Speaker 1: Steven, we've talked a lot, not on tape, or on tape but not on video tape. I want to reprise some of the things that you've talked to me about. I want to start, which was both the sort of beginning and the end of where of our long interview, and that is what took you into activism in the first place, what you think it was in your background that led you to say, "I cannot tolerate these human rights abuses that I'm hearing about that are being perpetrated with the help of the American Psychological Association?" Take us back to the beginning.

Stephen: Well, the very beginning has to do with the family that I grew up within and the family that I grew up without, actually, which is that my parents were survivors of the Holocaust. They were very different. My mother was a young girl and went through the successes phases of, the war began, there was a small ghetto, then she was into the large ghetto of the Lodz ghetto and then to Auschwitz.

Speaker 1: Your mother was Polish?

Stephen: My mother was Polish. My parents were both Polish. Every step of the way, there was more and more horrors, but they were slow, until Auschwitz, where she was the last survivor of her family. Yet, through her remarkable, loving character and her capacity for fantasy and denial, she survived by, first of all, imagining that her family wasn't killed, that they were still alive somewhere. She said that at the very end, when she escaped from a death march and she came to a house and the Russian front came and she was going to go back to her hometown, she took some clothing for the other members of her family, even though somewhere she must've known that when they arrived at Auschwitz that they had been killed.

She kept that, but the other thing that she kept it was more remarkable was that she would always tell the me the stories of the ones who helped her, including the German soldiers who helped her. I have that on one side. Then, on the other side, I have my father who was in the Soviet army. He escaped from Poland into Russia. He was a communist. He was in the Soviet army and the experiences that he had were equally horrific, but he always had a gun. He was on the side of not only seeing his people is victimized, but himself as taking revenge or fighting for justice were trying to stop it, but we would consider him kind of a perpetrator today.

The way that he dealt with his own complicity in the horrors that were being in the Soviet army in the war was to think about the ethics of what's right and wrong, especially afterward. He had a very strong sense that one has to always align one's actions and one's history with some sense of value. He also experienced, firsthand, interrogation. Before he was in the Army, he was arrested as a spy and he was sent to Siberia and he was interrogated by the NKVD, the precursor to the KGB. All of the techniques that were used on him came back to me when I heard about what was going on at Guantánamo.

Speaker 1: He had talked about this when you were growing up?

Steven: Oh yeah. He had been … Yeah. He talked about it starting from when I was probably too

young to remember, but I was hearing stories about his arrest and his interrogation and his being interrogated over and over again and being sleep deprived and being cold and all of these things. I mean, my father did not have a parental sensor. I saw this firsthand when I had my own children. He started telling them the stories when they were 3 years old and I would hover and stop it and protect them, but it made me realize what I was kind of exposed to.

My mother's stories, actually, I didn't hear at all. None, until I was 16 years old and was leading a student-initiated seminar in my high school on Jewish literature. We were reading Elie Wiesel's "Night" and my co-student initiator said "Wouldn't it be interesting if we could find a survivor of the Holocaust to come and speak to the class?" I said "My mother was in Auschwitz, maybe I'll invite her." I did, and the first time I heard any stories about my life was sitting in a classroom full of fellow students listening to the stories for the first time.

That opened my curiosity and I begin asking her questions about it. How does that lead to my becoming an activist? I remember thinking about … Did I want … Starting at about age 11, I would imagine myself confronted with a Nazi, discovering a hidden Nazi, and what would I do? Did I want to take revenge? Did I want to bring him to trial? What was the right way to handle these issues? Then I also had this ridiculous, intense, now I would call it the superego, but this moral sense that everybody I met I would judge by the standard of "If the Nazis came, would they hide me?" This is what it was like to grow up in my family.

