Dingell, you have breathed new life into the movement to establish a few basic rules to protect all privately insured Americans from unfair and unreasonable delays and denials of care."

The letter goes on: "We recognize that powerful groups that oppose managed care reform will continue spending millions of dollars in their relentless efforts to scare the public and badger lawmakers who attempt to improve the health care system. However, we will do all we can to make sure that our members know of your courageous efforts on behalf of them and our patients. Patient protection is a genuine grassroots issue that cuts across geographic, economic and political boundaries, and we believe that only bipartisan action will achieve the goal that you want."

Here I have a news release from the American Academy of Family Physicians: "Today the 88,000 member American Academy of Family Physicians announces its support for H.R. 2723."

I have here a letter of endorsement from the American College of Physicians, the American Society of Internal Medicine: "The American College of Physicians, ASIM, is the largest medical specialty society in the country, representing 115,000 physicians who specialize in internal medicine and medical students. The American College of Physicians believes that any effective patient protection legislation must apply to all Americans, not just those in employer plans, require that physicians rather than health plans make determinations regarding medical necessity, provide enrollees with a timely access to a review process that

is independent, offer all enrollees in managed care plans a point of service that enables them to obtain care from physicians outside the network and hold all health plans accountable."

Mr. Speaker, I have a letter of endorsement from the American Academy of Pediatrics: "On behalf of the 55,000 general pediatrician-pediatric medical specialists and pediatric surgical specialists, I am writing to express our strong support of H.R. 2723. We are especially pleased that your legislation recognizes the unique needs of children and addresses them appropriately. Children are not little adults. Their care should be provided by physicians who are appropriately educated in unique physical and developmental issues surrounding the care of infants. You clearly recognize this, and have included access to appropriate pediatric specialists, and we are endorsing your bill."

□ 2115

I have here an endorsement from the American College of Surgeons: "We are pleased to note that H.R. 2723 requires health plans to allow patients to have timely access to specialty care and to go outside the network for specialty care at no additional costs if an appropriate specialist is not available in the plan."

This is important. A lot of health plans have incomplete physician panels. If the patient ends up with a complicated procedure, they need assurances their plan will cover them.

This letter of endorsement from the American College of Surgeons goes on: "If health plans continue to make medical determinations, then they should be held liable to at least the same degree as the treating physician. We are pleased to note that H.R. 2723 would allow patients to hold health plans liable when the plans' decisions cause personal injury or death. Additionally, the College agrees that it is reasonable to prohibit enrollees from suing their health plan for punitive damages if the health plan abides by the decision of the independent external review entity."

Let me expand on this, Mr. Speaker. What we are saying in this bill is that if there is a dispute on an item of coverage, let us say a patient's physician recommends a type of treatment, the HMO says no, then the patient would be able to appeal that decision in his plan. If the plan still says no, then the patient could take that appeal to an external independent peer panel of physicians and say, I really think that common standards of practice show that I should get this treatment.

Under our bill, that independent panel could make that determination. If they say, yes, we agree with you, and the health plan follows that recommendation, then the health plan is free of any punitive damages liability. That is a fair, commonsense compromise on this issue.

Furthermore, in our bill we have a provision that says, you know, if an employer simply contracts with an HMO, the HMO makes the decision, the employer has had nothing to do with the decision, then the employer cannot be held liable, either. The responsibility lies with the entity that makes a decision that could result in a negligent harm to a patient.

What kind of problems are we talking about? Let me give one example. A few years ago a young mother was taking care of her infant son, 6-month-old infant son, in the middle of the night. The family lived south of Atlanta, Georgia.

Little Jimmy Adams had a temperature of 105 degrees. Mom looked at this baby and knew that baby Jimmy was pretty sick, so she gets on the phone. She does what she is supposed to. She is in an HMO. She phones a 1-800 number. She gets some voice from thousands of miles away and explains the situation.

The reviewer, the HMO bureaucrat, says, all right, I will let you take Jim. I will authorize an emergency room visit for little Jimmy, but only at this hospital. If you go to any other hospitals, then you are going to pay the bill.

It so happens that the hospital that was authorized was 70-some miles away. It is 3:30 in the morning. Mom and dad wrap up little Jimmy. They get into the car. They start to drive this long distance to the emergency room, even though Jimmy is looking really sick. But his mom and dad are not health professionals. On their way to Hospital X they pass three other hospital emergency rooms, but they are not authorized to stop there. They know that they would get stuck with the bill.

They do not know exactly how sick Jimmy is, so they drive on. Before they get to the designated hospital, little Jimmy has a cardiac arrest and stops breathing. Imagine, dad driving frantically, mom trying to keep baby Jimmy alive. They swing finally into the emergency room. Mom jumps out with baby in her arms, saying, help me, help me. A nurse comes out and starts mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. They put in the IVs. They give the medicines. Somehow or other they get little Jimmy back and he lives. But because of the medical decision that that HMO made, saying no, you cannot go to the nearest emergency room, Jimmy is really sick, you have to go 70 miles away, and he has this arrest because of that decision, well, little Jimmy is alive, but because of that arrest he ends up with gangrene in both hands and both feet, and both hands and both feet have to be implemented.

So I phoned Jimmy's mother recently to find out how he is doing. He is learning how to put on his leg prostheses. He has to have a lot of help to get on his bilateral hooks. He will never play basketball. I would tell the Speaker of the House that he will never

wrestle. When he grows up and gets married, he will never be able to caress the cheek of the woman that he loves with his hand.

Do Members know what that HMO is liable for under Federal law? Nothing, nothing, other than the cost of the amputations. Is that fair? Is that justice? I will tell the Members what, these victims of managed care, that the managed care companies just call anecdotes, if you prick their finger, if they have a finger, they bleed. They are our neighbors, or they may be our own families. I could tell hundreds of stories like this.

That is why these organizations say a primary part of this legislation should involve responsibility for an HMO that makes medical decisions.

Here I have a letter of endorsement from the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists: "The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists is pleased to offer its support for the bipartisan consensus Managed Care Reform Act of 1999. This legislation would guarantee direct access to OB-GYN care for women enrolled under managed care," pretty important.

Here is a letter of endorsement from the American Psychological Association. "The American Psychological Association expresses our strong support for H.R. 27. Broad bipartisan support for this legislation represents a major breakthrough on behalf of patients' rights. An analysis of the bill shows that the insurance and managed care industry could generate income of \$280 million for every 1 percent of claims that are delayed over 1 year."

That is the provision that is in the other body. Our provision in this bill makes for timely appeals. We appreciate the endorsement of the American Psychological Association.

The American Occupational Therapy Association endorses this bill. "Over the August recess we have notified our members, asking them to talk to their legislators. Please let us know if we can assist you in your efforts to have comprehensive managed care legislation addressed on the House floor."

The American Public Health Association, which represents more than 50,000 public health professionals, endorses the bipartisan bill because the bill would "improve access to emergency services, allow more people to enter clinical trials," something the HMO industry has run away from, "provide patients with a fair appeals process for denied claims, lift barriers to specialists, and hold plans responsible."

"We understand," this letter says, "that some within the managed care industry oppose any government regulation. But this issue is a very important one for consumers, health care providers, and the public health community. H.R. 2723 is a significant and welcome step towards achieving new patient protections for managed care patients."

Here I have an endorsement by the American Association for Marriage and

Family Therapy: "On behalf of the 46,000 marriage and family therapists throughout the United States, we want to applaud Congressman Norwood and Representative Dingell for their effort to provide Americans with comprehensive patient protections. Provisions of significance to our organization include an independent review process for determination of medical necessity, the ability of people with special health care needs and chronic conditions to continue to access their doctors, such as a person who had a rheumatoid arthritis being able to continue to see their rheumatoid arthritis doctor."

We have an endorsement from the American Counseling Association: "H.R. 2723 provides a wide array of consumer protections, including key components for mental health providers and their clients."

I have an endorsement from the American Academy of Ophthalmology. I am so proud of the provider groups who have given endorsements for this bill, because this bill is a patient protection bill. It is not a provider bill. There are issues that separate some of these groups. Not all of these groups see eye to eye on health care policy.

Here is an example. We have an endorsement by the American Academy of Ophthalmology and an endorsement by the Opticians Association. Sometimes these groups have policy disagreements, but on this issue they are in 100 percent agreement that patients need protection, basic protection, commonsense protection, from HMO abuses.

The opticians say, "This bill gives basic, commonsense protections to millions of Americans, and it is certainly refreshing to see the bipartisan way it was approached."

I have a letter of endorsement from the American Podiatric Medical Association, foot doctors, foot specialists. I have the same endorsement from the orthopedic surgeons.

I have an endorsement here from the Association for Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons. We have an endorsement from the National Organization of Doctors Who Care. They say, "We strongly support H.R. 2723 because it ensures fairness and accountability in our health care delivery system lacking in the bill that passed the Senate," and other legislation that has gone before, and they are referring to a bill that passed this House of Representatives in the last Congress.

They go on and say in their letter, and I think this is important, "We are not against managed care. It does have a place. However, we are strongly against managed care plans not towing the line; i.e., not wanting to be held accountable for their medical decisions which adversely affect patient care."

I have here an endorsement from Physicians for Reproduced Choice in Health Care. This organization is especially pleased that H.R. 2723 would ensure that medical judgments are based

solely by health care providers. This is particularly important in that women should have direct access to women specialists."

We have the National Patient Advocate Foundation endorsing this bill. They go on and say in this endorsement, "Please note our strong endorsement of the bipartisan consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1997, our endorsement for each of the cosponsors of this legislation, and for each member of our United States House of Representatives who has contributed to this debate and to this resulting legislation in the last 3 years."

They say, "As one whose companion organization, the Patient Advocate Foundation, served over 6,000 patients last year who confronted insurance denials, of which more than 50 percent involved employer plans, our cases reflect an urgent need for a timely resolution and remedy for ERISA enrollments."

Then we have an endorsement from the Patient Access Coalition. This includes a lot of groups. I cannot name all 128 of the groups under this umbrella organization, but I want to just go through some of them, because this organization encompasses a lot of patient advocacy groups, groups that work for patients, for instance, that have multiple sclerosis or arthritis.

Some of these organizations are the Digestive Disease National Coalition, the Epilepsy Foundation. Remember, these organizations which I am reading are endorsing organizations for H.R. 2723.

There is the Guillain-Barre Foundation, the Huntington's Disease Society of America, the Infectious Disease Society of America, the Lupus Foundation, the National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare, the National Hemophilia Foundation, the National Multiple Sclerosis Society, the National Psoriasis Foundation, the Paget Foundation for Paget's Disease, the Pain Care Coalition, the Patient Advocates for Skin Disease Research, Scoliosis Research Society, the Society for Excellence in Eye Care, United Ostomy Association. The American Heart Association is an endorsing organization. The American Liver Association is, the American Lung Association. These are all organizations that have endorsed the bipartisan Managed Care Reform Act.

Continuing, there is the Amputee Coalition of America, the Arthritis Foundation, the Asthma and Allergy Foundation, the Cooley's Anemia Foundation, the Crohn's and Colitis Foundation, the American Diabetes Association.

□ 2130

These are just a few of the 128 organizations in this one umbrella organization that has endorsed the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Reform Bill.

Why are these patient advocacy groups endorsing this bill? One of the main things that they are interested

in, the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, the American Lung Association, the American Liver Association is because there is a provision in this bill that says, if a patient is getting standard treatment, and it is not working, the patient is out of luck, that that patient should be able to qualify for an experimental study; that the HMO would not incur the cost of the special treatment in that study, but that the HMO should be liable for standard care.

I am going to give my colleagues a personal example. Over the August recess, my father was in the hospital for 3 weeks with congestive heart failure. He had to receive intravenous medication in order to keep his heart pumping strong enough so that his kidneys would work. He could not get out of the hospital. Well, an HMO could have said, "Well, his time is up. We are not going to authorize any payments for any treatment related to a clinical trial."

Fortunately, my dad is not in an HMO like most Americans are, so he was able to qualify for an experimental study in which a special type of cardiac pace maker was inserted into both sides of his heart which, when it was turned on, gave his heart enough boost so that, within about 24 hours, he made a remarkable recovery; and he is now out of the hospital, and he is walking in the malls.

A lot of HMOs would say, "Well, that is experimental treatment. We are not going to even cover the cost of the hospital room." But our bill says that, if a patient has no other options, then the HMO has to pick up routine costs, not the costs of the device or the medicine, but the ancillary things like the cost of the hospitalization or the cost of the blood work. That is fair and reasonable. But HMOs, they look at the bottom line.

I had a pediatrician once who worked just outside of Washington come into my office. She is now working in the National Institutes of Health. She had managed a pediatric intensive care unit.

I said, "Why did you decide to go back into academic medicine?" She said, "I just could not put up with the HMO bureaucracies anymore. Let me give you an example. A few years ago, we had a little boy come into our intensive care unit. He had drowned. He was still alive, but he was a victim of drowning. We had him on the ventilator. We had the IVs running. We were giving him special medication. And the doctors and the parents and the family were standing around the bed praying for signs of life. He had only been in the hospital like 4 hours, and the phone rings in the ICU, and it is some bureaucrat in an HMO saying, 'Well, how is this little boy doing?' 'Well, he is on the ventilator. Chances, you know, are he is not going to do too good.' Well, the answer came over the telephone, 'If he is on the ventilator and his prognosis is poor, why do you not just send him home on a ventilator?'"

Now think about that for a minute. One is a mom and dad, and one's little boy is drowned. He is now in the hospital. He has been there a few hours. People are fighting to save his life, and an HMO bureaucrat is saying, well, his prognosis is not good just send him home. Our bill would prevent that type of abuse.

Here we have another letter of endorsement from the Paralysis Society of America. They represent 20,000 people with spinal cord injury and disease. This letter says, "Particular attention is given to those portions of the legislation covering freedom of choice, specialists, and clinical trials." Very important issue for them.

Here I have a letter of endorsement from the American Cancer Society, and it is a good letter. I would like to read all of it for my colleagues, but I do not have the time. "On behalf of the American Cancer Society and its 2 million volunteers, 2 million volunteers, I commend you for sponsoring H.R. 2723, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999. More than 140 million insured Americans are in some kind of managed care. This includes many of the approximately 1.23 million people diagnosed with cancer each year. In addition, the National Cancer Institute estimates that 8 million Americans today have a history of cancer. Your legislation adequately addresses our concerns in a way that will help individuals affected or potentially affected by cancer be assured access to the care that they need." That is their endorsement.

Here I have an endorsement from the National Association of Mental Illness. "On behalf of the 208,000 members and 1,200 affiliates for the National Alliance of the Mentally Ill, I am writing to express our support for your legislation, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act." "This protection," this letter says, "is critically important for people with serious brain disorders such as schizophrenia and manic-depressive illness who depend on newer medications as their best hope for recovery."

Here I have a letter of endorsement from the American Federation of Teachers. This is from Charlotte Fraas, Director of Federal Legislation. "I am writing on behalf of over 1 million members of the American Federation of Teachers to urge you to support H.R. 2723, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Empowerment Act of 1999. The AFT is proud to represent over 53,000 health care professionals who know such protections for patient advocacy are essential for quality health care."

I have a letter of endorsement from the Service Employees International Union. "On behalf of the 1.3 million members of Service Employees International Union, I am writing in support of the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2723.

"As a union representing over 600,000 frontline health care workers, we know

how important it is to protect health care workers who speak out against patient care deficiencies. Employers should be prohibited from firing or retaliating against such workers if we are going to encourage health professionals to report patient care problems."

I mean, do my colleagues want their nurse or their health care professional gagged? This bill will help prevent that.

Here I have a letter of endorsement from the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFSCME. "On behalf of the 1.3 million members" we thank you for your leadership on the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act. They are endorsing this bill.

I have a letter here of endorsement from the Center from Patient Advocacy. "Since our founding in 1995, the Center for Patient Advocacy has been a leading supporter of strong enforceable managed care reform legislation. Every day we work with patients across the country who have experienced problems with managed care. We know firsthand the barriers to care that patients face, including limits on access to and coverage for specialty care, emergency room care, arbitrary medical decisions based on cost rather than a patient's specific medical need and the lack of a timely independent and fair appeals process. Most alarming, however, is that managed care plans, not patients and their doctors, continue to make medical decisions without being held accountable for their decisions that harm patients."

I have here a letter of endorsement from the Friends Committee on National Legislation. This is a Quaker lobby in the public interest. This letter from Florence Kimball says, "I am writing on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation to express our strong support for the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999.

"The Friends Committee on National Legislation supports a health care system whose primary goal is improving health in the population. In recent years, managed care has taken over as a dominant health care delivery system. Managed care organizations are under strong pressure to keep costs down. They operate on a for-profit basis. We are sensitive to the economic issues in health care, but we believe that reform and regulation are necessary in order to ensure that managed care organizations hold the interests of patients as their prime focus." I would add to that not, necessarily the bottom line.

I have here a letter of endorsement from the United Church of Christ. This is a letter to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. NORWOOD). "I am writing to thank you for your leadership in sponsoring the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999.

"The United Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society, endorses the bill

as written." This is important, and I appreciate Dr. Pat Conover's letter here from the United Church of Christ. He says that, "In the event that the bill is weakened, or if 'poison pill' amendments are added, such as Medical Savings Accounts, it is likely that we would then oppose the bill."

This speaks to the fact that we need to pass a clean patient protection bill, not something that has untried ideas such as Healthmarts or association health plan extensions of Federal law that would enable more people to escape quality oversight by their State insurance commissioners.

I think that we could add, for instance, a provision to this bill that would improve the tax status for purchasing one's insurance. I think we could get bipartisan support for that. But if we start adding a lot of extraneous items, then I think we weaken the bill.

I have here a letter of endorsement from Network. This is a National Catholic Social Justice lobby. It is a letter to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. NORWOOD). "A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby supports the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 (H.R. 2723). Having participated in the lobbying for patient protections over the past 2 years, Network applauds your efforts and those of Representative Dingell" and myself "and the cadre of Republican physicians in facing down the serious opposition from the House GOP leadership. You have stood firm against this and other daunting forces mobilized against you. We commend you for your efforts."

Network affirms the Catholic social teaching and the UN Declaration of Human Rights that health care is a basic right. We support H.R. 2723, and we wish you luck.

I have here a letter of endorsement from the National Partnership for Women and Families. This is from the letter: "For women and families, few issues resonate as profoundly and pervasively as the need for quality health care. Survey after survey shows Americans' growing dissatisfaction with the current health care system. Many feel the system is in crisis. We need common-sense patient protections to restore consumer confidence and tip the balance back in favor of patients and the health care providers they rely on."

That is an endorsement by the National Partnership, and I want to build on that statement. None of us who are sponsoring this organization want to see the demise of HMOs. Some HMOs are providing good care for their families. I think people ought to have a choice. It may be that an HMO is a good choice for that family. But because of this past Federal law that was past 25 years ago, really for pensions but then expanded into health plans, we have a situation where the regulatory oversight was taken away from the States, and nothing was put in its

place at the Federal level. This has enabled a few bad actors to do some truly horrible things to their patients like the decision that cost little Jimmy Adams his hands and his feet, for instance.

So I think that, actually, contrary to what the HMO lobby says about this legislation, I see this legislation as improving patients' choices. People will feel more comfortable with a managed care company knowing that there are some guidelines that apply to it and that that managed care company cannot just arbitrarily deny them the kind of care that they deserve.

I have here a letter of endorsement from the National Association of School Psychologists. "The National Association of School Psychologists is an organization that represents 21,500 psychologists. If H.R. 2327 is passed, this provision will have an important positive impact on health care provided to adults with severe mental health illness, children with serious emotional disturbances, and other people with significant mental disorders who are increasingly being served in managed care settings."

Here is a letter of endorsement from the organization Alliance for Children and Families. The Alliance and International Nonprofit Association representing child and family serving organizations supports this important legislation. Alliance members serve more than 5 million individual each year in more than 2,000 communities. We support your bill because it includes needed patient protections, strong reforms in managed care, and due process protections.

□ 2145

I have here a letter of endorsement from an organization called Patients Who Care. This letter says: "We support the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999. We strongly feel it ensures fairness and accountability. These qualities have been lacking in what the House and Senate have passed in previous legislation."

I have here a letter of endorsement from Families USA, the Voice for Health Care Consumers: "Dear Congressman Norwood: Congratulations on the introduction of the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act. We are well aware of the efforts you and others have made to make this bill a reality. As you know, the American public is losing faith in our health care delivery system. Managed care companies that began with a promise of providing high quality care at an affordable price are not always delivering on that promise. Unfortunately, this has resulted in consumers being worried that they will not get the care they need even though they are covered with health insurance."

And I would add to this letter that everyone here, either through deductions in their salary or just out-of-pocket, is paying a lot of money to those HMOs. Now, that is fine as long

as we and our family members stay healthy. But what happens if we become sick? We may have an experience like Helen Hunt did in the movie "As Good As It Gets", where she describes to a physician the abysmal care an HMO has given to her son with asthma. I cannot repeat on the floor the words she used, but those who have seen the movie can remember that line very well because it got a standing ovation from most of the audience.

I have here a letter from the National Black Women's Health Project: "We are strong supporters of your legislation. It offers significant protections for all Americans. Of great import is the improvement of patient access to medical treatment and therapies, including clinical trials, and this is highly significant for women of color."

I have here an endorsement of our bill from the American Association of University Women. They say in this letter: "H.R. 2723 is particularly important to women because it ensures that women have direct access to OB-GYN services. It ensures that pregnant women can continue to see the same health care provider throughout their pregnancy if their provider leaves the plan. It ensures access to specialists when appropriate, specialists outside a network's plan. It ensures access to clinical trials for new treatment options that may save women's lives."

I have here a letter of endorsement from the National Breast Cancer Coalition: "On behalf of the National Breast Cancer Coalition and the 2.6 million women living with breast cancer, I am writing to thank you for your leadership in offering H.R. 2723, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999." This was sent to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. NORWOOD) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. DINGELL). "The National Breast Cancer Coalition is a grass roots advocacy organization made up of more than 500 member organizations and 60,000 individual members dedicated to the eradication of breast cancer through advocacy and action. One of our top concerns has been access to clinical trials, and your bill has that in it."

I have here a letter of endorsement from the American Lung Association: "Health consumers deserve quality health insurance. Far too often we hear of cases where health insurers have obstructed or denied insured patients the care they need. Your legislation will help end many of the abuses."

Well, Mr. Speaker, I have gone through just some of the letters of endorsement that I have received and others have received in endorsing H.R. 2723, the bipartisan patient protection legislation. But the hour is getting late. We have another speaker who has come to do a special order, so I will just close with this comment to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle.

It is now September. The Speaker of the House, the gentleman from Illinois

(Mr. HASTERT), indicated back in July that we would see a full and fair debate on this floor in July. It did not happen. We have had our August recess. The Speaker has said now that he expects we will see a full managed care debate on this floor in September. Those are the words of the Speaker of the House. I think we should hold the Speaker to his promise.

This is an important issue. There are lots of patients out there at this very moment that may not be getting the type of treatment that they need to save their lives because we have not passed this legislation. Mr. Speaker, I call on my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support a bipartisan bill that can be signed into law; that can go a long way towards correcting the abuses we hear about from our constituents.

Mr. Speaker, I include for the RECORD the letters and other documents I referred to earlier.

GROUPS ENDORSING H.R. 2723, THE BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS MANAGED CARE IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1999

1. Alexandria Graham Bell Association for The Deaf, Inc.
2. Allergy and Asthma Network-Mothers of Asthmatics, Inc.
3. Alliance for Children & Families
4. American Academy of Allergy and Immunology
5. American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry
6. American Academy of Facial Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
7. American Academy of Family Physicians
8. American Academy of Neurology
9. American Academy of Ophthalmology
10. American Academy of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery
11. American Academy of Pain Medicine
12. American Academy of Pediatrics
13. American Academy of Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation
14. American Association for Hand Surgery
15. American Association for Holistic Health
16. American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy
17. American Association for the Study of Headache
18. American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists
19. American Association of Clinical Urologists
20. American Association of Hip and Knee Surgeons
21. American Association of Neurological Surgeons
22. American Association of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons
23. American Association of Orthopaedic Foot and Ankle Surgeons
24. American Association of Orthopaedic Surgeons
25. American Association of Private Practice Psychiatrists
26. American Association of University Women
27. American Cancer Society
28. American College of Allergy and Immunology
29. American College of Cardiology
30. American College of Foot and Ankle Surgeons
31. American College of Gastroenterology
32. American College of Nuclear Physicians
33. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists

34. American College of Osteopathic Surgeons
35. American College of Physicians-American Society of Internal Medicine
36. American College of Radiation Oncology
37. American College of Radiology
38. American College of Rheumatology
39. American College of Surgeons
40. American Counseling Association
41. American Dental Association
42. American Diabetes Association
43. American EEG Society
44. American Federation of Teachers
45. American Federation State, County, and Municipal Employees
46. American Gastroenterological Association
47. American Heart Association
48. American Liver Foundation
49. American Lung Association
50. American Medical Association
51. American Medical Rehabilitation Providers Association
52. American Nurses Association
53. American Occupational Therapy Association
54. American Orthopaedic Society for Sports Medicine
55. American Osteopathic Academy of Orthopedics
56. American Osteopathic Association
57. American Osteopathic Surgeons
58. American Pain Society
59. American Physical Therapy Association
60. American Podiatric Medical Association
61. American Psychiatric Association
62. American Psychological Association
63. American Public Health Association
64. American Society for Dermatologic Surgery
65. American Society for Gastrointestinal Endoscopy
66. American Society for Surgery of the Hand
67. American Society for Therapeutic Radiology and Oncology
68. American Society of Anesthesiology
69. American Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgery
70. American Society of Dermatology
71. American Society of Dermatopathology
72. American Society of Echocardiography
73. American Society of Foot and Ankle Surgery
74. American Society of General Surgeons
75. American Society of Hand Therapists
76. American Society of Hematology
77. American Society of Nephrology
78. American Society of Nuclear Cardiology
79. American Society of Pediatric Nephrology
80. American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, Inc.
81. American Society of Transplant Surgeons
82. American Society of Transplantation
83. American Thoracic Society
84. American Urological Association
85. Amputee Coalition of America
86. Arthritis Foundation
87. Arthroscopy Association of North America
88. Association of American Cancer Institutes
89. Association of Freestanding Radiation Oncology Centers
90. Association of Subspecialty Professors
91. Asthma & Allergy Foundation of America
92. California Access to Specialty Care Coalition
93. California Congress of Dermatological Societies
94. Center for Patient Advocacy

95. Congress of Neurological Surgeons
96. Cooley's Anemia Foundation
97. Crohn's and Colitis Foundation of America
98. Diagenetics
99. Digestive Disease National Coalition
100. Endocrine Society
101. Epilepsy Foundation of America
102. Eye Bank Association of America
103. Families USA
104. Federated Ambulatory Surgery Association
105. Friends Committee on National Legislation
106. Guillain-Barre Syndrome Foundation
107. Huntington's Disease Society of America
108. Infectious Disease Society of America
109. Lupus Foundation of America, Inc.
110. National Alliance for the Mentally Ill
111. National Association for the Advancement of Orthotics and Prosthetics
112. National Association of Medical Directors of Respiratory Care
113. National Association of School Psychologists
114. National Black Women's Health Project
115. National Breast Cancer Coalition
116. National Catholic Social Justice Lobby
117. National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare
118. National Foundation for Ectodermal Dysplasias
119. National Hemophilia Foundation
120. National Multiple Sclerosis Society
121. National Organization of Physicians Who Care
122. National Partnership for Women & Families
123. National Patient Advocate Foundation
124. National Psoriasis Foundation
125. National Rehabilitation Hospital
126. North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology
127. Opticians Association of America
128. Oregon Dermatology Society
129. Orthopaedic Trauma Association
130. Outpatient Ophthalmic Surgery Society
131. Paget Foundation for Paget's Disease of Bone and Related Disorders
132. Pain Care Coalition
133. Paralysis Society of America
134. Patient Access Coalition (represents 129 of the groups on this list)
135. Patient Advocates for Skin Disease Research
136. Patients Who Care
137. Pediatric Orthopaedic Society of North America
138. Pediatric Medical Group: Neonatology and Pediatric Intensive Care Specialist
139. Physicians for Reproductive Choice and Health
140. Physicians Who Care
141. Pituitary Tumor Network
142. Renal Physicians Association
143. Scoliosis Research Society
144. Service Employees International Union
145. Sjogren's Syndrome Foundation Inc.
146. Society for Cardiac Angiography and Interventions
147. Society for Excellence in Eyecare
148. Society for Vascular Surgery
149. Society of Cardiovascular & Interventional Radiology
150. Society of Critical Care Medicine
151. Society of Gynecologic Oncologists
152. Society of Nuclear Medicine
153. Society of Thoracic Surgeons
154. TMJ Associations, Ltd.
155. United Church of Christ
156. United Ostomy Association

#### MEMBERSHIP LIST OF THE PATIENT ACCESS COALITION

Allergy and Asthma Network—Mothers of Asthmatics, Inc.

The Alexandria Graham Bell Association for the Deaf, Inc.

American Academy of Allergy and Immunology

American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry

American Academy of Dermatology

American Academy of Facial Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery

American Academy of Neurology

American Academy of Ophthalmology

American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons

American Academy of Otolaryngology—Head and Neck Surgery

American Academy of Pain Medicine

American Academy of Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation

American Association for Hand Surgery

American Association for Holistic Health

American Association for the Study of Headache

American Association of Clinical Endocrinologists

American Association of Clinical Urologists

American Association of Hip and Knee Surgeons

American Association of Neurological Surgeons

American Association of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons

American Association of Orthopaedic Foot and Ankle Surgeons

American Association of Private Practice Psychiatrists

American College of Allergy and Immunology

American College of Cardiology

American College of Foot and Ankle Surgeons

American College of Gastroenterology

American College of Nuclear Physicians

American College of Osteopathic Surgeons

American College of Radiation Oncology

American College of Radiology

American College of Rheumatology

American Dental Association

American Diabetes Association

American EEG Society

American Gastroenterological Association

American Heart Association

American Liver Foundation

American Lung Association

American Medical Rehabilitation Providers Association

American Orthopaedic Society for Sports Medicine

American Osteopathic Academy of Orthopedics

American Osteopathic Surgeons

American Pain Society

American Physical Therapy Association

American Podiatric Medical Association

American Psychiatric Association

American Psychological Association

American Sleep Disorders Association

American Society for Dermatologic Surgery

The American Society of Dermatopathology

American Society for Gastrointestinal Endoscopy

American Society for Surgery of the Hand

American Society for Therapeutic Radiology and Oncology

American Society of Anesthesiology

American Society of Cataract and Refractive Surgery

American Society of Clinical Pathologists

American Society of Colon Rectal Surgery

American Society of Dermatology

American Society of Echocardiography

American Society of Foot and Ankle Surgery

American Society of General Surgeons

American Society of Hand Therapists

American Society of Hematology

American Society of Nephrology  
American Society of Pediatric Nephrology  
American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, Inc.

American Society of Transplantation

American Society of Transplant Surgeons

American Thoracic Society

American Urological Association

Amputee Coalition of America

Arthritis Foundation

Arthroscopy Association of North America

Association of American Cancer Institutes

Association of Freestanding Radiation Oncology Centers

Association of Subspecialty Professors

Asthma & Allergy Foundation of America

California Access to Specialty Care Coalition

California Congress of Dermatological Societies

College of American Pathologists

Congress of Neurological Surgeons

Cooley's Anemia Foundation

Crohn's and Colitis Foundation of America

Cystic Fibrosis Foundation

Diagenetics

Digestive Disease National Coalition

The Endocrine Society

Epilepsy Foundation of America

Eye Bank Association of America

Federated Ambulatory Surgery Association

Gullain-Barre Syndrome Foundation

Huntington's Disease Society of America

Infectious Disease Society of America

Joint Council of Allergy, Asthma and Immunology

Lupus Foundation of America, Inc.

National Association for the Advancement of Orthotics and Prosthetics

National Association of Epilepsy Centers

National Association of Medical Directors of Respiratory Care

National Committee to Preserve Social Security and Medicare

National Foundation for Ectodermal Dysplasias

National Hemophilia Foundation

National Multiple Sclerosis Society

National Organization of Physicians Who Care

National Osteoporosis Foundation

National Psoriasis Foundation

National Rehabilitation Hospital

National Right to Life Committee

North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology

Oregon Dermatology Society

Orthopaedic Trauma Association

Outpatient Ophthalmic Surgery Society

The Paget Foundation for Paget's Disease of Bone and Related Disorders

Pain Care Coalition

Patient Advocates for Skin Disease Research

Pediatric Orthopaedic Society of North America

Pediatric Medical Group: Neonatology and Pediatric Intensive Care Specialist

Pituitary Tumor Network

Renal Physicians Association

Scoliosis Research Society

Sjogren's Syndrome Foundation Inc.

The Society for Cardiac Angiography and Interventions

Society for Excellence in Eyecare

Society for Vascular Surgery

Society of Cardiovascular & Interventional Radiology

Society of Critical Care Medicine

Society of Gynecologic Oncologists

Society of Nuclear Medicine

Society of Surgical Oncology

Society of Thoracic Surgeons

The TMJ Associations, Ltd.

United Ostomy Association

ANA ENDORSES BIPARTISAN MANAGED CARE BILL

ANA ENCOURAGES CONGRESS TO CONTINUE WORKING TOGETHER & PASS BIPARTISAN BILL

WASHINGTON, DC.—The American Nurses Association (ANA) today applauded the in-

troduction of a bipartisan consensus bill that would reform managed care. The bill, H.R. 2723, "The Bipartisan Consensus Patient Protection Bill of 1999," was introduced on August 8, 1999, by Rep. Charlie Norwood (R-GA). Rep. John Dingell (D-MI) is the lead co-sponsor.

"The American Nurses Association is pleased to endorse this bill and encouraged by the cooperation and compromises made to achieve real progress on managed care reform," said ANA President Beverly L. Malone, PhD, RN, FAAN. "It is heartening to see Congress working together to solve problems—this is how Congress should be working."

ANA has been a strong supporter of managed care reform legislation and believes every individual should have access to health care services along the full continuum of care and be an empowered partner in making health care decisions. Given the nursing profession's preeminent role in patient advocacy, ANA is particularly heartened by the steps proposed to protect registered nurses (RNs) and other health care professionals from retaliation when they advocate for their patients' health and safety.

"As the nation's foremost patient advocates, RNs need to be able to speak up about inappropriate or inadequate care that would harm their patients," said Malone. "Nurses at the bedside know exactly what happens when care is denied, comes too late or is so inadequate that it leads to inexcusable suffering, which is why we need to maintain strong whistleblower protection language in this bill. Nurses want to see strong, comprehensive patient protection legislation enacted this year."

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,

Chicago, IL, August 30, 1999.

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,

House of Representatives,

Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN NORWOOD: The 300,000 physician and student members of the American Medical Association (AMA) strongly urge the House of Representatives to begin debate on and pass meaningful patient protection legislation.

The AMA has endorsed H.R. 2723, the "Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999," introduced by Representatives Charles Norwood and John Dingell, which would guarantee meaningful protections to all patients and enjoys broad bipartisan support. The AMA also continues to work with Representatives Tom Coburn and John Shadegg, who are in the process of drafting patient protection legislation. Whichever bill becomes the vehicle for reform, it must include the following key provisions, embodied in H.R. 2723, that ensure genuine patient protections.

#### External Appeals

All patients must be guaranteed access to an external appeals process whenever a denial of benefits involves medical judgment or concerns medical necessity. All patients deserve access to an independent external review entity if they have been improperly denied a covered medical benefit. External reviewers must also be independent from the health plan or issuer. For the external appeals system to work in a fair and unbiased manner, external reviewers must not have a conflict of interest with the plan or issuer. In addition, treatment decisions or recommendations made by physicians must be reviewed only by actively practicing physicians (MDs/DOs) of the same or similar specialty. External reviewers must be properly qualified to ensure a meaningful external review process.

External reviews must be conducted on a timely basis, not to exceed specified time periods, with shorter periods applicable under

exigent circumstances. Plans and issuers cannot be permitted to intentionally delay an appeals process—or “slow-walk” enrollees who are seeking benefits to which they are entitled. The external reviewers’ decisions must also be binding on the plans and issuers. Unless external review entities’ decisions are binding, any right to an external review would be worthless for the patient.

#### *Medical Necessity*

Truly independent external reviewers must decide “medical necessity” according to generally accepted standards of medical practice. External appeal entities, when making “medical necessity” determinations, should not be bound by arbitrary health plan definitions. In addition, “medical necessity” determinations and other decisions involving medical judgment must be made by physicians (MDs/DOs) who are independent from the plans and issuers.

#### *Accountability*

All patients, even those covered by ERISA plans, should have the right to seek legal recourse against managed care plans when the plan’s negligent medical decisions result in death or injury. Health plans must be held accountable for their decisions. Employers who do not make medical treatment decisions should not be held liable.

#### *Point Of Service*

All patients must have the opportunity to choose, at their own expense, an option that allows them to seek care from outside the network of health care professionals chosen by their employers. If an employer selects a small, closed-panel HMO for its employees, the employees should be able to obtain medical treatment from a physician outside the panel and bear any additional costs.

#### *Emergency Services*

A “prudent layperson standard” must be the basis for determining when emergency medical services are appropriate and require coverage by a plan. Establishing this as a standard is not only fair, but essential for protecting patients. For instance, a patient who is suffering severe chest pain and honestly believes he or she is having a heart attack should be able to go to the nearest emergency room and be covered for treatment received.

#### *Prohibition On Gag Clauses*

Health plans and insurance issuers must be prohibited from including gag clauses within their contracts with physicians. Gag clauses seek to prevent physicians from discussing with their patients plan or treatment options or disclosing financial incentives that may affect the patient’s treatment. These clauses strike at the heart of the patient-physician relationship and can create real conflicts between patients and their physicians.

#### *Information Disclosure*

Group health plans and health insurance issuers must be required to provide enrollees with important and basic information about their medical coverage. Plans and issuers should identify the benefits offered—including covered benefits, benefit limits, coverage exclusions, prior authorization rules, appeals procedures, and other basic information. Patients deserve to know exactly what they are paying for.

In conclusion, the AMA appreciates the bipartisan efforts by House members to introduce legislation that would promote fairness in managed care. We urge you to support legislation containing these essential protections for all patients and to request prompt floor action on managed care reform legislation in September.

Respectfully,

E. RATCLIFFE ANDERSON, Jr., MD.

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF  
FAMILY PHYSICIANS,  
Kansas City, MO, Sept. 7, 1999.

#### HEALTH CARE STEPS TAKEN PATIENT CARE REMAINS PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The 88,000-member American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP) today announced its support for two major managed care reform bills that are likely to be considered by the U.S. House of Representatives this fall: H.R. 2723, The Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, introduced by Representatives Charles Norwood (R-GA) and John D. Dingell (D-MI); and for Health Care Quality and Choice Act of 1999, to be introduced by Representatives Tom Coburn (R-OK) and John Shadegg (R-AZ) when Congress reconvenes in September.

“Both bills go a long way to address the patient protections that are needed in today’s health care system,” said Lanny R. Copeland, M.D., president of the AAFP. “We are very appreciative of the work of the authors of these two bills and of their willingness to listen to our concerns.”

Both bills contain provisions that will allow patients to get the best healthcare and physicians to provide it:

All plans: Patient protections apply to all health plans, not just ERISA plans.

Gag clauses: Both bills would prohibit contract provisions between physicians and health plans that restrict or prevent medical communication between physicians and their patients.

Patient advocacy: Both bills contain some protections for physicians who advocate on behalf of a patient within a health plan or before an external review panel.

External review: Both bills would establish external review mechanisms independent of health plans.

Medical necessity: Such external review processes would not be bound by the health plans’ definition of medical necessity.

Liability: Both bills permit patients to sue in state court.

Women’s health care: The Coburn/Shadegg legislation would include family physicians among those designated as qualified women’s health providers. H.R. 2723 would not preclude patients from going to family physicians for their women’s health needs.

Children’s health care: The Coburn/Shadegg legislation includes family physicians among those designated as qualified primary care physicians for children H.R. 2723 would not preclude patients from going to family physicians for their children’s health needs.

“These legislators are being responsive to patients and to the public good,” said Copeland. “We urge the House of Representatives to expeditiously pass legislation reflecting these principles.”

PATIENT ACCESS COALITION,  
Bethesda, MD, August 16, 1999.

Hon. GREG GANSKE,  
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR REP. GANSKE: On behalf of the 130 patient advocacy and provider organizations that comprise the Patient Access Coalition, we deeply appreciate and acknowledge your demonstrated commitment to moving strong and meaningful patient protection legislation to the House floor for consideration this year. Your support of this issue has unquestionably sparked a new level of dedication and enthusiasm amongst your colleagues for making patient protections a top legislative priority when the House reconvenes in September.

Because the health of millions of Americans is dependent upon the care provided by managed care plans, the issue of patient protections is one of national importance and

urgency. It is clear that the only way to achieve passage of strong patient protection legislation this year is with the bipartisan support of Congress, and we are pleased that you are working toward that end.

The Patient Access Coalition has been working tirelessly for the past six years, in a bipartisan manner, to guarantee basic federal protections for all patients who are enrolled in managed health care plans. We believe there is now a very strong consensus in the country and in Congress to do so, and our commitment to reach that goal remains stronger than ever.

We look forward to working with you and other members of Congress to ensure that meaningful patient protection legislation is enacted into law this year.

Sincerely,

NANCEY MCCANN,  
Co-Chair.

CAMILLE S. SOROSIAK,  
Co-Chair.

NETWORK, A NATIONAL CATHOLIC  
SOCIAL JUSTICE LOBBY,  
Washington, DC.

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: NETWORK, A National Catholic Social Justice Lobby supports the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 (HR 2723). Having participated in the lobbying for patient protections over the past two years, NETWORK applauds your efforts and those of Reps. Dingell (D-MI), Ganske (R-IA), and the cadre of Republican physicians in facing down the serious opposition from the House GOP Leadership. You have stood firm against this and the other daunting forces mobilized against you. We also commend those who bolstered your efforts.

NETWORK will lobby in support of HR 2723, hoping that the bill will be strengthened in the process. Our membership nationally has already been alerted. But we wish to stress, Representative Norwood, that NETWORK believes that the long journey toward HR 2723, and hopefully its passage, further underscores the need for a national dialogue on health care.

The prolonged debate which began with the President’s Commission on Patients’ Protections, the subsequent introduction of patients’ protection legislation and the militancy and funding of those who championed opposition to strong protections are proof positive of the dangers we face as a nation in the commercialization of health care.

When HMO’s/insurance companies and pharmaceuticals begin to shift priorities from the rights of the patient to the success of the stockholder, we have entered a dangerous zone in human rights. The situation calls for a national ethical moral debate on what constitutes an authentic health care system.

NETWORK affirms the tenet of Catholic social teaching and the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights that health care is a basic human right and that the government has an obligation to protect that right out of responsibility for the common good. Consequently, we have supported past initiatives to protect that right through legislation which would provide for all citizens access to affordable quality health care.

That those initiatives have failed is a travesty of justice, leaving us the only industrialized nation in the world without a guarantee of health care for all its citizens.

Sadly, at this point, the nation’s non-system is hopelessly fragmented while the number of uninsured grows daily. As the need for patients’ protections indicates, even those privately insured under a variety and complexity of health care plans—the details of



which often elude them—are not guaranteed necessary, timely and quality health care.

Therefore, as we support HR 2723, we urge you to use the lessons of these two years as a launching pad toward universal access to quality, affordable health care. Universal access to affordable quality health care will be for NETWORK and many of our allies a critical election issue.

Sincerely,

KATHY THORTON, RSM,  
National Coordinator.  
CATHERINE PINKERTON,  
CSJ,  
NETWORK Lobbyist.

NATIONAL PATIENT  
ADVOCATE FOUNDATION,  
Newport News, VA, August 19, 1999.

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,

U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: On behalf of our patient and health care constituents, I write to commend your leadership in bringing a Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 (H.R. 2723) to the United States House of Representatives. Many members of the House of Representatives have sought to support reform that would improve patient access to care and patient autonomy in decision making with their physicians during their medical experience while assuring patients access to independent, external review and offering plan accountability for decisions made. Each member who has contributed to this debate has achieved success in the form of the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999.

The Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 reflects an understanding that insurance should not dictate or control health care of Americans rather it should facilitate and finance health care for Americans. Our organization strongly endorses H.R. 2723 citing specifically the following advantages:

The Bill is one of bipartisan consensus and it does reflect the health care matters that have long been debated on both sides of the aisle with resulting legislation that serves patients and medical providers fairly and equitably while supporting our managed care industry through the development of a clearly defined set of criteria that health plans must meet to conform to the federal law as defined in H.R. 2723.

The Bill affords protections to all people with employment-based insurance (including state and local government workers) and people who buy their insurance on their own which we feel affords an equitable opportunity for regulation and enforcement of industry standards for the majority of insured Americans.

The Bill establishes a uniform standard of accountability for health plans who make coverage decisions which is consistent with the level of accountability that exists for every business and industry that provides service to Americans and that becomes legally accountable for poor business practices or judgements that cause harm to our citizens. With 79 percent of our citizens in an ERISA plan that currently offers few venues of remedy for those citizens whose benefits are denied, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 does offer improved remedy and uniform regulations. As one whose companion organization, the Patient Advocate Foundation served over 6,000 patients last year who confronted insurance denials of which more than 50 percent involved ERISA plans, our cases reflect an urgent need for timely resolution and remedy for ERISA enrollees. This Bill improves the system of clarifying responsibilities, systems of appeal and opportunity for timely remedy. Patients confronting life threatening conditions must have timely, external,

independent review and closure to their cases.

The Bill assures that medical judgements are being made by medical experts and their patients.

It is our position that the provisions of this legislation that assure patient access to Clinical Trials, access to prescription drug not on the HMO's predetermined formulary when the treating physician deems the medication as needed for optimum benefit of patient care and the provision that doctors and nurses will not confront retaliation when they report quality problems all combine to assure higher standards of quality care for patients that will enhance disease survival and extend life.

Please note our strong endorsement of the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, our endorsement for each of the co-sponsors of this legislation and for each member of our United States House of Representatives who has contributed to this debate and to this resulting legislation over the course of the last three years. It was our recent pleasure to honor both you and Congressman Dingell with our National Health Care Humanitarian Award July 22, 1999 in Washington. Certainly the leadership that you both exhibit in the development, sponsorship and negotiation of this bill as you seek to position it on the floor of the House for debate is consistent with our evaluation of each of you as recipients of our award. Thank you for your noble leadership in addressing the matters embodied in this Managed Care Improvement Act. We encourage House Speaker Dennis Hastert to place this Bill on the floor of the House for debate and to allow your peers in the House of Representatives to vote their conscience in support of H.R. 2723.

Respectfully submitted:

NANEY DAVENPORT-ENNIS,  
Founding Executive Director.

AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS,  
Washington, DC, August 31, 1999.

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,

U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: On behalf of the 62,000 Fellows of the American College of Surgeons, I am pleased to offer the College's endorsement of Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2723. This legislation encompasses all of the provisions that the College believes are critical to ensuring that all privately insured patients have access to the most appropriate medical care. This legislation stands in stark contrast to the inadequate managed care reform legislation that the Senate passed in July.

The College believes that all patients should have timely access to appropriate specialty care. Patients should not be forced by their health plan to endure unnecessary delays in accessing specialty care nor should they be forced to receive care from a specialist who does not have the appropriate training and experience to treat their condition. We are pleased to note that H.R. 2723 requires health plans to allow patients to have timely access to specialty care and to go out-of-network for specialty care at no additional cost if an appropriate specialist is not available within the plan.

Once a patient is able to see an appropriate specialist, health plans are frequently restricting the patient's care by unilaterally determining the most appropriate medical treatment. This determination often is contrary to the advice of the patient's treating physician. It is also often formulated on the basis of cost rather than the patient's best interest. H.R. 2723 would protect patients by requiring health plans to offer their enrollees an opportunity for independent external review of their case. The external reviewer would then produce a binding determination.

The College further commends you for including a requirement that the independent external entity determine the appropriate treatment by considering the recommendations of the treating physician along with other reasonable evidence and to do so without being bound to the health plan's definition of medical necessity.

Another issue of deep concern to our Fellows is that surgeons and other physicians being forced to bear all of the liability involved in providing health care services when health plans are often restricting the services they can provide and the setting in which the care can be provided. If health plans continue to make medical determinations, then they should be held liable to at least the same degree as the treating physician. We are pleased to note that H.R. 2723 would allow patients to hold health plans liable when the plan's decisions cause personal injury or death. Additionally, the College agrees that it is reasonable to prohibit enrollees from suing their health plan for punitive damages if the health plan abides by the decision of the independent external review entity.

All of these provisions, along with the numerous other provisions included in H.R. 2723, address critical patient needs in our nation's changing health care system. Once again, the College is pleased to offer its support for the Bipartisan Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 and we look forward to working with you, the Republican and Democratic leadership, and, in fact, all the Members of the House of Representatives to ensure that comprehensive managed care reform legislation is enacted this year.

Sincerely,

GEORGE F. SHELDON, MD, FACS,  
President.

OFFICE FOR CHURCH IN SOCIETY  
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST,  
Washington, DC, August 10, 1999.

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,

U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: I am writing to thank you for your leadership in sponsoring the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999.

The United Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society, endorses the bill as written.

In the event that the bill is weakened, or if "poison pill" amendments are added, such as Medical Savings Accounts it is likely that we would then oppose the bill.

Thanks again for your effort to help protect patients from inappropriate denial of care and to make sure that the services promised in managed care contracts will be fully available from competent health professionals.

Sincerely,

REV. DR. PAT CONOVER,  
Policy Advocate.

AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS,  
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNAL  
MEDICINE,  
Washington, DC, August 12, 1999.

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: The American College of Physicians-American Society of Internal Medicine (ACP-ASIM) is the largest medical specialty society in the country, representing 115,000 physicians who specialize in internal medicine and medical students. ACP-ASIM is in a unique position to evaluate patient protection legislation as our members represent the full range of internal medicine practitioners. We believe

that any patient protection legislation must be comprehensive and provide patients with the necessary basic rights and protections they need.

ACP-ASIM believes that any effective patient protection legislation must:

Apply to all insured Americans, not just those in ERISA plans.

Require that physicians, rather than health plans, make determinations regarding the medical necessity and appropriateness of treatments. ACP-ASIM supports language that defines medical necessity in terms of generally accepted principles of professional medical practice, as supported by evidence on the effectiveness of different treatments when available.

Provide enrollees with timely access to a review process with an opportunity for independent review by an independent physician when a service is denied.

Offer all enrollees in managed care plans a point-of-service option that will enable them to obtain care from physicians outside the health plan's network of participating health professionals, and

Hold all health plans, including those exempt from state regulation under ERISA, accountable in a court of law for medical decisions that result in death or injury to a patient.

In addition to these protections, we also believe that it is important to address the need to ensure access to affordable health insurance coverage for all Americans. Patient protections are meaningless if patients lack health insurance coverage. ACP-ASIM calls on the Congress to guarantee the most basic right of all Americans—the right to insurance coverage—by crafting legislative solutions that will reduce, with a goal of eventually eliminating, the growing numbers of uninsured citizens.

As the U.S. House of Representatives considers this legislation, ACP-ASIM encourages the continuation of a bipartisan approach. We thank you for sponsoring the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act, H.R. 2723, containing the key elements needed for effective patient protection and demonstrating the bipartisan support for such legislation in the House. ACP-ASIM looks forward to the consideration of a comprehensive bill on the floor of the House in September that will be fully capable of providing Americans in managed care and other health plans with needed protections. We stand ready to assist in this effort.

Sincerely,

ALAN R. NELSON, MD, FACP,  
Associate Executive Vice President.

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS,  
Washington, DC, August 9, 1999.

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN NORWOOD: On behalf of the 55,000 general pediatrician, pediatric medical subspecialist, and pediatric surgical specialist members of the American Academy of Pediatrics, I am writing to express our strong support of your recently introduced legislation, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 (HR 2723). We look forward to working with you and other members of Congress to ensure that strong patient protection legislation becomes law this year.

We are especially pleased that your legislation recognizes the unique need of children and addresses them appropriately. Children are not little adults. Their care should be provided by physicians who are appropriately educated in the unique physical and developmental issues surrounding the care of infants, children, adolescents and young adults. You clearly recognize this and have

included access to appropriate pediatric specialists, as well as other important protections for children, as key provisions of your legislation.

Thank you for your efforts and we look forward to working with you to enact strong patient protection legislation. Please do not hesitate to contact me or Graham Henson of our Washington office if we can be of assistance.

Sincerely,

JOEL J. ALPERT, MD, FAAP,  
President.

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL  
ASSOCIATION,  
Washington, DC, August 10, 1999.

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR DR. NORWOOD: On behalf of the 159,000 members and affiliates of the American Psychological Association (APA), I am writing to express our strong support for the bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act (H.R. 2723), which you have introduced with Representative John D. Dingell.

Broad bipartisan support for this new legislation represents a major breakthrough on behalf of patients' rights. Your bill covers all persons with private insurance and includes much needed patient protections, strong reforms of the managed care industry and due process protections for providers. APA is especially grateful that you have continued to champion our top legislative priority, removing the ERISA shield from health plan legal accountability. As in your previous bills that APA has endorsed since 1996, H.R. 2723 permits persons who have been injured by decisions of health plans that delay or deny care to hold them legally accountable. We believe that removal of this special exemption will be a strong incentive for health plans to deliver clinically necessary care, obviating the need for lawsuits.

Improvements to an appeals process without legal accountability clearly would not be sufficient. A new analysis of the Senate-passed bill, S. 1344, shows that the insurance and managed care industry could generate interest income of \$280 million for every one percent of claims that are delayed for the full 377 days permitted. This PricewaterhouseCoopers analysis helps refocus the debate on the need for incentives to ensure that correct decisions are made by health plans to begin with and that health plans do not abuse an appeals process.

H.R. 2723 also includes the requirements that those in closed panel health plans be offered a point of service plan at the time of enrollment, enabling care outside of a network. The bill reflects a procompetitive provision banning health plans from excluding a class of providers based solely on licensure. Medical necessity decisions would be made by clinical peers in a fair and independent appeals process, moving the system away from some of its worst abuses.

APA appreciates your continued leadership on these vital issues and will continue to work with you to win enactment of comprehensive managed care quality legislation.

Sincerely,

RUSS NEWMAN, Ph.D., J.D.

SERVICE EMPLOYEES  
INTERNATIONAL UNION,  
Washington, DC, August 19, 1999.

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: On behalf of the 1.3 million members of the Service Employees International Union, I am writing in support of the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2723.

