IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO

LARRY C. JAMES, et al., CASE NO. 2017-CV-839

Plaintiffs,

-vs- <u>TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS</u>

(MOTION HEARING)

DAVID HOFFMAN, et al.,

(Pages 1 - 93)

Defendants.

PRESIDING: Hon. Timothy N. O'Connell

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1 (Friday, August 25, 2017, 09:29 a.m.) This Court of Common Pleas in and for the 2 THE CLERK: 3 State of Ohio, County of Montgomery, is now in session, with 4 the Honorable Timothy N. O'Connell presiding. 5 THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. We're on the 6 record at this time in the case of Larry C. James and others 7 versus David Hoffman and others. This is case number 2017-CV-8 839 in the Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County, Ohio. 9 This matter comes on today for hearing on the Defendants' 10 motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and forum 11 non-conveniens. 12 Would the attorney for -- or attorneys for Plaintiff, or 13 Plaintiffs, identify themselves for the record? 14 MS. FORREST: Good morning, Your Honor, Bonny Forrest. 15 THE COURT: Good morning. Good morning, Your Honor, Gerhardt "Gage" 16 MR. GOSNELL: 17 Gosnell for the Plaintiffs. 18 Okay. Mr. Gosnell, are you representing THE COURT: 19 all of the Plaintiffs? 20 MR. GOSNELL: We do, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Ms. Forrest, you represent --22 MS. FORREST: Mr. Free is not able to be here today and 23 I repre -- I'm going to speak for all the Plaintiffs today, 24 Your Honor. 2.5 THE COURT: Okay.



- 1 MS. FORREST: I technically represent four of them, but
- 2 | I'| 1 be speaking -- I'| 1 be the lead attorney arguing today.
- 3 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
- 4 MS. FORREST: Thank you.
- 5 THE COURT: Would the attorney or attorneys for David
- 6 Hoffman identify themselves for the record?
- 7 MR. HENTOFF: Good morning, Your Honor. I'm Thomas
- 8 | Hentoff and we are counsel for David Hoffman and Sidley Austin.
- 9 THE COURT: Thank you.
- 10 MR. IRELAND: And Your Honor, also, Jeff Ireland and
- 11 | Erin Rhinehart and Chris Hollon behalf of Sidley Austin and the
- 12 Defendant.
- 13 THE COURT: Thank you. Would the attorney or attorneys
- 14 | for American Psychological Association identify themselves for
- 15 the record?
- 16 MR. JUSTICE: Good morning, Your Honor, Steve Justice
- 17 | for the American Psychological Association. I'd like to
- 18 introduce Barbara Wahl.
- MS. WAHL: Good morning, Your Honor.
- 20 MR. JUSTICE: And Karen Carr with the Arent Fox firm.
- 21 Ms. Wahl will be lead counsel arguing this morning on behalf of
- 22 | the American Psychological Association.
- THE COURT: Thank you.
- MR. JUSTICE: Thank you.
- 25 THE COURT: We're going to proceed with the Movants, so



it will be Defendants first, followed by Plaintiffs, who are
the Respondents to the motions, and then we'll have rebuttal
allowed for the Movants.

Let me ask; is there any exhibits, evidentiary matters, or
factual matters stipulated to?

MR. HENTOFF: Your Honor, Thomas Hentoff, no. There's nothing stipulated to, but as we discussed on our status conference on the telephone last week, we agree that the legal standard here is that the Plaintiffs' burden is to make a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction based upon the allegations of the complaint, as supplemented by the allegations of the affidavits, which we must accept as true in considering the prima facie case.

THE COURT: Okay. So how do you intend to deal with the exhib -- with the affidavits?

MR. HENTOFF: Well, Your Honor, I can explain. So we had that issue with -- let me just pause for a second and say, this morning, except when I'm talking about David Hoffman separately, just for shorthand, I'll refer to both of our clients as Sidley, if that's okay with the Court?

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. HENTOFF: So in order to address the issue that came up last week with regard to the affidavits and exhibits, we filed a notice this week in which we withdrew all of the objections to the exhibits that were of the foundational

nature, such as hearsay or personal knowledge. So we have completely withdrawn anything that could give Plaintiffs' counsel impediment to talking about the exhibits that they believe are important in the case.

In a bit of housekeeping, in our notice, we said the only objections that we're not withdrawing are relevance and in the notice I pointed the Court to the relevance objections as being only the ones on the first column in our chart and Plaintiffs' counsel helpfully pointed out to me this morning that in addition, on page 3 of our motion, in section 1, we also make a couple of relevance objections that are not listed in column one.

So our proposal, I think all Defendants' proposal, Your Honor, is let's just proceed with the substantive motions. Everybody can argue whatever they want, and if the Court thinks or the parties suggest after the substantive motions that there's a need to take up the relevance objections, I propose that we address that issue at that time.

19 THE COURT: Very well. Thank you. Do you agree,
20 Ms. Forrest?

MS. FORREST: I do, Your Honor. I think we all want to proceed efficiently. You've got counsel here and I think proceeding with the argument makes the most sense.

The one thing that we specified in our notice is that as Your Honor -- if Your Honor takes under advisement various

affidavits that may or may not be mentioned today, that the record be made very clear about what Your Honor chooses to rely on and what he doesn't.

Now, that may mean and, you know, I understand that

Mr. Hentoff has been -- has graciously agreed to drop some of
the foundational issues, but during the argument, for example,
one of their cases brought up a new issue. So it may be that
we would need to continue the hearing to bring up that evidence
and provide witness testimony, Your Honor, if you choose to
rely on that.