Eventually, first, I went into the theater. In the theater, I began doing plays about refugees and about … I did play that took place in Auschwitz. It was based on Tadeusz Pietrozykowski's story. The issues, the morality were always there. Then became a psychoanalyst. One of my source of the pride as a psychologist was that we had an ethics code. I believed that and I remembered thinking this before I was a psychologist, thinking that as a Jew, that Judaism was about a code of ethics and the idea that it is necessary to have an independent source, an independent guide of ethics that stood outside one's institutional or national allegiance seems to me to be essential. Even though it made Jews, always, not fully a part of whatever culture they were embedded in, I remember eating this book called "Response of the Holocaust".

It's a book of the recollections of rabbis who had been in the concentration camps who had been asked these impossible questions and how they answered them on the spot. I, a father who has a son, and he's offered the possibility of saving his son from the gas, but he has to send somebody else in his son's place. Does he have the right to do that? The Rabbi didn't have his books, but he would give a response. I remember that story. It's making me cry because the Rabbi said "No, you're not. It says in the Talmud, what makes you think one person's blood is redder than another?" The father's son went to the gas in the father was, in a sense, relieved that he had the Rabbi's authority from which to make that choice.

For me, I grew up with this level of questioning. We now can all call that in the pop culture as a Sophie's Choice. Before Sophie's Choice was written and before I read it, I

mulled over these issues. The Jewish ethics were important to me and psychological ethics was important to me. When I first learned that psychologists were involved in the torture and, as the ICRC's report that was leaked to the New York Times, "In violation of their ethical obligations." I looked at that and was affected on every level.

Speaker 1: That was in 2004?

Steven: 2004, the end of 2004.

Speaker 1: You learned about it in the Times?

Steven: The New York Times, Neil Lewis' article where he didn't … I mean, he mentioned psychologist, I think. I know he mentioned health professionals. There were a few articles that he wrote about that at the time. I posted a piece on the Section 9 list. Section 9 was the social responsibility section of the American Psychological Association's division of psychoanalysis, Section 9, Division 39. We had a small but serious and politically aware listserv. I posted that health professionals were involved, what are we, as psychologists, going to do about that? This was already in 2005, going into 2005.

Somebody responded that the American Psychological Association had put together a task force and that one of our own, [Nina Thomas 00:12:00], was going to be on the task force. We should wait and see what happens. That seemed reasonable.

Speaker 1: The task force was charged with what, exactly?

Steven: At that point the task force was charged, first to see what psychologist were actually doing at places like Guantánamo and what ethical guidance should be for psychologists put in those situations. That seemed like a good charge for a task force. While this is going on, other health professions, the American Medical Association, the American Psychiatric Association, already said that it was just not acceptable for their members to be involved in any way in any individual's interrogation. That was just not okay.

We all just kind of assumed that the American Psychological Association would follow suit, but that they would going to put together a task force and that they were going to figure it out. If Nina was on it, it seems to me that they were putting the right people in it. That's turned out not to be the case.

Speaker 1: In what way?

Steven: I put that aside, I went on with my business of thinking critically about the Bush administration and the war, but I wasn't really active. I was, during that whole period, and this has gone on, now, for a number of years. I was involved with the group, kind of a radical group, that discuss politics once a month. I was aware, and one of them was a colleague of mine who was a Chilean psychologist and we talked a lot about … I had been suspicious of psychologists ahead of this, psychologists' role in the military ahead of this, and psychiatry's role, because of 2 pieces of information that I just noted. I

talking to Antonio about both of these.

One was, there were few of them, one was a psychiatrist at Guantánamo, this was the year before all of this, but I put it in my hopper of suspicion and questioning because there were 3 suicide attempts at Guantánamo. A reporter asked the head of the clinic, or a psychiatrist, spokesperson at Guantánamo, whether we had all been hearing about torture and we've been hearing about oppressive conditions, did he think that the torture or the oppressive conditions contributed to these suicide attempts. His answer was, "Oh, no. These detainees, and many of the detainees, were depressed before they got to Guantánamo." I thought to myself, and again, I put the things in the back of my mind and they simmer, but they don't actually turn into a conclusion yet.