We are very pleased that a truly comprehensive bipartisan patient protection bill has been introduced. This is a bill that addresses the concerns that many working families have about the failure of managed care plans to ensure access to quality health care and puts medical decisions in the hands of medical experts not insurance company bureaucrats. Unlike the Senate bill, H.R. 2723 would:

Cover all Americans who have private insurance's.

Provide true access to emergency services, specialists, continuity of care, and clinical trials

Provide for an internal and an independent external appeals process that ensures a timely process for consumers for whom health care is denied or withheld

Hold health plans accountable for treatment decisions that result in injury or death.

Additionally, H.R. 2723 includes a vitally important patient advocacy/whistleblower provision. As a union representing over 600,000 frontline health care workers, we know how important it is to protect health care workers who speak out against patient care deficiencies. Employers must be prohibited from firing or retaliating against such workers if we are going to encourage health professionals to report patient care problems.

We commend you and your leadership in putting forward a bill that provides real patient protections. SEIU looks forward to working with you to pass H.R. 2723.

Sincerely,

ANDREW L. STERN,  
International President.

THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF  
OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNCOLOGISTS  
Washington, DC, August 11, 1999.

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
Longworth House Office Building,  
5 Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN NORWOOD, The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) is pleased to offer its support for the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999. This legislation would guarantee direct access to ob-gyn care for women enrolled in managed care.

Women need the assurance that they can receive care for their women's health needs from their ob-gyns without the added time, expense, and inconvenience of first having to get permission from their primary care physicians. Your legislation would ensure this fundamental patient protection to all women in managed care plans.

Today, many managed care plans require women—even pregnant women—to get permission slips from their primary care physicians before they can see their ob-gyns. Sixty percent of ob-gyns in managed care plans report that their gynecologic patients are either limited or barred from seeing their ob-gyns without first getting permission from another physician. An astounding 28% report that their pregnant patients must first receive another physician's permission before seeing their ob-gyns. To make matters worse, nearly 75% of ob-gyns report that their patients have to return to their primary care physicians for permission before their ob-gyn can provide necessary follow-up care.

Direct access to ob-gyns for all covered obstetric and gynecological follow-up care, as under your plan, will help to ensure quality health for women, including pregnant women and their infants. Thank you for your leadership and commitment to these vital goals.

We look forward to working closely with you as this legislation moves toward enactment.  
Sincerely,

RALPH W. HALE, M.D.,  
*Executive Vice President.*

CENTER FOR PATIENT ADVOCACY,  
McLean, VA, August 9, 1999.

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,  
Longworth House Office Bldg.,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN NORWOOD: The Center for Patient Advocacy is pleased to support the "Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999."

Since our founding in 1995, the Center for Patient Advocacy has been a leading supporter of strong, enforceable comprehensive managed care reform legislation. Every day the Center works with patients across the country who have experienced problems with managed care. We know first-hand the barriers to care that patients face, including limits on access to and coverage for specialty care and emergency room care, arbitrary medical decisions based on cost rather than a patient's specific medical needs, and the lack of a timely, independent and fair external appeals process to name a few. Most alarming, however, is that managed care plans—not patients and their doctors—continue to make medical decisions without being held legally accountable for their decisions that harm patients.

The Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act is a common-sense approach that addresses these problems. In this era where the pressure to reduce costs often comes at the expense of the patient, it is not only appropriate, but imperative that Congress act and pass legislation to protect patients from managed care abuses.

We commend your continued leadership in the managed care reform debate and your tireless efforts to secure a strong, enforceable and bipartisan solution to the problems patients across the country are facing. As we have continued to emphasize, patients are not calling on Congress to pass a Republican or Democrat bill. They are calling on Congress to pass bipartisan legislation that will truly provide them with needed protections and empower patients and their physicians with the decisions affecting their health care. And we believe that the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act will do just that.

Sincerely,

TERRE MCFILLEN-HALL,  
*Executive Director.*

AMERICAN OSTEOPATHIC ASSOCIATION,  
Washington, DC, August 27, 1999.

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN NORWOOD: The American Osteopathic Association (AOA) represents the nation's 43,500 osteopathic physicians. As President, I am pleased to let you know that the AOA endorses your bill, the "Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999" (H.R. 2723).

The AOA advocates, on behalf of patients, for Congress to enact strong, meaningful, and comprehensive protections. After six years of debate and delay, we believe that H.R. 2723 is the bipartisan legislation that will ensure the AOA's long sought principles. These include: physicians allowed to determine medical necessity; health plans held accountable for their actions; a fair and independent appeals process available to patients, and protections which apply to all Americans.

Over the last two decades, managed care has become less interested in delivering quality healthcare to patients. Instead, the focus seems entirely on the bottom line. It is

time to bring the focus back to our patients and away from HMO profits. Employers and patients are tired of not receiving the care they are promised, pay for and deserve. H.R. 2723 will help bring the quality back into healthcare and allow osteopathic physicians to care for our patients in accordance with the high principles guiding our profession.

Again, thank you for your leadership on this critical issue. We are encouraged by the broad bipartisan support your legislation has received. The AOA pledges to work with you and all Members of Congress to ensure swift enactment of H.R. 2723. Please feel free to contact Michael Mayers, AOA Assistant Director of Congressional Affairs, in our Washington office with any further comments or questions.

Sincerely,

EUGENE A. OLIVERI, D.O.,  
*President.*

AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION,  
Washington, DC, August 13, 1999.

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,  
1707 Longworth House Office Building, Wash-  
ington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: On behalf of the 144,000 members of the American Dental Association, we wish to endorse H.R. 2723, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999. This is the first truly bipartisan, comprehensive patient protection bill in the 106th Congress. By joining forces with Representative Dingell, you have breathed new life into the movement to establish a few basic rules to protect all insured Americans from unfair and unreasonable delays and denials of care.

We recognize that the powerful groups that oppose managed care reform will continue spending millions of dollars in their relentless efforts to scare the public and badger lawmakers who attempt to improve the health care system. However, we will do all we can to make sure that all of our members know of your courageous efforts on behalf of them and their patients.

Patient protection is a genuine grassroots issue that cuts across geographic, economic and political boundaries. We believe that only bipartisan action will solve the problems in the health care system, and your bill represents a major, positive step in the right direction.

Sincerely,

S. TIMOTHY ROSE, D.D.S., M.S.,  
*President.*  
JOHN S. ZAPP, D.D.S.,  
*Executive Director.*

PHYSICIANS FOR REPRODUCTIVE  
CHOICE AND HEALTH,  
New York, NY, August 30, 1999.

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: Physicians for Reproductive Choice and Health (PRCH) is pleased to support the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 (H.R. 2723). We applaud your leadership, as well as that of Representative Dingell and the additional supporters of the legislation. The mission of PRCH is to enable concerned physicians to take a more active and visible role in support of universal reproductive health. We represent more than 3,000 physicians and non-physician supporters from around the country. PRCH is committed to ensuring that all people have the knowledge, access to quality services, and freedom of choice to make their own reproductive health decisions, and we believe this legislation is an important step toward that goal.

The American health care system is changing rapidly. PRCH believes it is vital that those changes do not come at the expense of quality care for patients. The Bipartisan

Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act includes many important patient protections. As a physician membership organization, PRCH is especially pleased that H.R. 2723 would ensure that medical judgments are rendered solely by health care providers, who are in the best position to guard the interests of their patients. Other particularly important provisions would assure that women have direct access to ob-gyn care from their choice of participating health care providers; protect health care professionals who report quality problems from retaliation by insurance plans and others; and prohibit health care plans from financially rewarding health care professionals for limiting a patient's care.

We commend your leadership in the struggle to ensure that patients' rights are established in federal law.

Sincerely,

JODI MAGEE,  
*Executive Director.*  
SEYMOUR L. ROMNEY, M.D.,  
*Chair.*

AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY,  
August 27, 1999.

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,  
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN NORWOOD: On behalf of the American Cancer Society and its 2 million volunteers, I commend you for sponsoring H.R. 2723, the "Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999," legislation that meets the needs of cancer patients. As the largest voluntary health organization dedicated to improving cancer care, we urge support of such legislation that would help ensure patients, especially those affected by cancer, access to quality and appropriate medical care. Specifically, we are pleased that the provisions in your legislation will benefit all 161 million Americans in private health insurance and employer-sponsored plans and that your legislation provides patients with direct access to clinical trials.

More than 140 million insured Americans are in some kind of managed care plan and this includes many of the approximately 1.23 million people diagnosed with cancer each year. In addition, the National Cancer Institute estimates that 8 million Americans alive today have a history of cancer. While managed care has greatly improved access to needed prevention, early detection, and cancer treatment, we are concerned about some of the gaps that remain in getting quality care to the patient.

Your legislation adequately addresses some of our concerns in a way that will help ensure that individuals affected or potentially affected by cancer will be assured improved access to quality care. H.R. 2723 grants patients with life threatening diseases access to specialists, including an out-of-network specialist if one is not available within their health plan; ensures continuity of care if an employer switches to a plan that does not include their physician who is providing on-going treatment or if a treating physician is no longer with the health plan; and permits for a specialist to serve as the primary care physician for a patient who is undergoing treatment for a serious or life-threatening illness.

Most importantly, your bill includes a clinical trials provision strongly supported by the American Cancer Society. H.R. 2723 recognizes that coverage of the routine patient care costs for patients enrolled in any phase of high-quality, peer-reviewed clinical trials affords people with cancer and other serious or life threatening disease the opportunity to seek the best and most appropriate care while helping to advance scientific knowledge. This access is integral to possibly extending life, reducing morbidity, and

increasing medical knowledge. As you may know, in many cases, coverage for routine patient services for patients who wish to participate in a clinical trial are often denied, thereby creating a major barrier for patients who would like, or need, access to these treatments. For these patients, the clinical trial offers a critical opportunity to receive state of the art cancer treatment—therapies that may be their best and most appropriate treatment option and their only chance at survival and an improved quality of life. In addition, without sufficient enrollment in clinical trials, we as a nation lose an opportunity to collect data about the safety and efficacy of a new therapy or technology that could potentially benefit future generations of patients and save the health care system money. We firmly believe it is essential that cancer patients have access to these oftentimes lifesaving therapies that can reduce suffering and prolong life and are very supportive of the provision in H.R. 2723.

The Society commends you for sponsoring this legislation that provides access to clinical trials for all patients with serious and life threatening diseases. Due to the nature of research, life-saving treatments for one disease are often found in clinical trials of a drug aimed at treating another disease. Recently, clinical trials of Rezulin, a diabetes drug, showed that the drug may slow rapid cell growth in some cancers. Similarly, research has shown that the cancer drug, endostatin, may help heart disease. By providing broad access to clinical trials, your legislation will help advance the state of research for many diseases by allowing for the cross-pollination of research—cancer patients will benefit from clinical trials in AIDS, diabetes, etc., and vice versa.

While we are very pleased with your leadership on this issue, we are concerned that H.R. 2723 will not help patients who want to enroll in privately sponsored pharmaceutical trials—the type that is most frequently provided through the Food and Drug Administration. We would greatly appreciate your consideration of increasing access to these types of clinical trials for managed care patients.

The diagnosis of cancer is devastating—not only must patients confront an array of medical decisions, they must deal with financial and emotional burdens as well. We thank you for sponsoring legislation ensuring that cancer patients, irrespective of type of health insurance, will face fewer financial worries as they consider their treatment options. Please call Megan Gordon, Legislative Representative, for any additional information you or your staff may need.

Sincerely,

KERRIE WILSON,  
National Vice President, Policy Advocacy.

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF  
OPHTHALMOLOGY,  
Washington, DC, August 30, 1999.

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
Longworth House Office Building,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: The American Academy of Ophthalmology (AAO) would like to thank you for your introduction of H.R. 2723, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999. Your bill contains the core patient protections the AAO supports and believes should be a part of all managed care plans.

AAO is the world's largest educational and scientific organization of eye physicians and surgeons (Eye M.D.s), representing over 26,000 members, dedicated to the treatment and diagnosis of disorders of the eye.

AAO supports H.R. 2723 on the basis that it would guarantee the following six protections to the millions of Americans enrolled in managed care plans:

1. An out-of-network (point-of-service) option at the time of enrollment;
2. Timely access to specialty care;
3. A fair and expedited independent appeals process;
4. A consumer information checklist;
5. A ban on financial incentives that result in the withholding of care or a denial of a referral; and
6. A ban on "gag clauses" which prohibit a provider from giving patients certain information, including treatment options.

We look forward to working with you to ensure passage of a strong, comprehensive and meaningful patient protections bill this Congress. Again, thank you for introducing your bill and for championing this issue in the House of Representatives.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM L. RICH, III, MD,  
Secretary for Federal Affairs.

FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL  
LEGISLATION,  
Washington, DC, August 26, 1999.

Re Managed Care Improvement Act.

Representative CHARLES NORWOOD,  
U.S. House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: I am writing on behalf of the Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL, a Quaker lobby in the public interest) to express our strong support for the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 (H.R. 2723).

FCNL supports a health care system whose primary goal is maintaining and improving the health of the population. In recent years, managed care has taken over as the dominant health care delivery system. The shift to managed care has reflected the belief, particularly within the business community, that managed care does a substantially better job of controlling health care costs than does traditional fee-for-service insurance. Thus, managed care organizations are under strong pressure to keep costs down. In addition, many managed care organizations operate on a for-profit basis which exerts pressures to reduce outlays. These changes in the structure of health care insurance have created an environment in which patients' interests can (and sometimes do) take a back seat. While we are sensitive to the economic issues in health care, we also believe that reform and regulation are necessary in order to ensure that managed care organizations hold the interests of patients as a prime focus.

Following are some of the provisions of H.R. 2723 that are of particular importance to FCNL.

Scope of coverage: We support extending managed care protections to all 161 million people in the U.S. with private insurance. This would complement the protection already afforded to those in Medicaid and Medicare managed care.

Access to care: We strongly favor efforts to reduce and eliminate bureaucratic obstacles that some patients have faced as they seek access to physicians and needed health care services. For example, we support access to closest emergency room, without prior authorization and without higher costs; guaranteed access to needed health care specialists, outside the network, if needed; access to pediatric specialists; the right of women to directly access ob/gyn care and services; and access to quality clinical trials for those with no other effective option.

Protection of Doctor/Patient Relationship: We oppose limitations placed on physicians by HMOs or insurance companies that reduce their ability to treat or communicate with patients. For example, we believe that legis-

lation should prohibit gag clauses that restrict the freedom of health care providers to discuss all treatment options with patients; limit financial incentives to withhold care; ensure continuity of care so that patients in the middle of long-term treatment plans do not suffer an abrupt transition of care if their physician or other provider is dropped from the plan; and assure that health care professionals who report deficiencies in the quality of health care services will not experience retaliation by the plan.

Accountability: We support the right of patients to timely appeals of health plan decisions and to be able to hold health plans accountable for decisions. Examples of such rights include access to internal and independent external appeals processes that are fair, unbiased, and timely; and a mechanism that holds health plans legally accountable when their decisions harm patients.

FCNL applauds your efforts and the efforts of your colleagues to pass legislation that would provide these and other related protections to patients in managed care plans.

Sincerely,

FLORENCE C. KIMBALL,  
Legislative Education Secretary.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,  
Washington, DC, August 20, 1999.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE: I am writing on behalf of the over one million members of the AFT to urge your support for bipartisan patients rights legislation, H.R. 2723, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Empowerment Act of 1999. Hopefully, when Congress returns from its August recess, the House of Representatives will have the opportunity to vote on this important bill.

This bipartisan measure, introduced by Representatives Charles Norwood (R-GA) and John Dingell (D-MI), is compromise patients' rights legislation that retains essential features of the Patients Bill of Rights, H.R. 358, that AFT has also supported.

The bipartisan bill (H.R. 2723), which applies to all 161 million Americans with health insurance coverage, has these essential features:

Ensures access to emergency care without prior authorization, following a "prudent lay person" standard;

Authorizes direct access to OB/GYNs and pediatricians to be primary care physicians;

Provides access to pediatric specialties;

Provides for continuity of care when there is a change of plan or change in the provider network;

Provides for an independent external appeals process;

Authorizes patients to sue health plans in state courts, but disallows punitive damages if a plan complies with an independent external appeals decision;

Provides that doctors and nurses can report quality problems without fear of retaliation from Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), insurance companies and hospitals.

AFT is particularly pleased that H.R. 2723 contains protection against retaliation for health care workers acting as patient advocates. The AFT is proud to represent over 53,000 health care professionals who know such protections for patient advocacy are an essential component of quality health care.

H.R. 2723 offers the House a very real opportunity to enact legislation on a bipartisan basis that will improve the quality of managed care. The American Federation of Teachers urges you to co-sponsor and support this vital legislation.

Sincerely,

CHARLOTTE J. FRAAS,  
Director of Federal Legislation,  
Office of Government Relations.

AFSCME, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF  
STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL  
EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO,

*Washington, DC, August 18, 1999.*

Honorable CHARLES NORWOOD,  
*U.S. House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC.*

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: On behalf of the 1.3 million members of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), I am writing to thank you for your leadership in introducing the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 (H.R. 2723). This compromise legislation provides meaningful reform of managed care with significant and enforceable protections for consumers.

In particular, we are pleased that the bill extends patient protections to all of those who are covered by managed care plans rather than just limited segments of the insured population. Importantly, the bill holds all, rather than just some, plans accountable for treatment denials which result in the injury or death of patients. But the liability shield now enjoyed by self-funded plans is removed in a balanced way, providing that there will be no punitive damages where the plan has followed the recommendation of an external review panel. Further, the bill makes clear that employees cannot be sued unless they intervene in treatment decisions.

Of particular interest to AFSCME members who work in health care, H.R. 2723 includes important protections for physicians and nurses who raise concerns or warnings about the care of patients. Although limited, these protections will allow health care professionals to speak, without fear of reprisal, to appropriate public regulatory agencies, appropriate private accrediting bodies, plan administrators or their employers. The provision protecting patient advocacy will help accomplish the bill's overall goal of improving the quality of care for patients.

In sum, H.R. 2723 would accomplish reform in a meaningful, yet balanced way. We thank you for co-sponsoring this important legislation.

Sincerely,

GERALD W. MCENTEE,  
*International President.*

AMERICAN THORACIC SOCIETY  
AND THE AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION,  
*Washington, DC, August 24, 1999.*

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
*U.S. House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC.*

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: On behalf of the American Lung Association and its medical section, the American Thoracic Society, I want to congratulate you for introducing the Bi-Partisan Patient Protection legislation (H.R. 2723). The ALA/ATS strongly support this important legislation.

American consumers deserve quality health insurance. Far too often we hear of cases where health insurers have either obstructed or completely denied insured patients access to the care they need. Insurers, by design or default, are preventing patients from getting the care they need.

Your legislation will help end many of the abuses in our nation's health insurance system. Your legislation will give all of our nation's insured individuals access to specialists, a swift appeals process and legal recourse for denied care, and will ensure physicians—not insurers—determine medical necessity. These important patient protections are needed to restore confidence to our nation's health care system.

The American Lung Association and the American Thoracic Society are ready to work with you and other Members of Congress to quickly enact this important legis-

lation. Again, thank you for your leadership on this important issue.

Sincerely,

FRAN DUMELLE,  
*Deputy, Managing Director.*

NATIONAL BREAST CANCER COALITION,  
*Washington, DC, August 24, 1999.*

Representative JOHN DINGELL,  
Representative CHARLES NORWOOD,  
*U.S. House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC.*

DEAR REPRESENTATIVES: On behalf of the National Breast Cancer Coalition (NBCC) and the 2.6 million women living with breast cancer, I am writing to thank you for your leadership in offering H.R. 2723, The Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999. Passage of this legislation would ensure that patients in private health plans have access to legitimate patient protections.

The National Breast Cancer Coalition is a grassroots advocacy organization made up of more than 500 member organizations and 60,000 individual members dedicated to the eradication of breast cancer through advocacy and action. We have long been committed to working with Members of Congress to enact meaningful healthcare reform. While many versions of "patient protection" legislation have been discussed in the past, we appreciate your leadership on introducing strong and comprehensive bipartisan legislation that brings us one step closer to achieving our goal.

One of NBCC's top concerns is breast cancer patients' access to clinical trials. Women with breast cancer often seek participation in clinical research studies as their best treatment option. It is unconscionable that their health plans would deny payment for even routine patient care cost like physician and hospital charges merely because patients are receiving treatment in the context of a clinical trial versus standard therapy. H.R. 2723, which would require health plans to cover routine patient care costs for cancer patients enrolled in approved clinical trials, is a critical step in including greater participation in clinical trials.

We also want to thank you for including access to specialty care in the Bipartisan Consensus legislation. This provision is extremely important to ensure that individuals in private health plans have access to the specialty care they need—an essential component of a meaningful patients' bill of rights. We are pleased that this legislation would allow breast cancer patients to go straight to their oncologists should that be medically appropriate.

Finally, NBCC appreciates your recognition that a right without strong enforcement is no right at all. By holding plans accountable when their decisions to withhold or limit care injures patients, H.R. 2723 ensures that insurers are subject to the same rules and legal penalties for injuries as any other industry. Strong enforcement is absolutely essential to any meaningful managed care reform, and we are pleased that the Bipartisan Consensus bill incorporates this provision.

Thank you again for your outstanding leadership. We look forward to working with you to get H.R. 2723, The Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act, enacted into law this year. Please do not hesitate to call me or NBCC's Government Relations Manager, Jenifer Katz if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

FRAN VISCO,  
*President.*

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF  
UNIVERSITY WOMEN,  
*Washington, DC, August 24, 1999.*

PROTECT WOMEN'S HEALTH IN MANAGED CARE  
REFORM

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE: On behalf of the 150,000 members of the American Association of University Women (AAUW), I urge you to support the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 (H.R. 2723), introduced by Reps. Charlie Norwood (R-GA) and John Dingell (D-MI), when the House considers managed care reform legislation. AAUW believes that H.R. 2723 will ensure accountability of managed care plans and a health care delivery system that fully meets the needs of women and families.

AAUW believes that only H.R. 2723 will significantly improve managed health care for all consumers, and especially for women. H.R. 2723 covers all 148 million privately insured Americans and addresses a broad range of issues that will provide quality, timely, and appropriate health care to all consumers; ensure patients' rights; and meet the needs of women and their families. H.R. 2723 guarantees that patients can have a health plan's decision to deny care reviewed by an independent medical expert, and holds managed care plans accountable when their decisions to withhold or limit care cause injury or death. H.R. 2723 is particularly important to women because it: Ensures that women have direct access to ob-gyn services from the participating health care professional of their choice; Ensures that pregnant women can continue to see the same health care provider throughout pregnancy if their provider leaves the plan or their employer changes plans; Ensures access to specialists, including, when appropriate, specialists outside a plan's network; and Ensures access to clinical trials for new treatment options and that may save people's lives.

Once again, I urge you to support H.R. 2723 to ensure accountability of managed care plans and a health care delivery system that fully meets the needs of women and families. If you have any questions, please call Nancy Zirk, Director of Government Relations, at 202/785-7720, or Lisa Levine, Government Relations Manager, at 202/785-7730.

Sincerely,

SANDY BERNARD, *President.*

NATIONAL BLACK WOMEN'S  
HEALTH PROJECT,  
*Washington, DC, August 24, 1999.*

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
*U.S. House of Representatives,  
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN NORWOOD: The National Black Women's Health Project (NBWHP) is writing in support of the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act (H.R. 2723). NBWHP is the only national organization solely dedicated to improving the health and well-being of America's 17.8 million Black women through wellness programs and services, information, and advocacy. We have been and continue to be a strong supporter of managed care reform. The proposed legislation offers significant protections for all Americans, and the specific implications for women and women of color are vitally important. Of great importance is the inclusion of patient access to medical treatments and therapies including clinical trials. This is highly significant as women of color are often under-represented in clinical trials. In addition, the inclusion of access to all prescription drugs is crucial as women would have assured access to coverage for contraceptives.

There is an urgent need for consumer protections in the health care and insurance system, and we feel that this legislation is a

progressive action in this regard. We appreciate any opportunities to work with you. If you have any further questions, please feel free to telephone our office. Shelia Clark, our Public Policy Associate, is our contact person. We look forward to the passage of this legislation.

Sincerely,

JULIA SCOTT,  
President and CEO.

NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR  
THE MENTALLY ILL,  
Arlington, VA, August 24, 1999.

Hon. JOHN DINGELL,  
Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
U.S. House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC

DEAR REPRESENTATIVES DINGELL AND NORWOOD: On behalf of the 208,000 members and 1,200 affiliates of the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI), I am writing to express our support for your legislation, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 (H.R. 2723). As the nation's largest organization representing people with severe mental illnesses and their families, NAMI believes that federal standards are necessary to ensure that access to the most advanced treatment is not compromised in the name of cost savings. We support your efforts as an important step forward in protecting the interests of consumers and their families in the health care system.

In particular, NAMI is especially pleased that your legislation will address critical issues that are of great concern to people with severe mental illnesses and their families including use of restrictive prescription drug formularies and meaningful external appeals. NAMI is grateful that your legislation will protect the ability of patients and their doctors to go beyond a health plan's limited drug formulary when it is necessary to find the most effective medication. This protection is critically important for people with serious brain disorders such as schizophrenia and manic-depressive illness who depend on newer medications as their best hope for recovery.

NAMI also strongly supports your proposal for external grievance procedures that would require that decisions of independent review panels be legally binding upon health plans and prevent health plans from being able to select the independent third-party review panel. Patients and their families should be able to take their claim of an unfair denial of treatment coverage to an unbiased process for an adjudication of their rights.

NAMI also supports key provisions in H.R. 2723 regarding access to medical specialists. Health plans should be required to provide access to covered specialty care within a plan's network and allow consumers unobstructed access to a specialist, such as a psychiatrist, over a longer period, without repeated and unnecessary pre-authorizations from their plan. Finally, NAMI would like to thank you for including in your bill strong protections for consumer access to medical treatment costs associated with clinical trials. For many people with severe mental illnesses, clinical trials on new medications are the best hope for successful treatment. Health plans should not be allowed to deny patients access to these trials by refusing to pay for routine medical care.

NAMI is grateful for your efforts on behalf of people with severe mental illnesses and their families. Your bipartisan approach to this difficult issue is an important step forward in placing the interests of consumers and families ahead of politics. NAMI looks forward to working with you to ensure pas-

sage of meaningful managed care consumer protection legislation in the 106th Congress.

Sincerely,

LAURIE FLYNN,  
Executive Director.

FAMILIES USA FOUNDATION,  
Washington, DC, August 11, 1999.

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,  
Longwood HOB, Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN NORWOOD: Congratulations on the introduction of the "Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999," H.R. 2723. We are well aware of the efforts you and others made to make this bill a reality.

As you know, the American public is losing faith in our health care delivery system. Managed care companies that began with the promise of providing high quality care at an affordable price are not always delivering on that promise. Unfortunately, this has resulted in consumers being worried that they will not get the care they need even though they are covered with health insurance. Your bill is a reasonable compromise proposal that can bring back balance to our health care system.

We look forward to working with you to make the "Bipartisan Consensus" bill the law of the land.

Sincerely,

RONALD F. POLLACK,  
Executive Director.

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF  
PHYSICIANS WHO CARE,  
San Antonio, TX, August 24, 1999.

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,  
Longworth HOB, Washington DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN NORWOOD: I am president of Physicians Who Care, Inc. ("PWC"). It is a not-for-profit organization which is devoted to protecting the doctor-patient relationship and ensuring quality health care. Formed in 1985 in San Antonio, Texas the organization has approximately 4,000 members, most of them doctors in private practice. PWC believes the responsibility for medical care belongs first and foremost to physicians and patients. We affirm the right of the physician, as the provider of care, to diagnose, prescribe, test and treat patients without undue outside interference. We affirm the right of the patient, as the person most affected by care, to choose his or her own physician and help determine the type of treatment received.

On behalf of PWC and its board of directors, I am writing to you now. As you know, one of the major issues facing our country today is our health care delivery system—quality, access, delivery, accountability and fairness. We are appraised that this issue will come before the House of Representatives next month after Congress reconvenes from its summer recess.

We have reviewed H.R. 2723, the bill introduced into the House by Representatives Norwood and Dingell. It is known as the "Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999". We strongly support it as it insures fairness and accountability in our health care delivery system that has been lacking in what the Senate has passed and other legislation that has gone before (H.R. 2723). We ask that you vote in favor of it.

Now is the opportunity to vote on legislation that will support the ability of patients to receive proper care from their providers and provide providers with measures of confidence and comfort not known by them since managed care and managed care plans were foisted upon patients and physicians.

We are particularly impressed by the wording in H.R. 2723 relating to external appeals, the ability of patients to sue their health plans and managed care organizations like

HMOs (just like they can physicians, hospitals and others who make medical decisions in patient care), excluding employers from liability unless they are involved in the same medical decision-making that presently exposes physicians, hospitals, nurses and the like.

Moreover, we are mindful that opponents of this type legislation raise costs as an issue or that employers will not be able to provide health insurance to their employees if the ERISA preemption is lifted or even that lifting this preemptive effect will cause more lawsuits. To these points, we respectfully and firmly disagree! Opponents are using emotion and "scare tactics" to avoid fact and the ability of all patients to receive proper and quality health care.

We are not against managed care; it does have a place. However, we are strongly against managed care plans not "toeing the line", i.e. not wanting to be held accountable for their medical decisions that adversely affect patient care (all over the country managed care plans are failing, 200 in California alone).

Now may be the last time that you have to provide effective relief to patients and their providers alike. If you do not, our court system may do it for you (as recent decisions in the last few years seem to strongly indicate.)

Please vote what is right, fair and just for all patients; we sincerely ask that you support H.R. 2723.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

RONALD BRONOW, M.D.,  
President.

PATIENTS WHO CARE,  
San Antonio, TX, August 24, 1999.

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,  
Longworth HOB, Washington, DC.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN NORWOOD: I am president of Patients Who Care (PtWC). It is a non-profit 501(c)3 organization of approximately 20,000 members and is dedicated to promoting through education an understanding of issues affecting access by patients to the highest quality health care possible. We believe in preserving quality medical care, affordability of care and care reimbursement plans, and preserving the doctor/patient relationship. We also feel it is the right of patients to choose their own physician and determine the type of treatment received. Finally, we try to help patients understand their rights in the health care decision-making process.

On behalf of PtWC and its board of directors, I am writing to you now. As you know, one of the major issues facing our country today is our health care delivery system—quality, access, delivery, accountability and fairness. We are appraised that this issue will come before the House of Representatives next month after Congress reconvenes from its summer recess.

We have received H.R. 2723, the bill introduced in the House of Representatives Norwood and Dingell. It is known as the "Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999". We strongly support it as we feel it insures fairness and accountability in our health care delivery system. These qualities have been lacking in what the House and Senate have passed in previous health care legislation. We ask that you vote in favor of H.R. 2723, and do all you can to help this bill move quickly to passage.

Now is the opportunity to vote on legislation which will support the ability of patients to receive proper care from their providers. It will also give providers a greater measure of confidence and comfort in treating their patients since managed care and the managed care plans were foisted upon patients and physicians many years ago.

We are particularly impressed by the wording in H.R. 2723 relating to external appeals, the ability of patients to sue their health plans and managed care organizations like HMOs (just like they can physicians, hospitals and others who make medical decisions in patient care), excluding employers from liability unless they are involved in the same medical decision-making that presently exposes physicians, hospitals, nurses and the life. We are also mindful that opponents of this type legislation raise "costs" as the issue, saying 'employers will not be able to provide health insurance to their employees if the ERISA preemption is lifted or even that lifting this preemptive effect will cause more lawsuits'. We feel this is a lesser concern than decisions that adversely affect patient care (all over the country managed care plans are failing—200 in California alone).

Now may be the last time you have to provide effective relief to patients and their providers. If you do not, our court system may do it for you (as recent decisions in the last few years seem to strongly indicate.)

Please vote what is right, fair and just for all patients; we sincerely ask that you support H.R. 2723.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

STEVEN C. JOHNSON, CLU, RHU,  
President.

P.S. It is also our understanding that most "individual" health care plans, not currently under ERISA, will not be affected by this legislation, or be required to conform to H.R. 2723. please be vigilant of this issue which our members have raised.

ALLIANCE FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,  
August 24, 1999.

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: We at the Alliance for Children and Families are writing to express our support for the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act (H.R. 2723), which you have introduced with Representative Dingell. The Alliance, an international nonprofit association representing over 350 child- and family-serving organizations, supports this important legislation to protect patients' rights. Alliance members serve more than 5 million individuals each year in more than 2,000 communities.

Broad bipartisan support for this new legislation represents a major breakthrough on behalf of patients' rights. This bill provides essential protections for all consumers in the private health insurance marketplace. H.R. 2723 ensures that medical decisions will be in the hands of medical experts. It permits people to hold their managed care plans accountable when plan decisions to withhold or limit care result in injury or death. We believe that holding health plans accountable will be a strong incentive for them to deliver clinically necessary care, minimizing the need for lawsuits.

We support your bill because it includes much needed patient protections, strong reforms of the managed care industry and due process protections for providers. It ensures that patients have access to a fair and independent external review for cases in which care is denied. H.R. 2723 also ensures that patients have access to specialists, including, when appropriate, specialists outside a plan's network.

Thank you for your leadership in protecting patients' rights through the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999.

Yours sincerely,

CARMEN DELGADO VOTAW,  
Senior Vice President, Public Policy.

PARALYSIS SOCIETY OF AMERICA,  
August 23, 1999.

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,  
U.S. House of Representatives, Longworth  
Building, Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: On behalf of the Paralysis Society of America (PSA), I am writing to voice support for H.R. 2723, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999.

We are pleased to see that the consensus bill combines the patient protections found in the major managed care reform bills introduced in the House this year, including H.R. 216, the Quality Care Act, and H.R. 358, the Patients' Bill of Rights. We also note the importance of H.R. 2723 as a bipartisan bill. Legislators who support this bipartisan bill recognize the importance of a health care system that balances the cost of service delivery without sacrificing individual patient needs.

PSA's membership of more than 19,800 people consists of individuals with spinal cord injury or disease, their family members and caregivers, health care professionals, and others with an interest in the disciplines of spinal cord medicine and paralysis. As you can imagine, the outcome of patient protection legislation speaks directly to the vested interest in our membership.

Particular attention is given to those portions of the legislation covering freedom of choice, specialists, and external appeals, clinical trials and privacy. Also of interest to our membership are the sections covering continued care, freedom of communication, clinical trials reform, incentives to deny care, and privacy:

PSA members want the right to freely choose and/or change their doctor and hospital;

PSA members want the right to see a specialist if they and their doctor determine the need is paramount to managing the complex health care needs of people with spinal cord dysfunction;

PSA members want the right to a second and third opinion following denial of coverage by a health plan, at no cost to the patient;

PSA members should not be forced to change doctors and hospitals while in the midst of a course of treatment for a health care problem;

Doctors must be able to talk freely with patients without fearing repercussions from health plans. Every doctor should be free to discuss anything relative to a patient's health with the patient, even if the information may be negative towards the health plan. Health plans must not be permitted to use tactics that discriminate against doctors for cooperation in patient advocacy, such as threats of firing, disciplinary action and by providing incentives to deny care;

PSA members should be able to participate in clinical trials that may maximize their independence and quality of life without undue interference from their health plan; and

PSA members are concerned about their right to privacy. No medical information on a patient should be released without the patient's approval.

The right to quality health care and patient protection is of primary importance to the members of the Paralysis Society of America. PSA offers its support, and will gladly assist you in any way we can to ensure that H.R. 2723 is enacted into law.

Sincerely,

NANCY STARNES,  
Director.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF  
SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGISTS,  
Bethesda, MD, August 24, 1999.

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,  
Longworth House Office Building,  
Washington, DC.

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: On behalf of the National Association of School Psychologists, (NASP) I am writing to express our strong endorsement of H.R. 2723, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999.

NASP is an organization that represents 21,500 school psychologists and related professionals throughout the world. NASP works to actively promote educationally and psychologically healthy environments for all children and youth. We work together with national coalitions to increase support and funding for primary prevention services and mental health programs that deter youth from delinquent activity, assist them with improved learning and provide them with experiences and role models to become successful in life. In health care, our goal is to increase access and affordability of health and mental health services for which coverage is often extremely limited or denied.

Developing a balanced compromise on the most controversial of managed care reform provisions, the Bipartisan Bill would provide essential protections for consumers in the private health insurance marketplace. The Bipartisan Consensus Bill maintains a strong utilization review process to require the oversight of trained personnel, assures fair appeals, guarantees access to emergency and urgent care services and holds health plans accountable for their decisions. Furthermore, this bill requires the development of quality criteria along with performance and clinical outcome measures for at-risk individuals and people with chronic and severe illness. If H.R. 2723 is passed, this provision will have an important positive impact on the health care provided to adults with severe mental health illnesses, children with serious emotional disturbances and other people with significant mental disorders who are increasingly being served in managed care settings.

Our efforts to improve mental health service delivery must include the elimination of insurance discrimination against people with mental disorders and the serious problems associated with the delivery of mental health care by HMOs. It is time to move beyond the impasse in this effort. The Bipartisan Bill creates a new "Patients' Bill of rights" which should pass the House with minimal dissension. Thank you for your commitment to reaching a workable compromise to finally provide consumers with the opportunity to appeal instances of discrimination or denial of care.

Sincerely,

SUSAN GORIN, CAE,  
Executive Director.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF ORAL,  
AND MAXILLOFACIAL SURGEONS,  
Rosemont, IL, August 26, 1999

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,  
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: On behalf of the American Association of Oral and maxillofacial surgeons (AAOMS), which represents the nation's approximately 6,000 oral and maxillofacial surgeons, I thank you for supporting provider nondiscrimination language as stated in Section 133(a) of the bipartisan "Consensus on Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999".

We felt that this bill has the strongest chance of being enacted, as it is a bi-partisan effort and is endorsed by President Clinton. AAOMS lends its strong support for the Consensus on Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, and hopes that it is enacted into law.



Oral and maxillofacial surgeons in your district and across the nation believe that provider nondiscrimination is a key component of managed care reform. It is the top legislative priority of the AAOMS.

Thank you again for all your help in making sure that provider nondiscrimination language was included in this important piece of legislation.

Sincerely,

DAVID A. BUSSARD, DDS, MS,  
*President.*

—  
AMERICAN PODIATRIC  
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, INC.,  
*Bethesda, MD, August 31, 1999*

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,  
*U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC.*

DEAR MR. NORWOOD: With regard to HR 2723, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, I am pleased to announce our unqualified support of the proposal. Embodying every principle the association has embraced as essential for meaningful managed care reform, we are convinced its enactment is in the best interest of all Americans.

The strong bipartisan support your measure has heretofore generated is compelling evidence that, given a fair hearing by the full House, a comprehensive patient oriented reform package can prevail. To this end we offer our understanding and enthusiastic support.

Best regards!

Sincerely Yours,

RONALD S. LEPOW, DPM,  
*President.*

OPTICIANS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,  
*Fairfax, VA, August 24, 1999.*

Hon. CHARLIE NORWOOD,  
*Washington, DC.*

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: On behalf of the Board of Directors and the members of the Opticians Association of America, I am writing to thank you for sponsoring H.R. 2723, the bipartisan managed care improvement bill.

This bill would give basic, common-sense protections to millions of Americans in managed care plans, and it is certainly refreshing to see the bipartisan way in which it was approached!

In addition, we are pleased to see that the bill contains a point-of-service option and anti-discrimination language which guarantee consumers the widest possible choice of providers.

We look forward to continued collaboration in the interest of America's health care consumers.

Sincerely,

JACQUELINE E. FAIRBARNES,  
*Assistant Executive Director for Government  
Relations.*

—  
AMERICAN OSTEOPATHIC ASSOCIATION,  
*Washington, DC, August 27, 1999.*

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
*U.S. House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC.*

DEAR CONGRESSMAN NORWOOD: The American Osteopathic Association (AOA) represents the nation's 43,500 osteopathic physicians. As President, I am pleased to let you know that the AOA endorses your bill, the "Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999" (H.R. 2723).

The AOA advocates, on behalf of patients, for Congress to enact strong, meaningful, and comprehensive protections. After six years of debate and delay, we believe that H.R. 2723 is the bipartisan legislation that will ensure the AOA's long sought principles. These include: physicians allowed to determine medical necessity; health plans held accountable for their actions; a fair and independent appeals process available to pa-

tients, and protections which apply to all Americans.

Over the last two decades, managed care has become less interested in delivering quality healthcare to patients. Instead, the focus seems entirely on the bottom line. It is time to bring the focus back to our patients and away from HMO profits. Employers and patients are tired of not receiving the care they are promised, pay for, and deserve. H.R. 2723 will help bring the quality back into healthcare and allow osteopathic physicians to care for our patients in accordance with the high principles guiding our profession.

Again, thank you for your leadership on this critical issue. We are encouraged by the broad bipartisan support your legislation has received. The AOA pledges to work with you and all Members of Congress to ensure swift enactment of H.R. 2723. Please feel free to contact Michael Mayers, AOA Assistant Director of Congressional Affairs, in our Washington office at 202-414-0148 with any further comments or questions.

Sincerely,

EUGENE A. OLIVERI, D.O.,  
*President, American Osteopathic Association.*

—  
AMERICAN COUNSELING ASSOCIATION,  
*Alexandria, VA, August 27, 1999.*

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
*U.S. House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC.*

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: I am writing on behalf of the more than 51,000 members of the American Counseling Association to express our strong support for your legislation H.R. 2723, the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999. This bipartisan patient protection legislation will afford health care consumers the essential protections necessary to ensure the delivery of quality health care services.

H.R. 2723 provides a wide array of consumer protections including several key components for mental health providers and their clients, such as putting medical decisions in the hands of medical experts, not the insurance company bureaucrats; the ability to hold health plans liable when their decisions to withhold or deny care result in injury or death; adequate access to specialists; a continuity of care clause, and a provision to prohibit nondiscrimination against providers based on their type of license. In addition these protections would apply to all privately insured individuals, unlike other managed care legislation considered in Congress.

Representatives Norwood, we thank you for your continued advocacy on behalf of health care consumers. This legislation will make a difference to the millions of Americans with private health insurance. Please let us know if we can be of any assistance in your work.

Sincerely,

DONNA FORD, MS, NCC,  
*President, American Counseling Association.*

—  
AMERICAN PUBLIC  
HEALTH ASSOCIATION,  
*Washington, DC, August 10, 1999.*

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
*Washington, DC.*

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: On behalf of the American Public Health Association, which represents more than 50,000 public health professionals around the country, I am writing to express our support for your new bi-partisan managed care reform bill, H.R. 2723.

This bill will provide patients with real, enforceable assurances that they will receive the care they need and have purchased from managed care companies. If passed by Congress, this bill will: improve access to emergency services; allow more people to enter

clinical trials; provide patients with a fair appeals process for denied claims; lift barriers to specialists; and hold plans responsible for the medical decisions they make.

Furthermore, the bill's broad bi-partisan cosponsorship—and announced support from President Clinton—makes it Congress' best chance to complete action on this important issue this year.

We understand that some within the managed care industry oppose any government regulation, but this issue is a very important one for consumers, health care providers, and the public health community. Your steadfast commitment to reform and your strong leadership throughout this debate are commendable. H.R. 2723 is a significant and welcome step toward achieving new protections for managed care patients. We look forward to continuing work with you toward achievement of that mutual goal.

Sincerely,

RICHARD A. LEVINSON, MD, DPA,  
*Associate Executive Director,  
Programs and Policy.*

—  
NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP  
FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES,  
*Washington, DC, August 13, 1999.*

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
*U.S. House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC.*

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: The National Partnership is pleased to endorse the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 (H.R. 2723). This is strong, bipartisan patient protection legislation, and thanks to your hard work, we believe it can—and will—pass the House of Representatives.

For women and families, few issues resonate as profoundly and pervasively as the need for quality health care. Survey after survey reveals Americans' growing dissatisfaction with the current health care system, and many feel the system is in crisis. We need common-sense patient protections that will restore consumer confidence and tip the balance back in favor of patients and the health care providers they rely on.

There are many features of this bill that are especially important. First and foremost, this bill ensures that medical judgments will be in the hands of medical experts, not insurance bureaucrats looking at the bottom line. This bill:

Ensures that patients have recourse to a genuinely independent external review when care is denied.

Allows patients to hold their managed care plan accountable when plan decisions to withhold or limit care result in injury or death.

Ensures that women have direct access to ob-gyn services from the participating health care professional of their choice.

Ensures that doctors and nurses can report quality problems without retaliation from HMOs, insurance companies, and hospitals.

Ensures access to specialists, including, when appropriate, specialists outside a plan's network.

Ensures access to clinical trials that may save people's lives.

The House of Representatives faces an historic opportunity to provide patients the protections they need. We look forward to working with you to ensure passage of this important legislation.

Sincerely,

JUDITH L. LICHTMAN,  
*President.*

DEBRA L. NESS,  
*Executive Vice President.*

JOANNE L. HUSTEAD,  
*Director of Legal and  
Public Policy.*



THE AMERICAN OCCUPATIONAL  
THERAPY ASSOCIATION, INC.  
Bethesda, MD, September 1, 1999.

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
U.S. House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC

DEAR REPRESENTATIVE NORWOOD: On behalf of the 60,000 members of the American Occupational Therapy Association, Inc. (AOTA), I would like to express our endorsement for the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2723. We appreciate your leadership, along with Representative John Dingell, in continuing to pursue strong managed care legislation with real patient protections through bipartisan efforts.

H.R. 2723 contains many critical patient protections that the members of AOTA believe are necessary to ensure patients receive the care that they need. Federal legislation should: guarantee patients' access to all medically necessary specialty care using appropriate utilization review standards; protect patients' right to choose a health care plan allowing out-of-network care; prohibit the restriction of importance medical communications and require information disclosure standards; prohibit discriminatory practices against health care professionals; require timely, independent due process procedures; and hold health plans accountable for their medical decisions.

H.R. 2723 is considerably more comprehensive than legislation passed by the Senate in July. It is important that these protections are available to all Americans enrolled in private health care plans.

Over the August recess we have notified our members, asking them to talk to their legislators. Please let us know how we can continue to assist you in your efforts to have comprehensive managed care legislation addressed on the House floor.

Again, we thank you for your leadership and hard work on this issue. We look forward to continuing to work with you to pursue passage of comprehensive managed care legislation.

Sincerely,

KATHRYN M. PONTZER,  
Senior Legislative Counsel,  
Federal Affairs Department.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR  
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY THERAPY,  
Washington, DC, August 23, 1999.

Hon. CHARLES NORWOOD,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, DC

RE: Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 (H.R. 2823)

DEAR DR. NORWOOD: The American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy is writing to express our strong support for the Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999 (H.R. 2723). On behalf of the 46,000 marriage and family therapists throughout the United States, we want to applaud you and Rep. Dingell for your effort to provide Americans with comprehensive patient protections.

Your bill offers several safeguards that are integral to our members, as well as the public at large. One provision, the prohibition on discrimination against providers, has particular significance. It expands consumer access to qualified practitioners who are regulated by the states. Without this protection, insurers and plans can continue to discriminate against many licensed health care professionals. Additionally, the provision will foster competition among providers and expand the pool of trained practitioners.

The ability to access specialty care is also a positive component of this legislation. Pa-

tients with ongoing healthcare conditions will greatly benefit from the opportunity to access specialists who are trained in the treatment of their special conditions. Moreover, removing the requirement of a primary care referral will reduce costs and delays that burden health care delivery.

Other provisions of significance to our organization include: an independent review process for determination of medical necessity decisions; the ability of people with special health care needs and chronic conditions to continue to access their health care professionals after employers change plans; the ability to hold managed care plans accountable for decisions to deny care; and guaranteed access to emergency care services.

These protections are a superb example of how Members from both sides of the aisle can work together to improve the quality of medical care for all employees. Your leadership in this effort is truly outstanding and appreciated. If there is any role our organization can play in passage of this legislation, please contact our Government Affairs Manager, David Bergman, at (202) 467-5015. Its time to ensure that all Americans are provided with the security of a comprehensive health care system.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL BOWERS,  
Executive Director, American Association  
for Marriage and Family Therapy.

#### AMERICAN PUBLIC PLACES EDUCATION AS A TOP PRIORITY

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. TERRY). Under the Speaker's announced policy of January 6, 1999, the gentleman from New York (Mr. OWENS) is recognized for 60 minutes as the designee of the minority leader.

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Speaker, we have just returned from recess and we are about to enter the closing chapters of the first session of the 106th Congress. The end of the first session will only take us halfway. We can continue, and there are probably some things that will continue, but we have a full plate here.

There is a great deal of speculation about exactly what is going to happen with the appropriations bills and the fiscal plan which now is made more exciting by the fact that there is a surplus. After we lock the box and keep the Social Security funds in place, we still have a projection of a 10-year period of a trillion dollar surplus, and that has led to some radical proposals by the Republicans with respect to tax cuts, and that has certainly charged the atmosphere.

I am interested in continuing the dialogue on education. I think that we are in danger of making a great blunder if we do not use this great window of opportunity to do something dramatic to improve education in America. There is a need for a greater commitment from the Federal Government which now only is responsible for about 8 percent of the total expenditure on education. We need more federal support for education.

There are a lot of things that have to happen to improve education in America, but one of the things that has to happen is that we must have more fed-

eral support. The Federal Government is where the money is. The Federal Government's money is not made here in Washington; it all came from the local level, so it belongs to the people out there in the States and in the localities. This is no reason why we cannot resolve to use funds from the Federal Government to help solve and resolve some of the overwhelming problems that we are facing in education.

We can still win the war for education support. The status of legislation here at this point does not preclude some major development taking place either before we end this session, or certainly before we end the 106th Congress in the fall of the year 2000.

Let us take a look at where we are at this point. As far as education funding is concerned, we are in bad shape. A number of appropriations bills have been stalled, and we have only passed two; but the education appropriations bill, the Labor-HHS appropriation is further behind than any of the other appropriations in the process. It has not even gotten out of the subcommittee yet. The appropriations bill for education, it seems, is being used as a scapegoat; and it will be the last one out there, and it will have the greatest amount of reductions.

I am not on the Committee on Appropriations, but the rumors are that for the overall Labor, Health and Human Services and Education appropriations, the cut may range as high as 35 or 40 percent. And certainly education is in danger of a 15 to 20 percent cut if we follow the present process whereby there are budget caps. But they are not following budget caps on some appropriations bills. They are leaving the last ones to take most of the burden of the cuts. So education is in deep trouble at this moment in history. But I think we can still win the war.

What I want to talk about tonight is how the American public and public opinion, the common sense of the voters, still is a determining factor here. We need to hear that and know that. All of the polls still continue to show that the American people place education as one of the top priorities, either priority number one or priority number two, in terms of federal assistance, or the use of federal resources to help solve problems. They expect us to do something. They are concerned. And their common sense is correct. Their common sense is on target. But what they need to know is that there are a set of rules being followed and a set of maneuvers underway that will lead to inevitable cuts in education if those rules are followed.

The President is right when he says that not only do we face cuts in this present year, in the present appropriation, but in the bigger scenario that the Republicans have staked out, if they go ahead with a gigantic tax cut of \$790 some billion dollars over a 10-year period, then the mechanics of that



## Testimony by Russ Newman for the March 30, 2005 NCVHS Subcommittee on Privacy and Confidentiality Hearing

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Practice Directorate

March 30, 2005

Mark A. Rothstein, J.D., Chair

Subcommittee on Privacy & Confidentiality

National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics

### Re: Testimony on Privacy and Confidentiality Issues Concerning the National Health Information Network

Dear Chairman Rothstein and Distinguished Subcommittee Members:

I submit this testimony on behalf of the American Psychological Association (APA), the professional organization representing more than 150,000 members and affiliates engaged in the practice, research, and teaching of psychology. We appreciate this opportunity to submit this testimony regarding the development of a National Health Information Network (NHIN).

We understand that the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) assists and advises the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services in the study and identification of privacy, security, and access measures to protect individually identifiable health information in an environment of electronic networking. We further understand that NCVHS will make recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services in the form of suggested access, security, and privacy measures that should be taken to implement a NHIN. Therefore, the APA offers the following testimony to the Subcommittee regarding our suggestions and concerns in creating and maintaining access, privacy and confidentiality for health records in a NHIN.

The form, scope, uses and control of the NHIN have not been determined. Therefore, our comments can only address potential concerns and suggestions based on directions that we anticipate that the NHIN may take. Accordingly, we would appreciate opportunities to comment again as this dialogue develops.

## **I. Unique Privacy Concerns Raised by Mental Health Records**

Our primary concern regarding the NHIN is the need to balance accessibility of health information with privacy and confidentiality. This testimony will focus on the unique patient privacy concerns of mental health patients.

The NHIN has the laudable goal of improving patient care through greater and more efficient information access. We believe that it has the potential to substantially improve the quality of health care provided in this country by allowing instant access to critical patient information at any point of care. It also has the potential to increase the efficiency of service delivery and, importantly, lower administrative costs. Further, it has the potential to improve patient care specifically by fostering the integration of physical and mental health care as discussed in Section III.A below.

We are concerned, however, about possible unintended consequences to the extent that some of the powerful forces propelling the need for an electronic health record include economic/business concerns about efficiency. In prior instances where broad changes to the health care system were introduced to improve both efficiency and patient care (particularly with the advent of market-driven managed care techniques), many have now concluded that the new systems actually reduced the quality of care because they prioritized economic issues over patient care. The unfortunate reality is that our health care system has become increasingly dominated by corporatized “big business” for which profit making has become an essential part of business. With NHIN, our concern is that too much focus on improving the flow of health information for economic efficiency in the service of profit making and business interests could take priority over various patient care concerns, including privacy. We sincerely hope that this does not happen and that steps can be taken from the beginning to assure a balanced approach to addressing the various interests involved.

In order to develop the NHIN in a manner which will promote quality mental health care, it is important to consider the unique privacy issues relating to mental health records. Most people understand that mental health records are particularly sensitive because they may contain a patient’s innermost and most embarrassing personal information. Many also are aware that, unfortunately, the stigma attached to mental health disorders and mental health treatment makes the records of that treatment especially sensitive. This is an area of health care where the mere fact that a person has sought treatment, if revealed, can damage careers, reputations and relationships. Any violation of privacy could be devastating to the patient. Thus, patients receiving care for mental health issues may be prone to avoid or discontinue treatment if there is a real or perceived threat to the privacy of their health records.

Mental health care is unique in that successful treatment depends on both the existence of privacy and the *expectation* of privacy. There is no other health field in which the mere threat of loss of privacy can interfere with the success of treatment. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in the case of *Jaffee v. Redmond*, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996), the psychotherapist-patient relationship is:

**[R]ooted in the imperative need for confidentiality and trust...Treatment by a physician for physical ailments can often proceed successfully on the basis of a physical examination, objective information supplied by the patient, and the results of diagnostic tests. Effective psychotherapy, by contrast depends upon frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the *mere possibility of disclosure* may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment. (Emphasis added).**

Because of these concerns, psychologists and other licensed mental health professionals are trained to exercise great care in protecting their patients' records. The psychologist has typically viewed his or her role as a "gatekeeper" controlling access to those records. We would urge that the establishment of the NHIN preserve mental health professionals' role in being able to control and protect the records so that confidentiality, a trusting relationship and successful treatment may be preserved.

Psychologists have historically served an important role in determining what information in their patients' records to disclose, because they have a great understanding of the heightened sensitivity of mental health records, what records are relevant to other treating professionals, and the special legal and ethical rules concerning the disclosure of psychological records (which are generally considerably more protective than the disclosure rules for medical records). In this role, and working in collaboration with the patients, psychologists have been able, for example, to provide a critical perspective on what is "minimum necessary" information to release to insurers and other third parties, pursuant to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, as discussed in Section III.B below.

The psychologist's role vis-à-vis confidential mental health records is also highlighted by the NHIN's potential benefit of improving patients' access to their own records. The psychologist is in a key position to identify what parts of the patient's mental health record are appropriately viewed by the patient or, alternatively, viewed by the patient with the psychologist's simultaneous explanatory input. In recognition of this role, many state laws actually give the psychologist discretion to withhold portions of that record to prevent physical, emotional or therapeutic harm to the patient. A mental health record may be susceptible to misinterpretation by others, including the patient, or may cause a strong emotional reaction if viewed by the patient. Thus, even when access is appropriate, it is often highly advisable to have the psychologist present while the patient is reviewing his/her record in order to explain aspects of the record and help the patient cope with emotional responses to that information.

## **II. What mental health records would be included?**

Some, but not all, of the concerns outlined above would be reduced by limiting the scope of mental health records to be included in the NHIN. The records that should most logically be included are the basic information that the HIPAA Privacy Rule views as necessary for sharing among health care professionals.

This information, which we call the “clinical record”, includes basic items such as diagnosis, symptoms and treatment plan. This basic health information is necessary to assist all health care professionals who are treating patients in providing quality integrated care to them.

There are two types of mental health records that we strongly urge not be included, or only be included with specifically restricted access:

Psychotherapy notes. The HIPAA Privacy Rule recognizes that a mental health professional's private notes concerning therapy sessions contain highly sensitive patient confidences, are primarily for the professional's own use, and are not the type of information that needs to be shared with other health care professionals, insurers, or even patients. Accordingly, these notes are given heightened protection under the Privacy Rule, and can generally only be used by the psychologist who took those notes, absent a specific authorization from the patient. The same considerations call for excluding them from the NHIN, or restricting access so that only the psychotherapist who created them can view them (unless the patient specifically authorizes broader disclosure).

Psychological testing. Similarly, psychological test materials and results should not be included in the NHIN. First, psychological tests are particularly susceptible to misinterpretation by those not trained to interpret these tests. Parts of tests taken out of context by someone not trained to interpret the whole can be harmfully misleading. Second, the test materials themselves are unique (usually copyrighted) and they may lose their value as accurate diagnostic and evaluative instruments if they are too widely shared. This sharing can lead to several problems – from those that are intentional, such as manipulation of the test responses in order to achieve a desired result, such as with malingering, to unintentional invalidation of test results because of prior familiarity with the questions. Third, the raw data of psychological testing is as likely to contain highly personal confidential information as psychotherapy notes. Some of the questions themselves may elicit highly sensitive responses, and also the psychologist doing the testing may write observations and comments on the materials containing the questions and/or answers. Fear of loss of confidentiality may negate the effectiveness of a test in the same manner that fear of loss of privacy can interfere with successful psychotherapy. A patient may not be completely forthcoming with full answers to test questions if he or she thinks that the information may be widely disclosed.

### **III. Who Would Have Access to Mental Health Records and For What Purposes?**

A. Access by Other Treating Professionals/Integration of Mental and Physical Health. We believe that easy accessibility of records by treating health care professionals is one of the most important goals of the NHIN. For example, in the Veterans Administration (VA) system, patients typically see multiple health care professionals during that visit. Prior to the implementation of its electronic system, health care professionals treating a VA patient would not always have access to the patient's medical record when treating the patient because the record was either in the possession of another health care professional or was being held somewhere else in the VA hospital. Now, a health care professional can access the patient's record at any time and can update information and add his or her notes to the record. This is a particularly important feature as mental health care becomes an increasingly integrated part of overall patient

healthcare and interdisciplinary collaboration is improved. This improved access would be possible nationwide in a NHIN.

We believe the NHIN could actually have the beneficial effect of increasing the level of integration of mental health and physical health care. APA believes that such integration is important in light of the growing recognition of the link between behavior, health and illness. It is increasingly recognized that many of the physical ailments that are now the nation's dominant medical concerns, such as diabetes and heart disease, have strong mental and behavioral components. The corollary is, of course, that treatment of diabetes is more effective if a psychologist works with the patient and physician on behavioral and emotional issues, diet, exercise and medication compliance.

Currently, mental and physical health care are all too often provided in separate spheres that have little contact with each other. The integration of these spheres has been shown to greatly improve patient care, particularly in areas such as disease management and with individuals who display "at risk" behaviors such as poor diet, lack of exercise, smoking and alcohol abuse.

Because integration of mental health with physical health information through the NHIN would generally increase access to mental health records, it must be done carefully and selectively. First, there is the potential for differing levels of privacy maintenance in the mental and physical health spheres. With physical health, it is often appropriate to make a patient's record accessible to several physicians of different specialties, nurses and other affiliated staff. By contrast, a psychologist's psychotherapy notes generally cannot be shared with anyone other than the psychologist (without the patient's authorization), and access to the more public clinical record is often not shared with affiliated staff because even basic information, such as the diagnosis, can be highly sensitive. A common problem we have seen is that those on the physical health side are not always familiar with the unique and sensitive aspects of these mental health records and the greater privacy obligations imposed as a result. We are aware of instances in which psychologists have been asked to place their psychotherapy notes and patient files in common databases to which a large number of professionals and affiliated staff have access. For the psychologists to comply would, of course, place them in violation of their privacy obligations under HIPAA, state law and ethics code.

These problems could be expanded on a massive scale if the integration of mental health and physical health information through the NHIN was not carefully orchestrated. We are concerned that if these two very different systems are integrated through the NHIN, the overall level of confidentiality not be lowered to the physical health standard. We strongly urge that the NHIN not take a "lowest common denominator" approach. Perhaps the best alternative, as practiced for many years in Veterans' Administration settings is to have a two-tiered system, with greater privacy control on the mental health portion of the record.

A second concern is the potential unintended impact of the introduction of mental health information into a large number of physical health settings that are not used to having access to this information. Since the stigma attached to mental health disorders is still pervasive, some in the system may react to and treat patients differently if they know about their disorder. Relatedly, there is the concern that health professionals with little experience and training in mental health issues may misinterpret mental health information. For example, a primary care professional would have no training in interpreting psychological test data. If a

health professional were to review the test data alone, he or she might come to erroneous conclusions regarding the patient, and worse, could share this incorrect information with the patient or other treating professionals.

**B. Access by Health Insurers.** Key questions with the creation of an electronic health record concern the extent to which health insurers and other third party payors will be allowed access to the NHIN, for what purposes, and how would it be limited. We have witnessed a long-standing tension between mental health professionals trying to protect patient privacy and insurers requesting additional information to decide whether the mental health treatment is “medically necessary.” Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, this tension has shifted to disputes over what is the “minimum necessary” information for the insurer to determine medical necessity. Unfortunately, the flexible but vague “minimum necessary” standard leaves considerable room for disagreement. (Fortunately, the Privacy Rule leaves little room for debate when psychotherapy notes are at issue: the insurer cannot demand access.) In some cases, the extent of information requested by the insurer has become a tactic to discourage patients from accessing services, even when these services are necessary. The psychologist’s understanding of what information is most sensitive, what is potentially subject to misinterpretation, and what justifies his/her treatment plan, places the psychologist in an optimal position to determine what is the minimum necessary information actually needed by the insurer.

The ability of the health professional to exert control over the record is critical to enable a balance between the need for information disclosure and confidentiality. Any system allowing third party payors unfettered access to mental health information in the NHIN would remove that control and create grave privacy concerns.

**C. Access by Law Enforcement.** A final concern in this area is whether the NHIN would be made available for law enforcement. Generally, we believe that law enforcement access to patient records should be limited to the absolute minimum disclosure and use necessary in the interest of justice. If the NHIN would be open to such purposes, what type of legal safeguards would protect patients from unreasonable privacy intrusions? We would suggest that the disclosure of mental health records for the purposes of investigations regarding victims of crime or abuse only be permitted based on some form of judicial review – warrant, subpoena, court order, etc. If patients are concerned that their information is subject to government access without due process, they may be discouraged from participating in the NHIN or from seeking necessary treatment.

#### **IV. Questions Regarding Regulatory Scheme and Patient Participation**

A number of questions are raised with the prospect of regulating a system based on the NHIN. Would the NHIN be subject to and governed by the HIPAA Privacy Rule? If so, what role would state privacy laws play – assuming that the NHIN would be a national and/or federal network? Given that the Privacy Rule was only meant to set a federal floor, we believe it would be critical that stronger state protections (e.g., on patient consent, authorization and access) still apply to NHIN so that implementing NHIN did not result in substantial lowering of patient protection.

If the Privacy Rule were to govern use and disclosure of patient information in the NHIN, it will be important to re-assess whether the NHIN creates new privacy risks or issues not contemplated when the Rule was

drafted. For example, if the NHIN shifts control over access to records away from the mental health professional, it would be necessary to reconsider the adequacy and applicability of the Privacy Rule's current mechanisms for controlling disclosure.

Another critical area of uncertainty concerns the threshold question of what choice patients would have as to whether their records would be included in the NHIN. Would their participation in NHIN be voluntary? What, if any, aspects of the NHIN will be mandatory?

In order to make such consent meaningful, patients should be advised of the potential uses of their records, by whom and for what purposes, along with the benefits of participating in the NHIN. This might be provided in a HIPAA-type privacy notice (whether or not the Privacy Rule were to apply to the NHIN).

Finally, once a patient consented to have his/her records in the NHIN, would there be some uses of those records that would require additional authorization from the patient?

For example, while most patients would want their records available to health care professionals who are treating them, they might feel quite different about giving such access to insurance companies. This might be another area where the new privacy concerns posed by the NHIN would justify making certain aspects of the Privacy Rule more stringent as applied to the NHIN. It might make sense to require that the patient gave a HIPAA-type authorization before access to their records was granted to an insurance company (if insurers were to be allowed access at all). Alternatively, patients upon "joining" the NHIN, could select what uses would only be allowed with their authorization.

## **V. Conclusion and Recommendations**

The APA recognizes that this hearing is a beginning point toward developing a NHIN that will balance the ability to access health records with the need for privacy and confidentiality of records. We urge the Subcommittee to adopt the following recommendations relevant to mental health:

- Exclude from the NHIN, or place specific limitations on access to, psychotherapy notes and psychological test materials and raw data.
- Recognize and maintain the important role that the licensed mental health professional plays in determining what is appropriate access to mental health records by insurers, patients and others.
- Promote the integration of physical and mental health information but do so in a cautious manner that preserves the high level of confidentiality of mental health records, for example by creating a two-tier system where mental health records would be subject to more limited access.

We would appreciate the opportunity to work further with NCVHS and the Department of Health and Human Services to give additional input and suggestions on the NHIN as its development progresses.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/

Russ Newman, Ph.D., J.D.,  
Executive Director for Professional Practice  
American Psychological Association



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JOINT FTC/DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HEARING

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ON HEALTH CARE AND COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY

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Tuesday, June 10, 2003

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9:15 a.m.

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1st Conference Room

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1                                   P R O C E E D I N G S

2                   DR. HYMAN: Thank you all for coming to the  
3 Joint Hearing sponsored by the Federal Trade Commission  
4 and the Department of Justice on Health care and  
5 Competition Law and Policy. I'm David Hyman, Special  
6 Counsel here at the Federal Trade Commission. This is  
7 the latest in a series of hearings that we commenced in  
8 February, 2003 totaling approximately 30 days of hearings  
9 that are a broad examination of the performance of the  
10 health care marketplace.

11                   Today, we take up the subject of market entry,  
12 and we have a very distinguished panel to address that  
13 subject. We also have a distinguished speaker who is  
14 speaking about a subject that's related to, but distinct  
15 from, that. We're sort of subject to people's schedules  
16 in terms of when we include them. So let me -- we have a  
17 bio-book outside that contains the details of everyone  
18 who will be speaking today. So our rule is very short  
19 introductions. Let me go through those now, and then  
20 I'll have a couple of quick remarks about the way the  
21 rest of the morning is going to work.

22                   Our first speaker is Professor Robin Wilson,  
23 who is an Associate Professor at the University of South  
24 Carolina School of Law and a staff member at the South  
25 Carolina Center for Bioethics and Humanities. The next

1 speaker, who will actually be participating by  
2 teleconference because of his scheduling problems, is  
3 Professor Morris Kleiner, who is a Professor of Public  
4 Affairs and Industrial Relations at the University of  
5 Minnesota. Those of you who are here in the room can see  
6 that we're going from your left to your right in terms of  
7 order of the speakers.

8 The next speaker will be Tom Piper,  
9 representing the American Health Planning Association.  
10 He has extensive experience in Health Planning Regulation  
11 Development. Following him will be Tammi Byrd, who is  
12 President-elect of the American Dental Hygienist  
13 Association.

14 The next speaker will be Lynne Loeffler, who is  
15 a member of the American College of Nurse Midwives and a  
16 practicing midwife for 18 years. Then John Hennessy,  
17 Executive Director of Kansas City Cancer Centers.  
18 Following him will be Megan Price, who is the Director  
19 for Contracts and Communications for Professional Nurses  
20 Services in Vermont.

21 Then batting cleanup, Susan Apold, who is the  
22 President of the American College of Nurse Practitioners  
23 representing approximately 44,000 Nurse Practitioners  
24 nationally. She is also the Dean of Nursing at the  
25 College of Mount St. Vincent in New York.

1                   So we'll go through each of those speakers.  
2           We'll make presentations from up here, and then, because  
3           of the way the Power Point is projected, nobody will be  
4           sitting up at the front until the very end. Whereas,  
5           time allows, then speakers adhering to their time limits  
6           allows, we will have time for a short roundtable  
7           discussion involving all of the participants.

8                   With respect to time, Cecile over there on the  
9           table will be flashing you notes periodically to let you  
10          know how much time you have, so I would appreciate it if  
11          you would do that, adhere to your time limits. People  
12          will be listening in by telephone. This is also taped,  
13          for those of you who want to see yourself memorialized.  
14          You can give them as Christmas presents and the like.

15                   Two last comments for those attending, which  
16          is, first of all, if you could turn off your cell phones.  
17          It's quite disconcerting when you're making a brilliant  
18          point and suddenly it starts playing Jingle Bells in the  
19          background. And second, simply so everyone knows, the  
20          moderated roundtable at the end is limited participation  
21          to those who have spoken. It is not an open forum. So  
22          although we appreciate your attending and encourage you  
23          to submit comments for the record, either based on larger  
24          issues or on something you hear today, it's not an open  
25          mike.



1                   So with all of that, let me introduce Professor  
2 Robin Wilson to speak about unauthorized practice.

3                   MS. WILSON: I want to begin this morning by  
4 thanking the Federal Trade Commission and the Department  
5 of Justice for holding these hearings. And I wanted to  
6 thank, in particular, the Special Counsel for bringing  
7 scrutiny and attention to a disturbing practice world  
8 wide of using patients for teaching purposes in hospital  
9 without their knowledge or consent.

10                  And I want to focus by talk this morning on two  
11 such practices; the use of women under anesthesia  
12 awaiting surgery to teach pelvic examinations, and the  
13 use of deceased patients in the emergency room after  
14 their demise to teach resuscitation techniques without  
15 the family's or the patient's consent.

16                  I want to start by looking at pelvic exams  
17 first. And here we have some good statistical data from  
18 earlier this year demonstrating that this practice  
19 persists. This is a study published in February by Ubel,  
20 Jepson, and Silver-Isenstadt reported in the American  
21 Journal of OB-GYN. And what it shows is the result of a  
22 small study surveying students at five Philadelphia  
23 medical schools in 1995 who had completed OB-GYN  
24 rotations. They found that 90 percent, shown in yellow,  
25 had done exams on women under anesthesia.

1           Now in terms of consent it's difficult from the  
2           study to know exactly what was told to these women. And  
3           this is so because the study did not ask the students  
4           specifically within the study precisely what consent was  
5           there for the exam. And sometimes it's difficult for  
6           students to know what types of consent were given because  
7           they may not have been present at the time that it was  
8           given.

9           But the virtue of this study is that it follows  
10          on the heels of another study out of Great Britain which  
11          was published in the British Medical Journal in January.  
12          That study actually linked the practice together with  
13          consent. As you see, 53 percent of the students at a  
14          single medical school in England reported that they had  
15          performed an intimate exam, pelvic or rectal on a patient  
16          who was sedated or anesthetized at the time, while they  
17          were getting their undergraduate medical degree.

18          In terms of consent, and that's shown in blue  
19          by the way, in terms of consent you'll see that one  
20          quarter of the exams the students attested to the fact  
21          that there was no verbal or written consent for the exam.  
22          Another quarter of the exams there was consent written  
23          and then the remaining amount we just don't know. Now by  
24          the way, these students did not perform an insubstantial  
25          number of exams. The three classes of students that they

1 surveyed performed more than 700 exams combined and I  
2 thought that was significant.

3 Now we know that the use of women is neither an  
4 isolated nor a localized practice. So what I'm going to  
5 walk you through is three decades of studies that show  
6 that this has happened for a very long time across  
7 countries.

8 We know, for example, this is a study in 1988  
9 by Cohen of medical schools in the United Kingdom. It  
10 found that 46 percent of British medical schools, shown  
11 in yellow, used unconscious women to teach pelvic exams  
12 to medical students for their first time, i.e., the first  
13 pelvic they ever did. A 1985 study, which was done by  
14 Beckmann in the U.S. and of Canadian schools asked about  
15 a variety of teaching techniques. It found that 23  
16 percent, on the lefthand blue bar, of U.S. and Canadian  
17 schools reported using anesthetized patients during the  
18 initial pelvic exam in 1985. That number by 1992, you'll  
19 see, actually rose significantly.

20 Finally, a study by Cohen which was done, I  
21 believe, in 1989, of all U.S. medical schools found a  
22 slightly lower amount, ten percent of U.S. medical  
23 schools using women to teach first time pelvics. Of  
24 course, these studies say nothing about what's happening  
25 in the third and fourth years when students are actually

1 in the wards and getting some hands on training. That's  
2 why Ubel studies and Coldicott studies are so significant  
3 because they tell us that these practices persist into  
4 the third and fourth year.

5 Many commentators, in fact, note that using  
6 anesthetized patients before surgery is something that  
7 "has been long practiced." And the American College of  
8 OB-GYN acknowledged the practice in a letter to the  
9 U.S.C. Center for Bioethics, a colleague that I serve  
10 with there. Although they claim that the practice is  
11 "becoming less common." And that letter is dated in  
12 January of 2002.

13 Of course, the lingering question, obviously,  
14 is exactly what consent was there for these things. Only  
15 Coldicott studies of the ones I've showed you  
16 definitively answers that question. And yet we have a lot  
17 and we know a lot about how students are practicing  
18 generally and what is disclosed to patients about general  
19 student practice.

20 For example, one study reported that only 37.5  
21 percent of responding teaching hospitals informed  
22 patients that students would be involved in their care.  
23 Now, of course, informing someone and asking are two  
24 different things. But only a third, roughly a third, were  
25 informing patients at that time. But I think what's

1 really significant is what students and practicing  
2 physicians actually tell patients when they go in with a  
3 student. And what we see, and I'll show you some data  
4 about this, is that they routinely fail to inform  
5 patients about the students' status as a student and  
6 sometimes Ubel claims that they may even affirmatively  
7 deceive patients, and I'll walk you through some of the  
8 data that shows that.

9           Thus, for example, this is a study by Cohen in  
10 1987 that found that only a fraction of internal medicine  
11 departments and pediatric departments, 6.1 and 4.9 shown  
12 in blue, specifically inform the patient that a student  
13 will be performing a particular procedure while 65 to 73  
14 percent of those departments did not, shown in yellow.

15           Likewise, Ubel found that while 70 percent of  
16 OB-GYN departments did inform a patient that a student  
17 was on the care team, which isn't shown here, more than  
18 half or about half, excuse me, about half shown in the  
19 third yellow bar, of U.S. students hid their status or  
20 were not forthcoming about it when they actually walked  
21 in to do a pelvic.

22           Now that's not surprising, because 5 percent of  
23 OB-GYN chairs actually tell students to walk in,  
24 introduce themselves as a doctor and get on with it. But  
25 perhaps most revealing is this study by Beatty and Lewis.

1       There, every medical student had been introduced as a  
2       doctor at some point, shown in red, by a member of the  
3       medical staff or the hospital staff. Yet only 42 percent  
4       of them ever bothered to correct that misimpression shown  
5       in white.

6               Now we have even better studies regarding the  
7       linkage between practice and consent in the context of  
8       deceased patients and I'll walk you through those now.  
9       This is a study that was done by Burns. It's an  
10      anonymous survey of directors of U.S. training programs  
11      in emergency medical and critical care. He found that 63  
12      percent of emergency medical care units or programs,  
13      shown in blue, use newly deceased patients to teach  
14      resuscitation techniques.

15             Fifty-eight percent, shown in red, of neonatal  
16      critical care units did the same thing. Ninety percent  
17      of those programs obtained no consent, oral or written,  
18      which is shown in white.

19             And then we have the study by Denny, which was  
20      done of all teaching hospitals in a medium sized Canadian  
21      city. He found that 27 percent of the teachers, shown in  
22      blue, had students practice intubation on the recently  
23      dead. Thirteen percent had learners practice  
24      pericardiocentesis. I'm not a physician, but I'm told  
25      that that means passing a needle into the heart sac to

1       remove fluid. So they were practicing that on deceased  
2       patients. And then regarding consent in that study they  
3       found that in no case, 100 percent of the cases, there  
4       was no consent.

5               Now Fourre studied directors of accredited  
6       emergency medical programs. Forty-seven percent  
7       indicated that procedures were performed on the recently  
8       dead for teaching purposes as opposed to the patient's  
9       purposes or benefit. Seventy-six percent in that study  
10      said they "almost never" received consent from family  
11      members.

12             Now this track record has immediate  
13      implications for any person who wants to enforce her  
14      autonomy rights by bringing an informed consent or even a  
15      battery claim. But I'm going to talk about informed  
16      consent first. There are several standards that define  
17      what has to be told under the informed consent claim.  
18      And the majority standard in the United States is the  
19      professional standard. In other words, physicians have  
20      to disclose what other reasonable physicians would  
21      disclose.

22             And these numbers suggest that it's a common  
23      practice not to disclose, not to specifically inform  
24      patients and secure their consent before proceeding. And  
25      that's going to make it difficult for any person who even

1 discovers this, that's another big question, but any  
2 person who even discovers it to succeed on this sort of  
3 claim. This is why I believe that not only has medical  
4 practice let down the public, but the law has let down  
5 the public too, and I will talk about that more at the  
6 end of my talk.

7               So where are we? Well, we have a widespread  
8 practice, over several decades, of doing educational as  
9 opposed to medically needed and indicated exams on  
10 anesthetized and deceased patients often without consent,  
11 often without anything on the general admission form,  
12 often without specific consent, anything on the general  
13 admission form or surgical form -- I'll come back to that  
14 and explain why I believe that's the case -- often  
15 without the patient's knowledge.

16              Now I want to focus the remainder of my talk on  
17 anesthetized patients because the same justifications run  
18 through why teaching hospitals should be, in their minds,  
19 able to do this on women under anesthesia, as run through  
20 their discussions of why they should be able to use  
21 deceased persons. So I'm just going to focus on  
22 anesthetized women.

23              Now there are two principal ways in which exams  
24 under anesthesia or EUA's are actually done. The first  
25 is what I'll call the vending machine model. And I



1 actually take this from a narrative published by a Duke  
2 University Professor of a medical student's account. And  
3 the medical student described it as this: all these  
4 medical students parading in, each to take their turn,  
5 you know. Like going to a vending machine and walking  
6 by. Only it's not a vending machine, it's a woman's  
7 vagina and you're each taking your turn walking by and  
8 sticking your hand in. In this situation students claim  
9 it is not uncommon for five or six people to do a pelvic  
10 on that woman.

11 Now the second model is, I hope, the more  
12 prevalent one. In this model a student is a member of  
13 the care team and so it performs a pelvic for learning  
14 purposes prior to the patient's surgery. Later in my  
15 talk I want to test the intuition that many teaching  
16 faculty have that the care team model is defensible and  
17 justifiable even if the vending machine model is not.  
18 But for the moment, it's important to note that virtually  
19 every commentator who writes about these practices  
20 believes that they're extremely risky in terms of  
21 lawsuits.

22 For example, Cohen sees clear violations of  
23 patient rights under the accreditation standards. He  
24 sees battery and he sees a breach in the duty of informed  
25 consent. I'm not so sure, as I said a moment ago, that

1       there are clearly actionable claims of informed consent  
2       and battery here, and I'll explain that later. But for  
3       the moment, let's assume there are. The hard question,  
4       it seems to me then, is how is it that this can continue  
5       decade after decade after decade.

6               And certainly, I think, culture plays a role  
7       here. You know, physicians acquire knowledge by  
8       experience, hence the phrase, see one, do one, teach one.  
9       But there's also a whatever-it-takes ethic because they  
10      feel so pressured with so much coming down on them so  
11      quickly. It's not surprising then that a spokesman for  
12      the Royal College of OB-GYN in Great Britain labeled  
13      concerns over this practice as snide, sexual innuendo and  
14      academic nitpicking.

15             But beyond culture, however, teaching faculty  
16      articulate several justifications and I want to actually  
17      test these today because I think it's important to  
18      understand where they're coming from if you want to  
19      change minds and ultimately to change behavior.

20             Now the first is an argument from necessity  
21      which essentially holds that we can't ask you because if  
22      we ask you, you won't consent. The second is a claim of  
23      implied consent. In other words, patients that come to a  
24      teaching hospital know what they're getting into and  
25      therefore, have signed up to be, as I say, "practice

1 dummies." Third, there's a belief that teaching pelvics  
2 under anesthesia is the best way. In fact, one physician  
3 in the literature said, the only way to teach a pelvic.

4 And then running through all of this is  
5 misinformation and fear about the motivations of patients  
6 as well as the capacity of medical students to perform.  
7 And as the next slide shows, students wildly overestimate  
8 their perceived incompetence.

9 What I'm going to show you is a study by  
10 Magrane and you'll see that the scoring on the bottom or  
11 around the side is, the best scores are the lowest and  
12 the highest scores are the worst. And she asked students  
13 to rate their ability to do certain types of things.  
14 You'll see that their capacity in their mind of doing  
15 physical exams and vaginal exams were not rated very  
16 well. But when she asked patients to rate them we see  
17 the patients gave these same students much, much more  
18 favorable scores.

19 In fact, which makes us believe that perhaps a  
20 lot of people have blown out of proportion the likelihood  
21 of being rejected if they ask. In fact, we know that  
22 fears of refusal are misplaced because study after study  
23 shows that women will consent to pelvic exams by students  
24 for the student's education as opposed to their benefit.  
25 On the likelihood of consent, for example, we have two

1 different sets of studies.

2 I'm going to start first with the studies that  
3 look at women who are in out-patient settings. Looking  
4 first at the out-patient settings, two studies in the  
5 United Kingdom found identical numbers of women willing  
6 to have a pelvic exam by a medical student with nearly  
7 half, shown in yellow, willing to have the student do a  
8 pelvic exam for educational purposes. These were actual  
9 women giving actual consent to actual students; not a  
10 hypothetical study.

11 Now we also have hypothetical studies, like  
12 this one done by Ubel. He reported in 1990 that 61  
13 percent of students would definitely allow, probably  
14 allow, or were unsure, that that's the rust colored bar,  
15 whether they would allow a pelvic exam while being cared  
16 for as an out-patient. Now Ubel published only the would  
17 object statistics, but I've approached him and asked him  
18 to help me break down those other data better so we can  
19 parse out how many people definitely would allow it and  
20 how many people were unsure.

21 Then we had a second set of studies that deals  
22 with women prior to surgery. Again, I want to go back to  
23 Lawton. He found that 85 percent of women before surgery  
24 said yes to a pelvic, an actual pelvic, for educational  
25 purposes by an actual student. And then in a slightly

1 different approach, we have, Ubel found in a hypothetical  
2 study that more than half were willing to consent or were  
3 unsure.

4 In fact, we know that patients will consent  
5 even to risky procedures. This is a study by Grasby in  
6 Australia. She asked women if they would let people  
7 participate in their childbirth and 62 percent said they  
8 would. But what's really interesting is how that 62  
9 percent breaks down. Two percent of the patients, shown  
10 in blue, would allow a medical student to participate in  
11 an instrumental delivery, hold the forceps. Nine percent  
12 in a C-section. Twenty-five percent, shown in rust, in a  
13 normal delivery.

14 But what's most significant is that remaining  
15 group, the biggest group, would allow students to  
16 participate in any way without making any limitation on  
17 how they participated. And so we won't see medical  
18 education on the OB-GYN wards grind to a halt simply  
19 because we ask women.

20 Why do patients consent? They consent because  
21 they see a benefit to themselves. I'm going to show you  
22 this very quickly across six studies. The blue bars are  
23 the numbers of women who believe that there's a benefit  
24 to themselves in having a student involved. And two of  
25 those studies saw surprisingly high numbers of women

1 willing to have students included. Why? Because they  
2 thought the students would be more eager, would be more  
3 willing to answer their questions, would spend longer  
4 time with them.

5 But not only is that selfish motive there, but  
6 there's a significant streak of altruism as well. This  
7 was a study of women, pregnant women, who gave consent to  
8 the participation in their childbirth. And of those who  
9 consented, the study asked what's the single most  
10 important reason and you'll see that the wish to  
11 contribute to medical education was that, the single most  
12 important reason for the women in this study.

13 Now contrast this again with student  
14 perceptions. Only 40 percent of the students, shown in  
15 yellow, thought that was what was motivating those women.  
16 And again, it's this disconnect that seems to be driving  
17 the justification that we can't ask you because if we ask  
18 you, you won't consent. And in the end, that's simply  
19 inaccurate.

20 I want to start on my second justification and  
21 that is the idea that patients have implicitly consented  
22 to being medical guinea pigs by accepting care at a  
23 teaching facility. And this again, simply does not stack  
24 up factually. What I'm showing you here is a study by  
25 King of elderly patients who were actually admitted to a

1 teaching facility. She found that 60 percent had no idea  
2 that they were in a teaching hospital or even what one  
3 was.

4 Now this has, again, immediate implications for  
5 a breach of the duty of informed consent claim. One  
6 exception to the duty holds that providers need not  
7 disclose those risks of which people have common or  
8 actual knowledge. In other words, we don't tell people  
9 to tell you what you already know. But here, the fact  
10 that 60 percent of these patients had no clue that they  
11 were in a teaching hospital seems to undercut any claim  
12 of a common knowledge or actual knowledge exception by  
13 the hospital to that duty, if you could bring this type  
14 of claim.

15 But beyond the factual problem there are other  
16 problems with this claim too. First, many patients do  
17 not choose to be admitted to a teaching hospital, they're  
18 taken there in an emergency. Or they choose that  
19 hospital because it's the best reimbursement rate on  
20 their plan. Or they're loyal to their physician and  
21 they're simply following their doctor to whatever staff  
22 that they have medical admitting privileges to, whatever  
23 hospital they have their privileges to.

24 And with the rise of teaching community  
25 hospitals, which are not proximate and located next to a

1 university and do not have university in the logo or the  
2 sign, the claim that people would obviously know that  
3 something is a teaching hospital, I think, does not have  
4 the force that it would have had in 1950. The health  
5 care marketplace has changed.

6 Now more problematic is the fact that we rarely  
7 presume consent. And when we presume consent we do it  
8 only in those circumstances where we think people will  
9 not care. For example, medical examiners routinely  
10 remove corneas from deceased persons without the patient  
11 or the family's knowledge or consent. Why? Because we  
12 think nobody will miss them and we think the cost of  
13 asking is simply too high. But here people care, and  
14 they care very deeply.

15 This is a study that shows, these are studies,  
16 excuse me, but Magrane and Lawton of pelvic examinations  
17 under anesthesia that found that all patients, the first  
18 two, all patients wanted to know that a pelvic was going  
19 to be done on them. In the next study, which I've shown  
20 you, this is a study of first time spinal taps being done  
21 on conscious patients. Many of them consented to first  
22 time spinal taps, but 85 percent of them, or I'm sorry,  
23 80 percent of them wanted to know that a medical student  
24 was doing it for the medical student's first time. So  
25 they want to retain the right to know.



1                   And in a slightly different approach, Ubel  
2           asked how much importance they placed on being asked.  
3           And out of a possible five points with five being the  
4           highest score, patients gave an importance rating to  
5           being asked about pelvic of a 4.5. In fact, that was the  
6           highest importance rating received in that study for any  
7           question. Suggesting, as Ubel concluded there, "patients  
8           place great importance on being asked permission."

9                   Now the third justification, as I said, is that  
10          pelvics done under anesthesia are the most effective or  
11          indeed the only way to teach a pelvic. What I'm showing  
12          you here is a study by Beckmann showing that there are  
13          all these other methods for teaching first time pelvics  
14          too. So I'm going to make a distinction first between  
15          normal anatomy and then abnormal anatomy. You can see  
16          there's AV, Lecture, Teaching Associates; Gynecological  
17          Teaching Associates are women who are paid to allow  
18          people to do pelvic exams on them for a certain fee.  
19          Okay? So we have all of these.

20                   Now it can't be the case that exams done under  
21          anesthesia, which are shown in yellow, are the only  
22          effective method because teaching faculty have rated  
23          these for effectiveness in the same study and you can see  
24          that a number of things were rated just as effective as  
25          exams under anesthesia.

1           Now my medical school colleagues say, when I  
2     bring this up, that for teaching abnormal anatomy  
3     however, exams under anesthesia are essential. And I  
4     respond to them that perhaps, you know, you're going to  
5     have enough patients in the course of things that will  
6     consent that certainly you can do it ever by asking  
7     specific permission beforehand. And they respond to me  
8     that the supply and demand argument is overly simplistic.  
9     Instead they argue that teaching in real time is  
10    difficult since they want to expose students to as much  
11    as they can in a few weeks.

12           And there may be some merit to this. For  
13    example, we see something of a gray hair phenomenon,  
14    meaning that people are more willing to consent to  
15    residents who are more established and more experienced  
16    physicians than they are to interns, who are first year  
17    docs, than they are to students.

18           So I don't doubt that things may be harder. In  
19    fact, we know the willingness to participate drops off as  
20    the exam becomes more internal and more invasive. So it  
21    is possible that we will have a hardship in certain types  
22    of disciplines; internal medicine or OB-GYN, for example.  
23    And I'm not trying to minimize that; I recognize that.

24           Finally, we know that numbers matter a great  
25    deal. Magrane asked women who were admitted for

1        childbirth how the number of students who participated  
2        would affect their willingness. She first asked about  
3        non-vaginal exams and then she asked about vaginal exams.  
4        You can see for the non-vaginal exam 12 percent said that  
5        more than two students would be okay, i.e., the vending  
6        machine model. But 84 percent would cap it at two  
7        students, which looks more like the care team model,  
8        shown in yellow. But for the vaginal exam fully 100  
9        percent of the women in that study wanted to limit the  
10       participation to a single student suggesting that  
11       patients buy into the care team model just as teaching  
12       faculty do.

13                Now, I'm not so convinced that these two models  
14       are so different. It seems to me that the key question  
15       is whether the student's exam would have been performed  
16       but for the fact that the surgeon or the supervising  
17       physician is a member of a medical school teaching  
18       faculty. With the vending machine model it's probably  
19       not the case that a half dozen students would have done  
20       that exam without her knowledge or consent if she had  
21       been admitted, for example, to a non-teaching hospital or  
22       if her physician had not been a member of a teaching  
23       faculty.

24                But this also may be true of the care team  
25       model. Consider two scenarios; a woman is admitted for

1 surgery. The surgeon comes in and reconfirms the pelvic  
2 that led him to whatever the surgery is for and then a  
3 student repeats that exam. That second exam would not  
4 have been done but for the fact that the supervising  
5 physician is a member of the teaching faculty. So we  
6 have a duplicate that we have to explain and for which, I  
7 believe, we have to have consent.

8 And then similarly if the physician just  
9 yielded to the student and let the student do that exam  
10 the student then has received a reconfirming diagnosis or  
11 pelvic that is of a different character. I don't want to  
12 say worse necessarily. Some of the literature thinks  
13 that students can actually pick up things that more  
14 established physicians can't because the established  
15 physicians have been at it so long.

16 Now this raises an interesting question of  
17 whether or not the admission has actually authorized  
18 things that are done for the educational benefit of the  
19 student as opposed to the medically needed services of  
20 the patient. So I give you a typical consent form here  
21 and I've collected many of these from hospitals around  
22 the country. "I, the undersigned, agree and give consent  
23 to teaching hospitals, its employees, agents, the  
24 treating physician, his or her partners/consultants,  
25 medical residents, house staff and other agents, to

1       diagnose/treat the patient named on this consent." Now  
2       that authorizes first and foremost only those things that  
3       are done for the patient's benefit, as opposed to those  
4       things that are done for the student's education. Which  
5       brings us back to the before test that I just walked you  
6       through.

7               But it's also a real question about whether or  
8       not medical student is even contained under any of these  
9       categories. Health staff is a term of art. Stedman  
10      defines it, which is a medical dictionary, as to mean  
11      residents or interns and medical students are neither.  
12      Employee is difficult because medical students aren't  
13      employees so you can't wedge them under that heading.

14             And agents is difficult for a variety of  
15      technical reasons dealing with the accreditation  
16      standards, but the way I read those things is to say  
17      agents of the hospital are only those people who have  
18      clinical privileges at the hospital, have been through  
19      credentialing and area licensed or certified under state  
20      law, whichever state law requires. So I have great  
21      doubts whether they come under the heading of agent.

22             In closing, I'm going to spend one moment on  
23      informed consent and make a couple of observations that  
24      I've already sort of touched upon. The important point  
25      about informed consent and battery and other tort claims

1 is that they're not self-executing. They do you no good  
2 unless you know about them and you can't bring them  
3 unless you know. And here we're taking people who are in  
4 the worst possible position to know; they are dead or  
5 they are anesthetized and we are using them without their  
6 permission in some instances.

7 There's another problem too technically with  
8 this claim and that's that some jurisdictions limit what  
9 gets disclosed only to risks of the procedure and  
10 "characteristics of the provider are not encompassed in  
11 that disclosure duty." So for example, if your  
12 provider's an alcoholic there are courts that say that  
13 that doesn't have to be disclosed to you. Conceivably,  
14 medical student status may not have to be disclosed  
15 either in jurisdictions like that.

16 And then finally, persons are going to have  
17 difficulty showing the causation prong. Causation for an  
18 informed consent claim means that you would, if you had  
19 known about the pelvic exam for educational purposes you  
20 would not have had the surgery. Well, if you're having  
21 the surgery to remove a cancer, the likelihood of you  
22 making the causation prong is very, very slim. And so  
23 for those reasons people will have a great difficulty  
24 winning on that claim.

25 Finally, I want to spend a moment on

1 accreditation standards because like the claims about  
2 torts, accreditation standards, people assume, have been  
3 violated here. And what I've found in my research is  
4 that there seems to be something falling through the  
5 cracks. And I think that's because we have more than one  
6 accrediting body that could have weighed in. And  
7 frequently when you have more than one person the other  
8 assumes the other is doing it.

9           The LCME, which accredits undergraduate medical  
10 education, simply asks that informed consent, for its  
11 teaching hospitals, a duty to cover informed consent be  
12 placed somewhere in a hospital affiliation agreement. If  
13 the hospital takes it on, then they say fine, they are  
14 satisfied. When you get to the hospital side that  
15 actually looked promising to me when I first looked into  
16 this because there are patient rights chapters that give  
17 patients the rights to know the qualities and credentials  
18 of their providers.

19           But in dialogs with people at the Joint  
20 Commission I discovered it may not yet be an informed  
21 consent violation though because the standard or the  
22 yardstick for gauging compliance is whether or not the  
23 hospital complied with its own policy. If the hospital's  
24 own policy doesn't require that it document specific  
25 consent, the woman's permission, then they haven't

1       violated. And that brings you back again, to how would  
2       this ever get on the Joint Commission's radar screen  
3       because these women don't know and deceased patients and  
4       their families don't know.

5               In closing, my last point is just to say that I  
6       think these "paper fixes" that have been used to this  
7       point have been done in isolation. I applaud those  
8       groups like ACOG(American College of Obstetrics and  
9       Gynecology) that have actually issued statements about  
10      this, but they're one tiny slice of the health care  
11      industry and what we need is a systemic approach that  
12      goes across the entire system where we get reasonable  
13      people around the table to talk about why this is so  
14      difficult to accomplish. I've actually put together a  
15      working group to form a task force to look at this  
16      question. I hope that we can all come together and talk  
17      about how we can have a more effective solution.

18             And then finally, in the conference immediately  
19      following this I can spend a few minutes talking about  
20      some things that women can do in the way of self help in  
21      terms of avoiding this when they're admitted to a  
22      hospital. Thank you very much.

23             (Applause.)

24             MR. KLEINER: Hello, this is Morris Kleiner,  
25      and I've arrived for my presentation.



1 DR. HYMAN: Hold on one second, Morris. Let me  
2 get your Power Point slides up. Professor Wilson will be  
3 holding a press conference immediately next door in Room  
4 C and her remarks, just so everybody's clear, are part of  
5 our discussion of quality and consumer information issues  
6 focusing on physicians. And now, through the miracles of  
7 technology, Professor Kleiner is going to speak about  
8 occupational licensing and I'll advance the slides.

9 MR. KLEINER: Well, thank you, David.

10 DR. HYMAN: You can go ahead, Morris.

11 MR. KLEINER: Okay. Thank you, first of all,  
12 for the opportunity to address the hearing. I'm  
13 delighted that the Federal Trade Commission and the  
14 Justice Department are now interested again in  
15 occupational licensing. It was some 25 years ago when I  
16 was working with the Department of Labor that there were  
17 many hearings and papers that were written on  
18 occupational licensing. And even though the issue has  
19 continued to be an important one, there's been relatively  
20 little research in comparison to other areas on the role  
21 of occupational licensing.

22 And what I'm going to be discussing is really  
23 the growth of occupational licensing and talk about some  
24 of the concepts or ways of thinking about who gains and  
25 who loses from the process, then providing some empirical

1 evidence from the academic literature dealing with  
2 licensing and health services. And then finally,  
3 discussing some of the issues with respect to questions  
4 that policy makers, especially at the state and local  
5 levels, should ask as occupations come before them in  
6 order to increase licensing standards, or in terms of  
7 dealing with new occupations that seek to become  
8 licensed. So that will be my presentation and I want to  
9 thank David for working with me in presenting some of the  
10 data that I'm going to be presenting.

11 So I assume you know what I look like and  
12 moving on to slide two on occupational regulation.  
13 During the past 60 years there's been a significant  
14 increase in the number of occupations that are licensed.  
15 Slide number two on occupational regulations shows a  
16 typical state, from my home state of Minnesota, really  
17 showing the growth of occupational licensing. In the  
18 U.S. there's, there are now more than 800 occupations  
19 that are licensed in at least one state and about 18  
20 percent of the work force requires a license in order to  
21 legally do certain types of work.

22 To illustrate the importance of the issue a  
23 higher percentage of workers are licensed and belong to a  
24 union or are directly impacted by the federal minimum  
25 wage. In terms of what licensing does, licensing is

1 defined as a process where entry into an occupation  
2 requires the permission of government and the state  
3 requires some demonstration of a minimum degree of  
4 competency. Generally, members of the occupation  
5 dominate the licensing board. The agency is usually  
6 self-supporting through the collection of fees and the  
7 registration charges from persons in the licensed  
8 occupations.

9 In many states, provisions are established that  
10 require a licensed practitioner be present when a service  
11 is provided or when a product is dispensed. For example,  
12 in some states opticians must be present when contact  
13 lenses are dispensed. Other states prohibit, for  
14 example, the electronic prescription of certain types of  
15 drugs or services.

16 In contrast, an alternative to licensing is  
17 certification. And that permits any person to perform  
18 the relevant tasks but the government administers an  
19 examination and certifies those who passed and the level  
20 of skill or knowledge required. Consumers of the product  
21 or service can then choose whether to hire a certified  
22 worker. For example, travel agents and mechanics are  
23 generally certified by not licensed. In the case of  
24 licensing, and this is the important point, is that it's  
25 illegal for anyone without a license to perform a task.

1           Now, what I'd like to do is briefly discuss  
2           some of the conceptual issues in terms of licensing. And  
3           in the next slide, which is slide number three, entitled  
4           Impact of Tougher Licensing Standards, this is a figure  
5           developed a number of years ago by a researcher at the  
6           Center for Naval Analysis, Arlene Holen. And in this  
7           figure she shows the potential benefits of licensing, if  
8           licensing serves to preclude less competent individuals  
9           from entering the occupation. In this figure, as more  
10          individuals are eliminated from entering the occupation,  
11          assuming sort of a normal distribution of quality, the  
12          quality of those people who are in the occupation goes  
13          up. And this assumes sort of a static number of persons  
14          in the occupation and that the quality of persons in the  
15          occupation follows this normal distribution.

16                 The implications for health care are that if  
17          the number of individuals can be limited to the most able  
18          then the average quality moves to the right from B to A  
19          and the average quality of individuals who provide the  
20          service can be increased.

21                 In the next slide, I sort of take this figure,  
22          the following figure called The Net Effect of  
23          Occupational Licensing. I sort of take slide two and  
24          trace through some of the potential benefits and costs of  
25          occupational licensing. Now, the argument assumes that

1 the impact of regulation on the quality of service that's  
2 provided to consumers. And this figure provides a way of  
3 examining the impact on the demand for and the quality of  
4 services.

5 The figure traces through licensing impact on  
6 the demand for regulated services as well as how more  
7 intense regulation can have both a positive or a negative  
8 effect on the final services to the patient. In the  
9 first box at the left of the figure, licensing through  
10 state statutes, initial entry requirements and standards  
11 for individuals to move from one state to another may  
12 serve to restrict the number of individuals in the  
13 occupation. These requirements include residency  
14 requirements, letters from current practitioners  
15 regarding issues such as good moral character,  
16 citizenship and the general and specific levels of  
17 education of the practitioner.

18 Beyond statutory requirement, states and local  
19 governments also change pass rights to match relative  
20 supply and demand conditions for the service. For  
21 example, when there's perceived to be an oversupply in  
22 the occupation the regulatory board can raise the test  
23 scores required to pass the exam.

24 The second box shows that one of the  
25 consequences of regulatory practices is a reduction in

1 the flow of new persons into the occupation. Now this  
2 can have two potential effects. This sort of is the old  
3 Harry Truman statement of when he was talking and wanted  
4 an economist, he wanted an economist who wouldn't say  
5 just on the one hand and on the other, but wanted a one-  
6 handed economist who would give him an answer. But I'm  
7 sort of going to tell you both the pluses and the  
8 minuses.

9 In the upper box, prices rise as a result of  
10 the decline in the number of practitioners as  
11 practitioners are able to increase prices. In the lower  
12 box, the quality of services provided increases as fewer  
13 less competent providers of this service are not allowed  
14 to enter the market; this raises the average level of  
15 service in the occupation. Therefore, the level of  
16 service quality as a consequence of regulation is  
17 uncertain, as the last box to the right, where the net  
18 effect of, net effects of prices rise, the positive  
19 effects of service quality, each may have either a  
20 positive or negative effect on the measured quality of  
21 service provided.

22 As with any production relationship, other  
23 factors, such as capital, technology may also contribute  
24 to the overall quality of service provided. An example  
25 of this might be dentistry, an especially highly

1 regulated occupation that requires varying state  
2 requirements. To illustrate, the quality of a dental  
3 visit would be negatively related to the pass rate in a  
4 state assuming time and effort spent with each patient  
5 remains the same. This would occur because either low  
6 quality candidates would be rejected by a state or  
7 individuals would incur additional occupation specific  
8 training in order to pass the exam.

9 In contrast, increases in the pass rate would  
10 enhance access to dental services. Consequently, this  
11 outcome would provide greater access as more dentists are  
12 available in the state, which would reduce the money  
13 price of a dental visit and office waiting time to see a  
14 dentist, as well as travel time. Therefore, this would  
15 be included in the implicit or full price of a dental  
16 visit. Overall dental outputs would be a function of  
17 both the quality of a dental visit as well as access to  
18 care.

19 Now, that's sort of the issue of how one might  
20 think of the role of regulation on net quality to  
21 consumers. Now there's been a fair amount of research  
22 examining these conceptual issues. And in the following  
23 table entitled table five, or slide five entitled,  
24 Studies on Costs and Benefits of Licensing. In this I  
25 give information on studies that, first of all, discuss

1 the costs initially to consumers of different types of  
2 occupational licensing requirements.

3 One that was done a number of years ago at the  
4 Federal Trade Commission shows, the upper portion of the  
5 table shows the cost of licensing to consumers and  
6 practitioners of varying regulatory practices that are  
7 associated with licensing.

8 For example, the average cost of an eye exam  
9 and eye glass prescriptions is 35 percent higher in  
10 cities with restrictive commercial practices for  
11 optometrists. Also, 11 of 12 common dental procedures  
12 are more expensive in states with more restrictive  
13 licensing procedures. The costs of licensing to  
14 practitioners generally involve reductions in the ability  
15 to move from one political jurisdiction to another. For  
16 example, mobility for persons in health related  
17 occupations is significantly reduced in states with  
18 tougher standards.

19 The bottom section of the table shows estimates  
20 of the potential benefits, in the next slide, some of the  
21 benefits of the potential benefits of occupational  
22 regulation to consumers and practitioners. Unfortunately  
23 there have been many fewer analyses of the effects of  
24 benefits of licensing to patients.

25 However, some of the earlier studies have found



1       some positive impacts. One study completed in the 1960s  
2       on dentistry shows that tougher restrictions improve the  
3       quality of care. In contrast, more recent analysis  
4       suggests there are negligible effects on the quality of  
5       outcomes to patients as a result of states passing  
6       tougher standards.

7               For practitioners there have been many more  
8       studies showing that the impact of licensing on the  
9       earnings of licensed individuals is positive. The impact  
10      of state regulations of occupations is greater among more  
11      educated and higher income occupations. If an occupation  
12      like physicians is able to limit the number of  
13      competitors, for example, alternative medicine providers,  
14      they're able to increase their earnings and presumably  
15      prices go up for consumers.

16             Internationally, there's new evidence that  
17      obtaining a license for previously licensed physicians  
18      has large earnings effect. The study found that relative  
19      to physicians who are granted a license by practical  
20      experience, those who had to take a licensing exam with a  
21      low pass rate had lower long term earnings.

22             In occupations like respiratory therapists,  
23      there is a greater political or economic power by members  
24      of the profession in the state, they were able to obtain  
25      licensing provisions for their members and eventually

1 greater economic benefits for members of the occupation.

2 In addition, federal regulations dealing with  
3 interstate commerce may conflict with state laws.  
4 Provisions in state licensing laws may restrict many of  
5 the benefits to commerce provided by, for example, the  
6 internet. In an earlier FTC hearing, obtaining contact  
7 lenses in Connecticut requires the supervision of a  
8 licensed optician and a registered optical establishment  
9 or store. These state licensing provisions limit the  
10 ability of consumers to take advantage of the economic  
11 benefits of internet transactions to the extent that  
12 other services such as dentistry, medical services, and  
13 pharmacy related products have similar occupational  
14 licensing restrictions. This may limit the ability to  
15 consumers to purchase products which have the lowest cost  
16 relative to quality.

17 In addition, there tend to be conflicts within  
18 states between different occupational licensing  
19 requirements. For example, dentists are often in  
20 conflict with dental hygienists and most states require a  
21 dentist to be present. And as a result, dental  
22 hygienists are unable to offer, or open offices that deal  
23 only with the cleaning of teeth.

24 In Kansas City, Kansas, for example, there were  
25 dentists who were able to get the state to close a dental

1       hygienist office because no dentist was present when the  
2       dental hygienists were offering these services.

3               Slide seven shows the policy implications of  
4       occupational licensing on entry and quality of service.  
5       For example, tougher occupational licensing standards, do  
6       they have the impact of raising standards and do they  
7       have the impact of increasing costs? Generally, in the  
8       empirical result, tougher occupational licensing  
9       standards tend to raise the costs to consumers relative  
10      to alternatives. One, being a relatively lower licensing  
11      standard on entry and geographic mobility as well as an  
12      alternative of certification, which is item number two.  
13      Licensing also raises costs relative to certification and  
14      also reduces the choices to consumers.

15             The way of discussion, especially item number  
16      two, is the Mercedes Benz effect, whereas you can either  
17      get a high quality service though licensing or no service  
18      at all because no other services are legally available.

19             Item number three is that practitioners on  
20      average seem to see economic benefits to tougher  
21      licensing but this varies a lot by occupation.  
22      Occupations such as dentistry seem to be able to raise  
23      their earnings as a result of tougher occupational  
24      licensing standards. But other occupations toward the  
25      lower end of earnings tend to see relatively small

1       benefits of occupational licensing. The benefits  
2       generally of licensing tend to be fairly difficult to  
3       measure. But in the studies of dentistry, especially,  
4       the benefits at least of more recent studies suggest that  
5       they tend to be fairly small.

6               Now since occupational licensing is generally  
7       imposed at the state level there are a number of  
8       questions or issues that state policy makers should ask  
9       as occupations seek to become licensed. And this is  
10      especially the case in health services where because of  
11      third party providers various occupations in the health  
12      services are seeking to become licensed or are seeking to  
13      increase the current standards that are imposed to enter  
14      or to move from one state to another.

15             So consequently I've provided a number of  
16      questions in my conclusions in slide eight which are  
17      questions that policy makers should ask. That is, are  
18      state licensing laws reducing or increasing the price  
19      and/or quality benefits of health care? That is, are the  
20      benefits of licensing laws resulting in individuals  
21      receiving higher quality care, greater access to  
22      services, and will licensing, in fact, increase the  
23      quality of practitioners? This includes not only initial  
24      entry, but are individuals required to maintain their  
25      standards or maintain their ability to stay up with

1 current changes in technology in their fields?