I associated that, he was saying that these detainees, we at Guantánamo were not responsible for the suicide attempts because they were suffering from a pre-existing condition. He was using the language of insurance companies to not insure patients because they have a pre-existing condition. He was saying that we're not responsible. He just took that corporate American idea of responsibility and, when we're not responsible, he just lifted it and absolved himself from human responsibility for the suicide attempts and absolved the entire command from responsibility for these suicide attempts because of a pre-existing condition. The current conditions just don't count.

Speaker 1: It was also the argument that the Germans gave when Jews saw compensation after World War II.

Steven: That they were poor before?

Speaker 1: Yeah, that it was preexisting, that's why they were in trouble, psychologically.

Steven: Wow. That just sort of stuck. It was on metabolize-able for me at the time. Then, the other, there were two others that were very similar. One was when the CIA went to capture Khalid Sheik Mohammed in Pakistan. They had a tip about his home. They went to capture him, they didn't find them at home, but he had 2 sons that were home. One 7, one 9. The CIA kidnapped his sons, transfer them to a black site and ostensibly to try to get information out of them. After they captured Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, they still didn't release his sons because they used them as sort of pressure for him.

This is kind of a nightmarish idea what the CIA is capable of and where ethics go out the window when under the pressure of justified … You can isolate and kidnap and imprison 7 and 9-year-olds to pressure someone into revealing information. What can you do?

Speaker 1: Did you have a question at that time whether mental health professionals were involved?

Steven: Yes. I didn't have a question. It was answered in the article. The article said, "Don't worry. We have child psychologists taking care of these children." That was in the Wall Street Journal article. That idea of, "Don't worry. They're getting the best of care." As if you can kidnap children, isolate them and somehow give them care. That a

psychologist's job is to somehow … I don't know what they … My sense of the psychologist's ethics does not reach to that use of language. These children are getting the best of care in their imprisonment in a CIA black site. It just does not compute that a psychologist could, in any way, somehow participate.

In both of those cases, the health professional is using his professional knowledge and authority for strategic military or intelligence purposes, but not in the interest of the human beings in his or her care. I saw that as a gross violation of ethics. I still wasn't an activist. I was just disgusted. I didn't become an activist until after the PENS report came out and it supported psychologists being in these …

Speaker 1: That was the report from the task force that you'd just been describing?

Steven: Exactly, the PENS report came out and said psychologists have a legitimate and ethical role to play in interrogations, which made me sick, but that didn't do it. What did it was when the military, after the APA's task force report came out, which was significantly different from the physicians and the psychiatrists and the nurse's response. The military said that based on the responses of the professional Association, "We have decided that from now on we are going to only use psychologists as part of these behavioral science consultation teams." Then, I was moved to act. Then, I became an activist.

I simply wrote a letter, a totally naïve letter, to the president of the American Psychological Association, Gerald Koocher, and I said, "I don't know if you get the impact of this announcement by the US military that says that psychologists will be the only ones to be part of these interrogation teams, but the impact is that the country will see psychologists as the only health professional willing to consult on these in torture. In fact, according to the ICRC, this is torture. This is now the exclusive domain of psychologists. I'm asking you to publicly come out and condemn this."

He wrote back this kind of church response that I shouldn't believe everything I read in the press. That was the turn, I wrote a letter. Because of that letter and his response, one of the psychoanalysts on Section 9, I post about those letters on Section 9. One of the psychoanalysts took the letters and gave it to his friend, Amy Goodman. Amy Goodman invited me to appear on her TV show with Gerald Koocher.

Speaker 1: Dr. Koocher.

Steven: We debated the issue on TV and then I became noticed by the press and noticed by the Physicians for Human Rights and noticed by a variety of sources. I had the opportunity to use all of this information that I had in the hopper that I was just thinking about politically. Suddenly, I felt like I had been training. Between the information about psychologists and my upbringing for my parents, it was if I had been in training to be an activist. A little bit from the theater background.

Speaker 1: What did that bring?

Steven: Well, I was an improvisational theater. I was good on my feet. And, I had learned in improvisational experimental theater, never to take anything at face value, but to find the center, the soul of the human question. With all of this, I was ready to be an activist. That's the background.