2 Do these restrictions also, and the second  
3 question, do these restrictions benefit consumers by  
4 protecting service quality? And this is also tied to the  
5 ability to maintain current standards and current changes  
6 in technology relative to the standards that were in  
7 place when the individual first entered a particular  
8 occupation.

9 Is the competency of the service enhanced  
10 through occupational licensing? That is, are the tests  
11 really measuring what individuals are required to do and  
12 especially if service quality goes up, if prices go up,  
13 how do you handle low income individuals who may lose  
14 relative to individuals who have higher incomes and can  
15 afford the higher quality care that licensing provides  
16 but individuals with lower incomes may now lose relative  
17 to higher income individuals? And how do these licensing  
18 requirements service low income individuals?

19 The next slide, conclusions on questions policy  
20 makers should ask, slide number nine. Are there  
21 unintended consequences to others such as the spread of  
22 disease of certification relative to the protections  
23 offered by licensing? That is, would certification  
24 provide the protections of the spread of disease?  
25 Certainly, one can think of a recent disease such as the

1 spread of SARS. Would having licensed individuals who  
2 arguably are of higher quality provide greater  
3 protections than would individuals who might be certified  
4 and are those benefits sufficient to impose the relative  
5 cost imposed through prices and reduced ability of having  
6 services through occupational licensing?

7 Our federal regulations, usurping what states  
8 view as the optimal amount of regulation. Traditionally  
9 occupational licensing has been established at the state  
10 or local level. To the extent that federal government  
11 requirements might be imposed to the extent that the  
12 federal government might impose universal licensing  
13 requirements that apply to all states, what are some of  
14 the legal as well as the price and quality benefits of  
15 having national licensing requirements which is the case  
16 in the European union relative to state by state  
17 licensing, which is the case in the U.S.

18 Now how should different or competing states  
19 that impact regulated occupations be handled? Some  
20 states have much more difficult licensing requirements  
21 than others. States in the Midwest tend to have, it is  
22 much easier to pass those licensing exams in many  
23 occupations in health services than for example, states  
24 like California.

25 To the extent that individuals move from state

1 to state, how should that be handled and what level of  
2 quality should be imposed on all states. And that is an  
3 issue for the federal government to be concerned with as  
4 well as the practitioners and the occupations themselves.

5 And finally, what is the enforcement mechanism  
6 to monitor and to impose the appropriate costs to  
7 individuals who chose to potentially violate state  
8 statutes governing occupational licensing requirements.

9 To what extent do those requirements impinge on the  
10 ability of consumers to have a wide variety of choices  
11 from the high quality licensed individuals who provide a  
12 service to others who may be able to provide lower  
13 quality and also lower price of services.

14 And all those are issues that legislators and  
15 state and county governments, who also have been very  
16 much involved in regulating occupations, are issues and  
17 questions that they should ask as occupations come before  
18 them seeking to either become licensed to add to the over  
19 800 occupations that are currently licensed. Or, in the  
20 case of many occupations, seeking to impose tougher  
21 standards on individuals who wish to enter the  
22 occupation.

23

24 And I'll be glad to take any questions during,  
25 later during the session in which I guess we're going to

1 be having a round table later on. So thank you very much  
2 for the opportunity to address your committee.

3 DR. HYMAN: Thank you, Morris.

4 (Applause.)

5 DR. HYMAN: Next up is Tom Piper to talk about  
6 Certificate of Need issues.

7 MR. PIPER: Good morning. I'd like to thank  
8 the Federal Trade Commission and also the Justice  
9 Department for allowing me to share some of my  
10 observations today and for bringing us to the nation's  
11 capital in order to discuss what are some of the most  
12 important issues about health care services.

13 As I speak today, I'll be talking about a  
14 variety of topics including the certificate need  
15 background, its operations, success and relationship to  
16 competition. I'll also be illustrating many of the  
17 benefits that the public will have in having assured  
18 broad input, access that is being maximized, quality that  
19 is being improved and costs that are being contained.

20 First, let's begin by looking into a few of the  
21 milestones of health planning that have affected us over  
22 the past century. For almost 100 years medical education  
23 has changed dramatically because of a report initially by  
24 Abraham Flexner which closed many schools of alternative  
25 medicine and changed into what we call today, regular



1 medicine.

2           Some would hold that this is one of the first  
3 of the 20th century challenges to open competition among  
4 health care providers. Now by the mid-1930s, society was  
5 moving toward national health insurance and other  
6 programs when President Franklin Roosevelt steered  
7 legislation into a more conservative Social Security Act.  
8 The seeds of public insurance had been planted at this  
9 point. Immediately after the second World War the  
10 Hospitals Survey and Construction Act of 1946, also known  
11 as the Hill Burton Act, was passed. The act authorized  
12 federal grants to states to survey the hospitals and  
13 public health centers and to plan construction of  
14 additional facilities and to assist in their  
15 construction. This began to rebuild the foundations of  
16 health care infrastructure in America.

17           After 20 years of infrastructure development  
18 publically funded health insurance was passed. Medicare  
19 and Medicaid became the new platform for federal and  
20 state investment in the health of its citizens.  
21 Federally sponsored health planning also came of age and  
22 the community demand for public accountability became a  
23 national theme with comprehensive health planning.

24           Less than a decade passed before the Social  
25 Administration then connected health care development and

1 reimbursement and empowered the states to plan and  
2 regulate accordingly using Section 1122, the Social  
3 Security Act. And with a new authority of the National  
4 Health Planning and Resource Development Act, planning  
5 and regulation consolidated and solidified into a strong  
6 effort to thrive until the early 1980s, when this was  
7 moved aside in favor of a new era of competition.

8 With the move to deregulation, managed care  
9 became a popular new tool for competition using  
10 diagnostic related groups and other classifications to  
11 establish purchasing controls. This became the new  
12 initiative to reduce charges, to improve quality and to  
13 ensure access. Today, we're struggling to contain the  
14 spiraling insurance premiums and find balance between the  
15 promoters of regulation and competition.

16 Well, let's look more closely at the genesis of  
17 certification of need. Based on many years of  
18 traditional community volunteer efforts, we saw a  
19 cooperative, quite public model emerge in the mid-1960s.  
20 Business and insurance leaders gathered in Rochester, New  
21 York to organize the nation's first community health  
22 planning council. Now, this included all the affected  
23 groups including consumers, also administrators,  
24 physicians, insurers, business, government and others.  
25 Within two years the Rochester model was adopted by the

1 New York state legislature and an era of voluntary health  
2 planning was born.

3 By 1975, 60 percent of the states had  
4 voluntarily started health planning and regulation. Much  
5 of this ten year effort was encouraged through the  
6 Comprehensive Health Planning Act's funding. For the  
7 remaining 19 years or 19 states, Louisiana being the last  
8 holdout until 1990, federal law leveraged Certificate of  
9 Need into place. The chart and map on the next two  
10 slides will show how this change happened and what was  
11 affected.

12 On the left, in red, are bars that depict the  
13 first 30 states that voluntarily embraced regulations.  
14 Hospitals and many others thought that this was an  
15 excellent idea and readily adopted that platform. The  
16 blue bars on the right then go on to show the 36 states,  
17 as well as the District of Columbia, who have continued  
18 Certificate of Need through the present time. These  
19 colors are maintained on the map on the next slide.

20 As you can see, this shows how much of the  
21 eastern United States initiated Certificate of Need  
22 regulation voluntarily, again showing that in dark red.  
23 And it also continues to maintain these programs today,  
24 those in dark blue as well. Including even some of those  
25 in the northwest United States that started early and

1       then terminated their programs later on. The light blue  
2       and the pink are those which terminated their program  
3       within the last 15 years.

4               Now using a very different chart we examine the  
5       diverse dimensions of the 37 CON programs that exist  
6       today. Down the left column is a list of states ranked  
7       by the comprehensiveness of their programs. This rank is  
8       calculated based on how many services are reviewed. Now  
9       if you look at the list across the top of 30 categories  
10      ranging across this matrix. And if you look to the note  
11      that where a state and a service intersect, that area is  
12      shaded and that means that that state reviews that  
13      service.

14  
15              In addition, the level of the reviewability  
16      thresholds; reviewability threshold being a financial  
17      point at which certificate need is required. And there  
18      are three different kinds. There being that for capital  
19      investments such as for buildings, for major medical  
20      equipment such as for MRI's and other large equipment,  
21      and for new service establishment. These have been  
22      converted into a weighted factor on the far right. And  
23      when you multiply the weighted factor against the number  
24      of services provided you come up with an index or a rank  
25      that then shows the comprehensiveness of the program as

1       you go from Maine at the top to Louisiana at the bottom.

2               But there's a cautionary note here that this  
3       does not relate to the severity of either the CON program  
4       or its decisions. But this chart has had many uses.  
5       It's on our internet website and many people such as  
6       policy makers look at it to see how they can quickly  
7       discern the diversity of the CON programs across the  
8       country. And some have used it such as in West Virginia  
9       in order to streamline their regulatory efforts.

10              The shades of blue from top to bottom  
11       originally divided the states into three categories of  
12       regulation with dark blue being the most comprehensive.  
13       Over the last ten years a number of states have drifted  
14       down the list as review thresholds have raised and the  
15       number of services have been reduced.

16              The map on the next page will easily illustrate  
17       the geographic distribution and intensity of CON. Again,  
18       the darkest states are those that have the most  
19       comprehensive programs. Obviously, CON regulation  
20       remains quite popular east of the Mississippi with only a  
21       few states like Indiana and Pennsylvania which have  
22       terminated their programs in the last seven years.

23              Now let's move on to the next slide where we  
24       begin to talk about the conceptual foundations, some of  
25       the criticisms and the benefits of certificate of need.

1       Let me take a moment just to point out that much of this  
2       information seen so far is taken from a national  
3       directory that's been produced for the last 14 years in  
4       order to track what's going on in certificate of need as  
5       well as other kinds of planning, data, and policy  
6       programs.

7               Now, let's talk about conceptual purposes of  
8       certificate of need. These can be distilled down into  
9       six basic points. First, CON is a fundamental tool to  
10      implement community health plans. It provides feedback  
11      and support to the development of those plans and it  
12      provides support to planning for many health services  
13      facilities and systems. It also illustrates an analytical  
14      discipline and goal orientation for all planning.

15             It also intervenes in the phenomenon which is  
16      commonly known as the excess supply generating excess  
17      demand. And I'll talk about that in a few minutes. And  
18      finally it helps preserve precious community and provider  
19      capital.

20             Now what's so unique about some of these  
21      purposes? CON is a unique tools that covers a broad  
22      range of important features. First a process is based on  
23      sound planning theory. It requires extensive analysis  
24      and is driven by objective facts. As an open process,  
25      this is one of the few venues where the public is not

1       only welcome but it is invited to be directly involved in  
2       the process. Because the market has gaps and excesses  
3       like the avoidance of low income populations and  
4       concentration of services in an affluent areas, CON often  
5       negotiates incentives and supports plans to strengthen  
6       services. Quality and effective performance are  
7       principles central to the development of standards and  
8       criteria and their achievement is often seen through much  
9       better applications and fewer denials of projects.

10               Competition in health care is a very different  
11       concept from other types of products and services, in  
12       part because planning and reimbursement establishes  
13       target capacities and capabilities for specific areas for  
14       which providers compete in terms of charges and quality.  
15       CON review is very practical in its approaches to health  
16       care. It often teaches potential applicants about health  
17       service alternatives and business plan effectiveness  
18       among other items.

19               CON's criterion standards and CON's  
20       responsiveness to the community based health planning  
21       process often redirects resources into areas of greatest  
22       need and helps providers achieve higher and more  
23       efficient levels of performance based on what is good for  
24       the community rather than what is good for providers.

25               Now a moment ago I had pointed out that the

1 market has various gaps and some excesses and here are a  
2 few related issues. Like any business capital investment  
3 must be passed on to the consumer either through charges  
4 or premiums or taxes. Competition in health care is  
5 different because providers control the supply of  
6 services. Medical practitioners direct the flow of  
7 patients and therefore, the demand for services. And  
8 consumers don't have enough information. Consumers are  
9 not able to shop for most health care, particularly based  
10 on price. Where, in fact, are the price lists for them  
11 to shop from?

12 Higher costs create higher charges as aptly  
13 demonstrated by the current double digit inflation has  
14 health care insurance premiums notably higher than the  
15 medical cost inflation state currently seen in our  
16 country. Unfortunately, consumers are insulated from the  
17 specific costs of care but suffer under the ultimate  
18 increased costs in premiums and their taxes. Although  
19 reimbursement systems have changed significantly in the  
20 last 40 years, the cost of health care continues to  
21 escalate and our policy makers continue to look for new  
22 answers.

23 A certificate of need has been criticized since  
24 its very inception and the reasons are fairly simple.  
25 First, many believe that CON tries to restrain market



1 entry, lower capital outlays and cap technical innovation  
2 all in ways to controls costs. They also believe that  
3 CON is more concerned about geography than access rather  
4 than social and system questions. Quality is often a  
5 factor that critics say is left out of CON reviews. The  
6 most prevalent claim is that CON regulators neither  
7 understand nor react to health service market forces.

8 Now these claims deserve some specific  
9 responses. The record documents actual CON performance  
10 across the country showing that not only are access and  
11 quality concerns often considered more than cost, but  
12 equity is an important feature in attempts to improve  
13 economic and social access for the community in general,  
14 and patients and providers specifically. CON uses high  
15 standards and best practices to help CON review, elevate  
16 quality.

17 Sound business plans are fundamental to the  
18 regulatory process similar to lending principles that are  
19 used by community bankers, looking at everything from  
20 reasonable cost of facility development to competitor  
21 charges for procedures to assure responsibility and  
22 efficiency. CON also recognizes the realities of market  
23 forces by involving providers, consumers, business,  
24 payers, educators and others for the development of  
25 criterion standards used to conduct CON reviews thus

1 ensuring that real live practical experience is reflected  
2 in the process. That by using a request for proposals  
3 for needs expressed in health plans in some states,  
4 applicants are able to compete on many levels and CON  
5 tries to ensure that health facility staffing is open to  
6 reasonably qualified practitioners.

7 On the other hand CON discourages the breaking  
8 health services into many segments or offering services  
9 only to those who can afford to pay or creating practices  
10 that exclude other providers or abandoning communities  
11 which are depressed or rural or no longer profitable to  
12 serve.

13 Now while we're talking about practical  
14 experience, let's talk about practical success. Critics  
15 have long used various theories, studies and musings to  
16 condemn CON. Over the past two years new evidence from  
17 business experience and treatment outcomes has come to  
18 light that clearly shows how successful CON has been.  
19 The big three auto makers have monitored their costs.  
20 Outcomes from Medicare heart patients have been reviewed  
21 and ambulatory surgery centers have been tracked. Here  
22 are some of the results.

23 Faced with rising health care costs and the  
24 possibility of weakening or eliminating the Michigan CON  
25 program the big three auto makers last year undertook

1 separate systematic analysis of their health care costs  
2 in states where they have large numbers of employees and  
3 insured dependents. This empirical experience was  
4 recorded only in states where they had at least 10,000  
5 employees and comparable health benefit programs.

6 DaimlerChrysler showed in the year 2000 that  
7 their employees in CON states of Delaware, Michigan and  
8 New York enjoyed health care costs which were up to 164  
9 percent lower than in non-CON regulated states of  
10 Wisconsin and Indiana. DaimlerChrysler also cited and  
11 endorsed experience and views of other business  
12 organizations including the Leapfrog Group that CON  
13 regulation also helps to ensure quality by assuring  
14 procedure minimums and promoting higher average program  
15 volumes for many health care services.

16 Now let's look at another auto maker, General  
17 Motors. They analyzed health care use and expense data  
18 among its employees and dependents in Indiana, Michigan,  
19 New York and Ohio; four states where it has a large  
20 number of insured from 1996 to 2001. During this time  
21 Indiana had been without CON regulations for many years  
22 and Ohio had repealed the acute care portion of its CON  
23 program a year earlier in 1995.

24 Comparisons show that GM spent nearly a third  
25 less in CON states for health care expenses for employees

1       than in non-CON states. GM noted that with over a  
2       million employees it spends \$4.2 million each year on  
3       health care benefits for its employees, retirees and  
4       dependents. In interpreting its experience GM stated,  
5       some argue that deregulating health care expansion will  
6       trigger free market forces of supply and demand and lead  
7       to lower costs. On the contrary. General Motors has not  
8       found that to be true based on our vast experience in  
9       states that have varying degrees of CON regulation.

10               Now let's look at the Ford experience. Ford  
11       Motor Company, in its report, included Kentucky, Michigan  
12       and Missouri as CON states and Indiana and Ohio as non-  
13       CON states. In certain respects the Ford study is  
14       broader than the GM study in that it distinguishes  
15       between in-patient and out-patient hospital costs as well  
16       as service specific costs for Magnetic Resonance Imaging,  
17       often known as MRI, and coronary artery bypass graft  
18       surgery, often known as CABG. When comparing in-patient  
19       and out-patient costs for their hospital Ford found that  
20       CON states came in about 20 percent lower than non-CON  
21       states. These results, well, the results of their other  
22       studies were also equally persuasive. As we look at Ohio  
23       and Indiana compared to Michigan for MRI and for CABG  
24       services, health care costs were found to be anywhere  
25       from 11 to 39 percent lower in CON states.

1           In summarizing its report Ford stressed the  
2           consistent relationship between CON coverage and lower  
3           costs across a wide range of different services and  
4           settings. Ford's analysts believe that the failure of  
5           academic studies to document the cost benefits of CON and  
6           regulation is because of the inability of such large  
7           imprecise macro echometric studies to account properly  
8           and adequately for the many confounding factors that were  
9           otherwise effectively taking into account by Ford.

10           Now let's look at ambulatory surgery services  
11           nationally. A national surgery monitoring organization  
12           collected charge data showing that ambulatory surgery  
13           center charges in CON states were over a quarter lower  
14           than in non-CON states. Now, obviously business and  
15           others are concerned about money and about the bottom  
16           line. So the illustrations are about lower health care  
17           costs.

18           Now elsewhere the concern we have is for about  
19           saving lives. The importance of program service volumes  
20           in the connection to CON regulation has been demonstrated  
21           recently with the publication of a nationwide study of  
22           Medicare patients that document statistically significant  
23           lower mortality rates for CABG surgery patients receiving  
24           treatment in programs in states that regulate open heart  
25           surgery. The University of Iowa research authors note

1       that most CON studies have focused on whether CON  
2       affected capital investment and health care costs and  
3       that few have examined direct relationship between CON  
4       regulation and quality.

5               After analyzing experience over 900,000  
6       Medicare patients 65 and older from 1994 to 1999 they  
7       concluded, among other things, that CON regulations is  
8       associated with better patient outcomes, thus repealing  
9       the CON regulations may have negative consequences on  
10      patient outcomes.

11             It also definitively showed that mortality  
12      rates were over 20 percent lower in CON states including  
13      my own state of Missouri. Critics of CON regulation are  
14      reluctant to acknowledge a connection, but there are few  
15      mechanisms other than community based planning and CON  
16      regulation that systematically promote regional service  
17      programs and minimum patient volumes. Obviously, these  
18      practices save lives and they save money.

19             This brings us back to where we started. As I  
20      had illustrated before, public input has assured  
21      accessibility is maximized, quality is improved and costs  
22      are contained. But how does CON relate to the concepts  
23      of competition? Quite simply. If you look at Webster's  
24      the definition of competition is a business rival  
25      competing for consumers or for customers or markets. But

1       who is the customer? Are they hospitals, physicians or  
2       others? Where are the patients? Could they be the ones  
3       who are among the trampled masses? They are at the  
4       bottom of this old time poster where the business rivals  
5       are competing and clashing. Do they have the information  
6       needed to measure competing services? The consequences  
7       of competition are a great concern.

8               Because these consequences will splinter the  
9       provider delivery network, will threaten safety net  
10      facilities, will create high profit niche markets and we  
11      will conclude that supply drives demand. Just as the  
12      Dartmouth Atlas was briefly reviewed in one of the  
13      hospital publications it said that supply generates  
14      demand putting traditional economic theory on its head.  
15      Areas with more hospitals and doctors spend more on  
16      health care services per person.

17             To compensate, we need balance. We need to  
18      balance regulation and competition. And we do this by  
19      promoting the development of community oriented health  
20      services and facility plans, by providing pricing and  
21      quality information on consumers so they have an educated  
22      choice, and by providing a public forum to ensure the  
23      community has a voice in health care. This, I believe,  
24      will protect the consumer's interest.

25             I thank you very much for this opportunity to

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1 discuss certificate of need and competition. For follow-  
2 up you can contact the American Health Planning  
3 Association or you can contact me with this information.

4 This has been an excellent forum. I feel  
5 privileged to have been included, and I thank you.

6 (Applause.)

7 DR. HYMAN: Thank you, Tom. Next up is Tammi  
8 Byrd, representing the American Dental Hygienist  
9 Association. And for those of you who are wondering, we  
10 will probably take a break either after Tammi or after  
11 Ms. Loeffler and then continue on from there. But the  
12 door is out there if you can't wait.

13 MS. BYRD: Good morning. I'd like to thank you  
14 also for the opportunity to present the comments from the  
15 American Dental Hygienist's Association. I am President-  
16 elect for the American Dental Hygienist Association.

17 I'm here to answer some very pointed questions  
18 that have been raised. Number one, what does the  
19 empirical evidence say about the cost, the quality and  
20 the availability of dental hygiene services? I'd like to  
21 address each of these issues. When we look at costs the  
22 empirical evidence states that it will lower costs to  
23 have independent practice of dental hygienists. There's  
24 a comparative study of independent practice along with  
25 traditional practices. When we look at these studies the



1 independent practices were always significantly lower  
2 than private practice dental practices.

3 Other indirect studies show when you take the  
4 dental hygiene work in a traditional practice, that when  
5 you look at that, that you have the probability of  
6 lowering costs to patients of approximately 20 to 40  
7 percent.

8 What about quality? Independent practice  
9 versus traditional practice; in a study that studies  
10 independent practice versus traditional dental practices  
11 it was proven that dental hygiene practices were as good  
12 and we actually safer in several areas. Number one, in  
13 infection control and sterilization, in medical alerts  
14 and in the determination of whether treatment should be  
15 rendered to a patient.

16 In a study of diagnoses, it looked at the  
17 different between the diagnosis of dentists and dental  
18 hygienists. There was very little difference, and dental  
19 hygienists tended to err on the safer side.

20 As far as education, dental hygienists are far  
21 more educated than dentists are in the overlapping scope  
22 of practice that pertains to dental hygiene. Dental  
23 hygienists are educated by dental hygienists. They are  
24 supervised by dental hygienists and they're competency is  
25 evaluated by dental hygienists. In many dental schools

1       when you get to the periodontal section of this dental  
2       hygienists are actually the ones who teach dentists these  
3       areas of practice.

4               When you look at professional liability  
5       insurance for dental hygienists it is the exact same  
6       whether the hygienist has supervision, no supervision,  
7       whether they are performing expanded functions such as  
8       local anesthesia, replanning and curettage and several  
9       other expanded functions. The supervision or lack of has  
10      nothing to do with the price of professional liability  
11      insurance when it regards to the practice of dental  
12      hygiene.

13             The ADA accreditation standards assure a  
14      competent education. This is from the American Dental  
15      Association Commission on Dental Accreditation. If you  
16      look at the accreditation standards and the American  
17      Dental Educator's Association core competencies for entry  
18      into the dental hygiene profession, you will note that  
19      hygienists must be competent in providing care for the  
20      child, adolescent, adult, geriatric and medically  
21      compromised patients.

22             They must be responsible for the assimilation  
23      of knowledge requiring judgement, decision making and  
24      critical analysis. They must be competent in diagnosis,  
25      treatment planning, provision of the treatment,

1 subsequent needs, evaluation of the services rendered and  
2 making referrals for problems that fall outside the scope  
3 of practice for dental hygiene. They are also competent  
4 in treating all types of periodontal disease. Dental  
5 hygienists must also be competent in evaluating and  
6 communicating with diverse populations. They must be  
7 competent in life support measures and medical  
8 emergencies. They must be competent in comprehensive  
9 patient care and management of patients.

10 When you look at the accreditation standards  
11 and these core competencies nowhere in these does it  
12 state that the competency is diminished if a dentist is  
13 not physically present or supervising a dental hygienist.

14 The availability and employment forecast.  
15 According to the U.S. Department of Labor and Statistics  
16 there's going to be a 37 percent increase between 2000  
17 and 2010 of the available positions for dental  
18 hygienists. Conversely, dentistry is expected to  
19 increase only by 5.7 percent. According to information  
20 from the American Dental Association, we graduate between  
21 36 and 3800 dentists a year in the United States. We  
22 have 6000 dentists a year that retire or die.

23 We are not keeping up with the population, so  
24 we must look at ways to treat the population and  
25 prevention has got to be one of the keys. Dental

1       hygienists are the prevention specialists of the dental  
2       team. Prevention will help save money and save lives.

3               What regulatory and non-regulatory strategies  
4       have been employed to restrict the independent practice  
5       or to broaden the clinical autonomy of registered dental  
6       hygienists? Number one, efforts have been made to stop  
7       or limit the self regulation of dental hygienists. When  
8       we look at this we have, dental hygiene is one of the  
9       only professions that is regulated by their employers.  
10      When we have a board that regulates dental hygiene we  
11      also have the ability for the board to impose emergency  
12      regulations.

13              I can speak from experience in South Carolina.  
14      I am a practicing dental hygienist. I run a school based  
15      oral health program. Statutory change was made in 2000  
16      to allow dental hygienists to work in nursing homes and  
17      schools, clinics and various other settings. We  
18      practiced from January of 2001 until the end of the  
19      school year, the beginning of June that year, with no  
20      problems, nothing arose. But once the legislature  
21      recessed that year the Board of Dentistry put in an  
22      emergency regulation that tied the legislature. This  
23      emergency regulation was able to stand for six months.

24              What it did was it put back in a requirement  
25      that had been removed in statute requiring a pre-

1 examination by dentists. The basis of this emergency  
2 regulations was that lives were being endangered and that  
3 subsequent claims had been filed that may or may not be  
4 proven to cause harm. It is almost two years since that  
5 regulation went into place. No substantiated claims of  
6 harm have ever been founded. It has never come to  
7 fruition.

8 Also, the actions of the Board of Dentistry at  
9 that time in this regulation capacity, they were not  
10 working as a regulatory capacity, in my opinion. They  
11 were acting as a commercial participant in a given market  
12 and limiting access to individuals.

13 We delivered care to 15,000 children from  
14 January until June when we started with no complaints.  
15 When this emergency regulation went into place we had to  
16 hire dentists to do exams on children before they were  
17 able to have services. The emergency regulation listed  
18 that there would be no fiscal impact with this  
19 regulation. It cost our Department of Health and Human  
20 Services over a quarter of a million dollars in this six  
21 month period while the regulation was in place and this  
22 was only having approximately six hygienists at a time.  
23 When we had to hire dentists we had to implement the cost  
24 of that exam. Then when the children were referred they  
25 had another exam at an office when they were referred to

1       us, so there ended up being double expenditures also with  
2       the Department of Health and Human Services.

3               On a board of dentistry that has very little  
4       input from dental hygiene there are usually one to two  
5       dental hygienists serving on the board and one to two  
6       consumer members, but the overwhelming majority of  
7       individuals are dentists on the boards. Recently, our  
8       dental hygiene member on the board in South Carolina has  
9       not even been informed of the last two board meetings.  
10      She has been left off of the mailing list and not been  
11      told there were even board meetings. So we have some  
12      conflict here when you're regulated by your employing  
13      professional.

14             It has been documented by the legislative audit  
15      council in South Carolina that dental hygiene members on  
16      our board of dentistry in South Carolina did not even  
17      receive seconds on motions that they made to even open  
18      them for discussion. So there is somewhat of a conflict.

19             Another area that has been used is to maintain  
20      gatekeeper privileges for dentists. This includes  
21      supervision, orders, examinations and direction.  
22      Supervision levels. We have general supervision,  
23      indirect supervision, public health supervision.  
24      Dentistry works really hard to make sure there is still  
25      some tie to dentistry there that they still have some

1 control over it. In eight states in the United States  
2 there is a number of dental hygienists that a dentist can  
3 actually supervise in outside settings. Why? I don't  
4 know, but there is.

5 Direction and public health settings, even if  
6 there is only direction by a dentist it is still required  
7 that it is a dentist giving direction whether they see  
8 the patients or not or evaluate any of the work.

9 The pre-examination, which I just talked about  
10 in the emergency regulation, it ties the dental hygiene  
11 services to dentistry. There's no evidence to support  
12 the need for this.

13 In private practice this is often required if  
14 there's general supervision but yet in a public health  
15 setting an exam is not required.

16 This is setting up a double standard of care.  
17 We have individuals that are served in public health  
18 settings that do not have to have an exam, which evidence  
19 supports. But yet, in a private practice they do have to  
20 have an exam. I asked what the reasoning behind this is?

21 Non-regulatory strategies that have been  
22 implemented. We have a quote from the Institute of  
23 Medicine. "Rhetoric and political power frequently  
24 substitute for evidence and rational decision making."  
25 One of the clearest examples of this problem is the case

1 of dental hygiene services. One thing that has happened  
2 is political power has had a very, very high cost to the  
3 consumers. Great respect has been afforded with the  
4 title, doctor.

5 At legislative hearings, information and  
6 opinion is given without any evidence basis to back it  
7 up. I can give personal example on this, also. At  
8 school board meetings when we are discussing, in South  
9 Carolina the number one reason children miss school is  
10 dental problems. Implementing a public health program  
11 into the schools has been recommended by the CDC, a  
12 Public Health Sealant Program. When we present this  
13 program we actually had presidents of the Board of  
14 Dentistry and Dental Association members stand up and  
15 state that it was substandard care. It was third world  
16 dentistry. Everything that is being offered is based on  
17 national standards. And I actually have packets of  
18 information for the panelists that has the newspaper  
19 articles and the quotes and the emergency regulation and  
20 different information in that.

21 In Spartanberg County we had a school board  
22 vote unanimously that they wanted the services in their  
23 schools. I got an e-mail at 11:37 saying we have voted  
24 unanimously for these services. At 12:02 I got an e-mail  
25 that said, whoa, put it on hold. We have had so many



1 calls from dentists asking for these services not to be  
2 delivered that we have decided to hold off. So, in less  
3 than 30 minutes.

4 Donations from dental schools have been  
5 withheld by dentists. If dentists speak out in dental  
6 schools, they have withheld donations from the dental  
7 schools. We have had a dentist that was willing to work  
8 with us in South Carolina, had checked with the attorneys  
9 with the university that he worked with to make sure it  
10 was okay for him to be a consultant. He was given a  
11 green light, a clear.

12 But the Dental Association, upon visiting the  
13 school, they were told that they would withdraw  
14 legislative funding and support. The dentist could not  
15 work with us so we had to look for alternate care.

16 Dental supply companies, we have dental supply  
17 companies that have also been told that they cannot  
18 provide service, they should not provide services or  
19 supplies to us. Recently I received a call. We have  
20 been purchasing supplies since January of 2001 and I just  
21 received a call a few weeks ago asking me for the name of  
22 a dentist that could be listed in order for them to  
23 continue selling us supplies.

24 What consumer information and protection issues  
25 will be raised by a less restrictive environment for

1 market entry? Number one is the consumer's right to  
2 choose. The market system, with competition and the  
3 efficiencies it generates, is based on the consumer's  
4 freedom to make choices among available options.

5 The health profession's profession has urged  
6 revision of the regulations. One of the key principles  
7 they have asked for this is the respect of consumers  
8 rights to choose their own health care providers from a  
9 wide range of safe options.

10 One thing that has been brought forward is  
11 licensure. All states, with the exception of Alabama,  
12 require dental hygienists to pass a National Board Exam  
13 to become licensed to practice dental hygiene. In order  
14 to do this, this requirement, I feel, should be  
15 maintained. This assures that there is a knowledge base  
16 that has been established and maintained through the  
17 dental hygiene education process.

18 The accredited education should be maintained.  
19 Accreditation serves four purposes. To protect the  
20 welfare of the public, to serve as a guide for dental  
21 hygiene program development, to serve as a stimulus for  
22 improvement of established programs, to, and to provide  
23 criteria for the evaluation of new and established  
24 programs.

25 One other method that has been implemented is

1 to stop reimbursement to dental hygienists from Medicaid  
2 and from health insurance. What has happened in the  
3 past, in South Carolina in particular, we were given a  
4 letter stating that dental hygienists were going to  
5 become Medicaid providers. Dentistry came to a meeting  
6 and threatened to withhold and withdraw their public  
7 members from service Medicaid children if hygienists were  
8 allowed to be directly reimbursed.

9 We have situations like this. In Maine,  
10 tomorrow, Maine care is looking at their provision.  
11 Dental hygienists have been reimbursed for several years  
12 for certain services. They are implementing a change at  
13 a hearing tomorrow where the hygienists will no longer be  
14 reimbursed, if they are practicing under public health  
15 supervision, they must be employed by a dentist in a  
16 private office.

17 So we have numerous issues when it comes down  
18 to reimbursement. For, in particular, in our state, we,  
19 we are authorized by the Department of Health to provide  
20 services. A dentist does not have to see the children  
21 before we provide the services and we provide urgent case  
22 referral and management of these children to make sure  
23 they get into offices and are seen by offices. In order  
24 to be paid, we must employ a private practice dentist to  
25 receive reimbursement.

1           The dentist never sees the children, never  
2 evaluates the work or has any portion of that. He  
3 oversees what our policies are but so does the Department  
4 of Health. We have a procedure's manual and we have  
5 guidelines that we have to work under.

6           The dentist never participates in actual  
7 delivery of care or evaluation, but we must employ them  
8 in order to get reimbursed.

9           What is the conclusion? From the evidence  
10 presented you can see that supervision and/or control of  
11 dental hygienists is not necessary. Independent dental  
12 hygiene will create greater accessibility and have a  
13 significant impact on the general health of the public.  
14 Dentistry has a vested economic interest in controlling  
15 the profession of dental hygiene without any evidence to  
16 justify this control.

17           The legislative changes that are needed to  
18 bring about this will not require public expenditures.  
19 Yet, it will increase access to care, it will allow  
20 consumer choice and it will ultimately lower expenditures  
21 for oral health care services.

22           Seventeen states now have unsupervised practice  
23 of dental hygiene, yet only eight states are directly  
24 reimbursed by Medicaid or insurance.

25           One of the strategies by dentistry is to allow

1 dental, to train dental assistants in providing dental  
2 hygiene services. There is no accredited education for  
3 dental assistants. Every state in the United States  
4 allows dental assistants to be trained on the job.

5 If you look at, according to the Department of  
6 Labor, the salary, approximate salary, for dental  
7 assistants in the United States, it is \$26,000. If you  
8 look at the approximate average salary for dental  
9 hygienist it's \$54,000. There's obviously a vested  
10 economic interest in lowering the standards, but this  
11 does not reflect the claims that dental hygienists,  
12 providing these services in other settings, are not safe.  
13 We have proven that they are, yet on the other hand, they  
14 want to lower services to patients.

15 I feel that patients need to have the right to  
16 know that their providers have graduated from an  
17 accredited program, have been properly educated and  
18 licensed and have the right to refuse treatment if this  
19 is not so.

20 Boards of Dentistry, an organized dentistry, as  
21 private, as private business operators, have acted  
22 precipitously to persuade public authorities to adopt  
23 statutes and regulations that establish competition  
24 suppression mechanisms. As you have seen, from this  
25 evidence, nothing supports this. Evans and Williams, in

1       1978, stated that dentists essentially operate as a  
2       cartel limiting the supply of care and creating prices  
3       higher than they would under competition.

4               I ask that you review this evidence from the  
5       perspective of the public. It is time for change. The  
6       current model of dentistry does not serve the diverse  
7       populations that need oral health services the most. And  
8       it has also placed a superfluous burden on our society.

9               Thank you.

10              (Applause.)

11              DR. HYMAN: Okay. We'll take about a five  
12       minute break and then we'll reconvene.

13              (A brief recess was taken.)

14              DR. HYMAN: Our next speaker is Lynn Loeffler.

15              MS. LOEFFLER: Good morning. Like all the  
16       other speakers we're happy to have this opportunity to  
17       testify today in front of the Department of Justice and  
18       the Federal Trade Commission on some issues that are of  
19       great concern of the American College of Nurse Midwives.

20              I'm at the opposite extreme from Professor  
21       Kleiner in terms of technology. I don't have any slides.  
22       I will use the microphone because midwives only use  
23       technology when it's really necessary.

24              So, my name is Lynne Loeffler. I'm a Certified  
25       Nurse Midwife from Blanco County, Texas, which is famous

1       for nothing except being the childhood home of LBJ. I'm  
2       also a practicing nurse midwife and the chapter chair for  
3       the region of the country that includes Texas.

4               The American College of Nurse Midwives is a  
5       professional organization for certified nurse midwives.  
6       Nearly 90 percent of practicing nurse midwives are  
7       members of the college.

8               Nurse midwives play a vital role in women's and  
9       infants' health. We handle approximately 10 percent of  
10      spontaneous vaginal births in the United States and as  
11      much as 30 percent in some states in the country.  
12      Certified nurse midwives are credentialed and expert in  
13      their field. They must pass a rigorous, national  
14      certification exam and they are licensed and recognized  
15      in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

16              Nurse midwives are recognized under all states  
17      and under federal law as independent health care  
18      practitioners with no requirement of physician  
19      supervision. Certified nurse midwives provide care to  
20      many medically underserved populations, but they are also  
21      an important competitive choice for women of all income  
22      and health insurance categories.

23              CNM's provide excellent care and value as  
24      demonstrated by both clinical and cost measures.  
25      Epidemiological studies have further illustrated the

1 success of using nurse midwives. While operating as  
2 independent and self sufficient professionals, certified  
3 nurse midwives also collaborate and work in partnership  
4 with family physicians, OBGYN's and other health care  
5 providers, as recognized in the joint practiced  
6 statements referenced in our written testimony.

7 But despite licensure, despite regulatory,  
8 scientific and professional acceptance of nurse midwives  
9 and despite the every growing popularity of nurse  
10 midwifery services among patients in the public, nurse  
11 midwives face significant challenges in gaining a fair  
12 opportunity to practice in many communities. Antitrust  
13 enforcement has sometimes been necessary to challenge and  
14 breakdown anticompetitive barriers to practice.

15 Barriers to entry and, and obstruction of nurse  
16 midwifery practice still continue in many areas.  
17 Frustrating the evolution of more diverse, efficient  
18 patient choice and focused forms of health care delivery.  
19 Antitrust enforcement, by the Federal Enforcement  
20 Agencies, must be an important tool in protecting  
21 patients' ability to access nurse midwifery services.

22 The ACNM asked me to come here today to talk to  
23 your two agencies about practice restrictions and other  
24 barriers which are intended to, or which do in fact, have  
25 the effect of excluding nurse midwives from the women's



1 health care services market. In addition to outright  
2 exclusionary practices, nurse midwives, their  
3 collaborating physicians and institutional purchasers of  
4 nurse midwife services have been subjected to practices  
5 which so increase the cost of providing services that the  
6 otherwise cost effective advantages of utilizing nurse  
7 midwives are lost.

8 Most of the time, these exclusionary or  
9 predatory practices are the product of collusive action  
10 by groups of physicians, usually OBGYN's. And here, I  
11 might say, that I could substitute midwives and OBGYN's  
12 for dental hygienists and dentists and use her slides.

13 I am not here as an antitrust expert, which I  
14 certainly am not, but rather as an affected nurse midwife  
15 whose practice in Austin, Texas was closed about a year  
16 ago as a result of actions by a group of OBGYNs who  
17 viewed our practice as a competitive threat.

18 The complex details of my situation are set out  
19 in the first of several case studies, which will be  
20 submitted later this month as addenda to ACNM's written  
21 testimony, which was filed today and is available in the  
22 hall.

23 In short, my two partners and I were recruited  
24 by the Chairman of the Board of a health care  
25 organization and the CEO of a hospital within that

1 network to start a CNM practice providing continuity of  
2 care to an undeserved population. The faculty OB's of  
3 the residency program at that hospital, who each contract  
4 individually with the hospital to supervise the  
5 residents, were never happy about us being there. And  
6 over a three year period they utilized several of the  
7 techniques that I'm going to talk about in order to close  
8 our practice.

9 The other case studies in our addenda concern  
10 nurse midwife practices in another Texas city, in a large  
11 Florida city, in a small town in New Mexico, a city in  
12 Oregon, a city in Arizona and a city in Iowa. As you can  
13 see, there are problems in all parts of the country. In  
14 each case, the actions of OBGYN competitors have forced  
15 the closure, or at least seriously threatened the  
16 continued financial viability, of a nurse midwife  
17 practice which fills an unmet community need.

18 These case studies are merely representative  
19 samples, the proverbial tip of the iceberg. It is fair  
20 to say that nurse midwives are under siege in many  
21 locations. Obstruction of nurse midwives's practice  
22 takes a number of forms.

23 Brief examples, which are covered more fully in  
24 our written testimony, include physicians abusing their  
25 control of the hospital staff credentialing process to

1       exclude nurse midwives altogether. Physicians conspiring  
2       to refuse to provide consultative or collaborative  
3       services that may be necessary in order for nurse  
4       midwives to qualify for or maintain hospital privileges.  
5       Physicians conspiring to set arbitrarily high prices to  
6       be paid by hospitals, nurse midwives or third party  
7       payers as stipends for consulting services for nurse  
8       midwives.

9               This was on one of the techniques used in  
10       Austin where each of the eight OB's demanded \$60,000 a  
11       year to be our consulting physicians, which required no  
12       additional time or effort on their part over what they  
13       were already required to do as supervisors of the  
14       residency program. Physicians insisting that nurse  
15       midwives, in independent practice, may not have hospital  
16       privileges and that privileges may only be granted to  
17       nurse midwives who are employed by a physician or a  
18       hospital.

19              Another technique is physicians causing  
20       hospitals to adopt restrictive credentialing, supervision  
21       or practice policies that effectively prevent meaningful  
22       practice opportunities for nurse midwives.

23              Again, these were techniques that were used in  
24       our situation. A sponsor was required and, not only  
25       that, the sponsoring physician had to be in the hospital

1       during the entire labor and deliver of the CNM's patient.

2               The big problem in many cases is that hospital  
3       Boards of Directors have totally advocated responsibility  
4       for credentialing to their medical staffs who may have  
5       little incentives to credential non-physicians.

6               Another technique is physicians manipulating  
7       managed care contracting or credentialing practices to  
8       deny nurse midwives fair access to health planned  
9       patients. There have been instances of imposition of a  
10      surcharge on the liability insurance premiums of  
11      physicians who collaborate with nurse midwives. Reports  
12      of such surcharges indicate that only physician owned or  
13      controlled malpractice insurance plans impose these  
14      surcharges. The Superintendent of Insurance of the  
15      District of Columbia ruled in 1992 that such surcharges  
16      are not justified by actuarial evidence and constitute  
17      double dipping. Yet, in some areas of the country, they  
18      continue.

19              And finally, there have been instances of  
20      obstruction of licensing for free standing birth centers  
21      by physicians and/or hospitals.

22              In all these situations, the restrictions are  
23      imposed on nurse midwife practice. But the  
24      anticompetitive effects are felt by hospitals,  
25      noncommunity clinics, health departments and, of course,

1 the consumers who are deprived of access to nurse midwife  
2 services.

3 Nurse midwives are actual as well as potential  
4 competitors of physicians. Although CNM's scope of  
5 practice is not as broad as that of a physician, in the  
6 realm of normal and low risk, which is at least 75  
7 percent, 70 percent of all births, CNM services are  
8 substitutable, not merely complimentary, to those of OB's  
9 or family practice physicians.

10 Nurse midwives offer competitive alternatives  
11 in women's health care services, not just for consumers,  
12 but also for the various entities that purchase or  
13 provide women's health care services. Although some  
14 nurse midwives practice as physician employees, and  
15 nearly all nurse midwives practice in some form of  
16 collaboration and referral relationship with a physician,  
17 nurse midwives can legally practice as separate economic  
18 entities from physicians in all jurisdictions in this  
19 country.

20 We have two final points today. Each about  
21 antitrust enforcement, focus and commitment. The first  
22 concerns quality of care bug-a-boos. The second concerns  
23 competitive effects analysis.

24 As to the first, nurse midwives are rightfully  
25 proud of the quality of their services. Study after

1 study confirms excellent patient outcomes and patient  
2 satisfaction. Both federal and state law, and national  
3 health care organizations including the American College  
4 of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, recognize the  
5 important and valuable role that nurse midwives play as  
6 independent health care practitioners working within the  
7 health care delivery system. However, local physicians  
8 will sometimes obstruct opportunities for independent  
9 professional practice by nurse midwives trotting out  
10 tired and debunked arguments.

11 Nurse midwives' lack of medical school training  
12 or medical licensure will be used to support a broad  
13 range of restrictions purportedly based on some type of  
14 quality concern, such as insistence that nurse midwives  
15 must be employed by physicians to get hospital  
16 privileges, that a physician must be physically present  
17 for midwives to practice, or that nurse midwives are not  
18 trained to perform services that they, in fact, perform  
19 every day.

20 These and other restrictions, while couched in  
21 terms of quality of care, are empty of merit, are not  
22 evidence-based, are usually adopted without benefit of  
23 any inquiry, and serve to forestall practice by nurse  
24 midwives and to deny choice to patients.

25 While the arguments used to support these types

1 of restrictions may sometimes seem plausible at first  
2 glance, these types of restrictions are not justified and  
3 can be extremely pernicious. In many cases, the doctors  
4 who voted to impose the restriction in question are then  
5 collectively unwilling to provide the collaboration that  
6 they have insisted upon as a credentialing criterion. In  
7 these and other cases, the extra measures demanded are  
8 not only wholly unnecessary, but are exclusionary,  
9 because the resulting duplicative costs make nurse  
10 midwives' services uneconomical for patients and third  
11 party payers.

12 We urge the Department of Justice and the  
13 Federal Trade Commission to require the same rigor from  
14 those who would defend an otherwise anticompetitive  
15 restraint on nurse midwives as you would require from  
16 those seeking to defend boycotts, concerted refusals to  
17 deal, and other restraints in other industries.

18 We recognize that quality of care to patients  
19 and excellent patient outcomes, in our case healthy moms  
20 and healthy babies, is essential. So we reject any  
21 suggestion that we are asking you not to consider  
22 quality. In fact, we are asking that you concentrate  
23 your attention very closely on purported justifications  
24 that are raised for restraint on competitive practice by  
25 nurse midwives.

1                   This is far preferable than to letting  
2                   pernicious restraints escape close scrutiny merely  
3                   because the quality banner is waived.

4                   As ACNM's written comments make very clear  
5                   today, after all the studies attesting to the excellent  
6                   results of midwifery care, we are far beyond any real  
7                   vulnerability to a so called quality of care defense. A  
8                   review of the literature demonstrates, without question,  
9                   that no quality of care defense could succeed. No  
10                  clinical, legal, actuarial or regulatory evidence can be  
11                  mounted to support a quality of care, or for that matter,  
12                  even a risk of professional liability defense. The  
13                  evidence is all the other way, supporting the safety,  
14                  quality and legal and professional autonomy of nurse  
15                  midwifery practice. ACNM will provide copies of all  
16                  relevant articles and studies as follow up comments on  
17                  the record of these hearings.

18  
19                  As to the last point, competitive effects,  
20                  while nurse midwives often compete with physicians, that  
21                  does not mean that elimination of a nurse midwifery  
22                  practice from a market area has the same competitive  
23                  effect or lack of competitive effect in a community as  
24                  does a single physician's loss of medical staff  
25                  privileges.



1           From an antitrust standpoint, the situation is  
2       quite different. Removal of a nurse midwife from a  
3       health care community is not, from a competitive  
4       standpoint or from a patient choice standpoint, a mere  
5       reduction in the supply of competitors. Such collusion  
6       takes away from consumers a distinct type of health care  
7       provider, one who will generally offer services  
8       different, from a different learning base with a  
9       different type of care orientation and often with a  
10      different cost. And who, thereby, poses critical  
11      competition to the prevalent physician practice style in  
12      a community.

13           Indeed competition from nurse midwives can  
14      spark innovation and competitive response in a whole  
15      marketplace. In a way that the presence or absence of  
16      one single physician practice may not. Boycotts and  
17      exclusionary practices that deprive consumer of access to  
18      nurse midwives pose a marked threat to the diversity of  
19      competitive choices available to consumers. They also  
20      drive up costs.

21           Nurse midwives do not bemoan our situation or  
22      decry a lack of support or cooperation from other health  
23      professionals. Indeed, we've made great strides in the  
24      past 50 years and nurse midwives have excellent  
25      relationships with hospitals, physicians and managed care

1 firms alike. It's a minority here who are causing the  
2 problems.

3 In no small measure, though, the presence of  
4 antitrust law, as a deterrent to anticompetitive abuses,  
5 has been a friend of our growth. The continued vitality  
6 of antitrust is a deterrent to abuses, and as a guard for  
7 diversity, is dependent on the active exercise of  
8 antitrust muscle.

9 We appreciate the important work the antitrust  
10 agencies do in the health care field and we urge active  
11 scrutiny and action against restraints that deprive  
12 consumers of choice and deprive nurse midwives of  
13 competitive opportunity.

14 ACNM has been a strong opponent of antitrust  
15 exemptions in the health care field. As you well know,  
16 the lessons of antitrust must be continually taught. The  
17 last federal antitrust action relating to nurse midwives  
18 was resolved 15 years ago. The problems, though, are  
19 still here.

20 So what does ACNM want? We would like to see  
21 some enforcement actions and investigations so that your  
22 staffs can judge for themselves the restrictions that  
23 prevent consumer access to CNM's in so many markets. We  
24 would like to see the potential deterrent effect of  
25 enforcement actions so that fewer CNM's may, in the

1 future, be confronted with these restrictions. And  
2 lastly, we would like to see reinstatement of the former  
3 Competition Advocacy Program to provide comments to state  
4 legislators and regulators on competitive effect and  
5 effects on consumers of proposed regulations or  
6 legislation.

7 Thank you.

8 (Applause.)

9 DR. HYMAN: John Hennessy is next.

10 In regard to Ms. Loeffler's comments, I am  
11 pleased to announce that we've taken care of one-third of  
12 her requests already, because we have reinstated the  
13 Competition Advocacy Project and have been filing  
14 comments with a variety of states. My recollection is  
15 that none of them have involved nurse midwifery, but that  
16 doesn't mean we won't do so.

17 And, in fact, we filed comments relating to a  
18 dental hygienist issue in South Carolina. And, in fact,  
19 I believe have offered testimony on that. But I'm  
20 running into Mr. Hennessy's time. So let me let him talk  
21 instead.

22 MR. HENNESSY: Thank you very much. Thank you  
23 for the invitation to speak here today. I will stick  
24 within my time frame.

25 I'm very interested in hearing from the

1 American College of Nurse Practitioners. We're a 29-  
2 physician practice in Kansas City. In the last year and  
3 a half we've integrated seven nurse practitioners to our  
4 practice. It's been a tremendous advance for our  
5 patients. I'm interested to see where the profession is  
6 going so we can merge with you.

7 I'm going to discuss today certificate of need  
8 as a barrier to market entry. I'm from the Kansas City,  
9 Missouri market. I'll be taking a very micro-focus on  
10 how it impacts us in, in both sides of the state line in  
11 our metropolitan area.

12 To give you some perspective, in my career I've  
13 been, spent seven of my health care years as a provider  
14 of health care services, either as an administrator in a  
15 hospital or in a medical group setting. I spent nine of  
16 my years as a purchaser of health care services,  
17 primarily on the west coast. And, from firsthand  
18 experience, I can tell you that market entry has been one  
19 of the single most important forces in helping make huge  
20 strides in containing costs, not just for health plans  
21 and employers, but for patients who have co-payments and  
22 co-insurances, as well.

23 In my experience, the open health care markets  
24 have produced cost containment and quality improvement,  
25 both in terms of offering new alternatives and forcing

1 alternatives to improve against each other. Open markets  
2 also promote access to care by, for giving more  
3 opportunity for care. And we believe it promotes  
4 community economic health, as well.

5 I'm in the cancer business, so I'll tell you a  
6 couple things about cancer today. One in two men, and  
7 one in two women, have a lifetime risk of developing  
8 cancer. So a lot of us in this room. About 80 percent  
9 of cancer care is delivered in physician office settings.  
10 It used to be a hospital-based treatment regimen, and in  
11 the last 20 years has changed dramatically.

12 And five year survival rates have changed over  
13 the last years from 50 percent to 62 percent in large  
14 part because of access to screening and detection,  
15 improved technology with new entrance and enhanced access  
16 to care.

17 At the same time, the cancer incidents, which  
18 is the number of new people per year diagnosed with  
19 cancer, is increasing. And the prevalence is increasing,  
20 meaning that people who are living with cancer, that  
21 number is growing, as well. We're successful in treating  
22 the first cancer, which typically means we'll treat them  
23 again.

24 Access to cancer treatment is artificially  
25 limited by Certificate of Need. Limited access keeps

1 vital therapies and technologies out of reach and, in  
2 fact, franchises old technologies.

3 In our experience, CON is a failure as a cost  
4 containment tool. I won't go back through a lot of the  
5 work that Mr. Piper did in terms of background, but  
6 clearly payment mechanisms over the last 20 years has  
7 changed dramatically from a cost based system to a system  
8 focused on prospective payment, resource based payment  
9 and market based pricing. And, while a lot of states  
10 have changed their Certificate of Need program over time,  
11 many states still have the same program it was back in  
12 the '70s.

13 I'm going to talk to you a little bit about  
14 Kansas City and what I call a Tale of Two Cities. I've  
15 got a map here that shows you the big picture of Kansas  
16 and Missouri. There's a small picture and that bright  
17 green line there, which is my technological  
18 sophistication, is the state line. There's no mountain  
19 range, there's no river, it's a two lane road.

20 Missouri is a certificate of need state.  
21 Kansas is an open market state, there's no certificate of  
22 need whatsoever. Like I said, the state line is a two  
23 lane road. But in terms of access to health care, it may  
24 as well be the Berlin Wall, or the Berlin Wall 20 years  
25 ago.

1           In Kansas City, CON is not a cost containment  
2     tool. And I give you some concrete examples from our  
3     market. Go to the CMS website, look at the triple AP,  
4     double APCC, which is what Medicare uses to pay Medicare  
5     Plus Choice Plans for Medicare Plus Choice enrollees.  
6     Jackson County, Missouri; Johnson County, Kansas; the  
7     exact same number per capita. That's a reflection of  
8     actual health care costs. Look at the Medicare Plus  
9     Choice co-premiums in that market. You'll see they're  
10    exactly the same on the Kansas and on the Missouri side.

11           If you were to ask for an individual health  
12    insurance premium in Kansas or Missouri, you'd see that  
13    they're exactly the same. I'll give you a small  
14    exception. The Blue Cross plan in our town, it's a one  
15    percent difference. What's interesting is that  
16    difference is lower in high deductible plans than low  
17    deductible plans. What that says is that it's not the  
18    cost of facilities and hospital beds and the surgeries  
19    that are causing the price differential, if there is any.  
20    So in terms of how this actually impacts consumers,  
21    people like you and me, not large organizations, it  
22    doesn't help from a cost containment standpoint.

23           We believe CON does not improve quality of  
24    care. I have two projects that I report to the Missouri  
25    Certificate of Need Committee on, and the only reporting

1 I give to them is the cost of the project, never been  
2 asked on the quality of care we deliver, on the number of  
3 patients we deliver care to, just how much we spend. No  
4 one asks us anything in Kansas so I think you've got a,  
5 probably a case where neither standard is where we'd like  
6 it to be, but in either case no one's asked us about  
7 quality of care.

8 The default assumption of CON, therefore, must  
9 be that the incumbent equals quality. Now, everything we  
10 know about quality improvement in other industries says  
11 that's not the case. If that were the case you'd see a  
12 name, instead of Toshiba here, it would say Osbourne.  
13 That tells you how many people remember the Osbourne  
14 computer. But the original PC was developed by a company  
15 named Osbourne.

16 So what does CON do if it doesn't control  
17 costs, if it doesn't improve quality of care? Our, in  
18 our experience, CON protects incumbent providers,  
19 franchisees, from competition, investment and service and  
20 care improvement.

21 Two examples from our market where market entry  
22 was denied by a Certificate of Need process. IMRT is the  
23 first radiation technology to limit damage to healthy  
24 cells. Radiation kills all human cells, you want to kill  
25 cancer cells you don't want to kill healthy cells. You



1 want to preserve the quality of life for patients and you  
2 want to make sure you don't create cancers by, by hitting  
3 cells you shouldn't.

4 Our practice was the first to the Kansas City  
5 metropolitan market with IMRT in May, 2002. We take care  
6 of the pediatric patients for Children's Mercy of Kansas  
7 City who, before our entry in the market, had to go to  
8 Saint Louis or Denver for, for this type of radiation  
9 care. In June, 2002, we had an application reviewed to  
10 be the first to bring this technology to the Missouri  
11 side of the state line. Our application was opposed by  
12 each and every operator of existing radiation therapy  
13 equipment.

14 We didn't get our application approved. And as  
15 we a appeal through the court system today, only two of  
16 the ten opponents have actually implemented IMRT as an  
17 improvement in patient care.

18 Second example is PET scanning, positron  
19 emission tomography, is a tool used almost exclusively in  
20 oncology to detect the effectiveness of our treatments  
21 and to see if cancer is growing. We were the first to  
22 market in a non-hospital setting in Kansas City. We were  
23 actually the second entered into the market entirely.  
24 And we were at full capacity within eight months.

25 During that time, 80 percent of the patients we

1 saw had a change in treatment plan based on PET results.  
2 So this was not a technology that wasn't driving results  
3 for patients, it absolutely was. In June of 2002 we  
4 applied to put a PET scanner on the Missouri side and we  
5 were opposed again. What was interesting here is some  
6 were existing players and some were players who had no  
7 interest in getting into the market, but were interested  
8 in keeping us from getting into the market.

9 One year later, the only PET scanning resources  
10 available for oncology on the Missouri side are two part  
11 time PET scanners who spend part of their time in other,  
12 in either, in Kansas or in other parts of the Missouri  
13 market.

14 So what does our Tale of Two Cities tell us?  
15 Well, we have broad access to health care in Kansas. I'm  
16 a Kansas resident, so while I benefit from this as a  
17 consumer, as an American I really can't tolerate it. But  
18 we have new hospitals. All the new hospitals that have  
19 been built in the last 10 or 15 years in the metropolitan  
20 area are on the Kansas side. We have free-standing  
21 facilities, which are including cancer centers, surgery  
22 centers, small hospitals. Children's Mercy, who has a  
23 facility in downtown, when they had the opportunity to  
24 expand, did it in Kansas because there were fewer  
25 barriers to market entry.

1           If you go to the Missouri side you're going to  
2   see old hospital facilities and very few community-based  
3   options. And the result we see is patients migrating  
4   from Missouri to Kansas to get their health care.

5           We think the Kansas market has broad benefits  
6   to consumers, both patients and employers. Timely and  
7   convenient access to care is very important. I've done  
8   part of my life in the workers' compensation system. And  
9   it's not just getting the care but making sure you get it  
10   timely to make sure people don't spend time away from  
11   work, away from their families and away from producing  
12   income for, for their families and for their employers.

13           My wife had a kidney stone about a year and a  
14   half ago. We waited seven days to get access to a  
15   lithotritor, which is reviewable under the state law.  
16   Those were not a pleasant seven days, and I didn't have  
17   the kidney stone.

18           But what also happens in Kansas is better jobs,  
19   high- paying jobs; nurses, physicians, nurse  
20   practitioners, laboratory technicians, radiology  
21   technicians have all migrated to Kansas as the new  
22   technology's been developed over there. That develops a  
23   broader tax base. And for those of us on the Kansas  
24   side, better roads, better schools, and more public  
25   safety.

1           The health care free market really is an  
2           economic engine for the State of Kansas. It is 14  
3           percent of the gross national product and keeping people  
4           employed in that industry is good for everyone in the  
5           economy.

6           So today I will give, I have an invitation for  
7           the FTC and the Department of Justice. Today we filed  
8           two Letters of Intent for Missouri Certificate of Need.  
9           We're filing for a linear accelerator with IMRT  
10          technology and a PET CT scanner, which would be the first  
11          in the Kansas City area. And my invitation is to watch  
12          these applications go through the process and to see if  
13          this process benefits consumers.

14          This is not to say there's not a role for  
15          government in looking at health care markets. But I  
16          don't think it should be as a rationer by limiting  
17          supply, but should be in an oversight role in health care  
18          markets, as they do in other markets. And some things  
19          the, the government does in other markets is that they  
20          provide information to consumers that help them make  
21          better decisions. So rather than limiting choice, give  
22          people tools to make that choice better.

23          In conclusion, Certificate of Need, in our  
24          experience, is an impediment to market entry. It's an  
25          impediment to innovation. It's an impediment to quality

1 improvement. And it, lastly, it's an impediment to the  
2 war against disease and disability in America.

3 Thank you for the opportunity.

4 (Applause.)

5 DR. HYMAN: John is actually our last user of  
6 Power Point this morning. And so, in order to expedite  
7 things, if I can ask all of the panelists to come up and  
8 Megan Price, and see where their names are.

9 And Megan Price will be our next speaker.  
10 We'll do Ms. Price and Ms. Apold, and then we'll go  
11 directly into the moderated discussion.

12 MS. PRICE: Does that mean you don't make me  
13 bigger than I really am even in real life?

14 DR. HYMAN: I'm not sure how the cameras would  
15 work.

16 MS. PRICE: Okay. Well, I guess I'll stand  
17 over here.

18 MR. KLEINER: David, do you know that I've got  
19 a project? We'll be glad to answer questions. This is  
20 Morris Kleiner.

21 DR. HYMAN: Okay. We're -- we actually have  
22 two more presentations, which will take us until probably  
23 just after noon, and then we'll start the moderated  
24 discussion with Professor Kleiner.

25 Okay. Ms. Price?

1 MS. PRICE: Thank you very much. My name is  
2 Megan Price, whose background -- I am not a nurse. My  
3 background is as a reporter and then as a state  
4 legislator in Vermont.

5 I might explain a little bit about Professional  
6 Nurses Service and explain our experience in trying to  
7 create consumer choice and competition in home health  
8 care services in Vermont.

9 It's been a 23 year episode. Professional  
10 Nurses was incorporated in 1980 as a home care provider.  
11 We were the first organization in Vermont to apply for  
12 and complete what was then the newly enacted Certificate  
13 of Need process. So, we were the first to go through  
14 this process.

15 Our request to become Medicare certified as a  
16 home health care agency was opposed then and is today  
17 still by the Vermont Assembly of Home Health Agencies,  
18 which calls itself VAHA. Subsequent requests have been  
19 made over 23 years. Subsequent requests have been  
20 opposed by VAHA. VAHA is always the only opponent of our  
21 becoming Medicare certified and they have prevailed.  
22 There is no choice in Vermont in home health care.

23 Professional Nurses Service is prohibited from  
24 providing physical, speech and occupational therapies,  
25 medical social work services, Medicaid services for

1 adults and some children and maternal child health care  
2 services. The way they do this is restricting our  
3 licensed nursing assistance to their full skill level.  
4 Each time the company's has applied for CON change or for  
5 a change in state statute, we have been denied. And with  
6 that denial becomes more power, more money flowing to the  
7 oligopoly and more brazenness in the way they behave in  
8 the marketplace.

9 In 1980, VAHA was estimated to be a 20 million  
10 dollar annual industry in Vermont. Today, that annual  
11 revenue for VAHA is approaching \$85 million a year. VAHA  
12 continues to grow and expand its corporate overhead while  
13 increasing the numbers of Vermonters either go without  
14 services, or find the services that are offered to them  
15 by the one provider available to their Medicare of  
16 Medicaid insurance and most private insurance, not to  
17 their liking. They have no choice of anyone else to call  
18 unless they want to pay out of pocket and then they can  
19 call Professional Nurses Service.

20 It's our estimate that approximately \$1 billion  
21 has flowed through VAHA, which controls more than 95  
22 percent of all home care services in Vermont in the past  
23 23 years.

24 You asked us to address the cost and quality  
25 and availability of services. The following quote's

1 taken for the March, 1999 Certificate of Need guidelines.  
2 Again, it is a Certificate of Need process in Vermont  
3 that keeps the oligopoly in place. These are published  
4 and the CON law is enforced by the Vermont Department of  
5 Banking Insurance Securities and Health Care  
6 Administration, known as BISHCA. These guidelines were  
7 written 19 years after Professional Nurses Service's  
8 inception. Quote, "Due to the lack of objective data and  
9 information concerning the quality and access to home  
10 health care services, the Division of Health Care  
11 Administration is currently collecting data on  
12 complaints, waiting lists, et cetera," end quote.

13 This data collection process has literally been  
14 going on for 23 years without resolution. It began most  
15 seriously in January, 1998, after we went to the  
16 legislature seeking relief and, and asking and bringing  
17 people who wanted a choice in home health care services.  
18 We have recently asked for information from BISHCA saying  
19 where is the data? Where are the reports that you  
20 yourselves said you've been collecting and disseminating?  
21 And we were told in the last two months that, in fact,  
22 they do collect the information and we provide, you know,  
23 data on services provided by ourselves. But the response  
24 was, quote, "Nothing is ever done with it."

25 Now, with yet another application under way



1 from us with a new administration in Vermont, we've  
2 retained an attorney to ask for this information,  
3 finally, through the public documents statute. And we  
4 hope to have some information to determine ourselves the  
5 need that we believe and know deeply exists.

6 As it's clear from the above, the state has no  
7 objective data that would create standards by which an  
8 applicant, such as Professional Nurses Service, could  
9 prove the need for new Medicare Certified Home Health  
10 Agency. The issue becomes one for clients who call us in  
11 desperation, as there's a nursing shortage in Vermont and  
12 nationwide. I literally speak to young people who have  
13 been lying in their own waste for three days with no one  
14 to come take care of them.

15 In speaking with private insurance, we have  
16 come to believe the Professional Nurses Service costs are  
17 lower, our quality is comparable and the timeliness and  
18 the delivery of our services often exceeds that of the  
19 existing oligopoly members. By example, I can tell you  
20 that a contract representative from a Colorado based  
21 infusion company called me last winter. I handle  
22 contracts for the company. Excuse me. And they had just  
23 signed a contract with VAHA, which also represents itself  
24 to private payers as VNA Health Systems, and sets one  
25 price for private insurance statewide.

1                   But then the oligopoly members, through  
2 Medicare,  
3 accept. This happened after our last CON application and  
4 they decided that the plan we have, as one corporate  
5 office and then services statewide, was a good one and  
6 they would adopt that. And so, for private insurers  
7 coming to Vermont, they called the VAHA central office  
8 through VNA Health Systems and get the set rate statewide  
9 for private insurance.

10                   This insurer was nice enough to tell me what  
11 they had just signed the contract with for VAHA. And the  
12 rates for a home needs assessment was \$125 through  
13 VAHA/VNA Health Systems. Our rate is \$70 for the same  
14 service. That would be a savings of \$55 per home care  
15 assessment for that insurer.

16                   The contractor told me that the same time for a  
17 nursing visit, the fee would be \$95 for the contract they  
18 just signed. What did we charge? And, again, it's \$70  
19 for that visit. This, again, affects the private market  
20 tremendously as well as state and federal tax dollars in  
21 terms of revenue coming in with no competition.

22                   In -- excuse me just a second. From a quality  
23 perspective, the combined monopoly power of these 13  
24 agencies, and their corporate status, creates the worst  
25 possible of all monopoly markets. The current agencies

1 are not only insulated from the need to improve and to  
2 innovate services, but management is also insulated from  
3 its mistakes. And, as with most monopolies, their  
4 management is prone to overinvest in capital and  
5 administrative overhead.

6 In the mid-1990s, just one oligopoly member  
7 purchased the former headquarters of the largest private  
8 insurer in Vermont. And this serves -- understand,  
9 Vermont's entire population is 600,000 people. So when  
10 one small, regional agency buys the multi-million dollar  
11 corporate offices of a former insurance company, people  
12 gasp. Even legislators gasp.

13 They came back a year and a half ago to build  
14 again and add on to that building. So the corporate  
15 overhead, multiplied by 13, we consider is quite  
16 substantial and these costs, again, go to private  
17 insurance, Medicaid and Medicare.

18 In an effort to survive in the Vermont market,  
19 excluded as we are from most Medicaid reimbursement and  
20 even private insurance reimbursement, Professional Nurses  
21 has a system, the development of Vermont's high-tech  
22 program and traumatic brain injury programs. We were the  
23 first home care provider in Vermont to receive JCAHO  
24 accreditation. And we're the only provider to guarantee  
25 statewide services. We were the first company to offer

1 services 24 hours a day, seven days a week. We're the  
2 only home care provider to offer a State Board of Nursing  
3 an approved, nursing assistant course. And upon  
4 completion of these courses, nurse graduates can sit for  
5 the state licensing exam, these, again, nursing  
6 assistants.

7 The availability of home care services in  
8 Vermont is diminished because of the monopoly. There was  
9 unquestionably an unmet need for services and innovation.  
10 In Vermont, in fact, the Vermont Agency of Human Services  
11 contracts with a number of home care providers who have  
12 no sealant at all. But they're allowed to provide  
13 services through the Agency of Human Services to Medicaid  
14 insured populations. While we have brought this to the  
15 attention of BISHCA, they have told us simply we don't  
16 have the staff to enforce the law and thank you for  
17 complying with it.

18 We have a letter we'd love to show you. The  
19 following is a brief excerpt from a newly issued report  
20 by the Vermont Agency of Human Services that says, quote,  
21 "Vermont's fastest growing age group is those 85 years  
22 old and older. And Vermont has been unable to adequately  
23 address its need for community based services. Demand  
24 out strips capacity. By the end of this decade the  
25 number of people needing assistance will climb 52

1       percent." Despite one agency within state government  
2       making these kinds of statements, BISHCA will tell you,  
3       you have to prove need. There's no evidence of need.  
4       You cannot get a CON. You cannot operate.

5               What reasons have been advanced to justify  
6       restrictions on the entry? Well, people have said it so  
7       well. Competition's not applicable to health care. Not-  
8       for-profit providers have greater integrity than for-  
9       profit providers. I want to make clear here that we are  
10      for-profit company, up to 60 percent of our income has  
11      been Medicaid. Currently, it's about 45 percent. I  
12      don't consider that cherry picking, which is one of the  
13      other allegations.

14             Competition would further fragment the system  
15      and weaken the existing providers. VAHA, by the way,  
16      opposes both not-for-profit entries into the market as  
17      well as for-profit. They don't discriminate, as to  
18      corporate status, entering their market.

19             Competition would result in less efficient,  
20      duplicative system with decreased capacity to subsidize  
21      uninsured individuals. Competition will erode volume,  
22      reduce the economy's scale for the existing oligopoly, et  
23      cetera,       et cetera.

24             They also point to other states, which they say  
25      have been ruined by competition. Tennessee is among

1       them. If someone's here from Tennessee, I'd like to know  
2       if Tennessee's in ruins. But I'm not sure. And  
3       universal access will be lost. Clients will be turned  
4       away by some providers.

5               The goal of the CON laws that was adopted in  
6       Vermont was to control the cost of health care. In terms  
7       of home health care services, when you apply, not one  
8       penny has to be attached to that certificate. If you  
9       simply apply and want to offer services, you must get a  
10      CON. So there's no dollar cost. All practitioners, the  
11      healing arts, exempted themselves while VAHA made sure  
12      that nurses, if they want to do home health care, must  
13      get a CON. So if you're a physician and you want to open  
14      a physician practice you can spend millions of dollars  
15      without getting a CON at all.

16             The CON process, in our opinion, is not the  
17      least restrictive process. And, in fact, increases  
18      barriers to consumer access. We believe Maine, which  
19      was, I think, was mentioned earlier, which has a  
20      licensing law for home health care, is an excellent idea.  
21      And a bill was introduced this year in the legislature  
22      but it got not one minute of testimony, while the CON Law  
23      was again rewritten, and again home health care was kept  
24      exactly the same. The goal was to go after Vermont's  
25      hospitals to reign in their costs, but at the same time,

1 the power of the oligopoly made sure that home health  
2 care was not changed again.

3 We believe consumer information protection  
4 would be enhanced through a less restrictive environment.  
5 Consumers can call a number of providers once they have a  
6 choice. In Maine, all of them are listed on a home, a  
7 home health site on the web page and they make, you know,  
8 a consumer informed, excellent decisions. I believe  
9 consumers have the capacity to decide what's the best  
10 service and if they don't like it, pick up the phone,  
11 call someone else.

12 For 23 years we've experience what we believe  
13 to be a tremendous misuse of power by the State of  
14 Vermont. As a former legislator and reporter, I cannot  
15 name them here, but I can tell you there are appalling  
16 conflicts of interest. And the only thing that's going  
17 to change is this federal intervention. We have tried  
18 every legal avenue including, recently, standing on  
19 street corners with a banner saying please change the CON  
20 Law in Vermont and free the nurses. And nothing is  
21 getting through.

22 It will take federal intervention. We ask you,  
23 beg you to come because I'm telling the truth when  
24 consumers call me, they're, when they complain, the  
25 complaints are turned right back to the agency for

1 fixing. And they are then told, have you considered a  
2 group home or a nursing home? I don't think that's  
3 appropriate in 2003.

4 Thank you.

5 (Applause.)

6 DR. APOLD: Good morning. My name is Dr. Susan  
7 Apold, and I am here today on behalf of the American  
8 College of Nurse Practitioners, or ACNP.

9 ACNP represents thousands of nurse  
10 practitioners, or NPs, across the nation, and is  
11 dedicated to improving access to quality health care  
12 across the life span.

13 As President of ACNP, together with our state  
14 and national affiliates, I would like to join with my  
15 colleagues in thanking the Federal Trade Commission and  
16 the Department of Justice for holding these hearings this  
17 morning. I know putting a national dialog to the many  
18 barriers to practice experienced by nurse practitioners  
19 and other qualified health care professionals.

20 Today, an individual who chooses a career as a  
21 nurse practitioner must be a registered nurse with a  
22 bachelor's degree and a master's degree who has  
23 successfully passed a national certification examination.  
24 These standardized tests are administered by such  
25 organizations as the American Nurse Credentialing Center



1 and the National Certification Board of Pediatric Nurse  
2 Practitioners and Nurses, which are recognized by the  
3 nursing and medical communities, as well as, by the  
4 Medicare program as a measure of an NP's competence.

5 Graduate NP programs require students to  
6 complete advanced didactic study, as well as, clinical  
7 clerkships, conduct research and defend a thesis.  
8 Further, some nurse practitioners, like myself, complete  
9 doctoral study and, in addition to maintaining a  
10 practice, serve as professors in collegic schools of  
11 nursing and medical schools across the nation.

12 NP's are prepared to provide primary health  
13 care and a range of specialty care services to  
14 individuals of all ages. Specialty practice areas  
15 include geriatrics, pediatrics and family medicine. NP's  
16 practice in every site of service, including office and  
17 clinic settings, hospitals, long term care facilities,  
18 hospitals, ambulatory surgery centers, school based  
19 clinics and prisons and across all socio-economic  
20 classifications.

21 For decades, many NP's have been the central,  
22 if not the only, health care providers willing to serve  
23 many areas in rural and frontier American and in some of  
24 the most disadvantaged urban communities in the country.

25 NP's derive their legal authority to practice

1 through state practice acts and licensure. These laws  
2 and regulations set forth NP's scope of practice and  
3 prescriptive authority.

4 NP's hold an independent license. This means  
5 that we do not derive our authority to practice through a  
6 delegation of duties from a physician. This reality  
7 differentiates us from our physician assistant colleagues  
8 who practice under the supervision of a physician and  
9 derive their authority to practice from their supervising  
10 physician's license.

11 This independent license means that if NP's  
12 practice, outside their scope of authority, we are at  
13 risk of both administrative and legal action. We are at  
14 risk, not the physician.

15 Currently, 25 states permit NP's to diagnose  
16 and treat independently. Meaning without any physician  
17 collaboration, direction or supervision. In 13 of the 25  
18 states, NP's also prescribe, including controlled  
19 substances, independent of physician involvement.

20 Another one third of the states require that  
21 NP's maintain a collaborative relationship with a  
22 physician. Collaboration means that the physician be  
23 available for consultation, not that the NP must be  
24 employed or supervised by the physician.

25 Frequently, physicians provide these services

1 through independent, contractor arrangements with nurse  
2 practitioners. The remainder of the states require some  
3 level of physician involvement, or involvement by the  
4 State Board of Medicine, in the regulation of NP  
5 practice. There are currently approximately 100,000  
6 nurse practitioners in the United States.

7 And, from here on in, I can join my comments  
8 with my nurse midwife and dental hygiene colleagues.

9 Growing competition from nurse practitioners  
10 does without doubt, put pressure on physicians to be more  
11 cost conscious and to respond to consumer's desire for a  
12 more holistic model of health care. Empiric evidence  
13 reveals that NP's provide high quality, cost effective  
14 care that results in patient outcomes that equal, and  
15 sometimes exceed, those reported for physicians.

16 Horrocks, Anderson and Salisbury, in the  
17 British Medical Journal, found that, I quote, "Patients  
18 were more satisfied with care by a nurse practitioner,"  
19 unquote. And that, quote, "No differences in health  
20 status were found."

21 Furthermore, NP care and management of patients  
22 with certain chronic illnesses have been shown to lead to  
23 fewer hospitalizations and the need for less costly acute  
24 intervention. In 2000, Mundinger et al, reported in the  
25 Journal of the American Medical Association that outcomes

1       for diabetic and asthmatic patients were equal for  
2       physicians and nurse practitioners, while hypertensive  
3       patients, managed by a nurse practitioner, had  
4       statistically significantly lower diastolic blood  
5       pressure readings. Lower diastolic blood pressures are  
6       linked to reductions in heart attacks, heart failure and  
7       strokes.

8               Additionally, the literature reflects that  
9       nurse practitioners have improved outcomes, maintained  
10      quality and decreased costs in patients with heart  
11      failure, in geriatric populations, in emergency rooms and  
12      in infants in neonatal intensive care units throughout  
13      this nation.

14             Nurse practitioners have been studied for 35  
15      years. Our quality has not been questioned by the data.  
16      I present these facts not to challenge the need for  
17      physicians and physician services, but to compel us all  
18      to rethink whether preconceived notions and the opinion  
19      of physician organizations that only physicians may  
20      direct care leads to mis-allocated resources and waste in  
21      a system bleeding our economy.

22             In 1993 alone, it was estimated that annual  
23      lost cost savings to the health care system, from the  
24      failure to use NP's to their full potential, was between  
25      \$6.4 billion and \$8.75 billion. Can or should our system

1 continue to lose an opportunity to invest these lost  
2 dollars in other, much needed health services over what  
3 amounts to arbitrary barriers to practice? The ACNP  
4 believes we are all dis-served by allowing the current  
5 state of affairs to continue.

6 In preparation for this testimony, in addition  
7 to looking at the literature, we spoke to our membership.  
8 Over 500 nurse practitioners responded to a call for  
9 discussion of barriers to practice for nurse  
10 practitioners. Our members reported three predominant  
11 barriers. First, restrictions on reimbursement and  
12 impanelment on NP's by private, third party payers,  
13 limiting laws and regulations and narrow privileges in a  
14 hospital setting.

15 Lack of direct, third party reimbursement for  
16 NP services and refusal by managed care organizations, or  
17 MCO's to impanel NP's, is one of the most frequently  
18 sighted barriers to independent NP practice. Our members  
19 report that it is a matter of routine for many MCO's to  
20 encourage patients to visit physicians rather than NP's.  
21 To limit payment for particular services considered to be  
22 within the scope of NP training. Or to limit all access  
23 to NP's completely by refusing to credential or reimburse  
24 for NP services.

25 For example, members have detailed instances

1 where MCO's have advised NP's to apply for provider  
2 status or to send credentialing information, but never  
3 respond to those applications. Others report that MCO's  
4 have told them, just go ahead and bill for your services  
5 under a physician's name. In other instances, MCO's  
6 refused to pay for durable medical equipment, clinical  
7 laboratory tests or prescriptions arising from an NP  
8 order, even when those orders are within the NP's legal  
9 scope of practice and the NP serves as the primary care  
10 provider for a patient.

11 I had an interesting experience with this when  
12 my orders for radiology exams were denied by a radiology  
13 service because they required my collaborating physician  
14 to have his name on the order. My collaborating  
15 physician contacted the agency and said he understood  
16 perfectly why my name needed to be on there. But in the  
17 future, he would not utilize the services of that agency.  
18 Within two hours, the agency's requirement that his name  
19 appear on the orders was dropped.

20 Third party payers require the NP to submit the  
21 claim under the name of the physician or require the  
22 order to be signed by a doctor. This places enormous  
23 hardship on these NP's and for the patients who have  
24 chosen them to be their health care provider.

25 Furthermore, such a system can lead to delays

1 and mis-communications when results are reported back to  
2 the physician rather than to the NP who was treating the  
3 patient and who needs the information.

4 When candid, third party payers have sighted a  
5 number of reasons for not recognizing NP's fully. I list  
6 four this morning. First, lack of understanding of NP  
7 educational requirements for entry into practice. Next,  
8 increased administrative effort to discern variation in  
9 state laws governing practice and prescriptive authority.  
10 Third, failure to take the time to develop a program for  
11 credentialing NP's. And finally, concern that physicians  
12 may boycott their panels if they include NP's.

13 ACNP finds the first three without any  
14 particular persuasiveness, given that the Medicare  
15 program and some third party payers, have managed to  
16 develop systems for including access to NP's within their  
17 plans, as well as, direct reimbursement to NP's for their  
18 services.

19 Furthermore, we have had members offer to  
20 assist insurers in developing credentialing guidelines  
21 and policies regarding scope of practice or to serve on  
22 their credentialing or quality committees. Yet, insurers  
23 generally disregard these offers. Our membership does  
24 not believe that it is a coincidence that physicians are  
25 major players on Boards of Directors of many of the

1 managed care companies.

2 Inequitable or unwarranted laws and regulations  
3 at both the state and federal levels, serve as immense  
4 barriers to NP entry into the market. At the state  
5 level, variation in state practice acts and prescriptive  
6 authority interfere significantly with the ability of  
7 NP's to contribute to our health care system to the  
8 extent for which we are trained and prepared. It is  
9 frustrating that these differences and laws and  
10 regulations are not based on science or patient outcomes,  
11 but rather are the byproducts of political maneuvering,  
12 often by the organized medical community.

13 It is not surprising to learn the barriers to  
14 NP practice generally are more oppressive in states with  
15 the strongest state medical associations. The American  
16 Medical Association has, unfortunately, made it clear to  
17 the physician community at large that every effort must  
18 be made to block or interfere with NP autonomy and  
19 reimbursement parity. These anticompetitive efforts  
20 include lobbying to defeat legislation granting NP's  
21 independence and instilling the public sector with  
22 misleading information regarding non-physicians.

23 In an article appearing on the AMA website, the  
24 organization sets forth its two pronged strategy for  
25 dealing with legislation which is favorable to physician,



1 to non-physician practitioners. First, and I quote,  
2 "Spend money. Lobby hard. And work with national  
3 medical associations and take the approach of: See the  
4 bill? Kill the bill." End of quote.

5 The second option is to, quote, "Negotiate with  
6 the opposition to get the best possible deal." End of  
7 quote.

8 Although the AMA generally cloaks its arguments  
9 in concern for the public. Statements, such as that  
10 issued after the AMA House of Delegates meeting in  
11 January of 2001, reveal the true motivation. Quote, "We  
12 are faced with non-physicians extending their practice to  
13 where they should not be." End of quote.

14 Organized medicine also attempts to drive a  
15 negative public opinion about the capability of NP's  
16 through misleading public comments and policy statements  
17 that state incorrectly that physicians delegate duties to  
18 NP's and that physicians must supervise NP's. Both fly  
19 in the face of the state of the law across the majority  
20 of the country today. Yet the unknowing reader, or  
21 recipient of this information, including law makers and  
22 private payers, are influenced by these statements.

23 I know that you will be considering the Noerr-  
24 Pennington Doctrine and its exceptions tomorrow. I urge  
25 you to consider the very negative and manipulative

1 efforts, such orchestrated campaigns of deception have on  
2 consumers. I question why such propaganda should be  
3 tolerated.

4 By way of illustration, in February the  
5 American Academy of Pediatrics issued a policy statement  
6 called Scope of Practice Issues in the Delivery of  
7 Pediatric Health Care in which the AAP asserts that the  
8 pediatrician must oversee the pediatric health care team  
9 and delegate patient care responsibilities to NP's and  
10 supervise the NP. AAP goes on to state that the care  
11 provided by NP's is second tier and compromises the  
12 quality of health care that should be available to all  
13 pediatric patients.

14 The AMA issued an equally troubling and  
15 deceptive policy statement in April. These and other  
16 similar statements seem to be calculated to dissuade  
17 patients and third party payers from relying on NP's  
18 unless, of course, the NP is under a physician's control  
19 and the physician is permitted to be reimbursed for the  
20 NP services.

21 Although ACNP acknowledges the leadership of  
22 the federal governments in recognizing NP services, there  
23 is room for improvement. There are existing federal laws  
24 and regulations that impede NP practice, as well. One of  
25 the most common frustrations that we hear from our

1 members is the inability of NP's to certify and recertify  
2 for home health care services. Under the Social Security  
3 Act, in order for a home health agency to receive payment  
4 for services by Medicare a physician must certify or  
5 initiate those services on behalf of the beneficiary. In  
6 some cases, the certifying physician, who does not have a  
7 relationship with the patient, relies upon the input of  
8 the nurse practitioner in certifying a Medicare  
9 beneficiary for home health.

10 The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 authorized NP's  
11 to develop a plan of care for home care patients but  
12 overlooked initiation of this care. ACNP finds this  
13 inconsistency and encourages legislative action to  
14 correct this problem.

15 A major concern stemming from federal  
16 legislation in Medicare and some private payers, an  
17 equitable reimbursement system of paying NP's 85 percent  
18 of the reimbursement rate, paid to physicians. In the  
19 Medicare context the Balanced Budget Act of 1997  
20 authorized NP's to bill directly to the program  
21 regardless of geographic location. Since then,  
22 increasing numbers of NP's have obtained their own  
23 provider numbers and have billed directly rather than  
24 incident to a physician. These NP's, however, are being  
25 asked to provide the same level of service, which they

1       should and do, but get paid less for identical services  
2       even though NP's incur the same practice expense costs  
3       for delivering these services.

4               Given that physicians are arguing that they are  
5       having difficulty maintaining a practice when receiving  
6       100 percent of the fee schedule payment, you can  
7       understand that it is even that much more difficult for  
8       NP's to enter and continue in the market. As a result,  
9       the many benefits of NP's, including increasing provider  
10      access for patients, are being jeopardized without  
11      legitimate reason.

12             Finally, our members have expressed their  
13      repeated concern with narrow privileges in the hospital  
14      setting. As in the case of MCO's, hospitals also claim  
15      to be confused as to how to credential NP's and the NP's  
16      scope of practice and concern as a medical staff  
17      reaction. Yet, even after NP's make the effort to  
18      respond to such concerns, institutions still refuse to  
19      grant privileges or grant very narrow privileges.

20             Our feedback indicates that some hospitals  
21      refuse to schedule patients for testing or for outpatient  
22      laboratories unless a physician's name is on the order.  
23      One NP reported that, quote, "On several occasions I have  
24      had abnormal mammogram results sent to my collaborating  
25      physician's office and his staff sends them back not

1 knowing who the patient belongs to. I have had the  
2 experience of my patient receiving the results before I  
3 do."

4 Another NP stated that her involvement with a  
5 hospital affiliated, urgent care clinic nearly doubled  
6 the number of patients the clinic was able to accommodate  
7 per day. In addition, a survey of clinic patients  
8 revealed increased satisfaction with the clinic services  
9 that were directly attributable to her.

10 In spite of these positive changes for the  
11 hospital and the dramatic improvement in access to care  
12 for patients have requests to be listed on the referral  
13 page for the clinic and in the provider director were  
14 denied.

15 In closing, NP's face many barriers to  
16 practice. All of which do a disservice to the health  
17 care system and the patients that we serve. Nurse  
18 practitioners deliver quality, cost effective health care  
19 within our prescribed scope of practice as determined by  
20 law. We endeavor to be accepted as equal members of the  
21 health care team, bringing to health care the unique  
22 perspective of a nursing background.

23 Nurse practitioners have earned the right to  
24 professional autonomy in the form of independent practice  
25 and direct reimbursement for the vital service that we

1 render.

2 ACNP is hopeful that as greater attention is  
3 given to these issues, many of the arbitrary barriers  
4 will be removed and an equitable balance will be found to  
5 achieve the goal of improving access to quality, cost  
6 efficient care to patients across the United States.

7 Thank you.

8 (Applause.)

9 DR. HYMAN: Okay. We've got about 20 minutes  
10 for discussion. Our general practice is to ask earlier  
11 speakers whether they wanted to dispute or comment on  
12 anything they heard subsequently since the subsequent  
13 speakers heard the initial speakers first.

14 So, Tom, did you want to say anything? I mean,  
15 or, I'm sorry, Professor Kleiner, first in order but not  
16 in presence.

17 MR. KLEINER: I, I have nothing other than if  
18 there are questions for me, would be glad to address them  
19 in terms of the overall effects of licensing on both  
20 practitioners and/or consumers. We'd be glad to answer  
21 any questions along those lines.

22 DR. HYMAN: Okay. Tom, do you have anything  
23 you'd like to add to what you said already?

24 MR. PIPER: I think probably the only things  
25 that I would add to what I said earlier was that when we

1 look at government oversight of health care services, I  
2 think it's important that when we talk about competition  
3 and differentiate it from other kinds of competition, you  
4 have to keep in mind that over half of the revenue that  
5 goes into health care services comes from public sources.  
6 Whether we're talking about Medicare, Medicaid, cash  
7 grants, other kinds of, of revenue that government really  
8 has a responsibility, whether it's state or federal, in  
9 order to monitor those to try to assure that the money is  
10 being used efficiently, effectively, and toward is higher  
11 quality service as possible.

12 And I certainly compliment Mr. Hennessy in his  
13 presentation in, in pointing out the quest for, for  
14 quality. And, but I think first and foremost,  
15 Certificate of Need agencies represent the interest of  
16 the consumers. And we are very concerned about  
17 providers' positions, but first we want to see what the  
18 impact is on consumers.

19 But I'd also like to compliment the  
20 presentations on dental hygiene and on nurse  
21 practitioners because, having employed both in prior  
22 lives and in Iowa, I found that it was some of the  
23 highest quality services and most responsive to patient  
24 needs that we were able to provide.

25 Thank you.

1 DR. HYMAN: Do you want to add anything or?

2 MS. BYRD: I'd, I'd just like to add that in  
3 dentistry is not mostly publicly funded. Dentistry, at  
4 this point in time, is mainly privately funded and very  
5 little public funding does go toward dentistry. So  
6 that's part of the problem is because dentistry has  
7 become inaccessible to individuals who cannot afford to  
8 pay out of pocket or have private insurance. So that  
9 affects it.

10 And as far as licensing goes, dental hygiene  
11 has reciprocity in most states and can move from state to  
12 state after national licensure. Whereas, dentistry does  
13 not. It's restricted and in most states is not allowed.

14 MS. LOEFFLER: Actually, I had a question for  
15 Mr. Piper.

16 MR. PIPER: Yes.

17 MS. LOEFFLER: I was interest in seeing the  
18 results of the studies from the auto makers concerning  
19 Certificate of Need but I didn't really see what the  
20 theory of causation was so I wondered what variables were  
21 controlled for in, in coming to the conclusion that  
22 whether or not a state had Certificate of Need had any  
23 impact on the cost of health care in that state?

24 MR. PIPER: Not having conducted those studies,  
25 I don't know all the causal factors went into it either.



1       What I do know is that they took actual cost in, in  
2       health benefits' programs that were very equalized  
3       between the states and looked at their bottom line, which  
4       is what business tends to do the most. They feel, and I,  
5       I believe that in speaking of Ford, in particular, that  
6       they spoke to the causal factors, were somewhat critical  
7       of other studies in saying that they had not taken them  
8       all into effect. But I would tell you that I do not have  
9       that information.

10               On the other hand, looking at other studies  
11       such as those done by the University of Iowa, in looking  
12       at lower mortality rates and, and the affect of cost.  
13       But particularly mortality rates, what they had looked at  
14       there, in it was an, an excellent study of all states, of  
15       over 900,000 people in order to look at the factors that  
16       really had to do with volume. And more than any other  
17       item, volume had to do with proficiency. It often is  
18       said the more you do the better you do is an ultra-  
19       simplification but it is, is a, is a well-held principle  
20       in medicine that proficiency is based upon the quantity  
21       with which you do. So higher quantity leads to higher  
22       quality.

23               MR. HENNESSY: Two thoughts, one I was going to  
24       actually take Tom's comment and, although, we may  
25       disagree about whether government should be rationed or,

1 or act as an oversight, government does have a very  
2 strong interest in health care even beyond Medicare and  
3 Medicaid. Remember, that most premiums in this country  
4 are pre-taxed. So, it essentially is subsidized by tax  
5 dollars and even a lot of dental premium is, is  
6 subsidized in that fashion.

7 The other thought I'd share is on, regarding  
8 the nurse practitioners. We have found managed care to  
9 be a tremendous obstacle for, for nurse practitioners.  
10 We had one plan that actually said we, you, your nurse  
11 practitioners can't see our patients. And we said, well,  
12 nurse practitioners can see all of our patients and if  
13 you want the same level of care the rest of our patients  
14 have you will allow them to see nurse practitioners.

15 And, to one of your points, we actually looked  
16 at the effect of nurse practitioners in the first year of  
17 our practice and we looked at increase in urgent care  
18 visits. And while the cost of the visits was \$900,000  
19 more than it had been the prior year, we saved \$1.8  
20 million in unnecessary hospitalizations. So, very good  
21 data suggesting that, that works and we're challenged,  
22 like you are, to expand the role of the nurse  
23 practitioners in our office.

24 MS. APOLD: And that's important data to keep  
25 in mind because prevention is what saves the dollars

1 ultimately.

2 MS. PRICE: Well, I wonder if Mr. Piper has  
3 any, you know, from our perspective in Vermont, and we're  
4 talking again home nursing, when there's no dollar cost,  
5 it's a service, and if it's Medicare or Medicaid, it's a  
6 fixed price repayment from your state or federal tax  
7 dollars. What would the CON reason be to restrict  
8 competition in the industry, which merely serves  
9 consumers and keeps them out of a hospital?

10 MR. PIPER: Home health is, is a broadly  
11 debated service as to whether it should or should not be  
12 regulated under Certificate of Need at all. In Missouri,  
13 we have never regulated home health. Yet, in our  
14 Arkansas, directly south of us, they have done it for a  
15 very long time. That's one of the few services it  
16 regulates.

17 What we have found was that in looking at home  
18 health it is often a balance, and you pointed this out in  
19 your presentation, between home health residential,  
20 assisted living, nursing home care or even higher levels  
21 of acute care as various alternatives. And I think that  
22 as you look at that, what I would call a continuum of  
23 care, that that is, is a under, a valued principle. That  
24 is something that I hoped that the FTC and the Department  
25 of Justice and, and any state that looks at this, needs

1 to take into account a balancing of all of the possible  
2 alternatives for care for that particular population,  
3 whether is a disabled population or an elderly population  
4 or otherwise, it could be eligible for that kind of care.

5 As in looking at payment mechanisms for  
6 Medicare and Medicaid, yes it is a fixed rate, but even  
7 the fixed rate is based upon cost. And, and I think it  
8 is unfortunate, although I'm not specifically familiar  
9 with the Vermont situation, you do need to have multiple  
10 practitioners in, in order to make comparative studies.  
11 And if you only have one, it doesn't sound right. But --

12 MS. PRICE: Tom, do you know of any state in  
13 the country that limits physicians by CON, that would  
14 require physicians to get a CON anywhere in the country?

15 MR. PIPER: I am familiar that in West  
16 Virginia, as an example, which a largely rural state,  
17 that yes, they do require getting the Certificate of Need  
18 to establish many of their practices. I believe there  
19 are a handful of other states. It is not a, a broad  
20 precept, though.

21 MS. PRICE: Thank you.

22 MS. APOLD: I just have an additional comment.  
23 I think it bears repeating that my dental hygiene and  
24 certified nurse midwifery colleagues identify the reality  
25 that the battle cry for anticompetitive behavior is

1 always one of quality. And yet there are no data to  
2 support that dental hygienists, nurse midwives or nurse  
3 practitioners provide a lower level of care or  
4 substandard care. In fact, as mentioned by my nurse  
5 midwife colleague, the data fly in the fact of that.  
6 And, in fact, indicate that our care is good and, in many  
7 instances, provides a type of care that is missing from  
8 the health care system that we have today.

9 And I think that it's important that that be  
10 heard by the public because of the carefully orchestrated  
11 campaign to limit public access to the types of care that  
12 we provide.

13 DR. HYMAN: Okay. Let me start with just a  
14 quick question for Professor Wilson and then I have a  
15 bunch of questions for other people as we have time to  
16 cover them.

17 The, the data that you showed suggested that if  
18 you ask women, a substantial majority, depending upon the  
19 context, will consent, and I guess you can run the  
20 question two different ways. If they're going to consent  
21 anyway, why bother? Would be the sort of pragmatic,  
22 liberty ignoring approach to the issue.

23 Or alternatively, if you asked them and they  
24 don't consent then what happens to medical education? So  
25 I guess I'd just like to ask you to address both prongs

1 of that inquiry.

2 MS. WILSON: Well, I think with respect to the  
3 first prong, that the idea of discarding consent in this  
4 context flies in the face, and to use another colleague's  
5 term, 30 years of biomedical ethics where we have, we  
6 have cast aside paternalism and we have returned to  
7 patients that autonomy to decide what would happen with  
8 their bodies. And so, I just think it just fundamentally  
9 doesn't fit with what, what else we've done in, in  
10 medicine.

11 With respect to the ability to train though, I  
12 think that you have to look very carefully at both the  
13 raw numbers of people who are willing to consent. And I  
14 think you also have to look at the absolute need in the  
15 medical school years to teach certain things.

16 There certainly is a possibility to shift  
17 things that we might otherwise want to expose people to  
18 in the medical school years, to training in the  
19 internship in residency years where people have already  
20 become committed to a path to become a certain type of  
21 physician. It may be that some medical students who are  
22 being exposed to things, because we want to give as much  
23 exposure as we can, even in a context where we ask, could  
24 still be exposed to those things, but later, after  
25 they've committed to a path, to actually become an OBGYN.

1       So, I think it's a, a richer, more complex question than  
2       just raw numbers.

3               So, I think we also have to be more willing.  
4       If those numbers decrease, perhaps to move things out of  
5       the MD years into the internship for the residency years.

6               DR. HYMAN: Okay. The next question is for the  
7       various provider representatives on the panel. And we've  
8       heard a variety of elements, if you will, that seem to be  
9       driving difficulties. And in no particular order,  
10      licensure/CON seems to be on of them. But there's also  
11      credentialing at a local institution. There's also  
12      liability, in terms of the availability of insurance.  
13      And the risk of liability independent of that. And  
14      there's also reimbursement, the ability to get into  
15      panels, the ability to get compensated on a level  
16      commensurate with services that you're providing.

17              So just in terms of comparative magnitude of  
18      those things. And if I'm missing something, please feel  
19      free to add it. I'm just trying to get a sense of  
20      prioritization. Which are the bigger problems, which are  
21      the problems that are there but are less significant.  
22      What's the low hanging fruit is probably the sort of  
23      management speak version of this.

24              So, Tammi, let me start with you.

25              MS. BYRD: I think, for dental hygiene, direct

1 reimbursement is a crucial factor. One thing dentistry  
2 tends to practice in private practices across the United  
3 States. And what has happened, because of the shortage  
4 of dentists in the United States, the people that are  
5 suffering the most are our elderly and our  
6 underprivileged and our school children who don't have  
7 access to offices on Monday through Thursday from eight  
8 to five.

9 If dental hygienists, and if you look at the  
10 criteria, most dental hygienists who are practicing  
11 independently in the United States are practicing in  
12 areas of home health and assisted living areas in school  
13 based program. They're practicing in areas that are  
14 undeserved yet we have no ability to be reimbursed. And  
15 so it makes it really hard for a practitioner to be in  
16 these areas. And it limits the access.

17 So, I would have to say from a dental hygiene  
18 prospective, direct reimbursement has to be one of the  
19 number things.

20 MS. LOEFFLER: I would say for nurse midwives  
21 that credentialing is the number one problem because if  
22 you aren't credentialed and can't practice then you don't  
23 need to bill anybody.

24 Billing and reimbursement are certainly  
25 secondary issues. But 99 percent of the women in this



1 culture choose to have their babies in the hospital. So,  
2 if we cannot practice in the hospitals, then we can't  
3 serve those women.

4 The problems with reimbursement, partially have  
5 to do with the 65 percent Medicare issue because many  
6 private insurers also tend to follow that. And also  
7 getting listed, as my nurse practitioner colleague was  
8 saying, on provider panels so that you have some  
9 visibility in the marketplace. If you're not in the  
10 directory you don't exist. No one's going to call your  
11 office.

12 MR. HENNESSY: For us it's entirely a CON  
13 issue. We, where there's no CON in Kansas, we build  
14 facilities and get them up and running fairly quickly.  
15 On the Missouri side we, we can't do it.

16 From a liability standpoint, that's a business  
17 decision. We can buy liability insurance. It maybe more  
18 expensive but it's a business decision. Reimbursement,  
19 we're fortunate, even though we have, we have physicians,  
20 we have nurse practitioners and other folks, you know,  
21 it's a business decision whether we can get reimbursed or  
22 not.

23 Credentialing, again, is a business decision.  
24 So, CON is, is the sole barrier for us in terms of, you  
25 know, enhancing the cancer care we provide on the

1 Missouri side of the state line.

2 MS. PRICE: Speaking for Professional Nurses  
3 Service in Vermont, it is again solely a CON issue. We  
4 could, we at one point had JCAHO accreditation with  
5 deemed status which is the equivalent of Medicare  
6 certification. And yet even with that in place and  
7 training nursing assistants for other providers including  
8 VAHA statewide, once those nursing assistants want to  
9 work for Professional Nurses Service, they cannot  
10 activate their skill level.

11 So, while you can get your blood pressure taken  
12 at any pharmacy or order the machine through the QVC  
13 channel, or whatever, our nursing assistants cannot do  
14 that. And the barrier for us is strictly legislative and  
15 really regulatory at this point.

16 MS. APOLD: It's very hard to pick the low  
17 hanging fruit because all of those issues are intertwined  
18 for us in the nurse practitioner community. But if I had  
19 to pick the most important I would say reimbursement  
20 because it's sort of the umbrella issue. And it's  
21 important to note that reimbursement, certainly, is  
22 fundamental to our existence but it's not just about  
23 getting paid for our services. It's also about  
24 visibility. It's also about our contribution to the  
25 health care system. As long as I am told, just go ahead

1 and bill it under Dr. Smith's number, I don't appear  
2 anywhere. I do not exist. And it is very difficult to  
3 advance your profession to let consumers know who you  
4 are, not the consumers, let me take that back. They do  
5 know who we are. They're very clear about who we are.

6 But about the health care community in general.  
7 It's difficult for them to know what we do and the  
8 services that we can provide because we're hidden behind  
9 this invisible cloak. And the excellence that we provide  
10 completely becomes subsumed under another provider's  
11 number because of the inconvenience, the concern, the  
12 concern for boycotts from other professional communities  
13 that the managed care companies have.

14 MS. BYRD: I'd just like to add our case in  
15 South Carolina, what has happened is legislation has  
16 passed the Dental Association and the Board put in  
17 legislation that says that the individual that is billing  
18 for services actually is the clinical provider of the  
19 services. And the dental hygienist is the clinical  
20 provider of the services. We actually are licensed and  
21 regulated and therefore should be considered the clinical  
22 provider for those services but we are having to utilize  
23 a dentist to bill for the services.

24 This is put in as a measure to try to inhibit  
25 dentists from participating with us because of some

1 liability. Yet there are -- our law requires us to have  
2 professional liability insurance and there are no changes  
3 in liability no matter whether we are supervised or not  
4 supervised. So it's been put in as a barrier, this  
5 particular issue.

6 DR. HYMAN: This is a questions for Professor  
7 Kleiner and it builds off of a comment Ms. Byrd made,  
8 which you identified some of the difficulties you are  
9 having in South Carolina with the licensing board. And  
10 the suggestion that I had heard was we need a separate  
11 board made up of dental hygienists in order to regulate  
12 and not be subject to the difficulties by having dental  
13 domination on that board.

14 And so, I guess Professor Kleiner, given your  
15 skepticism about all licensure, I'd be interested in your  
16 comments on that proposal and how you might balance the  
17 procompetitive consequences from a dental-hygienist-only  
18 board without dentists, but limit the potential risks  
19 from a dental-hygienist-dominated board.

20 MR. KLEINER: Well, I think you raised an  
21 important point. And let me just briefly comment on the  
22 issue of which of these issues are important.

23 Certainly, from the employee's prospective, the  
24 fact that licensing has grown so dramatically over the  
25 last 50 years suggests that licensing, in general, is an

1 area that a lot of occupations see as a way to provide  
2 professionalism on the one hand. But also to restrict  
3 entry and increase earnings and status within the  
4 occupation. And, certainly, if you follow the trends  
5 over the last 50 years it is in the area of the greatest  
6 labor market regulation.

7 To answer your question regarding having only  
8 members of the occupation as, as members or as  
9 determining who can be licensed and who can get in and  
10 who can't, there's been a movement in a number of states  
11 including California, my own State of Minnesota and  
12 Virginia to have public members on these boards.

13 And, one additional issue is that that the  
14 occupations have, have gone to the legislature and said,  
15 look, this is a cheap way for you to regulate an  
16 occupation and the occupation itself will pay for it  
17 through additional fees. Another question to ask the  
18 State is if it's so important for public interest, that  
19 public funds should be used to support these regulatory  
20 boards, which would suggest not only members of the  
21 occupation, it can provide professional expertise on what  
22 it takes to do the work. But also members of the public  
23 who can provide a public consumer patient perspective on  
24 what are the benefits and costs of either becoming  
25 regulated or additional standards that might be imposed

1 by the boards.

2 DR. HYMAN: Does anybody want to comment on  
3 that proposal.

4 MS. BYRD: I will. Dental hygiene does not  
5 necessarily want strictly a dental hygiene board. We  
6 welcome consumer members on board. However, what  
7 happened in South Carolina by being dominated by a dental  
8 board that employs dental hygienists, that is what set an  
9 emergency regulation up with a loophole, I guess you  
10 would say. I guess it's there for emergency purposes.  
11 But for a board to wait for the Legislature to recess and  
12 a few days later implement an emergency regulation  
13 claiming that lives were being endangered by cleaning a  
14 child's teeth without an exam by a dentist is something  
15 that if dental hygiene was not regulated by our  
16 employers, that type of emergency regulation could not  
17 have been put in place. Thereby keeping children from  
18 receiving services for six months, costing an  
19 astronomical amount of money and costing the state an  
20 extra quarter million dollars.

21 DR. HYMAN: Tom.

22 MR. PIPER: David, I think one of the  
23 overriding principles and all the things we're talking  
24 about is a difficulty in regulation of being able to talk  
25 about what should be because too often a regulation has

1 to do with what should not be. And one of the great  
2 criticisms I would have of many regulatory systems, and  
3 certificates aren't even included, is that too often the  
4 state plans, if they exist at all, are insufficient to  
5 talk about where we ought to be going let alone how we  
6 ought to get there. We should be able to anticipate  
7 innovation. We should be able to anticipate broader use  
8 of health care manpower and woman power and the kinds of  
9 disciplines that we could have.

10 We're not helping customers shop. We're not  
11 even helping consumers get the right kind of information.  
12 And I think until we're able to put into the hands of the  
13 common consumer a price list, a way of rating quality for  
14 practitioners and providers, to have standards of access,  
15 to be able to have a community planning model, we're  
16 going to be continually frustrated. And we will always  
17 criticize regulation because it's still about what you  
18 can't do instead of what you can do.

19 DR. HYMAN: Well, on that note I would  
20 encourage the panel and anyone else who wishes to submit  
21 recommendations as to how we should tailor our efforts as  
22 well as how regulations should be tailored in this area.  
23 Just take full advantage of the opportunity to submit  
24 those comments. And we will carefully consider them.

25 I'd like to thank the panel for their

1 thoughtful comments this morning --

2 AUDIENCE: I'd like to make a comment.

3 DR. HYMAN: I'm sorry, we don't accept comments  
4 from the audience.

5 AUDIENCE: I've got a question.

6 DR. HYMAN: We don't accept questions from the  
7 audience, either, as I said at the outset.

8 So, I wish the audience to join me in a round  
9 of applause for the panelists, and thank you very much.

10 (Applause.)

11 (Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., a lunch recess was  
12 taken.)