Speaker 1: One of the things that I think we haven't talked about are the people who came in to support you. Your, what do I call them? Your lieutenants. Your generals and lieutenants.

Steven: I would say that it wasn't that people came in to support me. What happened is that the group of people working separately, using their own particular backgrounds and strengths, but we were all working separately and we all had our expertise. This is a little bit like mission impossible where you have these dossiers of people with different expertise. It wasn't I who brought them together. It was Physicians for Human Rights. It was Glenn Rubenstein and Paul [Rockland 00:23:55] and Natty Raymond, who, they had been part of influencing the physicians and psychiatrists and they had had no luck with the psychologists. They found anyone who had a voice, protesting this APA's position. They brought us together, but eventually a few of us, and I would say a few of the ones who … I don't know how it is, but a few of us found each other. Originally it was me and Natty, and we connected for various reasons, and then Brad Swanson.

Speaker 1: Brad Olsen.

Steven: You're right. Brad Olsen. Sorry, Brad. Brad Olsen joined and then Jean Maria Arrigo and then Steven [Sultz 00:24:46]. Then later, we added others, Roy Eidelson and Trudy [Bond 00:24:52]. We became a coalition but I wouldn't say that they were in any way lieutenants. Steven Sultz at the time had a grasp on the speed and language of social media, particularly the Internet, that was brilliant. He also has an ethical soul that is clearer and more humane than anyone else that I know, including me. He's the one that, when he corrected me, I knew he was right. I didn't always follow him. I'll give one example of when I didn't, but he had all of those skills.

Jean Maria Arrigo had a connection to the world of intelligence because she was an oral historian of the intelligence world.

Speaker 1: Is she also a psychologist?

Steven: She's a psychologist, yes. She was raised by a family member who was in the intelligence world. She brought her own ethics, but she brought ethics to believing that interrogations must be done, and how to do them ethically? She also was a oral historian, so she has a sense of history and truth and archive. Brad understood the APA very well, so he brought that. Natty, who was the non-psychologist, but he was an amazing mixture of human rights activist, political savant, had unbelievable connections. The wildest imagination, that is often incredibly useful, he was the energizer of the group. When we were ready to despair, he felt his job was to keep us going. Each of us brought our own ...

I'd say of the group, I'm the most adept at speaking to the public in a way that

galvanizes energy. That is partly because my theater background and because of my personality. I'm not overly shy. I come from a family of storytellers, so I know how to tell a story. We each came together. I don't remember your question, but I wanted to correct the idea that they were lieutenants.

Speaker 1: Those of you who formed this, as Koocher would probably call it, Kabal …

Steven: He has called it a Kabal.

Speaker 1: Yes, I was channeling him. We don't have time to cover those three or four really intense years of trying to get the APA to disentangle themselves from the CIA and DOD, but pick a couple of highlights of your involvement.

Steven: Well, okay. The highlights that I'm going to pick, the first ones that come to mind are the ones, the moments of real belief. I would say, and this gets back to the place where I disagree with Steven Soldz, we were proposing a policy at the APA, which we always tried to call a moratorium on psychologist participation in these interrogations until more was known about the interrogations. Our idea was that psychologists couldn't ethically participate in secret missions, especially when the missions had been … What was known was ethically suspect. Since there was no way to know, there was no way to advise. We would have to say that until we knew differently, we shouldn't participate.

We had to give ethics a benefit of the doubt, not security. Neil Altman proposed policy, which he would repeatedly do, among others, about this moratorium. By the time it got to a vote at council, it had been pretty much changed into a restatement of APA's policy that psychologists don't participate in torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment. Then, we had trouble with that. Then, I learned from Benjamin, a reporter for …

Speaker 1: Mark Benjamin.

Steven: Mark Benjamin, a reporter for Salon. He called me and interviewed me about certain issues and he interviewed me about one issue which I didn't know until he told me, which is that when the council was going to be debating this policy, President Koocher had invited the Surgeon General of the Army to speak to the council. One person, speaking to the council and this person happens to be the boss of the BSCT psychologists, the psychologists who are involved in those very interrogations. He was their boss, and he was going to be giving the council a pep talk on why this was unnecessary?