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## 1 A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N

2 DR. HYMAN: Welcome back to the afternoon  
3 session of the joint hearings held by the Federal Trade  
4 Commission and the Department of Justice on Health Care  
5 and Competition, Law and Policy. This is part of a  
6 multi-month process of holding hearings on a variety of  
7 issues relating to the performance of the health care  
8 markets, including testimony from a wide array of  
9 distinguished panelists and commentators.

10 We are lucky to have a very distinguished panel  
11 this afternoon with us. We've actually copied and bound  
12 short bios for each of the speakers today in a document  
13 that's outside. We could easily use up all of our time  
14 simply recounting the exploits of everyone who's going to  
15 be speaking today. And rather than do that, our rule is  
16 everybody gets a one sentence introduction and you can  
17 read about them.

18 So, the order in which people are going to  
19 speak is sort of left to right. As you see at the table,  
20 there's no one there. That's not because there are no  
21 speakers here. It's because we have some Power Point  
22 presentations and it's easier for people to see it if  
23 they're seated out in the audience. After everybody's  
24 had a chance to speak, we will then convene the panel and  
25 in the time remaining, which will hopefully be about 25

1 minutes or so, we'll have a roundtable discussion of the  
2 issues that we'll be discussing this afternoon.

3 I can please ask everybody to turn off your  
4 cell phones. And I think that was all of the preliminary  
5 introductions. Our first speaker today is Professor  
6 Michael Morrissey, who's a professor of Health Care  
7 Organization and Policy at the University of Alabama.  
8 I'm just going to introduce everybody at once to make  
9 things easier.

10 The second speaker is Professor Gregg Bloche,  
11 who's a professor at Georgetown University School of Law.  
12 He has the record for the shortest commute for the  
13 discussion today because it's right across the street.  
14 Francis Mallon is the Chief Executive Officer for the  
15 American Physical Therapy Association. Steven Lomazow is  
16 here representing -- Dr. Steven Lomazow, excuse me, is  
17 here representing the American Academy of Neurology. He  
18 is a practicing neurologist from New Jersey. Dr. Russ  
19 Newman is a psychologist and the Executive Director for  
20 Professional Practice for the American Psychological  
21 Association. Dr. Jerome Modell is here representing the  
22 American Society of Anesthesiologists and he's a  
23 Professor Emeritus at the University of Florida, College  
24 of Medicine. And then batting clean up, Jeffrey Bauer,  
25 who's a futurist and a medical economist studying the

1 evolution of the health care system.

2 So, first, Professor Morrissey.

3 MR. MORRISSEY: Thank you, David. I'm delighted  
4 to be here. I am a health economist in the School of  
5 Public Health at the University of Alabama at Birmingham,  
6 and I'm the Director of the -- Center for Health Policy.  
7 I'm here speaking in my private capacity.

8 What I'd like to do is spend a little bit of  
9 time talking about certificate of need with respect  
10 mostly to hospitals because that's where the research  
11 literature lies, tell you a little bit about some new  
12 work that's been done looking at the certificate of need  
13 in nursing home markets. And then spend the remainder of  
14 my time looking at any willing provider and freedom of  
15 choice laws all in the context of various entry.

16 As was discussed this morning, certificate of  
17 need programs were established in the '70s to help  
18 control health care costs. Hospitals, nursing homes and  
19 other providers were required to obtain state approval to  
20 open or to expand a facility. At its peak, all states,  
21 except Louisiana, had a CON Program. And according to  
22 the American Health Planning Association, in 2002 some 36  
23 states plus the District of Columbia still had some form  
24 of certificate of need.

25 The rationale for CON is that health care

1 providers typically in the early days were paid on a cost  
2 based basis and any new facility was essentially paid  
3 for, essentially received the cost that it incurred under  
4 cost based reimbursement from Medicare, Medicaid and,  
5 indeed, private payers. Non-priced competition in the  
6 form of services, amenities, quality led providers to  
7 expand services and arguably led to duplication of  
8 services. So as a consequence, certificate of need would  
9 control costs by preventing this duplication of services.

10 In a standard economic model, CON would be  
11 viewed as a barrier to entry. It artificially restricts  
12 the supply of a particular health care service and would  
13 allow current providers to charge higher prices.  
14 Providers would be expected to devote resources to obtain  
15 a CON franchise and to do all they could to keep their  
16 competitors from offering similar services.

17 The proponents of CON tend to argue that health  
18 care markets are not price competitive. And as a  
19 consequence, this regulation of supply is necessary to  
20 control cost. CON opponents argue the health care  
21 markets are priced competitively, that CON franchise  
22 allows the providers to charge higher prices and that an  
23 increase in price competition would lead to greater  
24 demand for CON franchises or indeed for a greater  
25 barriers to entry.

1           So the question becomes did CON result in lower  
2 hospital costs. Amongst the health economics community  
3 that has examined this from an academic perspective, the  
4 issue is, in my view, largely resolved. There are a  
5 series of rigorous multi-state econometric studies from  
6 the '70s, the '80s and the '90s that looked at the  
7 effects of CON on hospital costs and concluded that CON  
8 didn't lower costs. In the most recent work, Conover and  
9 Sloan from Duke, concluded that CON repeal had no effect  
10 on hospital cost.

11           And, indeed, there's some evidence that CON, in  
12 fact, raised hospital costs. In some work that we did in  
13 the late '80s, early '90s, trying to control not only for  
14 the other factors going on in the hospital markets, but  
15 also to try to take into consideration why laws were  
16 enacted or kept in place in the states that they were, we  
17 concluded that hospital costs were in the neighborhood of  
18 20 percent higher as a result of Certificate of Need.

19           Did CON advantage existing hospitals? There  
20 have been a series of studies, again, somewhat dated as  
21 of today. But in the academic literature resolving much  
22 of the issue, Monica Noether in the late '80s showed that  
23 hospital costs, and prices were higher the longer CON had  
24 been in effect. McCarthy and Kass argue the greater CON  
25 toughness resulted in smaller investor owned market

1 shares in hospital markets. And some work that I did  
2 with Jeff Alexander concluded that hospitals were less  
3 likely to join multi-hospital systems, less likely to be  
4 contract managed the longer Certificate of Need had been  
5 in effect. In some sense that's a characterization of  
6 having monopoly power, allowing one to live the good  
7 life, at least from the point of view of hospital  
8 administrator.

9 Did CON affect quality? There's two dimensions  
10 of that side of the question that's been examined.  
11 There's some mixed, there will be old evidence on  
12 technology diffusion. Most of those studies have found  
13 no effect of CON on diffusion of technology. It appears  
14 that the market, either by providing services by  
15 unconstrained providers or otherwise have been able to  
16 provide the services.

17 More recent evidence has tried to look at the  
18 effects of CON on mortality. Some early work by Shortell  
19 and Hughes found that CON increased Medicare in hospital  
20 mortality. More recently, Robinson and colleagues found  
21 that the substantial growth in coronary artery bypass  
22 graph programs in Pennsylvania after the repeal of CON  
23 but no effect of that increase on fatalities in the CABG  
24 area. And much more recently in a 2002 paper in the New  
25 England Journal of Medicine, Vaughan-Sarrazin and

1 colleagues found that Medicare CABG mortality rates were  
2 higher in states without CON.

3 The issue, at least amongst economists, with  
4 the mortality literature and the effect of CON is that  
5 the causation can run in two directions. On the one hand  
6 there's the argument that repeated efforts at a  
7 particular procedure makes one better at it. So volume  
8 improves quality. But the causation can run in the other  
9 direction as well in the sense that because I'm an  
10 excellent provider, volume finds its way to me because  
11 I'm known for doing good procedures. And so the  
12 direction of causation isn't all together clear in this  
13 literature.

14 As I say, most of the literature to date has  
15 focused on the hospital market. There has been some  
16 limited work looking at the nursing home market. The  
17 standard model used by economists in looking at nursing  
18 homes is that nursing homes face both a private,  
19 relatively inelastic demand and a perfectly elastic  
20 Medicaid demand. So, they face two markets. Providers  
21 are alleged to price discriminate, charging what the  
22 market will bear in each market. And that Certificate of  
23 Need serves to limit Medicaid expenditures while allowing  
24 private residents to be cared for at market prices.

25 The argument has been that the, one of the, at

1       least, major purposes of Certificate of Need in the  
2       nursing home market is to try to control state Medicaid  
3       nursing home expenditures. So the argument is that  
4       private patients can find placements in nursing homes  
5       paying the market price. And the rest of the home is  
6       filled with residents who are covered under Medicaid.  
7       That there's, at least as this theory is put forward, a  
8       relatively large cohort of folks Medicaid eligible who  
9       could be in a nursing home if there were sufficient beds.  
10      The Certificate of Need Program limits those number of  
11      beds, limiting the expenditures for Medicaid patients and  
12      thereby limiting state Medicaid expenditures.

13               To date there's been no direct evidence linking  
14      Certificate of Need to Medicaid nursing home  
15      expenditures. There have been a series of studies that  
16      have looked at parts of the story. Charlotte Harrington  
17      and colleagues looked at the presence of Certificate of  
18      Need or construction moratorium in the nursing home  
19      market and found that, indeed, CON and the moratoriums  
20      appear to reduce nursing home debt growth. Miller and  
21      colleagues, in a couple of studies, concluded that CON  
22      redirect its spending out of nursing homes into home and  
23      community based services. And that CON had resulted in  
24      higher per capita long term care expenditures.

25               In some undated work, Conover and Sloan,



1        actually in the late '90s, concluded that CON repeal had  
2        no statistically significant effect on Medicaid plus  
3        private nursing home expenditures per capita. So a  
4        suggestion there that CON was not controlling nursing  
5        home costs.

6                In some work that my colleagues and I have  
7        forthcoming inquiry this summer, we look at the effects  
8        of the repeal of Certificate of Need in the nursing home  
9        market focusing on Medicaid nursing home expenditures.  
10       Analyze the data in 1981 through '98, looking exclusively  
11       at Medicaid nursing home expenditures and then at  
12       Medicaid expenditures for nursing homes and long term  
13       care. And we find no statistically significant effects  
14       of CON repeal on Medicaid expenditures.

15               CON may not be binding in the case of nursing  
16       homes and/or it may be that there are now many more  
17       substitutes available in the long term care market. And  
18       to the extent that older adults can now be placed in  
19       assisted living facilities, in foster care and those  
20       sorts of programs. The pressure on the nursing home  
21       market may have changed such that that CON has no longer  
22       the bite that it arguably may have had earlier.

23               So, with respect to CON, what the research  
24       literature tends to conclude is that CON has been  
25       ineffective in controlling hospital costs. It may have

1 raised costs and restricted entry. There have been no  
2 studies, at least to my knowledge, that have examined the  
3 effects of CON on prices paid by managed care plans,  
4 although the presumption would be that those prices would  
5 be higher as a result of CON's presence.

6 If anything, managed care and increased  
7 competition would benefit from having additional  
8 providers being willing to negotiate lower prices and if  
9 Certificate of Need is constraining in the hospital  
10 market, one would expect that managed care plans wouldn't  
11 be able to get as low a price as they otherwise would  
12 have. It's also the case that CON has probably delayed  
13 entry and reduced competition in those hospital markets.

14 On the nursing home side, CON is, in our  
15 judgment, ineffective in controlling Medicaid nursing  
16 home costs. It may have restricted the supply of beds  
17 but we can't find evidence that the elimination of CON  
18 led to a statistically significant increase in Medicaid  
19 expenditures probably because of the many new substitutes  
20 in nursing homes.

21 I wanted to also look at any willing provider  
22 and freedom of choice laws as barriers to entry into  
23 managed care markets. Any willing provider and freedom  
24 of choice laws essentially require an HMO or a PPO to  
25 accept in its panel any provider willing to accept the

1 terms and conditions of the contract. By the mid 1990s,  
2 by our count, 11 states had any willing provider laws  
3 that covered physicians, nine had them applicable to  
4 hospitals and 25 states had any willing provider laws  
5 applicable to pharmacies.

6 With respect to freedom of choice laws, they  
7 require that an HMO and/or PPO allow a subscriber to use  
8 a non-panel provider and to obtain partial payment from  
9 the managed care plan. Again, by the mid-'90s, that is,  
10 let's say, 1995, our count identified some six states  
11 that had freedom of choice laws covering physicians, five  
12 covering hospitals and 18 states had freedom of choice  
13 laws covering pharmacies.

14 Now, arguably what happens with freedom of  
15 choice and any willing provider laws is that they get in  
16 the way of the one thing that, in my judgment, managed  
17 care does well: selective contracting. Over the, at  
18 least the first half of the '90s, it's clear that managed  
19 care was successful in reducing the rate of increase in  
20 health insurance premiums during the '90s by selectively  
21 contracting, essentially trading volume for lower prices.

22 Any willing provider in freedom of choice laws  
23 reduces or eliminates the ability of a managed care plan  
24 to effectively selectively contract.

25 Let's look first at any willing provider laws,

1       then the freedom of choice laws and then at what the  
2       empirical literature says about what effects it had.  
3       With respect to any willing provider law, an HMO or a PPO  
4       exchanges the promise of volume for a lower price from a  
5       provider. So, I'm willing to direct my patients to your  
6       hospital or to your pharmacy network if you're able to  
7       give me sufficient quality and a good price.

8               The any willing provider law eliminates the  
9       exclusivity of the contract. So the effect is that as a  
10      hospital, you're now less willing to offer me a low price  
11      because I can't assure you the volume that you otherwise  
12      would have. In essence, because of the any willing  
13      provider law, you agree to a low price but now your  
14      competition down the road agrees to accept that same  
15      contract at the same price. Some of the volume that I  
16      would have directed to you now gets directed to the  
17      provider down the road. And as a consequence, none of  
18      the providers can get the volume that they otherwise  
19      would have. And as a consequence they aren't willing to  
20      offer the price that they otherwise would have, at least  
21      in theory.

22              With respect to freedom of choice laws, under  
23      the freedom of choice laws subscribers face lower out of  
24      pocket prices if they use a non-panel provider.  
25      Essentially, a managed care plan may have a small panel

1 of providers for which one, as a subscriber, one pays  
2 maybe a ten or a \$20 co-pay.

3 Under the freedom of choice law, the managed  
4 care plan has to allow other providers, allow their  
5 subscribers to go to other providers who aren't part of  
6 the panel and the managed care plan will pay not the ten  
7 or will not require the \$10 or the \$20 co-pay but may  
8 require a \$30 or a \$50 co-pay. So, one can step outside  
9 of the narrow network to get care from other providers.

10 This gives some providers sufficient, some  
11 subscribers sufficient incentive to use the non-panel  
12 providers. This reduces the volume that the managed care  
13 plan could assure and as a consequence, the panel of  
14 providers, the smaller panel of providers doesn't get the  
15 volume that it otherwise would have and isn't willing to  
16 quote as low a price.

17 Well, what sort of empirical evidence do we  
18 have on the effects of any willing provider and freedom  
19 of choice laws? Well, there are really a couple of  
20 issues. The first is that these laws aren't randomly  
21 distributed across the states but result as a consequence  
22 of the political process. Evidence from work that  
23 Marsteller and colleagues at the Urban Institute and my  
24 colleagues and I at UAB have tried to look at which  
25 states have enacted any willing provider and freedom of

1 choice laws. And essentially conclude that those laws  
2 tend to be enacted in states where managed care has not  
3 yet been prevalent. Essentially, the take from both of  
4 these studies is that the laws appear to be preemptive  
5 efforts to keep out managed care.

6 Well, given that what effect does any willing  
7 provider and freedom of choice laws have on health care  
8 spending? There's been one study that looked at that by  
9 Michael Vita published in 2001. And what he does is look  
10 at those any willing provider and freedom of choice laws  
11 and create an intensity of regulation variable and  
12 controlling for other factors tries to look at the  
13 effects of that regulation on health care spending per  
14 capita. Finds that those states with intense freedom of  
15 choice, any willing provider laws have spending on  
16 physicians that are 2.7 percent higher, spending on  
17 hospitals that are 2.1 percent higher, and overall health  
18 care spending that's 1.8 percent higher. The suggestion  
19 here is that managed care plans were inhibited from  
20 negotiating lower prices with providers and as a  
21 consequence the cost they had to incur for providing care  
22 was higher.

23 In some work that we currently have underway,  
24 we have looked at the effects of these laws on HMO market  
25 share. One would argue that if these laws are

1       successful, what they would do is make managed care less  
2       attractive relative to more traditional insurance plans.  
3       And so as a consequence the managed care plans would have  
4       a smaller market share.

5               So we look at metropolitan areas using that  
6       measure of high intensity, any willing provider, freedom  
7       of choice laws in the same way that Vita does. And what  
8       we conclude is that HMO market shares were six to seven  
9       percentage points lower in areas where any willing  
10      provider, intense any willing provider and freedom of  
11      choice laws existed.

12             We also found that freedom of choice laws  
13      tended to reduce market share more than any willing  
14      provider laws and that laws affecting physicians tended  
15      to reduce market share while hospital and physician laws  
16      were not nearly as effective in that regard.

17             So, in summary, the any willing provider,  
18      freedom of choice laws tend to work as barriers to entry  
19      to managed care. The laws appear to be preemptive in  
20      that they have been implemented in states where managed  
21      care is less prevalent. The laws appear to increase  
22      health care cost and to reduce at least HMO market share.  
23      The findings are consistent with the view, with limiting  
24      the ability of HMO's and PPO's to selectively contract.  
25      And that while our study and the earlier ones have looked

1 at the first half of the '90s, my suspicion is that some  
2 of this effect has been attenuated in the late '90s  
3 because of the managed care backlash that we've seen.  
4 And had that not emerged we would see, you know, a much  
5 greater concern about the effects that these laws have  
6 had.

7 So with that, I will relinquish my remaining  
8 time and look forward to the discussion.

9 (Applause.)

10 DR. HYMAN: Thank you, Mike. Next up is  
11 Professor Gregg Bloche, who is going to talk about a  
12 slightly different element of the regulation of health  
13 care and that is self imposed regulation or maybe not so  
14 much self imposed. Speaking about the market for medical  
15 ethics.

16 DR. BLOCHE: Thank you, David. I do not have a  
17 power point presentation. As some of you may know, law  
18 professors in law classes tend not to use power point.  
19 We law professors know that a picture is worth a thousand  
20 words. We just prefer the thousand words.

21 I am also not an antitrust scholar. I should  
22 fess up at the outset, although apparently I do play one  
23 on T.V. And what I'm going to talk about today is seen  
24 by some to be a topic at the irregular and unseemly  
25 margins of antitrust law. It's certainly a topic that is



1       bitterly controversial, I gather amongst the antitrust  
2       scholars. I'm not going to address the topic as an  
3       antitrust scholar. But I am going to address the topic  
4       from a perspective of, I think, of knowing perhaps a bit  
5       and thinking at least a little bit about the role of  
6       various medical ethics norms and other mechanisms of self  
7       covenants in the medical marketplace.

8               And I want to begin with where virtually all  
9       such discussions, I think, need to begin. An article  
10      published just about exactly 40 years ago by the Nobel  
11      Winner in economics, Kenneth Arrow, an article published  
12      in the American Economic Review called "Uncertainty in  
13      the Welfare Economic of Medical Care."

14             And Arrow offered up a claim, a central claim  
15      in this article which is rather peculiar as a claim,  
16      certainly peculiar as a claim to come from an economist.  
17      The claim was and is that physician adherence to an  
18      anticompetitive ethic of fidelity to patients and  
19      suppression of pecuniary or financial influences when  
20      clinical judgment pushes medical markets towards social  
21      optimality. That being anticompetitive in the literal  
22      sense of the word would move markets not away from  
23      optimality but toward optimality.

24             And this, of course, stands conventional  
25      economics wisdom on its head. It did then and the

1 conventional wisdom amongst healthy economists today is  
2 that this claim is either naive or outdated. Arrow's  
3 story was essentially this. That anticompetitive,  
4 professional norms can compensate for information  
5 asymmetry, for uncertainty in medicine and for moral  
6 hazard.

7 Now, I'm going to pretty much assume that you  
8 all know what those things are about. I do have an  
9 article called the "Market for Medical Ethics" that sets  
10 forth some of these arguments in more detail. It ran in  
11 the Journal of Health Policy, Politics and Law. And also  
12 a related piece that ran in Stanford Law Review last  
13 December called "Trust and Betrayal" in the medical  
14 marketplace.

15 Okay. So this notion was at odds with health  
16 economists' more typical treatment of professional norms  
17 and any self governing norms within an industry as  
18 monopolistic constraints on contractual possibility. And  
19 Arrow acknowledged that all industry wide norms of  
20 conduct limit the options for economic exchange. If  
21 there's a norm that you're following as a member of any  
22 industry, it means you can't deviate from that norm and  
23 offer buyers another alternative. And that reduces  
24 competition amongst sellers, of course.

25 And for some commentators, the very fact of

1       such limits is proof enough of the perniciousness of  
2       professional norms from an efficiency perspective and I'm  
3       aware that there are some in academic antitrust law who  
4       are of that view. Judge Richard Posner treats the common  
5       ideology, as he puts it, of guild members, of members of  
6       any professional group, the common ideology concerning  
7       matters of quality and craftsmanship as tools for making  
8       production into a cartel in order to serve the interest  
9       of members whenever there is common norms about how a  
10      craft should be conducted.

11               And in this view, so called guild ideology,  
12      deceives both its adherence and the public concerning  
13      guild members furtherance of their own interests at  
14      society's expense. And guild norms or professional  
15      norms that express this ideology in this view, in this  
16      classic view, do not deserve the laws deference. To the  
17      contrary, the suppression of the competition is brought  
18      about by these kinds of norms within a profession or  
19      guild ought to be the object of legal attack if we're  
20      going to achieve a more competitive economy within that  
21      professional sphere and something closer to this  
22      optimality. That at least is the classic story, which  
23      I'll call the proposed Narain story, but there are lots  
24      of other who adhere to this view.

25               Now, Kenneth Arrow did not deny that physician

1 adherence to an ethic of fidelity to patient and an ethic  
2 of suppression of pecuniary influences at the bed side  
3 serves the medical professions of self interest. In  
4 fact, built into Arrow's story is a long term versus  
5 short term trade off. The core idea is that physicians  
6 resist bed side financial temptation, supposedly. Notice  
7 I'm not claiming myself that this is all true but this  
8 was a kind of an abstract model that was valued by many,  
9 back in the early '60s, at least.

10 The notion here again is that physicians resist  
11 bed side financial temptation. On a case by case basis,  
12 in order to reap the longer term, reputational, and  
13 therefore financial rewards of proceed adherence to this  
14 ethic. You might be able to get a short term gain by  
15 cheating on your patient at the bedside today providing  
16 them more expense tests when you can get away with it.  
17 But if you do that over the long haul, so the logic goes,  
18 you'll get a bad rep. Patients will trust you less.  
19 Perhaps other colleagues who might refer you patients  
20 will trust you less and you'll do less well. So it makes  
21 sense to adhere to this ethic of short term suppression  
22 of pecuniary interest. So at least went the story.

23 Arrow and critics who view this and other  
24 professional norms as pernicious from a social welfare  
25 perspective, differ not over whether these norms protect

1 and reflect professional self interest, but over whether  
2 they yield welfare gains or welfare loses. By comparison  
3 with a hypothetical absence of such, self constraint.  
4 And the question of how law, especially antitrust law,  
5 should treat professional ethics is closely linked to how  
6 you answer this underlying controversy.

7 But the question of laws, treatment of  
8 professional ethics shows up in other ongoing legal  
9 controversies as well outside the antitrust sphere. It's  
10 an issue in the context of conflicts over the lawfulness  
11 of financial rewards to physicians for futile practice,  
12 conflicts over the authority of treating physicians  
13 versus health plan managers when medical need is at  
14 issue. And it's at issue in conflict over the  
15 supervisory powers of health plan managers over clinical  
16 practitioners. Tension in all these contexts between  
17 professional norms and more immediate market pressures.

18 Back to antitrust law where this tension is  
19 most visibly an issue. Over the past quarter century or  
20 so, an antitrust doctrine has come to view professional  
21 norms with skepticism as so called naked restraints on  
22 trade. But courts have allowed ethics norms, some ethics  
23 norms, to survive antitrust's scrutiny through a variety  
24 of doctrines that enable these norms defenders to argue  
25 that they advance consumer welfare or other public

1 purposes.

2 And the three principal doctrines that have  
3 been evoked, all doctrines that are bitterly  
4 controversial amongst antitrust scholars and lawyers are  
5 the worthy purpose exception, the market failure defense  
6 and the rule of reason. And most famously, four years  
7 ago, in the case California Dental Association versus  
8 FTC, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled an increased  
9 willingness to entertain exactly these kinds of  
10 arguments.

11 The Supreme Court, as probably most of you  
12 know, offered a market failure rationale in defense of  
13 ethical rules, professional ethical rules that govern  
14 claims about low or discounted fees. And there are a lot  
15 of folks, especially free market, pure oriented antitrust  
16 folks who are really unhappy with the Cal Dental  
17 decision.

18 Now, if the goal of health care policy and law  
19 is to maximize the social welfare yield from medical  
20 spending, and I leave open the question of whether that's  
21 the goal but I'll assume for the rest of my remarks that  
22 it is, if that is the goal then consideration of the  
23 place of professional ethics in health policy requires  
24 that we pose three questions.

25 First of all, how can we distinguish between

1 professional norms that enhance social welfare even if  
2 anticompetitive in some sense and the norms that  
3 therefore merit our deference and perhaps even some legal  
4 protection. And norms that reduce welfare, how can we  
5 distinguish between norms that enhance welfare and ones  
6 that reduce welfare?

7 Second, when we conclude that a professional  
8 norm is, in fact, socially undesirable, how should we go  
9 about choosing among regulatory and legal strategies and  
10 deference to markets as means for dissolving the norm?  
11 Just because we decide, just because we believe that a  
12 norm is socially undesirable doesn't mean that we should  
13 therefore intervene in a regulatory or a legal fashion to  
14 push the norm back, to dissolve the norm. Maybe the  
15 market will attend to that.

16 And third, when we conclude that a professional  
17 norm is socially desirable, how do we go about, how  
18 should we go about preserving it? Should we defer to  
19 market outcomes and perhaps shield select forms of  
20 professional collusion in support of norms from antitrust  
21 intervention? Or should we defend the norm actively  
22 through regulatory and legal intervention?

23 Now, my focus today is on the first of these  
24 three questions, since time is short. From a public  
25 policy perspective, though, the second and third are

1       equally important. It's hardly obvious that a socially  
2       undesirable norm should be targeted by judges or  
3       regulators rather than left just to wither in the  
4       marketplace. And nor is it clear that a norm, which is  
5       socially desirable, needs legal or regulatory support to  
6       survive.

7               Going back to Arrow for a moment, Arrow's story  
8       about norms of fidelity to patients and suppression of  
9       case by case self interest was not a story about what  
10      regulation did. It's a story about a norm that emerged  
11      as a result of market pressure.

12             Now, let's go back to Arrow again. Arrow's  
13      explanation for the ethic of suppression of self  
14      interest, it's important to put information problems  
15      front and center. And here's the core of Arrow's  
16      argument. Arrow argued in brief that patient's  
17      uncertainty about the effectiveness of medical care is a  
18      barrier to the marketability of medical services because  
19      people don't know what they're going to get when the  
20      doctor prescribes something. They're uncertain about its  
21      value and that will discourage people from buying medical  
22      services, assuming for a moment that medical care is  
23      about as reliable as any other commercial product sold by  
24      somebody who can cut and run.

25             The classic market response to uncertainty and



1 risk, Arrow pointed out, is the offering of insurance.  
2 Here insurance against the undesired outcomes of medical  
3 care. Notice we're not talking about medical malpractice  
4 insurance only for medical negligence. Nor, of course,  
5 are we talking about insurance that covers the cost of  
6 getting medical care. We're talking about insurance  
7 against getting a negative outcome. Insurance against  
8 not getting cured or made better as a result of going to  
9 your doctor and saying yes to what your doctor recommends  
10 that you do.

11 For technical reasons, though, which we could  
12 get into if there were more time, for technical reasons a  
13 market for insurance for the outcomes of medical  
14 treatment has not developed and is unlikely to emerge at  
15 any time in the near future. And without this kind of  
16 insurance, Arrow pointed out, consumers who might benefit  
17 from medical care but are disinclined to bear the risk of  
18 poor results, are going to demand less medical service  
19 than they, quote, unquote, should from a socially optimal  
20 perspective.

21 And here's where the professional ethic of  
22 fidelity to patients and suppression of self interest  
23 comes in. By making medical advice more trustworthy,  
24 Arrow suggested, these ethics compensate to some degree  
25 for consumers' uncertainty about clinical outcomes and

1 consumers' inability to purchase insurance against  
2 disappointing results. Now, notice something else that's  
3 assumed in the Arrow story, which people believed back  
4 then to a greater extent than they do today about medical  
5 treatment.

6 Back in the early '60s, it was a kind of  
7 cultural high point that people trust their physicians.  
8 People thought that physicians knew what was right and  
9 what was wrong. The average lay person was probably  
10 utterly convinced that when a doctor recommended a  
11 treatment that that doctor had solid empirical data to  
12 support it.

13 Now, our little dirty secret in the medical  
14 world has kind of leaked out through the help of the  
15 Health Service Research community. And that is that the  
16 majority of decisions that doctors make every day don't  
17 have solid empirical evidence behind them. Many of you  
18 know about the research that John Winberg and others did,  
19 pioneering research back in the '70s and '80s on clinical  
20 practice variations. And that research led to a whole  
21 generation of additional health services research that  
22 documented in extraordinary detail the broad range of  
23 practice variations in medicine and the lack of empirical  
24 basis for a lot of practices. So, to some extent this is  
25 additional clinical data and empirical data that

1 undermines part of the Arrow story.

2 In any event, so long as you believe that  
3 patients know less than their doctors do about the  
4 outcomes of medical treatment, there's still something  
5 left to the Arrow story. And Arrow characterized  
6 professional commitment to the ethic of fidelity to  
7 patients and the ethic of suppression of financial self  
8 interest as, in essence, a long term marketing strategy.  
9 Physicians made this commitment in order to win their  
10 patients' confidence. Therefore, this ethic is, as Arrow  
11 put it famously, quote, part of the commodity the  
12 physician sells. And I emphasize sells, unquote.

13 This market based account casts physicians'  
14 commitments to professional standards of care,  
15 suppression of self interest and avoidance of what Arrow  
16 called, quote, the obvious stigmata of profit maximizing  
17 as signals of physicians' intentions to act on buyers  
18 behalf as thoroughly as possible. And because  
19 prospective buyers -- that is, patients -- respond to  
20 these signals by purchasing medical care at increased  
21 levels, the story goes, professional norms that reinforce  
22 this kind of conduct and commitment are in physicians'  
23 long-term collective self-interest.

24 And then Arrow makes the next, the next move  
25 Arrow makes, he holds that because consumer reliance on

1 medical advice yields net benefit, something you can  
2 still believe even in the face of this new evidence I  
3 mentioned about the uncertainty that physicians have  
4 about what they do, if you believe that the advice that  
5 the doctor gives is less than randomly likely to be  
6 useful, you can still buy this part of Arrow's story  
7 because consumer reliance on medical advice yields net  
8 benefits. Physicians' anticompetitive professional norms  
9 also enhance social welfare.

10 Now, notice something about how I'm using the  
11 term anticompetitive. I am not using the term in its  
12 perhaps almost euphemistic way, and the almost  
13 euphemistic way that it is used by some in the antitrust  
14 sphere. Sometimes the word anticompetitive in antitrust  
15 cases seems to mean literally restraints on competition  
16 between actors. Other times one gets the impression, and  
17 Peter Hemmer from the University of Michigan amongst  
18 others has written about this, other times one gets the  
19 impression that the term is used as euphemism for  
20 socially suboptimal so that ironically certain moves by  
21 competitors that might be anticompetitive in the literal  
22 sense of that word get treated in the case law as  
23 procompetitive.

24 Now, as a non-antitrust scholar, I am in no  
25 position to plunge into the morals around the use of that

1 term. I'm merely saying that when I use the term  
2 anticompetitive I mean it in its literal sense,  
3 restrictions on the alternative actions that actors in  
4 competition with each other are permitted to engage in.  
5 And I don't mean it, therefore, as necessarily either a  
6 pejorative term or a positive term.

7 Okay. Since the 1970s, a growing number of  
8 commentators from across the ideological spectrum have cast  
9 the ethics of the medical profession as a program for  
10 self interested restraint trade. And they've cast doubt  
11 on the Arrow story. Some commentaries seem to presume  
12 that the mere discovery that an ethical norm limits  
13 buyers and sellers freedom and benefits sellers is enough  
14 to establish the norms social on desirability.

15 More sophisticated critics of professional  
16 ethics offer powerful arguments for the inefficiency of  
17 particular anticompetitive norms, especially prohibitions  
18 against advertising and price competition. And more  
19 controversially contractual lowering of clinical  
20 standards of care. And Jim Blumstein and Clark  
21 Havighurst are two of the senior figures advocating that  
22 view.

23 These critics tie the norms they target to lost  
24 opportunities for consumers to learn more about the  
25 quality and prices of alternative providers to obtain

1 equivalent services more cheaply and to act on their own.  
2 It is cost benefit trade off preferences, by choosing  
3 lower levels of care at lower cost.

4 Consideration of the social welfare  
5 implications of professional norms can now draw on a new  
6 body of research and scholarship that aspires to explain  
7 the origins and the persistence of informal, non-legal  
8 norms in all sorts of settings, in lots of different  
9 settings outside the professional ethics sphere as well  
10 as within professions.

11 And I would point to Robert Elickson's theory  
12 of welfare maximizing norms as an especially influential  
13 example of this body of work. Robert Elickson's  
14 hypothesis is that members of a close knit group develop  
15 and maintain informal social norms whose content serves  
16 to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in  
17 their work a day affairs with one another.

18 And this is a story that's consistent with  
19 portrayals of physician's ethical norms as a self serving  
20 restraints on trade. Elickson and his followers have  
21 studied various close knit groups from Shasta County  
22 cattlemen in California to diamond traders in New York.  
23 And they've identified governing non-legal norms. And  
24 they've offered persuasive arguments for these norms  
25 efficiency within these communities.

1           The medical profession to some degree resembles  
2       these close knit groups which sustain their non-legal  
3       norms through peer feedback, gossip and reputational  
4       sanctions. And I underscore that the message of Elickson  
5       and his followers is very much one of needing those kinds  
6       of mechanisms and needing this culture, this close knit  
7       culture in order to support these informal norms.

8           But there are problems with applying this story  
9       to the medical professional. Divisions among physicians  
10      that arise from specialization, geography, status and  
11      institutional arrangements make the sustenance of self  
12      serving norms through informal feedback and gossip a lot  
13      more problematic. And there's good reason to suspect  
14      that the medical profession has become even less cohesive  
15      since the publication of Arrow's article forty years ago.

16           Doctors practice today within very diverse  
17      institutional and financial context. Multi-specialty  
18      group practices, all sorts of arrangements with health  
19      plans and provider networks and highly variable financial  
20      incentives exist along side the old solo and small group  
21      fee for service practice model that was the norm in 1963  
22      and is still found in many places today.

23           A more tangible sign, I think, of the  
24      profession's diminished cohesiveness is the increased  
25      willingness of physicians to testify against their peers

1 on plaintiff's behalf in medical malpractice suits. This  
2 was quite rare up into and through the early 1960s in  
3 large part because of physicians' distaste for turning  
4 against each other.

5 The medical profession's internal cleavages  
6 also cast doubt on the notion that any one set of norms  
7 can maximize the welfare of all or even most physicians.  
8 The profession has become a complicated mix of  
9 overlapping subgroups who both share a competing  
10 interest. And it's therefore hardly clear that  
11 traditional physician ethics, including even the norm of  
12 fidelity to patients and the suppression of financial  
13 self interest maximize the medical profession's aggregate  
14 welfare let alone society's welfare.

15 There have been some recent efforts to explain  
16 the persistence of non-legal norms in a different way in  
17 terms of their expressive function. And these norms  
18 arguably apply to a large extent to the debate about  
19 professional ethics in the antitrust sphere. And these  
20 recent efforts, I think, cast further doubt when the idea  
21 that physician norms maximize the profession's or  
22 society's welfare.

23 It's been suggested that people often abide by  
24 social norms not because the norms are efficient within a  
25 community but rather because the norms have taken on



1 meaning as signals of ones cooperative nature. And  
2 therefore, signals of one's desirability as a potential  
3 partner in collaborative effort and signals of one's  
4 reliability.

5 And there's a notion here that holds that once  
6 a norm is fixed in place by common understanding, such as  
7 signal, it's difficult to dislodge that norm even if it's  
8 wasteful in the aggregate for the group that abides by  
9 this particular norm as a signal. And even if it adheres  
10 to an alternative norm as a signal could, in theory,  
11 perform this signaling function at a lower cost.

12 Now, to the extent that physician norms perform  
13 this signaling function, their persistence can not be  
14 taken as evidence that they've maximized the profession's  
15 welfare. The norms may merely reflect an equilibrium and  
16 a difficulty of shifting to an alternative agreed upon  
17 symbol. And this may well apply to what Arrow calls,  
18 quote, obvious stigmata of profit maximizing, unquote.

19 The opthomologist who you hear on the radio  
20 selling laser surgery or lots of other examples that date  
21 back to the ruckus commercialism of physicians that  
22 George Bernard Shaw  
23 -- a hundred years ago.

24 Okay, the upshot of all this is that recent  
25 thinking about the social welfare impact of physicians

1        anticompetitive norms is deeply skeptical of Arrow's  
2        assertion that these norms have desirable welfare  
3        effects. And indeed, current law and economics models  
4        for the creation and sustenance of social norms invite  
5        doubt about whether physicians' anticompetitive norms  
6        further the medical profession's aggregate welfare, let  
7        alone society's.

8                On the other hand, these economic models so  
9        prevalent in the law in economics field of scholarship,  
10       these economic models do not support the sweeping  
11       conclusion that physicians' anticompetitive norms,  
12       including the ethic of fidelity to patients, are socially  
13       wasteful per se. There's a mess here that needs to be  
14       sorted out.

15               I submit this mess needs to be sorted out  
16       ultimately on a case by case basis. And simply saying,  
17       as some are inclined to in the antitrust field, that we  
18       should treat all professional norms including shared  
19       commitment to the ethic of undivided loyalty to patients,  
20       simply saying that we should treat all professional norms  
21       as kin to price fixing doesn't do the analytical work.  
22       It avoids the analytic work.

23               I want to conclude with some thoughts about how  
24       we might try to sort out this confusing picture. And  
25       I'll start with Arrow's account of ethical commitment as

1 something for which there's a market, ethical commitment  
2 as a response to consumer uncertainty about medical  
3 outcomes and a response to consumer demand for  
4 professional trustworthiness.

5 Indeed, I want to suggest Arrow arguably  
6 underestimated consumer demand for professional  
7 commitment to an ethic of devotion to patients and  
8 suppression of self in looking exclusively to medical  
9 uncertainty, that is to consumer uncertainty, about  
10 medicines biological efficacy as the source of consumers  
11 demand for trustworthiness. Arrow neglected the  
12 emotional dimension of patients' experience of illness,  
13 their yearnings for support and comfort, reassurance and  
14 credible explanation of frightening developments.

15 And to the extent that sick patients value  
16 trusting relationships with their doctors as a way to  
17 cope with these emotional needs, Arrow's exclusive focus  
18 and law and economic scholars today exclude focus on  
19 consumer information deficits, undervalues consumer  
20 desire for the ethics of commitment that we are seeking  
21 to explain.

22 Arrow's characterization of this ethical  
23 commitment in static terms as part of a market  
24 equilibrium missed dynamic features of the market for  
25 medical ethics that play a large role in ongoing health

1       systems change. Over the past hundred or so years,  
2       physician commitment to the ethic of suppression of self  
3       interest for the sake of patients hasn't stayed the same.  
4       It's, in fact, very widely, it's fluctuated greatly up  
5       and down almost certainly in response to changing demand  
6       side pressures.

7               At the dawn of the last century competing  
8       clinicians were hardly bashful about their  
9       entrepreneurial pursuits and claims for remedies. We  
10      still have the metaphors of the times snake oil and the  
11      like. And as I mentioned before the ruckus of  
12      commercialism, the snake oil sales and the like, the  
13      George Bernard Shaw parody in his play, The Doctor's  
14      Dilemma, just about a century ago, this sort of thing  
15      made doctors' commercialism the butt of jokes. It  
16      undermined consumers' belief in the value of what healing  
17      professions had to offer.

18             And by the second decade of the 20th Century,  
19      doctors in this country got this. They understood that  
20      their credibility, their trust in society and ultimately  
21      their incomes were at stake, were at risk and that  
22      something within the profession needed to be done simply  
23      in terms of the profession's own economic and social  
24      welfare.

25             And medical schools and the medical profession

1 began to respond aggressively to this image problem.

2 They began to close proprietary medical schools. Some of  
3 you may be familiar with the Flexnor Report, which  
4 basically reflected a large, broad based effort of self  
5 regulation aimed at cracking down on medical  
6 commercialism.

7           Proprietary medical schools were closed in  
8 droves. Clinical commercialism was cracked down on with  
9 new ethics, with more vigorous enforcement of ethic  
10 norms. And the medical profession presented its ethical  
11 commitment to suppression of self and to loyalty to  
12 patients as evidence of its superiority over other kinds  
13 of clinical practitioners, non-physician clinical  
14 practitioners.

15           By the time Arrow published his article in  
16 1963, patient confidence in the medical profession had  
17 surged in response to this effort and in response to the  
18 development of scientific medicine. And patient  
19 confidence in medicine had risen from an abysmal low to a  
20 historic high. Physicians had identified and met over a  
21 period of 30 or 40 years a previously unfulfilled  
22 consumer demand for trustworthiness.

23           Yet having won consumer's confidence, American  
24 physicians were by the early and mid-'60s under less  
25 market pressure to prove their trustworthiness and many

1       took opportunistic advantage, especially after the  
2       Medicare statute was passed in '65. Opportunistic  
3       advantage of this trust, of this climate of trust.

4               Okay. By acquiring ownership interest in  
5       hospitals and clinical laboratories and other health care  
6       businesses and the anti-commercial norms that Arrow had  
7       treated as part of a larger equilibrium fell by the  
8       wayside as physicians advertised aggressively and stopped  
9       providing free and discounted care to the poor. In other  
10      words, the profession began to drift back to its late  
11      19th Century commercialism.

12             Consumer awareness of this drift back, I  
13      suggest, and consumer cynicism about claims that doctors  
14      are little motivated by money opened the way for managed  
15      health plans to be explicit in the last few decades about  
16      financial incentives to physicians to limit care. And  
17      the managed care revolution itself has transformed the  
18      market for medical ethics by introducing a demand side  
19      perspective, sharply different from that of sick  
20      patients, the demand side perspective accompanied by  
21      explicit use of financial incentives to pull physicians'  
22      loyalties away from the interest of physicians at the  
23      bedside.

24             And yet we have the managed care backlash of  
25      the last several years and a conflict not yet resolved

1 over which way medicine will go. Will we go towards more  
2 commercialism or will we go towards, will we go back  
3 towards a kind of reaffirmation of the norms that Arrow  
4 was talking about? What is clear though, I think, and  
5 something that we need to keep in mind, is that the norms  
6 that Arrow's article treated as an equilibrium arose, in  
7 fact, through a dynamic process in which consumers'  
8 concerns about the doctor's trustworthiness and the  
9 physician's willingness to suppress self interest changed  
10 over time.

11 And I'm going to cut things short because of  
12 time and David's signaling. But I do try in the  
13 conclusion of this article, the Market for Medical  
14 Ethics, to offer what I hope is a more nuanced story  
15 about different context in which we should be more versus  
16 less protective of some of these norms. There are  
17 aspects of medical care, typically when you go to see a  
18 doctor on an out patient basis for something that's  
19 relatively minor, there are aspects of medical care that  
20 are much like other consumer transactions and for which  
21 various kinds of complicity, including complicity with  
22 respect to professional norms is therefore more  
23 problematic from the antitrust perspective.

24 But there are aspects of medical care; the  
25 desperation of a dying patient and his or her family, the

1 fear of the uncertainly at a time of disability and time  
2 of great emotional need in which the elements of medical  
3 practice that impart faith and confidence by virtue of  
4 notions of suppression of self interest are important to  
5 cherish. And from the antitrust perspective, one can't  
6 make, I mean, my core bottom line message here is one  
7 can't make antitrust policy in the health sphere without  
8 shirking from the task of a, without focusing on the task  
9 of detailed assessment of how health care has performed,  
10 what consumers and patients experience is.

11 One can't treat this whole thing as a black box  
12 and say, well, these constraints are, per se,  
13 problematic. They are naked restraints on trade and  
14 therefore should be rejected. Antitrust policy needs to  
15 become even more than it is today, explicitly a health  
16 policy.

17 Thanks a lot. Sorry for going so long.

18 (Applause.)

19 DR. HYMAN: Okay, next up is Francis Mallon,  
20 from the American Physical Therapy Association.

21 Those of you who are wondering, we will take a  
22 break, but we're going to get through at least Francis,  
23 certainly, and I expect Dr. Lomazow as well.

24 MR. MALLON: Thank you, David. I appreciate  
25 the opportunity to make a statement to the Commission and



1 to the Department and to all of you here present. I am  
2 going to be a little less philosophical than the well-  
3 informed presentation that you just received. So I hope  
4 you bear with me on that.

5 What I'd like to do is say a little bit about  
6 physical therapists, give you some background on that.  
7 And then address an issue which is a major obstacle for  
8 patients in achieving access to physical therapists. And  
9 then I'd like to talk a little bit about a very  
10 problematic situation that is fueled by the problem  
11 created in the access area.

12 The American Physical Therapy Association  
13 represents more than 63,000 physical therapists, physical  
14 therapists assistants and students of physical therapy.  
15 Physical therapists are licensed health care  
16 professionals who diagnose and manage movement  
17 disfunction and enhance physical and functional status.  
18 Following an examination of a patient with an impairment  
19 or a functional limitation or a disability, the physical  
20 therapist will outline a plan of care and then begin  
21 treatment and intervention.

22 Physical therapists treat across the broad  
23 spectrum of populations. And they will be treating  
24 problems resulting from such things as back and neck  
25 injuries, sprains, strains and fractures, arthritis,

1 burns, amputations, stroke and heart attack, multiple  
2 sclerosis, birth defects such as cerebral palsy and  
3 spina bifida and injuries related to work and sports.

4 The practice settings for the physical  
5 therapists are also quite diverse ranging from the  
6 private practitioner's office to the hospital to the  
7 skilled nursing facility, the rehab facility, to schools,  
8 fitness and training centers and industrial and work  
9 settings. In the written statement that I provided,  
10 there's a break down of the percentages that work in  
11 these particular areas. And you'll note from that that  
12 approximately 35 percent of physical therapists work in  
13 some hospital related setting, whether it be in patient,  
14 acute care, rehab, in patient, out patient or extended  
15 facility. And 35 percent of physical therapists are in  
16 private practice. About seven percent work in a home  
17 health care and about six percent in skilled nursing  
18 facilities.

19 The current educational minimum for a physical  
20 therapist is a graduation with a post baccalaureate  
21 degree from an educational program accredited by the  
22 Commission on Accreditation of Physical Therapy  
23 Education, CAPI. And CAPI is recognized by the U.S.  
24 Department of Education as well as by the Council for  
25 Higher Education Accreditation, CHEA.

1                   Currently there are 204 accredited physical  
2                   therapist programs throughout the United States. Of  
3                   these, 75 grant a Doctor of Physical Therapy degree, a  
4                   clinical doctorate. And another 75 are in the process of  
5                   transitioning from a Master's Degree to a DPT.

6                   A typical physical therapist curriculum  
7                   includes education and foundational sciences, such as  
8                   anatomy, histology, physiology as well as in the clinical  
9                   sciences that touch on systems that physical therapists  
10                  deal with, be they cardiovascular pulmonary,  
11                  integumentary, musculoskeletal and neuromuscular. Each  
12                  curriculum involves a very extensive clinical education  
13                  preparation.

14                 As for physical therapist regulation, physical  
15                 therapists are licensed in all 50 states as well as the  
16                 District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. And this has been  
17                 true since the early 1970s with the license removal  
18                 beginning some time back or the regulation movement  
19                 beginning some time back in the 1940s. The core  
20                 requirements for licensure are graduation from a CAPI  
21                 accredited program and successful completion of a  
22                 national licensure examination. States will vary in terms  
23                 of additional requirements, testing in jurisprudence,  
24                 testing in ethics and so forth.

25                 As for payment for their services, physical

1 therapists receive payment from three primary sources;  
2 private pay, government programs the largest of which is  
3 obviously Medicare but also through Medicaid, through the  
4 Veterans Administration, through various workman's comp  
5 programs and through the individuals with Disability  
6 Educational Assistance Act. And then through private  
7 insurance; Blue Cross Blue Shield, Aetna, United Health  
8 Care and others.

9 Coverage for physical therapist services is  
10 fairly comprehensive in both managed care and fee for  
11 service programs. As with other health care services, PT  
12 services are subject to visit limitations under managed  
13 care plans and to payment limitations as, for example,  
14 under the physician fee schedule that is employed under  
15 Medicare. Most physical therapist service in out patient  
16 settings are billed using the CPT coding system and  
17 primarily through the 97000 series including such things  
18 as physical therapy evaluation, therapeutic procedures,  
19 manual therapy, -- and so forth.

20 There is one major obstacle for patients  
21 seeking access to physical therapists. And that is the  
22 requirement that the patient must first go to a physician  
23 before that patient can see a physical therapist. This  
24 requirement is still written into 13 state laws. It does  
25 have, however, a much more expansive impact relative to

1 insurance and payment.

2           Slowly this very anachronistic requirement is  
3 changing relative to state law. 37 states currently have  
4 some kind and permit some type of direct access to  
5 physical therapist services. Of those 37, 14 have no  
6 limitation, 23 have some form of limitation. For  
7 example, there is one state that requires a pre-existing  
8 medical diagnosis. There are others that have time  
9 limitations on how long a patient can be treated under a  
10 direct access mode. There are also 47 states that allow  
11 a patient to come directly to a physical therapist for an  
12 evaluation.

13           Although the legal obstacle to securing direct  
14 access to physical therapists is slowly being removed,  
15 the payment barrier looms quite large. Insurers find it  
16 very difficult to remove themselves from the belief in  
17 the concept of the gate keeper and the physician as gate  
18 keeper. And that, despite the fact that there has been  
19 evidence produced that under a direct access mode there  
20 can be less utilization and there can be less cost with  
21 no harm whatsoever to quality.

22           In a study published in Physical Therapy in  
23 1997, researchers found that relative to physician  
24 referral episodes, direct access episodes encompassed  
25 fewer numbers of service; 7.6 versus 12.2, and

1 substantially less cost, \$1,004 versus \$2,236. The study  
2 involved paid claims data for the period of 1989 to 1993  
3 from Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Maryland.

4 Although legalizing direct access practice for  
5 physical therapist must be the first step in the process,  
6 very few patients will be able to take advantage of these  
7 legislative reforms unless and until insurance policies  
8 accept these changes in state law. You've all heard the  
9 maxim that payment shades practice. And I would say that  
10 there is probably few examples better than the example of  
11 the requirement for physician referral to get to a  
12 physical therapist that evidence the truth of this maxim.

13 Not all insurance programs, however, have  
14 remained blind to the benefits of direct access.  
15 Insurers in Maryland have paid for direct access for many  
16 years. And likewise, in recent years, Arizona and  
17 Montana and North Dakota and North Carolina and others  
18 have also had insurance programs that have paid for  
19 physical therapist services without a referral.  
20 And currently there's legislation pending in Congress  
21 that would permit Medicare coverage for direct access to  
22 physical therapist services.

23 As a result of this obstacle to patient access  
24 to physical therapists, a condition has been fueled that  
25 did not arise directly out of this need for a referral

1 but certainly has grown and expanded before it, because  
2 of it. Traditionally when a physician's patient needs  
3 physical therapy, the physician sends the patient to an  
4 independent entity that provides the physical therapist  
5 service. In the out patient setting, that entity might  
6 be an independent physical therapist, a physical  
7 therapist clinic, a rehabilitation agency or an out  
8 patient hospital department. The patient receives the  
9 needed physical therapy and close communication with the  
10 physician is maintained. There is no financial  
11 connection between the physician and the setting in which  
12 the physical therapy is provided.

13 This traditional relationship sometimes changes  
14 when the reign on the health care dollar is drawn  
15 tighter. And practitioners look for ways to make up for  
16 revenue shortfalls. For some physicians and medical  
17 practice management consultants, physical therapy is seen  
18 as a readily available means of negating some of the  
19 revenue losses. What frequently follows then is an offer  
20 or option rendered by the physician to the physical  
21 therapist or by a group of physicians that the physical  
22 therapist must either join the physician practice as an  
23 employee or contractor or be content to know that no more  
24 referrals will be coming his or her way.

25 The major change in the traditional pattern is

1       that the physician will not just be the referrer but will  
2       also benefit financially from the services provided as a  
3       result of that referral. Whether it is mandated by law  
4       or by insurance policies, the requirement that patients  
5       obtain a physician referral for a patient to receive  
6       services from a physical therapist clearly creates an  
7       unfair and an un-level playing field between physician  
8       owned physical therapist practices and practices owned by  
9       physical therapists.

10               Under these arrangements the physician has  
11       financial incentives to refer the patient to his or her  
12       own practice rather than a practice in which the  
13       physician has no such interest. Because the physician  
14       controls the referral it makes it difficult for physical  
15       therapists who own and operate their own practices to  
16       compete for patients whose access to these physical  
17       therapists is controlled by the physician.

18               Studies have demonstrated that this phenomenon,  
19       frequently known as POPTS, Physician Owned PT Services,  
20       may have a significant, this phenomenon may have a  
21       significant adverse economic impact on consumers, third  
22       party payers and physical therapists. Specifically a  
23       well publicized study appeared in the Journal of the  
24       American Medical Association in 1992. Co-authored by  
25       Gene Mitchell and Elton Scott, the study documented the



1 higher utilization and higher costs associated with  
2 services provided in POPTS situations in the State of  
3 Florida.

4 In summary, among other things, the study  
5 revealed that visits per patient were 39 percent to 45  
6 percent higher in joint venture facilities, both gross  
7 and net revenue per patient were 30 to 40 percent higher  
8 in facilities owned by referring physicians. Percent  
9 operating income and percent markup were significantly  
10 higher in joint venture physical therapy and  
11 rehabilitation facilities. And joint ventures also  
12 generate more of the revenues from patients with well  
13 paying insurance.