Speaker 1: He's not a psychologist?

Steven: No, he's not a psychologist. I don't remember what he was, but I think it was a gastroenterologist. I can't remember. He was a physician. Anyway, he was responsible, and he had been, basically, an apologist for the BSCTs from the moment their role was made public by the ICRC. I went back to our telephone group and learned that Lynn Rubenstein, the director of Physicians for Human Rights, had written a letter to Gerald Koocher asking whether he could speak alongside the general, because he had done

that before and had gotten no response, blah, blah, blah. Other people had written letters and gotten no response. I decided I was going to write a letter to Gerald Koocher, but I had gotten a little more savvy.

Speaker 1: On what grounds?

Steven: On the grounds, again, our reputation as psychologists is being challenged by this idea that only one side of the issue is being represented by the president of the Association during a debate. I said that somebody else should be able to speak alongside the general and I recommended Lynn Rubenstein. I recommended Phil Zimbardo, who had been critical of the PENS report, but I knew when I wrote that what the outcome was likely to be. I didn't get a response for about 2 days. Then I wrote him a second letter. In the second letter I said, "I haven't heard from you. Colleagues and associates in the press have been asking me to make public my first letter to you.

I've decided that I would give you another opportunity to answer before I made that letter public. Within about 4 hours, I got a response. It was the response I actually expected. He invited me.

Speaker 1: Why do you suppose he did that?

Steven: Because I was a nobody. Because I was not particularly strong in the debate with him on Amy Goodman as far as I was concerned, and obviously as far as he was concerned.

Speaker 1: He didn't think he had an opponent?

Steven: He thought that I was a lightweight and he thought that he could intimidate me the way he had intimidated others. He worked it out. This was the schedule. The surgeon general was going to speak. Then there was going to be a lunch and then I was going to speak. At the lunch, he sat me next to the Surgeon General of the Army. Between him and the Surgeon General. Across the way was Larry James, who he introduced to me for the first time as the man who cleaned up Abu Ghraib. I don't remember if Morgan Banks was at the table. Steve Behnke was at the table. Steve Behnke and I had this discussion.

Speaker 1: Identify again Steve Behnke.

Steven: Steve Behnke was the director of the ethics office of the APA. Steve has this way of being very soft-spoken, but asserting his history and authority. He was just being soft-spoken and saying "These are very difficult issues. I studied these issues when I was a student at Princeton and then I went to law school and also became a psychologist and they're very, very complex, but we really have spent our time …" I said "When were you at Princeton?" He said he graduated, I think, in 1978 and I said "Oh, I graduated in 1976," so I could sort of go head-to-head with all of his credentials.

I was as soft-spoken as he was but I was not in the least bit intimidated by him, but the thing that fascinated me was that I was not in the least intimidated by Surgeon General Kiley in spite of the fact that he was about 6'4" and wearing military fatigues and

surrounded by an entourage of military people and talking with the authority of not only the US military but the need to save the country from terrorism. This is the gambit that the military tends to use successfully with people, and I had seen it over and over again. When they have to justify taking the gloves off, that the terrible people that we're dealing with and the fact that, you know, what happened on September 11.

I could say to him, "I was in downtown Manhattan on September 11. I was at St. Vincent's Hospital on September 11. I feel as much as anybody about what that attack did to my city and my country." Somehow, I wasn't intimidated by him. The reason I'm telling this story, actually, is not because of what I could say to him during that lunch, and I was able to ask him very pointed questions without fear. I mean, I discovered that I wasn't afraid. It was remarkable. The speech I gave to the council, because I had done my homework. I had really done my homework. I had spoken to Lynn Rubenstein and asked him to allow me to be his proxy, so he prepped me, but I also studied the justification for the torture at Guantanamo. At that point, I believe the only thing that had been linked to the public, or maybe not leaked. Maybe brought into the public's eye by the ACLU's Freedom of Information Act actions.