14 At about the same time in other study that was  
15 published in the New England Journal of Medicine, there  
16 was documentation of higher costs associated with  
17 physical therapy care under the California Worker's  
18 Compensation Program when the services were provided in  
19 POPTS situations. Although the mean cost per case was  
20 about ten percent lower in the POPTS situation, the  
21 significant increase in utilization created a substantial  
22 sizable cost to the program. In the study the authors  
23 stated that because of the reduced cost, \$143,672 were  
24 saved.

25 And in a subsequent article, the authors

1 referred to the fact that this phenomenal of self  
2 referral or POPTS generates approximately \$233 million in  
3 services delivered for economic rather than clinical  
4 reasons. As I have noted, studies have found that  
5 physicians who had ownership or invested interest in  
6 entities to which they referred ordered more services  
7 including physical therapy services than physicians  
8 without those financial relationships.

9 This correlation between financial ties and  
10 increased utilization was the impetus for Congress to  
11 enact the two Stark laws, Stark 1 in 1989 and Stark 2 in  
12 1993. Stark 1 applied to services in clinical  
13 laboratories and Stark 2 extended that to other services,  
14 including physical therapy.

15 Specifically this law states that if a  
16 physician or a member of the physician's immediate family  
17 has a financial relationship with a health care entity,  
18 the physician may not make referrals to that entity for  
19 the furnishing of designated health services including  
20 physical therapy under the Medicare program unless an  
21 exception applies. After this law was enacted, many  
22 physicians divested themselves of their physical therapy  
23 practices. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services,  
24 formally HCFA, had issued final regulations implementing  
25 the law on January 4, 2001.

1           For the period, for most of the 1990s, there  
2       was really a chill on the establishment and spread of  
3       physician- owned physical therapy services. But that  
4       chill greatly thawed as we approached the end of the  
5       century due to the regulations that were published. And  
6       the tendency of those regulations to take what were  
7       loopholes in the Stark legislation and basically turn  
8       them into chasms. And those regulations were implemented  
9       and began to be used or followed, we can see at this  
10      present time the reemergence of the issue of physician  
11      owned physical therapy services.

12           So in conclusion, I would say the removal of  
13      the referral requirement from state laws will allow  
14      patients direct access to physical therapists. And the  
15      removal of the referral requirement from insurance  
16      policies will make these access complete and permit  
17      physical therapists to compete with physicians on a level  
18      playing field. Thank you.

19           (Applause.)

20           DR. HYMAN: Dr. Lomazow?

21           DR. LOMAZOW: Good afternoon. My name is Dr.  
22      Steven Lomazow. I'd like to thank the Federal Trade  
23      Commission and the Department of Justice for soliciting  
24      the advice of the American Academy of Neurology with  
25      respect to the issue of increasing unsupervised access of

1 non-physicians to patients. There are things here which  
2 are on my CV so I'll skip over that portion.

3 Neurologists and other physicians across the  
4 country are confronted by a growing number of states that  
5 allow non-physicians direct access to patients. To my  
6 knowledge, and I will trust Mr. Mallon's numbers, 14  
7 states allow unrestricted direct access by physical  
8 therapists. And others permit direct access to patients  
9 for a finite period of time under special circumstances.

10 The American Academy of Neurology and its  
11 18,000 members has a strong desire to educate law makers  
12 about the potential of increasing adverse outcomes as  
13 more non-plenary licensed groups seek to do what has been  
14 within the traditional purview of highly trained  
15 physicians. We firmly believe that direct access in  
16 these circumstances could negatively impact patient  
17 safety by eroding the quality and increasing the cost of  
18 patient care.

19 It is essential that a skilled physician  
20 evaluates and diagnose a patient's condition at the  
21 earliest possible juncture. Lacking adequate medical  
22 training, therapists are not properly equipped to make  
23 informed and often critical decisions about referral and  
24 treatment of patients. Patient care will be seriously  
25 compromised.

1           Allow me to state more specifically our  
2       concerns with non-physician direct access. First of all,  
3       direct access could lead to delayed treatment of serious  
4       medical conditions. Initial evaluation by a skilled  
5       physician is necessary to screen patients for serious  
6       problems that are beyond the scope and training of  
7       physical therapists. Triage by physicians significantly  
8       increases the likelihood that patients see highly trained  
9       professionals as early as possible. Compromising this  
10      authority means that patients will wait much longer for  
11      accurate diagnosis, at times incurring expensive,  
12      avoidable and unacceptable risk.

13           The national crisis in medical liability  
14      insurance is already strangling health care resources.  
15      Access to patient care by lesser trained individuals will  
16      do no more than greatly compound the problem. The  
17      liability problem we have at the present time isn't the  
18      entire problem. But it is the straw that is breaking a  
19      very large camel's back.

20           Direct access would also decrease prevention of  
21      serious medical conditions, lacking early sound medical  
22      diagnosis by trained physicians, conditions that might  
23      otherwise be prevented. Things such as stroke that  
24      depend on early diagnosis for good outcomes or cancer may  
25      be delayed in diagnosis. This could put patients at

1       grave risk and lead to greatly increased costs for later,  
2       more intensive health care intervention.

3               Direct access would undermine coordination of  
4       care, which is essential for good patient outcomes.  
5       Appropriate coordination of care leads to better patient  
6       outcomes. The health care of patients require a thorough  
7       initial evaluation by physicians in order to properly  
8       coordinate the best program of care. Patients who need  
9       physical therapy often require treatment from other  
10      rehabilitation specialists such as occupational  
11      therapists, speech therapists, nurses and vocational  
12      counselors to manage the different aspects of their  
13      disability. Physicians are clearly best equipped to  
14      direct this care.

15             Unrestricted access to non-physicians could  
16      significantly drive up, not drive down, health care  
17      costs. To employ an old maxim, an ounce of prevention is  
18      worth a pound of cure. Without physician referral,  
19      patients receiving physical therapy services are more  
20      likely to receive unnecessary treatments, leading to  
21      increased health care costs to third party payers. Costs  
22      will be increased and there will undoubtedly be cases  
23      where patients will receive needless and excessive  
24      therapy based on improper diagnosis and inadequate  
25      examination.

1           I take issue with Mr. Mallon's assumption that  
2       POPTS and physicians' access to patients will increase  
3       care. Our issue is quality. He mentioned Stark. Well,  
4       we have Stark, and that's as far as it should go.  
5       Enforce Stark, but going in the other direction is  
6       clearly deleterious.

7           In many states, direct access to physical  
8       therapist is coupled with an expansion of a scope of  
9       practice even farther than just direct access allowing  
10      performance of complex diagnostic tests of nervous system  
11      function. Electromyography, known as EMG, and nerve  
12      conduction velocity studies, which are part and parcel to  
13      EMG, are essential tools employed by highly trained  
14      specialists to diagnose and direct proper treatment of a  
15      wide variety of muscle and nervous system disorders. A  
16      complete examination involves the insertion of needle  
17      electrodes into muscles to assess their function.

18           Unlike an X-ray, for example, which is  
19      routinely and safely performed by a technologist for the  
20      later interpretation by a licensed physician, EMG and  
21      nerve conduction studies are a dynamic and variable  
22      procedures that requires sophisticated medical decision  
23      making throughout their performance. The performance and  
24      interpretation of these tests are generally taught within  
25      a curriculum of years of post graduate, specialty medical

1 training in the field of neurology and rehabilitation  
2 medicine or -- In fact, one or two year post residency  
3 fellowships are also available for even more detailed  
4 study of their performance and uses of these  
5 examinations.

6 Only physicians have the training to diagnose  
7 diseases. Tests like EMG and nerve conduction studies  
8 depend upon visual tactile and audio observations of the  
9 examiner as well as information gained prior to the test  
10 by a thorough and complete neurological examination.  
11 There is no way for physicians to independently verify  
12 the accuracy and quality of reports of physical  
13 therapists.

14 Accurate diagnosis means better patient care.  
15 Complex diagnostic tests such as EMG and nerve conduction  
16 studies allow physicians to distinguish symptoms from a  
17 wide range of conditions, including carpal tunnel  
18 syndrome, diabetes melitis, radiculopathy from herniated  
19 disc, motor neuron disease or Lou Gehrig's disease and  
20 Myasthenia Gravis to mention only a few.

21 These are many conditions that masquerade as  
22 others and require years of clinical training and  
23 advanced knowledge to make a sound medical diagnosis.  
24 Misdiagnosis leads to delayed or inappropriate treatment,  
25 including surgery at times, and a diminished quality of



1       life. It is not unusual for neurologists to find  
2       referrals for diagnostic testing to be inappropriate and  
3       not performed at all.

4               Unwarranted scope expansion could lead to  
5       unnecessary or excessive testing and an increase cost to  
6       third party payers. In states where non-physicians  
7       performed diagnostic EMG, there are numerous examples  
8       where a test performed by non-MD's must be repeated by  
9       specialists to properly diagnose potentially life  
10      threatening conditions.

11             Physical therapists are trained in therapy, not  
12      diagnosis. They're not physical diagnosticians. They're  
13      physical therapists. Needle and EMG and nerve conduction  
14      studies are diagnostic procedures. They have no  
15      therapeutic benefit.

16             Neurologists often defer decisions about the  
17      intricacies of physical therapy to professionals  
18      specifically trained in this discipline. We believe that  
19      we should be afforded the same consideration and respect  
20      for our professional training. Physical therapists are  
21      essential cogs in the wheel of health care. But they  
22      should not be the hub.

23             Physicians receive years, not hours, of  
24      training in diagnosis. Physicians complete four years of  
25      medical school and at least four years of post graduate

1 training. Specialists in neurology and rehabilitation  
2 medicine are highly trained in the skill of diagnosing  
3 neuromuscular conditions. The physical therapy  
4 curriculum in related areas is measured in hours, not  
5 years.

6 The issue surrounding direct access in the  
7 expansion of scope of practice for non-physicians are  
8 much more than turf battles for physicians. Our goals  
9 first and foremost include ensuring patient safety,  
10 protecting quality care and controlling the rising cost  
11 of health care. The practice of medicine is dependent on  
12 skilled physicians guiding and directing patient care and  
13 incorporating the skills of non-physicians in a  
14 coordinated program to the benefit of the patient.

15 Compromising the leadership and supervision of  
16 the highly trained physician leaves patients confronted  
17 with a maze of health care providers, many of them,  
18 although extremely important to the overall care of the  
19 patient, are not equipped to guide the patient through  
20 the system. And as Dr. Bloche testified, patients don't  
21 know what they're getting and they have to be guided by  
22 the most competent professionals.

23 The American Academy of Neurology is extremely  
24 concerned about the future of health care if physicians  
25 are not properly and expeditiously directed to physicians

1 to diagnose their illnesses and manage their treatments.  
2 We strongly urge you to consider the ramifications on  
3 patient safety, quality of care and health care cost if  
4 physicians are taken out of the driver's seat.

5 We welcome any opportunity to further assist  
6 federal decision makers in more systematically evaluating  
7 the potential adverse impacts on health care from non-  
8 physician direct access and scope expansion. We share  
9 the Federal Trade Commission's and the Department of  
10 Justice's concern about the escalating costs of medical  
11 care.

12 The American public deserves the highest  
13 quality and most efficient care for their health care  
14 dollar. Increasing open access to and scope of practice  
15 of non-physicians is a step backwards. Would you really  
16 want someone who is not a trained physician looking up at  
17 you from an Emergency Room from a diagnostic test or from  
18 an operating room? I thank you for your indulgence.

19 (Applause.)

20 MR. HYMAN: I think we'll take about a ten-  
21 minute break, and then we'll continue with the remaining  
22 three speakers and then go directly into the moderated  
23 round table.

24 (A brief recess was taken.)

25 MR. HYMAN: If everyone will take their seats

1       again, I think we'll get started. Our next speaker is  
2       Dr. Russ Newman, from the American Psychological  
3       Association.

4               DR. NEWMAN: Thanks, David. I'd first like to  
5       thank David, the Commission, and the Department for an  
6       opportunity to come and talk to the Commission and  
7       Department about barriers to market entry.

8               I am a licensed psychologist. I am also an  
9       attorney licensed in the District of Columbia and  
10      Maryland. I am neither a scholar on antitrust nor an  
11      expert in the area. And I'm here today to talk on behalf  
12      of the American Psychological Association's 155,000  
13      members and affiliates.

14              The American Psychological Association is quite  
15      familiar with the barriers to market entry. It's an  
16      issue with which we've had quite a bit of experience over  
17      the relatively young history of psychology. Psychology  
18      established its status as a licensed, independent, health  
19      care profession, independently licensed to do diagnosis  
20      and treatment in the late '60s and early '70s. No sooner  
21      had that independent status been established than did  
22      psychiatrists in Virginia work in concert with the Blue  
23      Shield plans of Virginia in order to require that  
24      psychologists be supervised by and billed through  
25      psychiatrists in order to receive any reimbursement from

1 the Virginia Blue Shield plans.

2 In response to a challenge by the  
3 psychologists, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in the  
4 Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield  
5 of Virginia found that practice to be anticompetitive and  
6 opined, "We are not inclined to condone anticompetitive  
7 conduct upon the incantation of good medical practice."  
8 With that decision from the Fourth Circuit, the  
9 independent practice in an outpatient setting pretty well  
10 was laid to rest for psychology. Any challenges to that  
11 seemed to fall by the wayside.

12 With one exception, attention from that point  
13 on turned to the practice of psychology in an inpatient  
14 setting. And that one exception is represented in a case  
15 that was filed in the Southern District of New York,  
16 Welsh v. The American Psychoanalytic Association in which  
17 psychologists challenged the American Psychoanalytic  
18 Association's policy of preventing psychologists from  
19 being trained to provide psychoanalysis. That case was  
20 settled successfully with barriers to entry to that  
21 training open for psychologists.

22 That one exception notwithstanding, the action  
23 for psychologists and barriers to market entry have  
24 really been in the area of hospital practice. Hospital  
25 practice was an issue where psychologists' existing scope

1 of practice enabled them to provide those same services  
2 in hospitals, but for the existence of some early  
3 hospital licensing laws that didn't include  
4 psychologists, and but for the opposition of organized  
5 psychiatry.

6 17 states now plus the District of Columbia now  
7 have statutes that recognize psychologists' authorization  
8 to provide independent services within hospitals. But to  
9 really get a picture of the barriers that have been  
10 erected in the hospital arena, an example of the facts in  
11 California, I think, help provide both the history of the  
12 challenge to access in hospitals as well as the tale of  
13 current, existing conflict with respect to gaining access  
14 to hospital access.

15 California was among the early of the  
16 jurisdictions to enact hospital practice statute by  
17 amending their existing hospital licensing law, Health  
18 and Safety Code Section 1316.5, back in 1978. But the  
19 real critical provision of law was enacted through  
20 amendment to that law in 1980 in which the law now  
21 contained language that prevented discrimination against  
22 psychologists. In fact, the law said that if a hospital  
23 offered services that both physicians and psychologists  
24 could provide, such services may be performed by either  
25 without discrimination.

1           Despite that amended statute, in 1983, the  
2           California Department of Health issued a regulation  
3           prohibiting hospitals from permitting psychologists to  
4           carry primary responsibility for the diagnosis and  
5           treatment of patients in hospitals. In response to this  
6           regulation, the psychologists sued in a case now known as  
7           the California Association of Psychology Providers v.  
8           Peter Rank, who was the Director of the Department of  
9           Health Services at the time. The trial court in that  
10          case declared the regulation to be invalid and in  
11          conflict with the existing statute. An appeals court,  
12          however, reversed that decision, and the case went on to  
13          the California Supreme Court.

14                 In 1990, the California Supreme Court struck  
15          down the regulation in conflict with the original  
16          hospital practice statute and interpreted that statute to  
17          be clear in authorizing that psychologists could take  
18          primary responsibility for the admission, diagnosis and  
19          treatment of their patients in hospital. Additionally,  
20          that court interpreted the existing statute and its non-  
21          discrimination provision as meaning just that. Non-  
22          discrimination means non-discrimination, that when  
23          psychologists and psychiatrists are both able to perform  
24          a service by virtue of the scope of their practice,  
25          "Neither is subject to constraints from which the other

1       is free."

2                   Implementation post CAPP v. Rank has hardly  
3       been easy or smooth. In particular, implementation in  
4       the State Hospital System for psychologists has remained  
5       quite a challenge. In 1996 and 1998, the psychologists  
6       in the state hospital setting went back to the  
7       legislature and amended that original hospital practice  
8       statute to explicitly indicate that it applied to the  
9       state hospital setting.

10                  Despite those amended provisions to the  
11       statute, in December of 2002, the Department of Mental  
12       Health issued a special order which allowed only  
13       psychiatrists to serve as attending clinicians, the role  
14       that is actually what allows a provider to provide  
15       primary responsibility. And it also required  
16       psychologists to practice under the supervision of  
17       psychiatrists. Psychologists in California are  
18       anticipating legal action against that rule which they  
19       believe to be in conflict with the existing statute, but  
20       in the meantime, some activity in the legislature has  
21       resulted in some interesting activity.

22                  In some discussion of the legislative intent  
23       from the original amendments to the hospital practice  
24       statute, the legislature then sent a message to the  
25       Department of Mental Health Services urging them to



1       become compliant with the existing law. In response to  
2       that, the Deputy Director of the Department of Mental  
3       Health Services sent a memo to all the medical staff of  
4       state hospital facilities in California urging them,  
5       without any specificity, but urging them to make their  
6       facilities compliant with the existing statute 1316.5.  
7       In response to the memo from the Deputy Director, one  
8       particular chief of medical staff of one of the state  
9       hospitals responded in a way that is very much exemplary  
10      of the response by psychiatry to the implementation of  
11      this law.

12               According to the chief of medical staff of  
13      Patton State Hospital, he says, and I quote, "It is my  
14      opinion as chief of medical staff at Patton State  
15      Hospital that our medical staff has complied with Health  
16      and Safety Code 1316.5. While the medical staff has been  
17      willing to examine the current utilization of  
18      psychologists within Patton State Hospital, it has been  
19      with the idea of improving patient care in a safe and  
20      legal environment. The evolving political link made by  
21      the psychologists' lobby is that Health and Safety Code  
22      1316.5 compliance requires state hospitals to allow  
23      psychologists to become attending clinicians. Within  
24      this law, there is no mention in plain language of  
25      medical staffs being required to grant psychologists the

1 position of attending.

2 "There has been no objective outside opinion of  
3 what the law Health and Safety 1316.5 requires. Until  
4 such time, the Patton State Hospital medical staff will  
5 rely on the plain language reading of the law. It is not  
6 out of disrespect, but rather out of deference to the  
7 carefully constructed laws produced by the legislature  
8 that we reach this conclusion. The medical staff of  
9 Patton State Hospital is in compliance with Health and  
10 Safety Code 1316.5."

11 The psychologists, as you might imagine,  
12 disagree.

13 I would also note and call the Commission's and  
14 Department's attention to a recent article that appeared  
15 in the June 1st issue of the San Francisco Chronicle,  
16 which looked at the salaries of state employees in  
17 California. And of the top ten highest paid state  
18 employees, approximately five were psychiatrists employed  
19 in the state system. And interestingly, the reason the  
20 salaries of psychiatrists tend to be high is there is  
21 thought to be a shortage of psychiatrists and of that  
22 service in the system so that recruitment and retention  
23 bonuses are paid to psychiatrists.

24 In addition, psychiatrists serve the role as  
25 being on call in the facility, a role that's enabled by

1       being an attending clinician. And as a result of the  
2       salary received from those bonuses and on-call  
3       experience, the end salary is boosted from 30 to 270  
4       percent over the original salary of those individuals  
5       according to the San Francisco Chronicle article. In one  
6       instance, one particular psychiatrist in addition to his  
7       salary was receiving well over \$100,000 in recruitment  
8       and retention bonuses as well as on-call pay.

9               While California may be the best example of  
10      barriers to hospital practice for psychologists, it's far  
11      from the only example. Another instance which currently  
12      has been in dispute is in Nebraska where fairly recently,  
13      1998, by relative standards, psychologists in Nebraska  
14      persuaded the legislature to amend the hospital practice  
15      statute in Nebraska so that any hospital was prohibited  
16      from denying clinical privileges to psychologists as a  
17      result of their license. Psychologists were added to a  
18      list of a number of other professions that were already  
19      included in the hospital licensing law.

20             Despite the change in statute, however, many  
21      psychologists in the State Hospital System were being  
22      refused medical staff standing in those hospitals. And  
23      15 psychologists in November of 2002 sued the individual  
24      psychiatrists who were responsible for the medical  
25      staff's decision to refuse medical staff standing to

1       those psychologists. The suit was brought in federal  
2       court based on an alleged violation of a provision of the  
3       Civil Rights Act in which a property interest was being  
4       denied without due process. The case survived the motion  
5       to dismiss and was fast proceeding to trial, although on  
6       the eve of trial, the case settled and the psychologists  
7       within the Nebraska State System have now been authorized  
8       to be part of the medical staff as a part of the  
9       settlement to that case.

10               The scope of practice issue for psychologists  
11       in hospitals is, as I mentioned earlier, one of actually  
12       doing the things that psychologists were already able to  
13       do in an outpatient basis, but now in a different  
14       setting. That, of course, doesn't mean an expansion of  
15       practice. Another issue now beginning to develop within  
16       the health care community and for psychology is with  
17       respect to statutory authorization of prescription  
18       privileges for appropriately trained psychologists, which  
19       of course is an issue of expanding psychologists' scope  
20       of practice and an issue which of course requires  
21       legislation leading to an acted statute to do that. Of  
22       course, then there is opposition to that which is  
23       considered part of healthy legislative debate on the  
24       topic.

25               We are, however, beginning to see some activity

1       that falls outside of the healthy legislative debate of  
2       the topic. As one case in point, a psychologist in  
3       Tennessee, among the states that are currently pursuing  
4       legislation to authorize appropriately trained  
5       psychologists to prescribe. This psychologist in  
6       Tennessee had a long history of being invited to do  
7       presentations and workshops on behalf of a number of  
8       pharmaceutical companies because of his areas of  
9       expertise in depression and panic disorder and  
10      cardiovascular disease; the psychologist found that all  
11      of his invitations were being rescinded and no new  
12      invitations to speak at any of the pharmaceutical company  
13      events were forthcoming.

14               He also was understanding that he was believed  
15      to be part of the prescription privileges movement in  
16      Tennessee. He believes and it is alleged in a pending  
17      lawsuit that at least one psychiatrist threatened the  
18      pharmaceutical companies with a refusal to prescribe  
19      their medication if those companies continued to use this  
20      psychologist as a speaker on their behalf in workshops  
21      and presentations. As I mentioned, this is collateral to  
22      the issue of scope of practice, but when I think of  
23      interest then perhaps relevance nonetheless. The real  
24      issue, of course, will be in the implementation phase of  
25      any existing prescription privileges statutes.

1           We now have one statute in the State of New  
2 Mexico where psychologists are now authorized to  
3 prescribe. That statute went into effect July 1, 2002  
4 and has been in a regulatory proceeding since in order to  
5 promulgate regulations to implement that statute. We at  
6 the American Psychological Association believe that the  
7 implementation phase of that statute will bear close  
8 watching in order to assure that in fact the law was  
9 being implemented as the law was originally enacted. But  
10 I would argue to you that in my profession, we're  
11 inclined to say the best predictor of future behavior is  
12 past behavior. And if that's the case, I would suggest  
13 that all of the implementation of the new prescription  
14 privileges statute that we'll see bear close watching.

15           In conclusion, I again want to thank the  
16 Commission and the Department for this opportunity to  
17 talk about barriers and to say that from our perspective,  
18 we see this as an ongoing dialogue and stand ready to  
19 offer whatever help we can at any point in time. Thank  
20 you.

21           (Applause.)

22           MR. HYMAN: Next up is Dr. Jerome Modell, and I  
23 would note that we have, since the beginning of this  
24 session, learned how to spell anesthesiologist on his  
25 name tag.

1 DR. MODELL: Thank you very much. I appreciate  
2 the opportunity to be here this afternoon to talk with  
3 you about a subject that I've been involved with now for  
4 over four decades. I am Jerome H. Modell, M.D. and I'm  
5 a, at present, I am Professor Emeritus in the Department  
6 of Anesthesiology at the University Florida College of  
7 Medicine.

8 From 1969 to 2000, I was a professor of  
9 anesthesiology in that department. And I chaired the  
10 department for 23 years from 1969 until 1992. In 1990, I  
11 was asked to become the senior associate dean for  
12 clinical affairs in the College of Medicine. And since  
13 that time until my retirement from these positions into  
14 the Professor Emeritus position in January of 2001, I  
15 have been in that position as well as the Executive  
16 Associate Dean of the College of Medicine, the Interim  
17 Dean of the College of Medicine, and the Associate Vice  
18 President for Health Affairs at the University of  
19 Florida.

20 I also, by way of interest and background, have  
21 been a consultant to over 50 academic health sciences  
22 centers in this country. I have delivered over 200  
23 invited lectures around the country and overseas and  
24 published over 200 scientific papers and book chapters in  
25 the fields of clinical care anesthesiology and patient

1 safety. Over the past four decades, I have been  
2 extensively involved as an academician and a clinician in  
3 the training of anesthesiology residents. And for  
4 approximately 15 years of that time, also training  
5 student nurse anesthetists.

6 I'm here today as a representative of the  
7 American Society of Anesthesiologists (or ASA), a  
8 national organization comprised of approximately 38,000  
9 persons most of whom are physician anesthesiologists.  
10 Anesthesiologists either provide or approximately  
11 medically direct the anesthetic care for about nine out  
12 of every ten of the 30,000,000 cases of surgical  
13 procedures performed per year in this country. The most  
14 common format for anesthesia practice is the anesthesia  
15 care team mode where the anesthesiologist will medically  
16 direct two or at most three nurse anesthetists  
17 simultaneously in caring for patients.

18 Next most common is the delivery of anesthesia  
19 by the anesthesiologist on a one to one relationship with  
20 the patient. And current data suggests that that occurs  
21 approximately 30 to 45 percent of all cases are performed  
22 in that manner. Least common, about ten percent, are  
23 cases in which nurse anesthetists deliver anesthesia  
24 under the supervision of the surgeon or other operating  
25 practitioner. The bulk of these cases are performed in



1       their own hospitals and physician offices.

2               The national scope of practice conflict or  
3       debate, if you will, between the ASA and the American  
4       Association of Nurse Anesthetists (or AANA for short) has  
5       been well publicized. It stems fundamentally from the  
6       AANA's position that nurse anesthetists are qualified by  
7       their training and experience to engage independently in  
8       the practice of medicine as it relates to anesthesia  
9       care. And ASA's position is they are not. ASA believes  
10      that nurse anesthetists should be directly supervised by  
11      a physician, preferably by the medical direction of an  
12      anesthesiologist.

13             Over the past three decades, this conflict has  
14      played itself out principally in the state legislatures  
15      and health related state regulatory bodies. It has also  
16      surfaced in the Congress mainly because the medicare  
17      rules for hospitals and ambulatory surgical facilities  
18      have, since the inception of that program, required that  
19      a nurse anesthetist be medically supervised. Beginning  
20      over a decade ago, the AANA embarked upon an effort to  
21      dismantle this quality oriented federal requirement. But  
22      the AANA effort was derailed two years ago when the  
23      current administration reversed the prior  
24      administration's proposal to repeal the medicare  
25      supervision rule.

1           Under current medicare regulations, physician  
2 supervision of nurse anesthetists is sill required. A  
3 state governor, however, is permitted to "opt out" of the  
4 medicare supervision rule if after seeking advice from  
5 his or her boards of medicine and nursing, the governor  
6 determined that an opt out is in the best interest of the  
7 state citizens. A nationwide survey and over a dozen  
8 statewide surveys uniformly disclosed that medicare  
9 beneficiaries support the supervision requirement by a  
10 margin of nearly three to one. Most governors who have  
11 opted out have essentially opted in, if you will, to  
12 state laws or regulations requiring physician  
13 involvement. Several other governors have been known to  
14 consider the opt out mechanism and elected to take no  
15 action.

16           Today, aside from the medicare rule, about 45  
17 states require as a matter of state law that nurse  
18 anesthetists be supervised by or collaborate with a  
19 physician. This pattern of required physician  
20 involvement exists because legislatures and regulators  
21 have determined that the delivery of anesthetics is  
22 sufficiently dangerous that the involvement of a  
23 physician is necessary to protect the patient medically.  
24 We must realize that we're talking here about the  
25 application of chemical agents which, when administered

1 in sufficient doses in the wrong combinations or given to  
2 a particularly sensitive patient, can kill, permanently  
3 incapacitate or mutilate the patient.

4 A qualified anesthesia provider must also  
5 properly diagnose and treat life-threatening medical  
6 conditions in the operating room. In many cases, he or  
7 she is providing complex procedures and therapies to  
8 maintain and improve a patient's medical condition while  
9 concurrently administering an anesthetic. Almost no  
10 patient is qualified in this highly dangerous environment  
11 to assess either the skills of the proposed anesthesia  
12 provider or to assess the risks expected or unexpected  
13 inherent to the administration of today's anesthetics.

14 ASA is proud of the fact that a major part  
15 because of its multi-faceted, \$20,000,000 patient safety  
16 program, anesthesia-related mortality rates have dropped  
17 radically over the past three decades. When I was a  
18 resident physician in the late 1950s, the anesthesia-  
19 related mortality rate was approximately one in 500 to  
20 one in 2,000 patients. Today, depending upon the  
21 relative health of the study population, anesthesia care  
22 is up to 400-fold safer in terms of mortality than it was  
23 when I was a resident from 1957 to 1960.

24 I take particular pride in this because we at  
25 the University of Florida were amongst the first in the

1 country to advocate the continuous monitoring of things  
2 like pulse oximetry and end tidal carbon monoxide tension  
3 in all patients under anesthesia. And actually submitted  
4 this for publication five or six years before it became a  
5 standard for the country. It has made a difference.

6 Even the most recent anesthesia outcomes data,  
7 however, show that much remains to be learned and done.

8 Our goal is that no one dies or is harmed from the  
9 administration of anesthesia. Here again, our department  
10 has been a leader and that one of our faculty members,  
11 Dr. Monk, has just completed a study showing the decline  
12 in cognitive skills in the elderly population after  
13 anesthetics to be a real thing and not a myth.

14 In this context, our goal is that no one should  
15 die or no one should be harmed from anesthesia. I am  
16 well aware that this form is organized by an antitrust  
17 enforcement agency. I ask, who is better qualified in  
18 the state legislatures and health-related regulatory  
19 bodies to determine on the basis of expert advice for  
20 physicians and other health care experts the appropriate  
21 minimum standards of anesthesia and other medical care  
22 necessary to protect the citizens of that state? Has ASA  
23 exercised its Noerr-Pennington rights under the  
24 Constitution to persuade these governmental bodies to  
25 closely regulate nurse anesthetists scope of practice?

1       You bet it has, again and again.

2               We frankly cringe at the suggestion implicit in  
3       the description of this hearing that there's something  
4       sinister or wrong about that activity. ASA has pursued  
5       this course of activity not because it enjoys their  
6       constitutional right to do so, but because it feels  
7       obligated to assume and assure that patients across the  
8       country are provided with the best possible anesthesia  
9       care consistent with the current state of medical  
10      knowledge. ASA feels well-justified in this pursuit  
11      principally because of the differences and qualifications  
12      of anesthesiologists and nurse anesthetists, and because  
13      anesthesia outcome studies have consistently underscored  
14      the importance of anesthesiologists' participation in  
15      every possible case.

16             Under current standards, anesthesiologists must  
17      obtain a Bachelor's degree after four years of  
18      undergraduate pre-med studies emphasizing the sciences.  
19      Then, four years of medical school resulting in an M.D.  
20      or a D.O. degree, and a four-year anesthesiology  
21      residency program for a total of 12 years. By contrast,  
22      nurse anesthetists under today's standards obtain a  
23      Bachelor's degree in nursing to become a registered  
24      licensed nurse, and then complete a two to three-year  
25      nurse anesthesia training program for a total of six or

1       seven years. That's the difference between the two  
2       disciplines of five to six years of formal training.

3               There are many grandfathered nurse anesthetists  
4       in practice today who have had as little as only four  
5       years of total nursing and anesthesia formal training in  
6       the past to prepare them to administer anesthesia.

7       Although the specific differences in training and  
8       clinical experience for the two disciplines are numerous  
9       both as to depth and subject area, what nurse  
10      anesthetists fundamentally lack is the comprehensive  
11      medical knowledge acquired by anesthesiologists in  
12      medical school prior to undertaking their anesthesia  
13      specific training and applying that knowledge in an  
14      extended residency program.

15             The AANA speaks proudly on its web site about  
16      the fact that it costs eight times as much to train an  
17      anesthesiologist as a nurse anesthetist. To me, this  
18      fact, if true, speaks absolute volumes about the relative  
19      qualifications of the two provider types to give the  
20      safest and most comprehensive medical anesthesia care.  
21      At the core of quality anesthesia practice is an  
22      understanding of the complex physiologic mechanisms of  
23      the human body in health and disease and how various  
24      chemical agents affect the -- systems, the  
25      cardiovascular, respiratory and neuro-systems, to name

1 the most significant.

2 Anesthesia providers must know how to deal  
3 successfully in a matter of seconds or minutes with  
4 changes in the patient's physiologic condition. That is  
5 not the practice of nursing. It is the practice of  
6 medicine, made possible by education of a physician prior  
7 to receiving training in the specialty of anesthesiology  
8 and then building on that education during residency.  
9 Not surprisingly, various anesthesia outcome studies over  
10 the past two decades have demonstrated lower morbidity  
11 and mortality rates when anesthesiologists are involved  
12 in the patient's care. A University of Pennsylvania  
13 study in 2000, showed that adjustment for patient acuity  
14 and hospital characteristics, after that, there were 25  
15 excess deaths per 10,000 medicare surgical patients when  
16 an anesthesiologist did not provide or direct the  
17 anesthesia care. And these results were very recently  
18 essentially replicated in an outcome study financed in  
19 part by the AANA.

20 There is a current shortage of anesthesia  
21 providers in this country, both anesthesiologists and  
22 nurse anesthetists. In response to a national survey  
23 conducted last year, one-half of the responding hospital  
24 administrators complained about a lack of anesthesia  
25 providers so that they had to either close operating

1 rooms early or extend cases until the following day.  
2 Contrary to popular belief, the ASA has consistently  
3 advocated the current shortage be solved by the training  
4 not only of more anesthesiologists but of nurse  
5 anesthetists as well.

6 ASA has repeatedly taken the position that  
7 nurse anesthetists are valuable members of the anesthesia  
8 care team, and rather than erecting barriers to their  
9 entry into the marketplace, has welcomed the training of  
10 more of them. Nurse anesthesia basic education is  
11 financed in a significant measure by federal funds. ASA  
12 has never called into question the wisdom of these  
13 appropriations. The ASA board of directors has recently  
14 recommended to its house of delegates, that ASA  
15 educational membership be opened to nurse anesthetists;  
16 thereby providing more ready access for those individuals  
17 to ASA's comprehensive, continuing education programs and  
18 ensuring that they will become even more valuable members  
19 of the anesthesia care team.

20 In addition to supporting the training of more  
21 nurse anesthetists, ASA in recent years have supported  
22 the training and licensure of anesthesiology assistants  
23 (or AA's). AA's are health professionals qualified by  
24 advanced education and clinical training to work under  
25 the medical direction of an anesthesiologist. AA



1 training requires a two-year course of anesthesia study  
2 following completion of a science-based undergraduate  
3 curriculum, and of -- and clinical training in  
4 anesthesia. Student AA's spend over 2,000 hours in  
5 clinical rotations involving more than 500 cases, about  
6 the same as student nurse anesthetists.

7 The two current master's degree programs  
8 offered by Emory University and Case Western Reserve  
9 University are accredited by the Commission in Education  
10 of the Allied Health Administration Programs. In recent  
11 years, AA's have begun to seek licensure as a category of  
12 health care professional under state law. The ASA has  
13 supported this effort. AA's are currently licensed in  
14 Alabama, Georgia, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina,  
15 Vermont, and legislation was recently passed in Missouri.

16 Professional liability insurance rates charged  
17 the AA's and nurse anesthetists are the same, except that  
18 AA's must be medically directed by an anesthesiologist as  
19 distinct from any other type of physician. ASA advocates  
20 that the scope of practice to the two types of providers  
21 be identical. This is the case in a large hospital in  
22 Atlanta which has the largest case load east of the  
23 Mississippi, and approximately half of their 67  
24 anesthesia care team providers that work under the  
25 direction of an anesthesiologist are AA's and the other

1 half are nurse anesthetists. Both do the same types of  
2 things and receive the same type of remuneration.

3 Given the nature of these hearings, it's of  
4 interest that the AANA and its members have undertaken a  
5 virulent lobbying and public relations campaign against  
6 further recognition of AA's by the states and federal  
7 agencies. This has included the procuring of  
8 congressional letters to the Department of Defense,  
9 denigrating AA qualifications to participate as proposed  
10 by DOD in the tri-care program for members of the  
11 military and their dependents. It has further included  
12 the sending of at least 400 letters to the Department of  
13 Veteran Affairs, objecting to the mere mention of AA's in  
14 its anesthesia manual that is currently under revision.

15 Two weeks ago, an AANA advertisement appeared  
16 in Stars and Stripes warning our service men and women  
17 about the unqualified AA's about to be forced upon by the  
18 Department of Defense. Perhaps of greatest interest are  
19 reports from a number of anesthesiologists in my own  
20 state of Florida including the University of Florida.  
21 They have received boycott threats from nurse  
22 anesthetists in the event that these physicians support  
23 legislation authorizing licensure of AA's or participate  
24 in the organization of ASA training programs at either of  
25 the two universities, Miami or Florida.

1           I, personally, find it startling and  
2       disappointing that nurse anesthetists would pursue this  
3       reckless course, especially in the fact of the severe  
4       shortage of anesthesia providers in my state.

5           In conclusion, I am not a lawyer, and I  
6       certainly am not schooled in antitrust laws nor am I a  
7       health economist. But I do understand after over 40  
8       years of practice, teaching and research to improve  
9       safety are the fundamental ingredients of sound, safe  
10      anesthesia care. If the Congress and state legislators  
11      are persuaded that the public good is better served by  
12      dismantling the system that currently requires medical  
13      direction of every case involving anesthesia care, it  
14      will represent a tragic development for the nation's  
15      health care system.

16           Until that time, however, both I and my society  
17      will vigorously advocate in favor of physician  
18      supervision and continue our efforts to make nurse  
19      anesthesia care safer than ever. Thank you.

20           (Applause.)

21           MR. HYMAN: Finally, Jeffrey Bauer, speaking on  
22      behalf of the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists.

23           MR. BAUER: Thank you, David, and thank you to  
24      the Federal Trade Commission for giving me the  
25      opportunity to participate in this very important debate

1       which I truly believe is part of the bigger picture of  
2       health care reform.

3               I was a kid who grew up in the '50s and the  
4       '60s, I can readily validate Dr. Bloche's  
5       characterization of the Kenneth Arrow view of doctors,  
6       namely, that doctors and only doctors know how to  
7       diagnose and treat illness and the doctors all know the  
8       same thing. So, you might ask what happened since then  
9       that makes me firmly convinced today that doctors are not  
10      unique and they're not deserving of any right to restrict  
11      the consumer choice to other equally qualified  
12      practitioners.

13             Now, I want to give you a quick overview of  
14      some rather bizarre experiences in my life that lead me  
15      firmly to this conviction. It all began back in the late  
16      '60s, a little after my 21st birthday with an  
17      overindulgence one night in Paris when I managed to  
18      consume both a bottle of champagne in its entirety and a  
19      large bar of Belgian chocolate. I felt like I was going  
20      to die the next day, much worse than a hangover.

21             And so, I asked the mother of the family that I  
22      was living with for that year if she would get me an  
23      appointment with a doctor. And she shot back, well, what  
24      kind of doctor would you like? And I just go, a doctor,  
25      there's only one kind of doctor, the ones that know it

1 all. And so, no, no, no, you know. We have different  
2 kinds of doctors here in France, and she went down the  
3 differences. They had allopaths and homeopaths and  
4 naturopaths, all recognized by the insurance system. I  
5 thought, boy, these crazy French, they realized something  
6 other than an MD could possibly have some understanding  
7 of human health.

8 I then went on several years later to become  
9 the director of educational support services for several  
10 residencies in a 400-bed teaching hospital. And I came  
11 down with a hospital staff infection that flattened me  
12 about as much as the champagne and the chocolate. And  
13 nicely, seven of the residency directors came to my  
14 bedside at my apartment. They were so concerned to get  
15 me back in action. And they poked and prodded and all  
16 asked me things, and I thought, seven doctors, you know,  
17 I'd get the same opinion.

18 And they took a vote on whether to give me  
19 antibiotics, and it was four to three against. And boy,  
20 did that begin to challenge my assumption that all  
21 doctors saw things the same way. Then I ended up getting  
22 a Ph.D. in medical economics not too long thereafter.  
23 In, 1973, joined the faculty at the University of  
24 Colorado Health Sciences Center with full tenure track  
25 appointments in both the Schools of Medicine and

1 Dentistry. And spent seven years publishing rather than  
2 perishing.

3 And ultimately, after I became tenured after  
4 seven years of teaching statistics and research at these  
5 medical and dental schools, I became the assistant  
6 chancellor for planning and program development. And my  
7 principal responsibility for the four years as assistant  
8 chancellor was to integrate the undergraduate curricula  
9 of medicine, dentistry, nursing and pharmacy.

10 And so I had this unique opportunity beginning  
11 with the champagne and chocolate going through four years  
12 where my job was to make it possible for a nursing  
13 student to take bio-chemistry alongside a medical  
14 student. And actually, we discovered there was no  
15 difference in the health sciences that these students  
16 were learning. So I became intimately aware of the  
17 curricula that were used to train physicians, nurses,  
18 dentists, and pharmacists.

19 And because I was originally trained as an  
20 economist, I found that I could look at all of this from  
21 the perspective not only of my years as a professor,  
22 being a statistician and research professor, but also  
23 looking at the economics harms that were associated here.  
24 I realize that many of the people who would be digesting  
25 this testimony are themselves Ph.D. economists or lawyers

1 well-versed in antitrust. But it is no doubt in my mind  
2 that I've tried to defend in many of my writings that  
3 there are entry barriers, undeserved entry barriers  
4 against other qualified practitioners, usually deriving  
5 from state practice acts.

6 There's clearly, as a monopoly, harm under this  
7 old practice, the pricing arrangement where there are  
8 unnecessary health care costs giving this opportunity and  
9 revenue to doctors to supervise people that quite frankly  
10 have equal or even better skills. There's also the  
11 ability on the part of the doctors claiming the right to  
12 protect solely the direct access to patients for  
13 unjustified income disparities. And there is the  
14 imposition of unnecessary and unearned supervisory fees  
15 which have been nicely mentioned by two of the preceding  
16 speakers.

17 But at the bottom of the line, there is the  
18 captain of the ship authority, the very strong assertion  
19 that only the doctor is qualified to take care of the SS  
20 Health care or whatever it might be, and it is the ship  
21 that fails to recognize that other people could meet the  
22 same criteria.

23 So toward the end of my four years as the  
24 assistant chancellor, I began to go back to my physician  
25 colleagues and many friends outside of academia who are

1 doctors, what is it that makes the doctors special? You  
2 tell me because you've been to medical school, that you  
3 are the only ones who are qualified to supervise patient  
4 care. And after many interviews with physicians and four  
5 years of immersing myself in the curricula of a lot of  
6 the non-physician professional schools, I developed and  
7 presented in my book, "Not What The Doctor Ordered," what  
8 I thought were the seven criteria that medicine stood on  
9 to claim its right to control the patient enterprise. I  
10 even had a cartoonist in my book, Not What The Doctor  
11 Ordered, put the captain of the ship up there. You had  
12 to step up these seven steps to prove that you deserve to  
13 be in charge of a health care delivery team.

14 And very quickly, there is our advanced  
15 education, namely, a six-year minimum, all involved in  
16 clinical sciences at a publicly accredited academic  
17 health center. Ongoing certification where you had  
18 current knowledge, you're required once you completed  
19 your training to stay current, not the years of training  
20 because the half-life of medical knowledge, I argue, is  
21 now less than two years. Competency-based testing on a  
22 regular, periodic basis showing that you knew what you  
23 were still doing. Again, unrelated to years of training,  
24 but to keeping up with fast-based change.

25 The scientific base, something that I strongly



1 believe in, using randomized and controlled trials  
2 reported ultimately in a peer review literature a  
3 coherent, clinical model. And indeed, allopathic  
4 medicine and osteopathic medicine are very clear and  
5 somewhat different clinical models. But so, too, did  
6 nursing and pharmacy in the various advanced therapies.  
7 And definitely a philosophy of patient care.  
8 Professional liability was clear. I don't think anyone  
9 should have the right to see a patient without someone  
10 else overlooking their shoulder unless they can get  
11 insurance coverage and have meaningful sanctions for  
12 violating the professional responsibilities.

13 Then, there's a professional ethic, namely,  
14 commitment to the general welfare and an accountability  
15 to the clientele, that again were part of what my  
16 physician friends told me made them the unique captains  
17 of the ship. But last but not least was the quality  
18 assurance. And I think that if the research enterprise  
19 in the last few years has done one thing more than the  
20 other, it's this concept of evidence-based practice and  
21 outcome measurement. And I included that in a book  
22 written back in '98 as one of the seven pillars of  
23 independent practice.

24 So, when I began to apply this based on my  
25 knowledge of what people knew, I discovered that there

1        were actually several substitutes within defined scopes  
2        of practice who merited independence defined by the same  
3        criteria that physicians had used to be the captain of  
4        the ship. Not only were physicians qualified to be the  
5        captain of their ship, but advanced practice nurses,  
6        clinical pharmacists, advanced practice therapists and  
7        psychologists, very amply and ably described by several  
8        preceding speakers, met the same criteria. And I'll be  
9        delighted to debate those with my physician friends in  
10       the panel in just a moment.

11                But I think there are clearly factors which  
12       would negate this right to independent practice if any  
13       one of these seven, be it the physicians or the advanced  
14       practice nurses or therapists, were to fail to maintain  
15       the integrity of these foundations to allow the model to  
16       get muddy or to somehow avoid liability. If they were to  
17       be subject to randomized and controlled research trials,  
18       in other words, defensible research that showed inferior  
19       outcomes or if we were to discover discrepancies between  
20       expected and actual practice, we could challenge that  
21       independence. But absolutely no evidence of any of those  
22       have been submitted so far today.

23                What we have heard and what we see in  
24       considerable evidence provided in documents I'll share  
25       with you in just a moment are some very false arguments

1       against the independent practice for certified registered  
2       nurse anesthetists. For example, there's the ample  
3       argument, part of ASA's litany, that physician  
4       supervision ensures quality. And yet the concept of  
5       supervision is poorly defined and inconsistently  
6       practiced. Supervision can mean many different things to  
7       many different people. And it's also backed by unfounded  
8       assertions, not by research.

9               Indeed, I would love to refer you, and, in  
10       fact, do refer you to the March newsletter of the  
11       American Society for Anesthesiologists where the editor  
12       of that particular journal says, and I quote, "For the  
13       safety of our patients, we realize that physicians must  
14       remain in charge of all aspects of medicine including the  
15       delivery of anesthesia care." We've already heard that  
16       today. "Although most nurse anesthetists," and I love  
17       this, "like most anesthesiologists," why not all  
18       anesthesiologists, "have as their preeminent goal the  
19       provision of good, clinical care for their patients, the  
20       nurse anesthetists state and national organizations all  
21       too often appear to be fixated on the single issue of  
22       independent practice."

23               I'm absolutely amazed then that the ASA can  
24       argue that they're going to be guaranteed good quality  
25       care when the editor of their own journal and the

1 official publication of the ASA just two months ago  
2 admitted that not all anesthesiologists are dedicated to  
3 high quality care. There's an assertion by extension  
4 that the anesthesiologists prevents independent practice.  
5 There's certainly the reference to the well-known  
6 scarcity of anesthesiologists in rural areas, and I live  
7 in rural America so I'm well familiar with this. And  
8 then of course, there's the declining quantity of new  
9 anesthesiologists.

10 And, again, I refer to one month later, to last  
11 month's issue, April, excuse, now that it's June, two  
12 months ago, from the Secretary of the American Society of  
13 Anesthesiologists. And she said, I'm relating to this  
14 argument that anesthesiologists will ensure necessary  
15 coverage in quality, this is a direct quote:

16 "In summary, because of low number of trainees  
17 and low written pass rates which bottomed out at 46  
18 percent of the people that took the exam in 2000, the  
19 number of newly board certified anesthesiologists who  
20 became available to enter the national workforce pool  
21 went from an annual high of 1,536 in '97 to only 705 in  
22 2001. This represents only half the number of new ABA  
23 diplomat anesthesiologists available annually five years  
24 earlier."

25 This is not invective from the AANA, this is

1 from the official publication of the American Society of  
2 Anesthesiologists.

3 Another false argument is that the independent  
4 authority eliminates collaborative practice. And we've  
5 already heard the evidence or the concern that nurse  
6 anesthetists or psychologists or physical therapists who  
7 are allowed independent authority would not continue to  
8 be part of the team. Yet, in doing my research, I found  
9 many areas, many of the states where independent practice  
10 is allowed, in anesthesia, in physical therapy, et  
11 cetera, where collaborative practice is still very, very  
12 important. And indeed, what I have also found is that  
13 many anesthesiologists support independence for CRNA's.  
14 Any assertion that all anesthesiologists feel the same  
15 way as what we've heard today would be totally wrong.

16 Then there's this idea of the quality  
17 imperative compelling us to keep nurses in ICU's. And  
18 again, from April issue, and again, written by the editor  
19 of the ASA's own journal, I find this patronizing quote:

20 "In order to increase the ranks of the student  
21 nurse anesthetists, recruiters must draw from a  
22 critically short supply of nurses in general, and ICU  
23 nurses specifically. This requirement is counter-  
24 productive in a time when patient's safety in the ICU is  
25 being emphasized by major corporations such as Leapfrog."

1 I'm very familiar with the Leapfrog assertions.  
2 I've read that literature extensively, and it deals with  
3 the physicians, not with the nurses. And again, I find  
4 it an example of anticompetitive behavior to suggest that  
5 nurses should stay in the ICU rather than move to  
6 critical care and advanced practice nursing by delivering  
7 anesthesia.

8 Another false argument is that the captain of  
9 the ship tradition saves money, and yet there's ample  
10 evidence that there's a wasteful duplication. I have  
11 four people, in other words, an anesthesiologist  
12 supervising three anesthesia assistants or three nurse  
13 anesthetists, why not have them all delivering the  
14 anesthesia? At least the certified nurse anesthetists  
15 and the anesthesiologists?

16 And indeed, there are many cases where the  
17 captains are less knowledgeable than the crew in this  
18 issue of delegation or supervision. And I discovered,  
19 and I think it's a clear lesson of the health reform  
20 debates of roughly ten years ago, that the public cares  
21 much more about choice than cost and health reform.

22 So efforts to suggest that we need to maintain  
23 cost here are second to what I think is clearly the  
24 public's focus on having choice between qualified  
25 providers. There's also the assertion made in several

1       ASA tomes that the dependent practitioners will remain  
2       loyal to the care team. One of the reasons that I do not  
3       include physician assistants in my book, "Not What The  
4       Doctor Ordered," is as I began to interview physician  
5       assistants, I found many of them demanding independence  
6       even though they by statute were required to be reporting  
7       to physicians. And so PA's, when they first formed their  
8       training programs, argued very strenuously that they  
9       would stay within the fold. I think it might be safe to  
10      say that as many as the majority would now like out.

11             The issue of anesthesiologists being the  
12      solution to the problem also strikes me as inappropriate  
13      in context to debating whether nurse anesthetists and  
14      physical therapists and the like ought to have  
15      independence because in reality, I think it is an  
16      anticompetitive act to replace CRNA's. And there's  
17      absolutely no way by my criteria that anesthesiology  
18      assistants are substitutes for CRNA's. They don't even  
19      come close in that seven-step ladder that I mentioned a  
20      moment ago. And there are certainly no models or valid  
21      studies demonstrating actual advantages to anesthesiology  
22      assistants.

23             And I certainly as a former medical school  
24      professor and academic administrator don't see how any  
25      new program could grow in the state that medical centers

1 find themselves in today. Nobody has any money for  
2 program expansion. So, if you say what problem the  
3 anesthesiology assistants solve, the answer would be  
4 none. I can only see control as the issue.

5 There are several protections that can be used  
6 to support independent practice. First of all, surgical  
7 privileges are awarded by hospitals, not by state  
8 legislatures, not by state boards. And indeed, the  
9 privileges are commonly tied to competencies, and you can  
10 go to any hospital meeting aimed at trustees or medical  
11 or even senior executive leaders and discover that making  
12 sure you've maintained the competency of your people is  
13 an obligation of the hospital. There is no evidence,  
14 anything that I'm aware of, that hospitals would  
15 credential AA's. States may pass laws but it doesn't  
16 mean the hospitals will accept them given their  
17 considerably lesser degree of training. And I think it's  
18 very clear that the American Hospital Association and the  
19 State Hospital Association support the CRNA's in their  
20 position and do not favor continuing the mandatory  
21 supervision requirement.

22 The next, and it's a very important point, is  
23 that the surgeons ultimately get to accept the anesthesia  
24 practitioner. And so, if indeed the surgeons are quite  
25 willing to accept anesthesiologists with nursing



1 background or anesthesia administered by nurse, then I  
2 think it's perfectly safe to say that the people who are  
3 on the ultimately responsible side of the table have no  
4 problem with this. And then, there is the formalized  
5 expectations of individual and organization  
6 accountability. Nobody practices unsupervised today.  
7 One of the biggest significant changes taking place in  
8 health care today is requiring everyone to be very much  
9 operating out in the open and accountable.

10 So the conclusion that I draw after many years  
11 of being involved in this with a bizarre background is  
12 that the CRNA's are at least as good as anesthesiologists  
13 by any of the criteria that merit the right to  
14 independent practice. There is no valid research showing  
15 that unsupervised CRNA's provide inferior care. I  
16 repeat, no valid research challenging that assertion.  
17 And the fact that professional liability claims have  
18 dropped dramatically over the last decade for CRNA's I  
19 think proves the fact that they have an excellent record.

20 And I also think there's ample evidence that  
21 anesthesia services will be worsened by mandatory  
22 supervision because then nurse anesthetists cannot  
23 practice, for example, when the doctor takes a well-  
24 deserved day or two off. If one would argue that we  
25 should leave physicians in control of the system, then

1       why do we have so many problems after a century of  
2       physician-controlled medicine that we're trying to  
3       reform? First of all, there's the argument, well, we're  
4       going to see continued quality if we have the  
5       anesthesiologist in charge. That I'm very disturbed by  
6       the fact that so many, an increasing number of  
7       anesthesiologists themselves are incapable of being  
8       certified by their profession's criteria.