There was the report of the working group at Guantanamo, which was the justification. Then, there was Rumsfeld's directive in response to the working group. The working group, I didn't know at the time, but they basically quoted Use Torture Memo and Use Torture Memo said that it is not torture if the interrogator consults with health professionals and mental health professionals and can say with confidence that these consultations have asserted that these actions do not cause …

Speaker 1: Lasting?

Steven: Yeah, there's two. There's kind of harm, permanent or long-term and severe harm. They needed to have health professionals present to certify that the interrogator turned to the professionals as a kind of consultation to indemnify the interrogator that they are committing torture or cruel, inhumane treatment. It was what was necessary legally and, according to the policy, to prevent an accusation of torture was the presence of health professionals. When I read that, and then Rumsfeld's memo said there must always … You can do these techniques, but there must always be a health professional present.

I concluded that the psychologists were necessary, especially now that the physicians and the psychiatrists refused to do it. I said, and Steven said, you've got circumstantial evidence, we don't know for sure that this is why the psychologists are doing it and that this is the case. Since then, we know that that's exactly the case, but I was taking a risk based on my interpretation of that. Steven is more cautious. He not only was cautious in terms of what was ethical, but he was also cautious in terms of when we could make a case.

Speaker 1: The case you made to the assembled council, I guess it was, at the APA, was that …

Steven: The case that I made was that we can stop the torture, because the torture can only

take place if there's a health professional present. The other health professionals have said no, their members can't do it. The only ones that still say yes are psychologists. If we say no psychologists can be present, these abusive interrogations, this torture will no longer have a legal framework. We can stop it.

Speaker 1: And?

Steven: I was not clever enough to anticipate every manipulation that the military, the CIA and the Justice Department had managed to create.

Speaker 1: At that meeting, Steven, when you spoke to the council, were those various ways around your very convincing and strong argument, were they brought up then?

Steven: Yeah, this is what happened. The military division, they said, basically, everybody argued to the council, "What Steven Reisner is saying is exactly the reason that we need this policy," but they had reworded the policy. They policy said the APA opposes any participation in torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment. The council felt that they were going to do what I was asking them to do, without realizing that we had no definition of torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment. I only realized that that was the major loophole during the vote, just before the vote, when they were debating it.

I ran over to some of the Division 48 people and I said "We don't have a definition. This is not going to be useful unless we have a definition. Let's use the definition that comes from the Tokyo Protocols of the World Medical Association, or the UN ethics for medical professionals. They have definitions of what is unethical. Let's use that." Nobody was willing to offer the friendly amendment. Everybody was offering an amendment on the question of whether they should add the word "Willingly." "No psychologist should willingly participate in this."

They went out, they rewrote the policy and added the word "Willingly." They didn't mention another change that they made in the policy, which I only found out later. It turns out, in fact, they had added a definition of torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. That definition came from the United State's "Reservations to the UN Convention Against Torture," which said that we don't have to uphold the UN convention against torture because we already have a US constitution that is against cruel and unusual punishment. Therefore, we only follow the UN convention as long as it coincides with our constitution.

Now, I had read, in the working group memo, that it was the reservations to the UN conventions against torture which provided the legal loophole of the definition of torture, cruel, unusual and degrading treatment, which permitted the torture to go on. You, I didn't know it was you at the time, I thought it was the working group, but they actually used this definition in order to permit torture. The APA had managed to permit, to include, a definition of torture which permitted the psychologists' participation in torture to go on while the council believed fully that they were voting to stop it. They were so much more clever.

I read that on the plane home and my stomach dropped. I called up Natty Raymond and I read that to him. Nobody knew it because it wasn't mentioned it was only in the final, printed version, which I only read on the plane home. We tried to be clever. They were cleverer and back and forth. We tried to change the language in the next one, and this cat and mouse game has been going on ever since.

Speaker 1: When you say "They," can you say this? Is it a guess or is it at this point knowledge? Can you say it on tape? The "They" wasn't just the APA.

Steven: The "They" was definitely not just the APA because the APA alone wouldn't have read so closely the working group report or the "U Memo" to make sure that the APA's policy always comported with the sometimes … I wouldn't say secret, exactly, at that point, but certainly not public knowledge policy of the CIA or the intelligence association. We know already, from the PENS report, from the PENS task force, the members of the PENS task force, one of the members of the PENS task force was Morgan Banks. Morgan Banks was the author of the memo under which the BSCT psychologists worked.

The task force incorporated some of the language of Morgan Banks' memo into APA policy.

Speaker 1: Banks is DoD?

Steven: Banks? Well, what is Banks? That's a good question. Banks, officially, is special operations of the Army, of the Department of Defense and the Army. However, Banks was sent to Afghanistan in, I don't know, December of 2001, just at the time of the invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion of Afghanistan was under the egis of the CIA. The interrogation and intelligence operations in Afghanistan were under the coordination of the CIA. Banks' position as Special Ops Army was also overlapping, in some way, with the CIA's aims and protocols in Afghanistan. I'm just being logical. I'm not saying this from any special knowledge.

Speaker 1: The assumption would be that both DoD, Department of the Army and the CIA were pulling the strings at the APA that allowed them to outwit you.

Steven: Well, we can say more than that. We can say that on the PENS task force was Scott Shumate, who had been a part of the CIA's counter-terrorism task force. Whatever. The CTC. He had been a major psychologist there. He had been present at the torture of Zubaydah in the CIA black site. Then, he was moved over to the DoD and was in charge of the DoD's intelligence operation and exploring processes of interrogation and in touch with what was going on at Guantanamo. The overlap, the cross-fertilization was pretty widespread and the influence in the APA could come from many different sources.

Speaker 1: Could, probably did. I mean, basically.

Steven: I'd say that it is a very … I would say it's a safe assumption to believe that the APA

language was always … I would say it's a safe assumption to say that the APA's language was always beholden to influences beyond the APA coming from CIA, DoD, who knows, the White House? Because Susan Brandon was working in the White House and she was present at the PENS task force. There is reason to believe that the influence, these influences were very strong.

Speaker 1: I'm going to stop you there.

Steven: I tell that story about the talk I gave to the council because, first of all, I really believed that we would be able to stop torture. I mean, I have changed my view since then. I don't believe that the APA can stop torture, but I do believe that the APA can return torture to the realm of shame again. The worst thing that happened during the Bush Administration is that torture became justified. Torture stopped being one of those, "You never do it and anybody who does it is, by virtue of torturing, a bad guy." We lost our shame about it and became proud of torture. My role now, with the APA is to restore shame, so that they have to put torture underground and whenever it's exposed, it gets stopped. That's how it used to be. When the CIA, what they did in Latin America became publicized, they had to stop, which is why they stopped being torturers until the Bush Administration returned it.

Then, it stopped being a source of shame, so that, at first, when I gave that talk I really believed we, the APA council, this group of people in front of me, could stop torture. That was the passion with which I brought that. Later on, as we began investigating, we pulled the thread of psychologists and torture, our group, the coalition, and began discovering more and more how psychologists, the story of psychologists and torture was the story of US torture. They were the same, because it was as we pulled those threads we began to discover that in every case, and there are basically 2, there's the CIA torture, and there's the DoD torture.

The CIA torture, we discovered that, and this is … This comes from our sources, but we discovered, through a variety of sources, but it came through us, that the CIA program in torture was created by 2 psychologists; Mitchell and Jessen. The Senate Armed Services Committee made clear, and we kind of knew it but didn't know it as clearly as when the Senate Armed Services Committee revealed it, that the Department of Defense's program in torture was created at Guantanamo by 2 psychologists … No, by a psychologist and a psychiatrist, John Lesso and Bernie … I don't remember Bernie's first name. I don't remember.