9               I also, as an economist, am concerned that  
10       something greater than the income differential, something  
11       greater than a factor of two, somewhere between two and  
12       three, of the money that can be earned by an  
13       anesthesiologist and a nurse anesthetist for effectively  
14       doing the same thing. And since there's no difference in  
15       outcomes, I absolutely can't understand why there's this  
16       difference in incomes. Then there's also the issue of  
17       access where supervision unnecessarily reduces the  
18       availability of services.

19              The argument, I think, that the bottom line is  
20       that the arguments against unsupervised CRNA practice are  
21       simply wrong. They're not backed by science and fact.  
22       And I think it's based effectively on inconsistency in  
23       the arguments, and I've shown you examples from the  
24       recent literature and the self-interest. I think the  
25       real concern is that the doctors believe that CRNA's are

1 not what the doctor ordered. And what it really should  
2 boil down to in the 21st century policy of this country,  
3 and that's why I'm so happy the Federal Trade Commission  
4 is looking at this, is the consumers deserve the choice.

5 It's not an issue as one of the previous doctor  
6 said of the doctors having the right to the patients, it  
7 should be the right of the patients having the choice of  
8 equally qualified providers. And in the case of  
9 anesthesia and several other professions recognized in  
10 this room today, there is simply no justification for the  
11 medical monopoly. I submit that ending this monopoly is  
12 an important key to health reform. Thank you very much.

13 (Applause.)

14 MR. HYMAN: If I can have all of the panel come  
15 up and take their seats? We've got just a little over 20  
16 minutes, because we always end on time. Cheers from the  
17 panel and the audience. And we've covered a lot of  
18 territory. Our general practice is to allow the earlier  
19 speakers to comment on the later speakers because the  
20 later speakers had the benefit of hearing the earlier  
21 speakers before the remarks.

22 I think I'm going to modify that slightly  
23 because as you've figured out by now, we've sort of  
24 paired the physical therapist and the neurologist, and  
25 the anesthesiologist and the nurse anesthetist. And so,

1 I'd like to ask first Mr. Mallon and then Dr. Modell  
2 whether they wish to comment on the remarks of  
3 respectively the representatives of the American Academy  
4 of Neurology and the representative of the CRNA's. And  
5 then we can throw it open more broadly for comments. And  
6 I have a whole series of questions.

7 But let me start with Dr. Modell first. I'm  
8 sorry, Mr. Mallon then Dr. Modell.

9 MR. MALLON: Surprisingly enough, I would like  
10 to offer some comments.

11 MR. HYMAN: I'm shocked. Shocked. Please.

12 MR. MALLON: I think, Dr. Modell, the concerns  
13 that you raised on their face are plausible. The problem  
14 is there is no evidence to say that they exist in  
15 reality. There's no evidence to say that direct access  
16 to physical therapy is going to cost more. In fact, what  
17 evidence exists says that it will be cheaper. There is  
18 no evidence that says that direct access to physical  
19 therapy will create harm.

20 And in fact, the testimony of liability  
21 insurers would be just to the opposite, that direct  
22 access has no effect on premiums. Nor could you search  
23 any of the 50 state licensure boards to find any evidence  
24 of professional action taken against physical therapists  
25 because of harm in this area. The same could be said, I

1 think, about lack of quality and lack of coordination.  
2 That's with regard to direct access.

3 Secondly, with regard to EMG, EMG constitutes  
4 no expansion of PT practice. PT's have been doing EMG  
5 since at least the early '70s. Medicare recognizes and  
6 pays for EMG provided by physical therapists. I doubt  
7 that medicare would pay for something that is going to  
8 create harm or is being provided by incompetent people.  
9 The states, by and large, in fact there is only one state  
10 that we know of that directly prohibits physical  
11 therapists from performing EMG, and even before that  
12 provision, that state had no physical therapists  
13 performing EMG. It happens to be Hawaii.

14 Thirdly, EMG's do not produce a medical  
15 diagnosis. They produce findings which are used by  
16 physicians to make a medical diagnosis. And I should  
17 clarify here, physical therapists are not claiming to  
18 make a medical diagnosis. We do not diagnose  
19 pathologies. We, I'm not a physical therapist. Physical  
20 therapists do not diagnose pathologies. And there is no  
21 time that we've ever claimed that. Physicians on a daily  
22 basis use the findings supplied by physical therapists,  
23 and many neurologists do this, supplied by physical  
24 therapists in order to make the EMG finding, in order to  
25 make a medical diagnosis.

1                   Fourthly, we have great respect for  
2                   neurologists and all other physicians and we are  
3                   certainly not wanna-be physicians. We are physical  
4                   therapists. And I take a, I hate to be old fashioned, I  
5                   take a little umbrage at the position that only  
6                   physicians care about quality and patients. Quality and  
7                   patients are the utmost concern of the physical  
8                   therapists, and I suspect to many others. And physicians  
9                   have no hold on that market. Thank you.

10                   MR. HYMAN: Dr. Modell, briefly?

11                   DR. MODELL: Yes. I'd like to have an hour and  
12                   have his slides so that I could have his talk but with a  
13                   different perspective. But I know that's not possible.

14                   With all due respect, I think many of the  
15                   things that you pointed out are your opinions. You  
16                   talked about basing them on fact. I didn't see the  
17                   facts. You talk about there's no definition of  
18                   supervision, the Toepfer regulations in the mid-1980s of  
19                   Medicare clearly outlined what is necessary for  
20                   appropriate medical supervision of nurse anesthetists and  
21                   nothing has changed. And those regulations came from the  
22                   Ethical Practice Guidelines of the American Society of  
23                   Anesthesiologists. I know that because I gave them to  
24                   the Senate Committee that put that bill forward at that  
25                   time.

1           As far as the education of the two groups,  
2           sure, you can take pharmacists and nurses and doctors and  
3           give them some of the basic science material together.  
4           We've done that. But I have had a program that I was  
5           responsible for, for training anesthesiology residents  
6           and a program for a school for nurse anesthesia at  
7           exactly the same time in my institution.

8           The people that came in to the nurse program  
9           were all A students. They were the cream of the crop.  
10          It was extremely competitive. We took about four or five  
11          students a year out of a pool of several hundred.  
12          Nevertheless, these individuals had to have supplemental  
13          tutoring or educational courses in addition to the  
14          general courses that we gave in order to make up for the  
15          lack of the background of medical school. There's just  
16          no question about it.

17          Another thing that I have done over my past 45  
18          years as a physician has been to review alleged medical  
19          malpractice cases. And I know under HIPAA regulations, I  
20          can't disclose any particulars, if I did some of you  
21          would absolutely cringe. But I probably looked at about  
22          400 at least, roughly one-third for the plaintiff and  
23          two-thirds for the defense. Some of the errors of  
24          omission because of the lack of medical school education  
25          and medical knowledge in making prompt diagnosis of

1       adverse things that occurred under anesthesia have  
2       accounted for the majority of the problems in causing  
3       death or brain damage in those patients.

4               I'm a little different than the rest of you.  
5       I'm a practicing physician. I've never in my life gotten  
6       paid on the basis of how many patients I've taken care of  
7       or what I did to them because I practiced in the US Navy,  
8       the University of Miami and University of Florida. I've  
9       always been salaried. I've never looked to see what I  
10      get paid or don't get paid for them. I think I can be  
11      objective.

12             And now, for the past two years, I donate my  
13      time to the University of Florida and I take care of  
14      patients and I teach students and residents without  
15      getting a paycheck. I do it because I love it. And I've  
16      had a lot of experience doing it and I don't see how  
17      anyone who is an economist can take a couple of little  
18      excerpts from a couple of newsletters, particularly one,  
19      David Matthew is not the editor of that journal, by the  
20      way. David Matthew is not an editor of that journal. He  
21      lives in Gainesville.

22             I know David, I talked to him two days ago,  
23      he's not an editor of the ASA newsletter. But you can't  
24      take a couple of excerpts like that. What you can take  
25      are the studies like the Pennsylvania study. And that



1 study is very, very impressive in that there were 25 more  
2 deaths in 10,000 medical patients when anesthesiologists  
3 don't medically direct nurse anesthetists.

4 The other thing you need to look at is the fact  
5 that the majority of the unsupervised "nurse anesthetist  
6 cases" are in rural hospitals and doctor's offices. They  
7 are short cases, they're not complex cases. The people  
8 who are really sick, they don't take care of them in  
9 those hospitals. They ship them to us at the university.  
10 So, you need to correct those things for patient  
11 population.

12 As far as office safety is concerned, I was  
13 appointed by Governor Bush in the State of Florida to the  
14 Commission on Safety in Office Surgery a couple of years  
15 ago. When you remember nationwide, they blew up all of  
16 the deaths that we had in offices, in plastic surgeon's  
17 offices, cosmetic surgeon's offices and so on. I had the  
18 opportunity as a member of that Commission to review  
19 every one of those cases and to participate. I was the  
20 only anesthesiologist on that Commission of 12 people.  
21 The others were nurse anesthetists, surgeons, lawyers,  
22 consumers, et cetera.

23 But that Commission recommended to the Board of  
24 Medicine that nurse anesthetists not do independent  
25 general anesthesia in doctor's offices on the basis of

1 safety. We did make the opportunity available for  
2 surgeons who are qualified to medically direct the nurse  
3 anesthetists in their office. And the surgeons then had  
4 to apply to the Board of Medicine to become certified to  
5 be qualified. To date, I think there is only a small  
6 handful of surgeons who have done that and been  
7 credentialed to do that on the basis of training and  
8 experience.

9 So, let's look at the facts. And the fact is  
10 you can't take away a medical school education and an  
11 extra two years of residency from me in order to say that  
12 a nurse anesthetist is at least as good if not better  
13 than I am in being a doctor. Now, I'm not anti-nurse  
14 anesthetists. I work with them all my life. I think  
15 they're terrific people. They're well trained for what  
16 they do under appropriate medical direction. And if I'm  
17 going to sleep, Lord help you, if you don't give me a  
18 medical direction of that nurse anesthetist, for I can  
19 promise you my family will be after you with my son who  
20 is a lawyer.

21 MR. HYMAN: Let me open this up to anyone who  
22 hasn't spoken yet.

23 DR. LOMAZOW: First of all, I don't want to get  
24 into a one-on-one with Mr. Mallon, but it's more than  
25 Hawaii. My home state in New Jersey does not endorse and

1 does not permit physical therapists to perform  
2 electromyography. So it's clearly not just Hawaii.

3           Number two, the basic issue of this whole thing  
4 here is do you want to run the system on high octane or  
5 regular? Do you want to use factory parts or do you want  
6 to use knock-offs or rebuilt? The American public  
7 deserves the best. They pay for the best. America  
8 rewards excellence. So, you can run the system, but then  
9 all you're going to wind up with is an execrable  
10 reduction in quality and accessibility of health care if  
11 the people who are most qualified -- now, we have  
12 survived in that, as much as you like it or whether you  
13 don't like it, doctors have survived the natural  
14 selection process it takes to become a doctor.

15           There's a limited amount of physicians in  
16 medical schools. We sacrificed 12 years of our lives  
17 over 60 hours a week, and that's minimum, to get where we  
18 are. We're survivors. We've been naturally selected to  
19 get there. And we deserve what we get. I don't  
20 apologize. I don't apologize for physicians.

21           And then, I'm also not talking about economics.  
22 You guys are talking about economics, I'm the one that's  
23 talking about quality. And I concur with the other  
24 doctor over here. And as far as the captain of the ship  
25 thing is concerned, as much as you may like Fletcher

1 Christian, there's no doubt that Captain Bligh was a  
2 better and more qualified sailor. Thank you.

3 MR. HYMAN: Let me first ask whether Dr. Newman  
4 wanted to get involved. And then I'll go back over to  
5 this side.

6 DR. NEWMAN: Certainly. No question. Please.

7 MR. HYMAN: You can say no.

8 DR. NEWMAN: No, I do. I do want to get  
9 involved. Loaded otherwise. I think one of the basic  
10 questions here is, and it applies across the board, is  
11 there only one way to train for the purposes of providing  
12 good quality service, whatever that service might be?  
13 And I can only look at it from the perspective of those  
14 issues that we're involved with, and I would argue there  
15 is more than one way to train for that. Both in terms of  
16 the training that goes into the practice of psychology in  
17 hospitals.

18 The California Supreme Court in CAT v. Rank  
19 very explicitly said either the psychologist or the  
20 physician could be captain of the ship. There was  
21 nothing about either that foreclosed them from being the  
22 captain of that treatment team. But I would take it  
23 beyond that and say that we have seen very clearly from a  
24 Department of Defense demonstration project, the psycho-  
25 pharmacology demonstration project sponsored by the

1 military and the Department of Defense in an attempt to  
2 answer the question: Can already licensed clinical  
3 psychologists be trained with enough medicine and  
4 pharmacology to be able to prescribe safely and  
5 effectively without having to go to medical school?

6 And in fact, the conclusion of that program by  
7 every study that's been undertaken is a clear yes.  
8 Clinical psychologists can be trained without going to  
9 medical school, with enough medicine and pharmacology to  
10 provide safe and effective prescribing. In fact, the  
11 most comprehensive study done by the American College of  
12 Neuro Psycho-pharmacology found that those psychologists  
13 who were trained in the program "filled critical needs  
14 and performed with excellence wherever they served." So,  
15 I would argue to you that there is in fact more than one  
16 way to train to provide qualified services.

17 MR. HYMAN: Professor Bloche?

18 DR. BLOCHE: I'd like to build on what Dr., is  
19 Lozamow?

20 DR. LOMAZOW: Lomazow.

21 DR. BLOCHE: Lomazow said. I also, myself,  
22 went to a residency training program. I know that  
23 feeling of being exhausted, being on call, getting up the  
24 next day, somehow trying to make it through the day,  
25 feeling that you're at the end a survivor, and feeling

1        somehow that the system owes you something for what you  
2        endured. That's a very profound and natural kind of  
3        feeling.

4                    At the same time, from a public policy  
5        question, the issue is not what way of doing things  
6        provides the absolute best, the Cadillac of health care.  
7        The issue is one, of course, of benefit tradeoffs. And  
8        the data simply hasn't been here, frankly, in any of  
9        these presentations for a rational assessment of what the  
10      cost benefit tradeoffs are for the series of cheaper  
11      versus more costly ways of doing things.

12                   There needs to be data both about quality and  
13      outcomes and about the cost that an incremental  
14      difference in quality, incremental difference in  
15      intensity of training, et cetera, entails. And medical  
16      malpractice suits or judgments or settlements are not  
17      good data. There's ample evidence to indicate that  
18      medical malpractice outcomes are neither sensitive nor  
19      specific as indicators of quality.

20                   And a final observation, if I may. The  
21      cacophony of what plainly are of turf claims, here after  
22      all there is  
23      -- it would be quite a coincidence if out of randomness  
24      the positions taken aligned with the interest of those  
25      who took them. The cacophony of turf claims here

1 undermines the credibility of all health professionals  
2 before the American public when it comes to quality  
3 issues. And the transparency of professional self-  
4 interest behind these professional organizations' claims  
5 also erodes the ability of professional organizations to  
6 argue credibly for those professional norms that may  
7 serve the larger welfare.

8           You're burning the seed stock here and I think  
9 that there needs to be more of an understanding of the  
10 common self-interest of American patients and health care  
11 providers and how that is eroded by doing Jerry Springer.

12           MR. HYMAN: Professor Morrissey?

13           MR. MORRISEY: Yes. Let me briefly just concur  
14 with Professor Bloche. It seems to me that the issue  
15 here is really a lack of evidence on one side or the  
16 other. And at minimum, it would be nice to see the  
17 Commission and the Department come forward with a call  
18 for additional rigorous analysis trying to look at  
19 whether or not the differences in licensure provisions,  
20 differences in scope of practice, differences in direct  
21 access, differences in payment issues affect cost, affect  
22 utilization, affect quality. At minimum, that would be a  
23 good outcome in my judgment.

24           MR. HYMAN: Let me follow up on that point and  
25 ask a specific question, and then let some more people

1 speak. The specific question is actually to Mr. Bauer.  
2 Dr. Modell referenced two studies, one done by it sounded  
3 like Penn, and the other he mentioned done by the  
4 American Association of Nurse Anesthetists which he  
5 suggested gave consistent results in a direction that he  
6 liked and presumably you wouldn't. So, I guess I'd just  
7 like to ask you to comment on those studies and then  
8 expand.

9 MR. BAUER: I strenuously disagree with Dr.  
10 Modell's interpretation of the statistics of those  
11 studies. I am familiar with them. And I would assume he  
12 might have the power to get us a little debate in the ASA  
13 journal because I as a former medical school statistics  
14 and research professor would be happy to explain why  
15 those studies absolutely do not support the assertions  
16 that he made.

17 I'm probably the only person sitting at this  
18 table or testifying in this hearing today that is the  
19 author of a statistics and research used in medical  
20 schools. So, the integrity of research and the like is  
21 something I love to debate. And simply the claims that  
22 he made relating those deaths, I won't get into the  
23 methodology right now unless you would like me to, but  
24 I'm prepared to. I think that's a little bit --

25 MR. HYMAN: I would encourage both of you to



1 submit written statements on that, if you see fit.

2 MR. BAUER: I would be happy to do that.

3 MR. HYMAN: But I think given our time, it's  
4 probably not the most efficient use. Actually, I think  
5 we would do it in writing, and let me, you had your hand  
6 up otherwise, Mr. Bauer, as did you, Dr. Modell. But Mr.  
7 Bauer was first.

8 MR. BAUER: I just want to make sure that the  
9 Federal Trade Commission does not lose an issue that I  
10 haven't heard from the physicians on the panel, and  
11 that's the right of the consumers to choose.

12 Let's go back to the Arrow study, and one of  
13 Professor Arrow's points was the inequality of  
14 information. And that is simply no longer true. It's  
15 now possible for people with the right kind of background  
16 to get the same information. There's absolutely no  
17 uniqueness to the information base available to a  
18 physician or a nurse or a pharmacist. That has changed  
19 dramatically.

20 And I also would like not to lose sight of the  
21 fact that the knowledge base changes so fast that even  
22 though I feel sorry for the years you stayed awake and  
23 missed all that sleep as a resident, it's irrelevant now  
24 because probably 80 percent of what you learned in your  
25 residency program is no longer relevant. And so, there's

1 a constant need to renew and that's why I developed the  
2 seven pillars, if you will, not of wisdom, but at least  
3 of moving science forward.

4 It's very important that the professions have  
5 criteria to make sure you stay up with the changes. The  
6 number of years that you trained is irrelevant to how  
7 competent you are with today's medical sciences.

8 MR. HYMAN: Dr. Modell?

9 DR. MODELL: I raised my hand because you  
10 asked, we have to look at cost-benefit ratio. According  
11 to the Silber study, there's one more dead person per 400  
12 anesthetics given that were unsupervised. Now, my  
13 question is which one of us or which one of our relatives  
14 is the one person and how much was their life worth?

15 If you can put, the economist can put to me on  
16 paper what one in 400 excess mortality is worth, then I  
17 can address that question. As a physician and as someone  
18 who has spent hundreds of thousands of our own dollars  
19 trying to make anesthesia safer, I can tell you, that  
20 number is unacceptable to me and to my colleagues at the  
21 University of Florida.

22 DR. BLOCHE: You just pointed to the challenge,  
23 though. You need to put a number on that one and 400.  
24 Ultimately, what is involved here is the need to come up  
25 with a valuation of a life saved. What is this

1 particular method, this particular policy costing in  
2 terms of, well, the cost of each life saved? Because,  
3 yes, we can always say what if it's so and so who we  
4 love, who we know? But when we lose those resources  
5 because we're taking the more expensive method of doing  
6 this, then we don't have those resources for other health  
7 care needs.

8 So, there is that kind of tradeoff that always  
9 has to be built in to that part. And so, if you can  
10 gather that data, that would be wonderful.

11 DR. MODELL: To me as a physician, it's totally  
12 unethical to say I will let somebody die for money. I've  
13 never done that in my life. I've taken care of people  
14 who didn't have a dime, all right, that I've actually  
15 given them money when they left the hospital to go get  
16 something to eat. I can't do that. I can't let people  
17 die to prove a point.

18 The anesthesia death rate is low enough today  
19 due to our efforts, not just mine but everybody in the  
20 profession, that I am told it will take well over a  
21 couple of million cases to get the type of statistical  
22 numbers you want and assign the dollars to it. And my  
23 feeling is, you know, I guess I'm glad I'm 70 years old.  
24 Maybe I won't have to look every time at the results of  
25 that and try to put faces to the people that we killed in

1 order to get those numbers.

2 I'm not an economist. And I can't put a price  
3 on a patient's life, I'm sorry.

4 MR. HYMAN: Mr. Bauer?

5 MR. BAUER: I will in my written testimony show  
6 why the one in 400 is an absolutely meaningless  
7 statistic. And even though I, as an economist, thirst at  
8 the opportunity to do this kind of cost benefit study, I  
9 will agree on one point with Dr. Modell. It would take a  
10 study of millions to come up with a valid point here, and  
11 the Pennsylvania study to which he refers is several  
12 orders of magnitude short of millions.

13 DR. MODELL: Oh, yes.

14 MR. HYMAN: Anyone else? Let me ask whether  
15 anyone wants to make any closing remarks. I have many  
16 more questions but we're running out of time. So,  
17 anyone?

18 DR. LOMAZOW: I just want to say that this  
19 whole issue of lesser trained versus more trained, it  
20 just simply flies in the face of logic. I mean, and you  
21 can talk about studies and studies and studies, but it's  
22 just illogical. You want the best. You want the people  
23 that are best trained, the best qualified to do the  
24 thing.

25 Do you want a certified plumber or do you want

1       some guy next door to come over? And it's the same  
2       situation. I mean, there's, we reward excellence. We  
3       reward training. The best get as far as they can go and  
4       they strive to be the best. And why go to the Mayo  
5       Clinic? Why not go to Podunk General Hospital? I mean,  
6       they're the same.

7               I mean, you have to go back, with all the  
8       statistics and all the education, just go back to plain  
9       logic. And the whole idea of less qualified people  
10      simply flies in its face. Thank you.

11             DR. NEWMAN: Maybe this is more the province of  
12      the Department of Health and Human Services than the  
13      Federal Trade Commission, but I would just point out that  
14      we ought to be a little careful in terms of our  
15      preoccupation with getting the best when we have as many  
16      people as we have out there who are receiving no health  
17      care at all.

18             MR. HYMAN: Anyone else?

19             MR. MORRISEY: Don't forget consumer choice,  
20      please, Federal Trade Commission.

21             DR. MODELL: Can you put the word "informed"  
22      before that?

23             MR. MORRISEY: Happily.

24             DR. MODELL: And then define how a consumer is  
25      informed about the risks and the training of the person

1 giving them anesthesia because even my own relatives,  
2 some who have Ph.D.'s in other areas call me to get them  
3 this and that and the other where they live in anesthesia  
4 because they have no idea how to make a choice.

5 MR. BAUER: They can just read my book. Sorry  
6 about that. I said that with a twinkle in my eye,  
7 please.

8 MR. HYMAN: Well, on that note, I'd like to  
9 thank the panel for their provocative presentations.

10 (Applause.)

11 (Whereupon, at 5:01 p.m., the hearing was  
12 concluded.) \* \* \* \* \*

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C E R T I F I C A T I O N   O F   R E P O R T E R

DOCKET/FILE NUMBER: P022106

CASE TITLE: HEALTH CARE AND COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY

DATE: MAY 27, 2003

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the transcript contained herein is a full and accurate transcript of the tapes transcribed by me on the above cause before the FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DATED: JUNE 11, 2003

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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I proofread the transcript for accuracy in spelling, hyphenation, punctuation and format.

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# APA's Russ Newman Testifies on Behalf of New Mexico's Important Step Toward Comprehensive Mental Health Care

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WASHINGTON - Russ Newman, the American Psychological Association's (APA) executive director for professional practice, testified before New Mexico's Psychologist Examiner's Board in support of regulations that would implement the state's new law granting prescriptive authority to psychologists.

New Mexico was the first state to enact a law granting psychologists the right to prescribe. Seeing a psychiatrist in New Mexico can take up to six weeks and an hours long commute. HB 170 and the regulations to implement it will expand the pool of mental health care providers by providing additional training in medicine and pharmacology to psychologists who are already experienced clinicians with doctoral level training.

In his remarks Newman thanked the board for its work developing a legal and regulatory "safety net" for prescribing psychologists and their patients. The regulations are a collaboration between the Psychologist Examiner's Board and the state's Medical Board.

"The prescribing psychologist statute and proposed regulations are quite comprehensive, careful, and well thought through in setting up extensive education and training requirements for prescribing psychologists which include numerous check points and safeguards," Newman said .

Under the regulations, psychologists will undergo a rigorous training period. The period includes classroom study, physician supervised clinical and assessment practicums, followed by a standardized national examination. Prescribing psychologists will also undergo a two year conditional prescribing period overseen by a physician. Only at that point will prescribing psychologists work independently, albeit in close collaboration with the patient's physician.

"The collaboration provisions of the regulations codify good clinical practice," Newman said.

This collaboration includes not only having the psychologist initiate contact with the patient's physician when medication is warranted, but also having the physician initiate contact with the patient's psychologist when any changes in the patient's medical condition might affect the treatment being provided by the psychologist.



6/11/2021

APA's Russ Newman testifies on behalf of New Mexico's important step toward comprehensive mental health care

"This ongoing two-way communication is a model of integrated care," Newman said.

"With the adoption of these regulations, the New Mexico psychologists who have completed, or will complete the required didactic and practicum training will be in a position to provide badly needed psychological and psychopharmacological treatment services, working in collaboration with patients' primary treating health care practitioners," Newman said.

*The American Psychological Association (APA), located in Washington, DC, is the largest scientific and professional organization representing psychology in the United States and is the world's largest association of psychologists. APA's membership includes more than 150,000 researchers, educators, clinicians, consultants and students. Through its 53 divisions and its affiliations with 60 state, territorial and Canadian provincial associations, APA works to advance psychology as a science and profession, and as a means of promoting health, education, and human welfare.*

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# APA Raises Privacy Concerns on Mental Health Records:

*Proposed nationwide system of electronic records requires managing many patient confidentiality issues*

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WASHINGTON - Patient privacy of mental health records was the focus yesterday during a hearing in Chicago, Illinois on the proposed National Health Information Network, which is an element of the Health Information Technology initiative put forth by President Bush in April 2004. The hearing was held by the Subcommittee on Privacy and Confidentiality of the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics whose charge it is to make recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human Services as to what privacy protections are necessary to implement an effective electronic health record.


Testifying on behalf of the American Psychological Association, Russ Newman, Ph.D., J.D., executive director for professional practice, raised concerns regarding the need to maintain an extraordinarily high level of privacy where mental health records are concerned.


"We believe that a National Health Information Network (NHIN) has the potential to improve the quality of health care provided in this country, allowing instant access to critical health information at any point of care," said Newman. "At the same time, however, we are extremely concerned about issues of privacy and confidentiality, particularly with mental health records, raised by this proposed increase in accessibility of health information."


According to Newman, in order to develop the NHIN in a manner which will promote quality healthcare, it is critical to consider the unique privacy issues relating to mental health records. "Most people understand that mental health records are particularly sensitive because they may contain a patient's innermost personal information. Many also are aware that, unfortunately, the stigma attached to mental illness and mental health treatment makes the records of that treatment especially sensitive. Any breach of privacy could be devastating to the patient. Unlike most other areas of health care, the mere possibility that confidential information might be disclosed prevents successful treatment from occurring by interfering with the development of the necessary trusting psychotherapy relationship and open communication with the therapist."

Additionally, Newman raised concerns about access to mental health records by others in the healthcare system not trained or experienced with mental health issues, health insurers and law enforcement officials. Newman also discussed what choice patients would have in deciding whether to have their records included in NHIN. "If patients consent to electronic records, it would be necessary to inform them of all potential uses of their records and by whom. While most patients may want their records available

*The American Psychological Association (APA), in Washington, DC, is the largest scientific and professional organization representing psychology in the United States and is the world's largest association of psychologists. APA's membership includes more than 150,000 researchers, educators, clinicians, consultants and students. Through its divisions in 53 subfields of psychology and affiliations with 60 state, territorial and Canadian provincial associations, APA works to advance psychology as a science, as a profession and as a means of promoting health, education and human welfare.*

  
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# APA Comments: Proposed Rule Providing Modifications to Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information

by Russ Newman, PhD, JD

April 24, 2002

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Office for Civil Rights

Attention: Privacy 2

Hubert H. Humphrey Building

Room 425A

200 Independence Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20201

Re: Proposed Rule Providing Modifications to Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, as published in 67 Fed. Reg. 14776, March 27, 2002

Dear Department of Health and Human Services Representatives:

I submit these comments on behalf of the American Psychological Association ("APA" or "we"), the largest membership association of psychologists with more than 155,000 members and affiliates engaged in the practice, research, and teaching of psychology, pursuant to the March 27, 2002 request (67 Fed. Reg. 14776) for comments regarding proposed modifications to the final rule regarding standards for the privacy of individually identifiable health information ("privacy rule"). As requested by the Department of the Health and Human Services (the "Department"), we focus our comments on three provisions of the privacy rule for which modifications have been proposed. Our comments concern: the proposed elimination of the patient consent requirement, the psychotherapy notes authorization requirement, and the "minimum necessary" requirement.

On December 17, 2001, the Mental Health Liaison Group ("MHLG"), the primary mental health advocacy coalition for mental health consumers, professionals and providers in Washington, DC, wrote to Secretary Tommy G. Thompson, regarding the patient consent, minimum necessary, psychotherapy notes authorization requirements, and other provisions in the rule. Our comments offered below are similar to those contained in the MHLG letter, which was signed by 38 other leading mental health consumer, professional and provider groups. Given this similarity and that the MHLG letter represents a consensus on the consent and other provisions that the Department now proposes to modify, we attach this letter to our comments for your consideration.

Patient consent should remain in the rule and be refined to address concerns of emergency medical providers, pharmacists and other entities regarding its impact on care.

The APA is disappointed with the proposed removal of the patient consent requirement of the rule at 45 C.F.R. § 164.506. During Congressional consideration of privacy legislation in the 1990's and throughout the privacy rulemaking process, we have consistently argued that patient consent is a cornerstone of assuring medical records privacy.

Patients have a right to their privacy, and therefore the right to protect the privacy of their records. Patients are afforded the opportunity to exercise their privacy right when they give consent for the use and disclosure of their records for payment, treatment, and health care operations purposes. Removing consent as proposed essentially shifts "ownership" of records to the entities that use and disclose them for treatment, payment, and health care operations purposes. Under the proposed modification, the patient is merely given the opportunity to acknowledge that he or she has received notice as to how his or her records will be used and disclosed.

As the Department notes, consent has little value under current practice and in the rule because it is mandatory. If a patient refuses to give consent, for example, he or she could be denied treatment. In practical terms, the distinction between patient consent and notice may appear slight. The patient will either allow his or her records to be used and disclosed for payment, treatment, and health care operations purposes, or be refused care in both instances. The distinction, however, may have legal ramifications for patients and for those entities that use and disclose the patient's records.

Consent represents a signed agreement by the patient regarding the manner in which health care professionals, providers, insurers, and other entities will use and disclose health information in the future. If a patient believes that his or her information has been improperly used or disclosed, evidence of such violation is legally framed by the terms of the consent agreement. Patient notice does not provide this framework, since a written and signed agreement does not exist between the patient and users of the record.

We urge the Department to carefully weigh this distinction, because the proposed consent modification, as mentioned, essentially shifts "ownership" of the record from the patient to the entities that use and disclose the record for treatment and administrative purposes. Under the modification, patients will lose their ability to give permission regarding the use of their records. Entities, but mainly insurers, will gain regulatory recognition of their use and disclosure of patient records. This modification, subtle as it may be in practical effect, appears to undermine the right of patients to the privacy of their records.

Rather than remove the consent provision entirely, the APA suggests that the provision be refined. For example, we believe that the Department makes strong arguments regarding the excess burden that consent places on pharmacists and emergency care providers. These arguments revolve around the difficulty of obtaining patient consent and its intrusion on the provision of patient care and services. The consent provision should be refined to consider such circumstances.

Health plans should be required to obtain patient authorization for treatment, payment, and health care operations purposes for which a patient could not foresee the use and disclosure of individually identifiable information.

In addition to strengthening the patient consent requirement, health plans should be required to obtain patient authorization for those treatment, payment, and health care operations purposes for which a patient could not foresee the use and disclosure of individually identifiable information. We view these certain purposes as administrative functions of the insurer that are not part of the direct treatment of an individual patient. We suggest this change preferably in addition to retention of the consent provision. If the Department ultimately removes consent, such patient authorization would be an important compromise that will help ensure the privacy of patient records.

The Department's statement in commentary to these proposed modifications that many patients "expect that their health information will be used and disclosed as necessary to treat them, bill for treatment, and, to some extent, operate the covered entity's health care business" may be true (1). Many patients, however, accurately believe that their treatment is no longer private. This belief appears to be particularly held by patients in large health plans, which commonly place private health information in easily accessible databases for use and disclosure by many employees for many purposes, identified in the rule as treatment, payment, and health care operations purposes (2).

Patients have lost confidence in the privacy of their records and in the confidentiality of their relationship with their direct treating professionals. In fact, we suggest that many patients loathe the current access of health plans to their private records for administrative purposes that benefit the health plan and have nothing or little to do with their individual treatment. Part of the problem stems from the necessary reality that, as the Department acknowledges, health plans lack direct contact and only have an "indirect treatment relationship" with the patient (3). This lack of direct contact and a treatment relationship with the patient, however, is at the core of the need for a patient privacy law in the first place.

Patients generally are not concerned with the use of their records by their treating professionals. Rather they are worried, and legitimately so, with the use of their records by entities with which they have little or no contact.

The current broad use and disclosure of records by health plans represents an unacceptable status quo. A status quo that the Department exacerbates by providing health plans with great access to patient records through very broad definitions of "payment",

"treatment", and "health care operations".

Health insurance industry advocates have argued that expansive definitions of "payment, treatment, and health care operations" are warranted, since access to identifiable patient information helps them improve patient care in addition to plan administration. Indeed the APA agrees that some health plan activities, such as on-going quality assessment, can improve patient care. However, these activities generally improve patient care in the aggregate and are not related to the direct provision of care to an individual patient. Therefore, an individual patient's privacy is substantially weakened or even lost when his or her individually identifiable information is shared for administrative purposes or for purposes that may benefit patients in general.

While the patient consent requirement would certainly not interfere with the treatment, payment, and health care operations of health plans, patient authorization for use and disclosures that are administrative would take some effort on the part of health plans. However, in our view health plans should not have such access to individually identifiable patient information for these purposes without patient authorization in the first place. Requiring patient authorization would represent an important proactive step toward guarding the privacy of patient records.

Many of these administrative functions that should require patient authorization are embedded in the "health care operations," "treatment," and "payment" definitions. These various administrative functions include: quality assessment and improvement activities, protocol development, clinical guidelines development, student training activities, and fraud abuse and detection programs. We urge the Department to require patient authorization for these and other administrative functions of health plans.

The psychotherapy notes patient authorization should be accompanied by an additional patient authorization for the release of particularly sensitive psychological test data.

The APA is gratified to see the Department's continued support for patient authorization for the release of psychotherapy notes for treatment, payment, health care operations purposes and for other uses and disclosures. By requiring an insurer or other covered entity to obtain patient authorization for psychotherapy notes, 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(2) provides an important privacy protection for patients seeking and receiving psychotherapy and related mental health services. Slight modifications proposed by the Department appear to strengthen the provision and, as the Department notes, to "clarify that this information is not permitted to be used or disclosed without individual authorization for purposes of another entity" (4).

We appreciate the Department's commitment to the understanding that mental health records, such as psychotherapy notes, need heightened protection in the rule. The reasons for such heightened protection are manifold but rooted in societal stigmatization of mental disorders, and more intimately to the individual patient, in the fear that disclosure of a mental disorder and treatment to loved ones, family, friends, business associates, and even acquaintances could harm these relationships, perhaps irreparably.

Patient authorization for release of psychotherapy notes will help secure the privacy of the relationship between the patient and treating psychologist, but more protection is needed. Psychologists and some other mental health professionals typically create and maintain psychological test data, which are in addition and often directly related to psychotherapy notes.

The privacy of test data should also be protected through patient authorization for release to ensure effective psychotherapy and other mental health treatment. Such authorization will help preserve an atmosphere of confidence and trust so that a patient "is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears (5)."

To clarify terms, "test data" includes test results, raw test data (generally, the test form itself, the actual answers of the patient on the test form, etc.), reports, and global scores, and "test materials" include protocols, manuals, test items, scoring keys or algorithms, and any other materials considered secure by the test developer or publisher. In this comment, we refer to both test data and test materials under the blanket term, "test data."

Since publication of the proposed rule in November 1999, the APA has repeatedly requested that the Department provide for patient authorization for the release of psychological test data in comments to the proposed and final rule (6). We have since been joined in our request by 38 other leading mental health advocacy organizations of the Mental Health Liaison Group. In a December 17, 2001 letter to



Secretary Thompson (as referenced above and attached), the MHLG requested that the Department amend the rule to provide for patient authorization for the release of testing records.

A primary reason for providing for patient authorization of test data is one of continuity. A patient cannot feel secure in the privacy of his or her relationship with a psychologist, if a realistic perception exists that some records, namely psychotherapy notes, require specific authorization for release, while other records, psychological testing and assessment records, with similar and highly sensitive, often embarrassing, information do not.

In discussing the psychotherapy notes patient authorization requirement in the final rule, the Department clarified the rationale for the requirement:

[T]he rationale for providing special protection for psychotherapy notes is not only that they contain particularly sensitive information, but also that they are the personal notes of the therapist, intended to help him or her recall the therapy discussion and are of little use or no use to others not involved in the therapy. Information in these notes is not intended to communicate to, or even be seen by, persons other than the therapist. Although all psychotherapy information may be considered sensitive, we have limited the definition of psychotherapy notes to only that information that is kept separate by the provider for his or her own purposes. It does not refer to the medical record and other sources of information that would normally be disclosed for treatment, payment, and health care operations (7).

We respectfully submit that psychological test data are exactly the same type of sensitive information as psychotherapy notes to warrant patient authorization for release. Essentially, the Department has determined that heightened protection for psychotherapy notes is needed because such notes: (A) contain particularly sensitive information, and (B) are kept separate by the mental health professional for his or her own purposes. The Department further elucidates on the second requirement by indicating that such notes are of little or no use to others not involved in the therapy, are not intended be communicated to or even be seen by persons other than the therapist, and do not refer to the medical record and other sources that would normally be disclosed for treatment, payment, and health care operations. As with psychotherapy notes, psychologists and other therapists may include portions of test data in patient medical records, but that portion which is generally not shared should similarly fall under a patient authorization requirement for release.

#### A. Test data in psychological assessment contains particularly sensitive information.

Psychologists typically utilize psychological tests that require patients to divulge highly sensitive personal information, which is typically as sensitive as the information contained in psychotherapy notes. For example, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI-2), one of the most commonly used clinical tests, contains an item asking the respondent to indicate whether he or she has "indulged in unusual sex practices." For example, MMPI-2 asks a respondent whether he or she "has used alcohol excessively." For example, the Rorschach, again a common testing technique, asks respondents to interpret what a series of inkblots might represent. Common responses include emotional expressions, fantasies, and notations by the psychologist on the respondent's behavior while giving the response.

Obviously, these questions themselves and the answers the patient provides contain particularly sensitive information, far more sensitive than nearly any information related to treatment for physical diagnoses. This information is more sensitive than general mental health information that may be provided to health plans for purposes of payment, treatment, and health care operations. Certainly, test data include patient emanations of highly sensitive information, which may have meaning only to the psychologist giving the test. For these reasons, psychological test data contain sensitive patient information similar to that contained in psychotherapy notes and meets this part of the Department's rationale for requiring patient authorization for release. In addition, these highly sensitive and personal responses are meaningless to persons not trained to interpret them in the aggregate, as elaborated below.

#### B. Highly sensitive test data are kept separate by the mental health professional for his or her own use.

A psychologist is required by ethical standards, law, and contractual agreements to carefully determine the release of test data, to keep certain test data for his or her own purposes, and to not include such data in the medical record (8). Many of these standards and laws are meant to protect the patient and the privacy of the records, and contractual agreements with the test developer or publisher are primarily meant to protect the tests themselves.

According to the APA Code of Ethics, a psychologist must " . . . make reasonable efforts to maintain the integrity and security of tests and other assessment techniques consistent with law, contractual obligations, and in a manner that permits compliance with the requirements of this Ethics Code (9)." Unless otherwise mandated by law, a psychologist must request patient consent for release of test data in order to obtain payment for services (10). Many states have statutes that require formal consent before records can be released or protect against disclosure of mental health records under the psychotherapist-patient relationship. Even with such consent and consent requirements, however, many psychologists release only certain test data to health plans.

For purposes of disclosing test data to health plans, such as (under this rule) for payment, treatment, and health care operations, many psychologists provide written psychological assessments in place of sensitive test data. A psychological assessment, often a standardized report, contains such information as an overall summary of diagnosis and treatment, diagnostic impressions and interpretations, and treatment recommendations. Psychologists generally keep separate and for their own use test results (other than summary results provided), raw test data, global scores, and test materials, such as protocols, manuals, test items, scoring keys, algorithms, and other related materials.

A psychologist keeps much test data for his or her own use for purposes of psychotherapy and treatment and to protect the privacy of the patient and of their psychotherapeutic relationship. In addition, many psychologists specialize in testing and administer testing for psychologists and other therapists for purposes of patient treatment. Authorization must also apply to psychologists as test givers.

When a patient provides answers during psychological assessment, these are responses of the patient, similar to responses that a patient would provide during psychotherapy. Assessment questions may require the patient to reveal highly sensitive personal information, and the psychologist will protect this information as necessary. Psychological testing then, like psychotherapy, depends upon "an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears."

Psychologists are particularly careful not to release test data, other than assessment summaries, to individuals who are not qualified to use such data. Regarding assessment techniques, interventions, results, and interpretations, for example, psychologists have an ethical duty to " . . . take reasonable steps to prevent others from misusing the information these techniques provide. This includes refraining from releasing raw test results or raw data to persons, other than to patients or clients as appropriate, who are not qualified to use such information (11)." Psychological testing standards call for responsibility for test use to be assumed by or delegated only to those individuals with the training and experience necessary to handle these responsibilities in a responsible and technically adequate manner (12).

Inappropriate release of test data can harm the health of the patient and the treatment relationship between the psychologist and the patient. In commentary to the proposed and final rule, the Department clearly recognizes this potential harm and has thus included a patient authorization requirement for release of psychotherapy notes. A patient, however, may be harmed in numerous other ways not directly related to treatment when sensitive test data is inappropriately disclosed.

One way that a patient can be harmed by the release of certain test data, such as raw data for example, is by its misinterpretation by individuals not trained in psychological testing, or by its use out of proper context. For example, an item on the MMPI-2 is combined with other items to determine if the respondent is being truthful. In other words, for assessment purposes several items on the MMPI-2, when viewed together can assist a psychologist in determining whether the respondent is attempting to mislead with his or her responses. One of these items asks the question: "I do not always tell the truth." If the person answers "no" to this question, it may then be combined with other answers to indicate that the person is actually attempting to mislead the tester. However, a "yes" answer, to a person not trained in interpreting this test, may be seen as meaning that the person is an untruthful person, when in fact he or she is being truthful in answering the item.

In addition to potential misuse, psychologists must consider release of test materials in relation to test security, potential invalidation, copyright law and contractual obligations. Psychologists' consideration of these issues has been succinctly discussed in psychological publication:

Disclosure of secure testing materials (e.g., test items, test scoring, or test protocols) to unqualified persons may decrease the test's validity. Availability of test items to an unqualified person can not only render the test invalid for any future use with that individual, but also jeopardizes the security and integrity of the test for other persons who may be exposed to test items or responses. Such release

imposes very concrete harm to the general public-loss of effective assessment tools. Because there are a limited number of standardized psychological tests considered appropriate for a given purpose (in some instances only a single instrument), they cannot easily be replaced or substituted if an individual obtains prior knowledge of item content or the security of the test is otherwise compromised (13).

Psychologists must make sure when disclosing records to health plans, for example, that an individual in that plan is able to use the test data appropriately and to ensure that unqualified individuals do not have access to the data. In doing so or in providing assessment summaries in lieu of test data, psychologists protect the interests of the patient and meet their contractual and other obligations to the developer or publisher of the test materials.

Because test data contain particularly sensitive patient information, which psychologists and other professionals, under ethical and legal obligations, keep separate for treatment purposes of the individual patient, the APA urges the Department to require patient authorization for test data. The mental health consumer and professional community is united behind the need for test data authorization as an important means of securing the privacy of the records of persons seeking and receiving psychotherapy and other mental health services. This important authorization should be included in the final rule.

Psychologists and other therapists should not have their participation in health plans predicated on seeking patient authorization for psychotherapy notes.

An important component of the psychotherapy notes authorization requirement is that a covered entity, such as a health plan, "may not condition the provision to an individual of treatment, payment, enrollment in the health plan, or eligibility for benefits on the provision of an authorization (14)." Obviously, this provision ensures that the psychotherapy notes authorization requirement is meaningful in that a patient may continue to receive treatment and remain enrolled in a health plan, even if he or she chooses not to provide sensitive information contained in psychotherapy notes to a plan.

Likewise, a psychologist or other therapist should not have his or her participation in a health plan predicated on seeking patient authorization for psychotherapy notes. In its December 2001 letter to Secretary Thompson, the MHLG anticipated that health plans could potentially attempt to pressure therapists into seeking patient authorization for psychotherapy notes. The MHLG urged the Secretary to provide guidance to ensure that the psychotherapy notes authorization could not be circumvented in this manner.

Unfortunately, we believe that health plans are now generating HIPAA information, targeted to our member psychologists, which is unclear as to whether they must obtain patient authorization in order to remain in the plan. For example, in a recent publication from Regence BlueCross BlueShield of Oregon ("Regence BCBSO"), participating professionals are informed that:

Non-psychotherapy notes are maintained in the patient's chart. Any items falling into the non-psychotherapy notes category must be disclosed to the health plan and the patient, with only a general consent. With patient authorization (specific disclosure with expiration and/or revocation rights) psychotherapy notes may also be disclosed to the health plan. All Regence BCBSO and affiliated health plan agreements require the creator of the record to release records necessary to facilitate payment and health care operations. In the future, Regence BCBSO will require contracted physicians and other mental health and chemical dependency providers to secure authorizations under HIPAA that permit them to "use and disclose" information to the health plan (15).

After elucidating the privacy rule's definition of items not included in psychotherapy notes, the Regence BCBSO publication states that: Under some circumstances non-psychotherapy notes may be sufficient to meet health plan needs for documentation. However, the quality of record keeping varies widely and access to psychotherapy notes may be necessary to make payment on some claims (16).

Under the Regence BCBSO description of patient authorization for release of psychotherapy notes, a psychologist or other therapist could reasonably believe that a health plan can require him or her to obtain authorization for purposes of the treatment, payment, or health care operations of the plan. In addition, the therapist may perceive from this health plan instruction that obtaining patient authorization may be required as part of his or her continued participation in the plan or that payment for services is predicated on the obtaining of patient authorization for psychotherapy notes.

While it may be appropriate, in extraordinary circumstances, for a health plan to request that a psychologist or other therapist seek patient authorization for psychotherapy notes, such request should not be coerced, either on the patient or the therapist. Certainly, this

should not be a routine request under "some" circumstances, related to inadequacy of the quality of documentation provided to the plan by a health care professional.

The privacy rule is quite clear that psychotherapy notes are not required for purposes of payment, treatment, or health care operations. The rule clearly indicates those data elements that are excluded from the term "psychotherapy notes" that may be made available to a health plan for treatment, payment, and health care operations purposes. These are: medication prescription and monitoring, counseling session start and stop times, modalities and frequencies of treatment, results of clinical tests, and summaries of diagnosis, functional status, treatment plan, symptoms, prognosis, and progress to dates. Psychotherapy notes are separated from these elements for the use of the therapist in treatment. A plan may ask for clearer or better documentation from a provider regarding that information which is not part of the patient's psychotherapy notes, but a plan may not routinely, or even sometimes, require a therapist to authorize release of information contained in psychotherapy notes for its administrative purposes.

The APA does not know how common this sort of instruction, as provided in the Regence BCBSO materials, is. Unfortunately, we believe that it could be a common instruction, which highlights the need for guidance by the Department on this issue.

The "minimum necessary" requirement should be interpreted most favorably to the patient to preserve the privacy of records when disclosed to health plans and other entities for treatment, payment, and health care operations purposes.

We appreciate the Department's proposed modifications that clarify that oral communications between health care professionals in treatment of a patient are not subject to the minimum necessary requirement. The "incidental" disclosure exception to the minimum necessary requirement for such oral communications appears well designed and narrow to ensure that patient treatment between health care professionals is not impeded. The APA supports the inclusion of this modification in the rule.

More importantly, we appreciate the Department's rejection of the suggestion that disclosures for treatment, payment, and health care operations be exempted from the "minimum necessary requirement (17)." Requiring that health plans request the minimum amount of individually identifiable patient information necessary for health plan administrative purposes lies at the heart of the protection that the rule affords to patients and their records.

The privacy rule provides health plans and other entities great access to patient records for uses and disclosures related to treatment, payment, and health care operations. This broad access is balanced in part by the minimum necessary requirement so that each time a patient's record is accessed by a health plan or other third party, such entity must demonstrate that it is requesting the minimum amount of patient information necessary for the purpose of its use. Removing or weakening the minimum necessary requirement would swing the balance of the rule in favor of health plans and would essentially gut the protections that the rule affords for patients.

The Department appears to recognize this balance in its commentary accompanying these proposed modifications:

With regard to payment and health care operations, the Department remains concerned, as stated in the preamble to the Privacy Rule, that, without the minimum necessary standard, covered entities may be tempted to disclose an entire medical record when only a few items of information are necessary, to avoid the administrative step of extracting or redacting information. The Department also believes that this standard will cause covered entities to assess their privacy practices, give the privacy interests of their patients and enrollees greater attention, and make improvements that might otherwise not be made (18).

The APA appreciates the Department's continued recognition of the primary importance of the minimum necessary requirement for the protection of the patient record. From our standpoint, health plans are most likely to be tempted to request an entire medical record, as has occurred in the past. Throughout our comments, we have mentioned our belief that health plan demands for individual patient information have substantially eroded the privacy of the records. For persons seeking and receiving mental health services, where particularly sensitive health information is involved, the minimum necessary and the psychotherapy notes authorization requirements will improve records privacy, while not denying health plans access to information for their administrative purposes.

The APA welcomes the Department's recent outreach to psychology and other professionals and consumers regarding the minimum necessary requirement. We assume that outreach is part of the Department's intention, as stated in commentary to the proposed

modifications, "to issue further guidance to clarify issues causing confusion and concern in the industry, as well as provide additional technical assistance materials to help covered entities implement the provision (19)."

Regarding any such clarification or interpretation that the Department may provide regarding the minimum necessary standard, we strongly urge that the Department interpret the provision most favorably to the patient and treating professional. This means in practice that if health plans must have concrete definitions of minimum necessary information for treatment, payment, and health care operations purposes, that such information be the absolute minimum necessary for such purposes.

To some extent, this minimum necessary data is already outlined for mental health records in the rule through the "psychotherapy notes" definition. In other words, depending on the purpose of the disclosure, a health plan may have that portion of the patient's record that concerns medication prescription and monitoring, counseling session start and stop times, the modalities and frequencies of treatment furnished, results of clinical tests, and summaries of diagnosis, functional status, treatment plan, symptoms, prognosis, and progress to date (20). A health plan may not have a patient's psychotherapy notes, absent patient authorization.

A health plan should never request, as some health plans currently demand, a patient's entire record without a compelling reason of a need for the entire record. This is an abuse of records disclosure of which the Department is apparently aware and which the minimum necessary requirement is meant to end.

Psychologists, by nature of the patients that they serve and the sensitivity of records associated with treatment, are deeply committed to the preservation of the privacy of mental health records and patient records in general. The APA is currently working to help our members understand and come into compliance with the privacy rule. We hope to continue to tell our members that the privacy rule contains a substantial floor of federal protection for their patients' records. For these reasons, we hope that the Department will retain the consent provision and improve the psychotherapy notes authorization and minimum necessary requirements, as we have requested.

The APA appreciates the Department's consideration of these and our past comments. We hope that the Department will continue to rely on the APA as it implements the rule. Please contact Doug Walter, J.D., Legislative and Regulatory Counsel, Government Relations, at (202) 336-5889, regarding these comments and for any further assistance that we may provide.

Sincerely,

Russ Newman, PhD, JD  
Executive Director for Professional Practice

## Endnotes

1. 67 Fed. Reg. at 14778.
2. Regarding patient concerns with the privacy of their records, see for example, California HealthCare Foundation, National Survey: Confidentiality of Medical Records (January 1999). Available at <http://www.chcf.org> (<http://www.chcf.org>).
3. 65 Fed. Reg. at 82648.
4. 67 Fed. Reg. 14798.
5. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), at 10.
6. APA comments to the proposed rule may be found at <http://www.apa.org/practice/privacycomments.html> (<http://www.apa.org/practice/privacycomments.html>). APA comments to the final rule may be found at <http://www.apa.org/practice/thompson.html> (<http://www.apa.org/practice/thompson.html>).
7. 65 Fed. Reg. 82623.
8. For purposes of brevity, we generally do not attempt in this comment to discuss the large body of federal and state law that concern the release of psychological test data. Many of these laws are peripheral to but affect the disclosure of test data for purposes of treatment, payment, or health care operations. We reference these laws for purposes of the Secretary's information and would provide more information regarding these laws upon his request.

9. American Psychological Association, Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, Standard 2.10 (1992).
10. Id. at Standard 5.05.
11. Id. at Standard 2.02.
12. American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, National Council on Measurement in Education, Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing, Standard 11.3 (1999).
13. American Psychological Association, "Statement on the Disclosure of Test Data," American Psychologist, 51, no. 6 (June 1996): 646.
14. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(4).
15. Regence BlueCross BlueShield of Oregon, "The Behavioral Health BluePrint Newsletter," 1, no. 1 (November 2001): 3. (Available on line at: [www.or.regence.com/provider/bcbso](http://www.or.regence.com/provider/bcbso) (<http://www.or.regence.com/provider/bcbso>).)
16. Id.
17. 67 Fed. Reg. 14786.
18. 67 Fed. Reg. 14786.
19. 67 Fed. Reg. 14787.
20. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501.

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