Anyway, what we began to discover along the way was that psychologists and torture, the story was the same. The story that I'm going to tell at this point was the other moment of incredible hope, because basically on his way to Washington to speak to the Senate Armed Services Committee about what he had learned about the sources of torture, particularly the role of psychologists and particularly the role of Mitchell and Jessen, but on his way, we were meeting in Chinatown and he said he had something he wanted to share with me about what he was going to be telling the Senate Armed Services Committee. We met in one of my favorite restaurants in Chinatown.

Speaker 1: Early 30s, late 20s.

Steven: At the time? I guess he must have been late 20s. Maybe 30, but yeah, this young guy. This young sort of Midwestern looking, friendly looking guy on his cell phone, and he says to me on the phone, "That's me. You're looking at me." That's how we met. He kind of had this Midwestern kind of easy-going, very funny way of communicating with a kind of piece of naiveté in his mode of communicating. He's got this American thing. I am twice removed from the American thing. One way I'm removed from the American thing is because I'm a child of immigrants, Polish immigrants. The other way I'm removed from the American thing is because I was born and raised in New York City. I don't usually meet people who are part of this kind of American way of speaking and American way of knowing something else but speaking with a kind of common sense.

He begins to tell me the information that he's going to be giving. What he tells me is he tells me about Mitchell and Jessen and how they had been basically lent from the Department of Defense to the CIA. He said, "Do you get why that's important? No? Okay, I'll explain to you why that's important. That's important because the CIA and the Department of Defense are independent operations that are not permitted to share their intelligence and their operations. If they are sharing their intelligence and their operations, it is because a group above both of them is calling the shots. There's only one group above the CIA and the DoD and that's the executive branch in the White House. This could only have come from the White House. That means that the torture directives could only have come from the White House. That is what I'm going to tell the Senate Armed Services Committee."

"They are going to," he said with full confidence, "They are going to do their research. They're going to do their … They're dealing with the Guantanamo torture right now, they're dealing with the Armed Services, this is going to come out. When it comes out that the White House directed the torture, we both understood at the same time, this is going to bring down the government. The country will be ashamed, we will see … If Watergate brought down the president, the president directing torture? Secret tortures at CIA black sites, that that will bring down the government. He left full of confidence. He gave me a present. The present was, I opened the bag, it was a t-shirt with Dustin Hoffman and Robert Redford in "All the President's Men." I'm just conveying how much faith we had.

Speaker 1: Yeah. It's a wonderful note to end on, and I will ask you this one question, because, and you've hinted at the answer when you talked about shame. While we were talking last time, you said that you're going to run for president of the APA. In a one-minute stomp speech, tell us what your platform will be.

Steven: I think that the APA has completely forgotten what makes psychologists stand out as having integrity and being respect-worthy. That has to do with this independent sense of what is right, but more than what is right, what is humane? There is an ethics code. There's a Hippocratic oath. There is a history of people trusting their doctors because their doctors stand for prioritizing the well-being of the individual that they are confronted with. We don't answer to the state first, we don't answer to the

corporations first. We don't answer to our pocketbooks first. We answer to the humane need in front of us, the person in front of us, and we do not harm them and we think, first and foremost in terms of the well-being of every human being, which is why we do not participate in military operations as health professionals.

We are there for the well-being of prisoners and soldiers. We are there for the well-being of all patients in this country, no matter what their insurance companies say and no matter what the government says. We may be beholden to the problems, and we may suffer under the very difficult lives that psychologists are experiencing now because of the insurance companies, the pharmaceutical companies and the Zeitgeist of profit before people, we may be suffering for that, but it is not our job to join that. It is our job to enlighten people on what it's like to be human beings struggling under such adversarial conditions. They should know that they can turn to us and we will talk honestly to them about some of the difficulties and what the humane, the human welfare, the human dignity and the human health possibilities are.

If we do that and we keep our integrity and research, we keep our integrity in clinical practice, we keep our integrity in teaching, even under such pressure, Americans will do what they did when I was in training, which is they'll turn to psychologists because they can trust them. I want to restore that sensibility and that reputation to psychologists, and I want the APA to be seen as the voice of that perspective.

Speaker 1: Terrific. Thank you, Steven.