And so, we would agree that we should proceed this morning with the arguments, but if Your Honor wants more testimony as we go through the argument or different sort of foundational evidence, for example a certified copy or somebody to lay the foundation about a record of APAs, then we would be prepared to go forward with that at another time.

17 THE COURT: Very well.

MS. FORREST: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Now, with regard to the Defendants, will both counsel for Sidley wish to argue and then separately counsel for the APA? Is that --

22 MR. HENTOFF: Yes, Your Honor, because the --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HENTOFF: -- the Defendants have different factual allegations that relate to them separately.



THE COURT: All right. Okay. Have you reached the agreement about who will go first? Sidley -- okay. All right. Counsel, you can proceed. DEFENDANT SIDLEY'S ORAL ARGUMENT MR. HENTOFF: Good morning, Your Honor. Good morning, sir. THE COURT: MR. HENTOFF: May it please the Court, this is a defamation case brought by five Plaintiffs. The five Plaintiffs are among the dozens and dozens of people associated with the APA, and that's my shorthand for the American Psychological Association, the Department of Defense, the CIA, or other federal governmental agencies who were discussed in the Sidley report that is the subject of this case. So Sidley provided to the APA a 540-page report of its investigation and as the Plaintiffs allege, and as the report states, over the course of several months, Sidley reviewed a large number of documents, interviewed about 150 people, and came up with a report. The report was focused on allegations regarding the actions that the APA took in the 2000s in connection with the U.S. government's use of enhanced interrogation techniques

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1	government. It was not in any respect, Your Honor, focused on
2	the State of Ohio.
3	Just to illustrate that point, I would like to quote from
4	two paragraphs at the very beginning of Plaintiffs' complaint,
5	because as we said, we accept as true the allegations of the
6	complaint. So in paragraph 2, at the very beginning, the
7	Plaintiffs say:
8	The lawsuit arises from an independent review and
9	report commissioned from Hoffman and Sidley by the
10	APA.
11	And David Hoffman, I should have said, was the lead Sidley
12	partner on this engagement.
13	The review was prompted and guided by claims that in
14	the aftermath of 911, the APA colluded with the Bush
15	administration, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
16	the U.S. military to support torture.
17	And then in paragraph 4, the Plaintiffs say:
18	As his review proceeded, however, it became a fishing
19	expedition spanning decades of events, not only
20	within the APA, but also within the government, the
21	military, and the CIA.
22	So the principal question on Sidley's motion is whether in
23	the course of this investigation and in the report that
2.4	discussed the findings and conclusions of the investigation is

whether Sidley and David Hoffman's relevant contacts with the

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State of Ohio are sufficient to satisfy the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution, such as the State of Ohio, can constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over these Defendants.

So in my argument this morning, I would like to cover three topics. The first is there's no general personal jurisdiction over Sidley or David Hoffman in Ohio. Second, and Your Honor, if you'd like me to slow down at any point, I'll do that. Or speed up.

THE COURT: It's okay.

MR. HENTOFF: Second, there's no specific personal jurisdiction over Sidley or Mr. Hoffman arising from their contacts with the State of Ohio in connection with their investigation and report.

Third and finally, under the doctrine of forum non-conveniens, this case in any event should be dismissed so that it can be refiled in the Superior forum, which is the District of Columbia, which means that if the Court were to dismiss on that basis, the case would not end. Plaintiffs would have an avenue to assert their claims. It would be in Washington, DC.

A final bit of housekeeping is our motion does not challenge jurisdiction under Ohio's long-arm statute. So I'm not going to address that.

So with regard to -- I'm sorry, general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has made very clear in a series of cases in the

last four or five years that general jurisdiction over a corporate entity is only proper under the constitution. Let me pause for a second and back up.

So, there are two ways for a state to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant. So general jurisdiction is where the defendant is at home or essentially at home in the jurisdiction and therefore anybody can sue them about anything. So, maybe not a good example, but Williams & Connelly is a Washington, DC law firm and if anyone wanted to sue Williams & Connelly about anything, they could sue in Washington, DC.

So specific jurisdiction requires a lawsuit in which the defendant's relevant contacts with the jurisdiction are such that the claim arises out of those contacts. That's why it's called specific jurisdiction instead of general jurisdiction.

So the Plaintiffs have alleged that in this case, there is both general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction against Sidley and David Hoffman and so I'm taking up general jurisdiction first.

I guess to cut to the chase on general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has made very clear and it has repeated itself in recent years that absent truly extraordinary circumstances that are not present here, a corporate entity can only be subject to general jurisdiction where it's formed or incorporated and where its principal place of business is.

As the complaint both alleges and acknowledges, Sidley is



an international law firm. It is based in Chicago. It has ten offices in the United States, and it has no offices in Ohio.

Plaintiffs' factual allegations about Sidley's contacts with Ohio are essentially that as a busy law firm, Sidley appears in Ohio courts, represents Ohio defendants, appears in the Sixth Circuit, and has some connections to institutions of higher learning in this state.

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So the Supreme Court has made clear that that's insufficient as a matter of due process to justify general jurisdiction over a defendant and it did it most starkly in the BNSF Railway-v.-Tyrrell case, which came out right before our reply brief was filed. So we cite that case in our reply brief.

In that case the defendant railway operated railroads in a number of states. It was headquartered in Texas and it was incorporated in Delaware. An employee of the railway who did not live in Montana and was not injured in Montana for some reason sued the railway in Montana. The rationale was, well, the railway's essentially at home in Montana even though it's not headquartered or incorporated there because it has 2,000 employees in the state and it is responsible for maintaining 2,000 miles of railroad track in Montana. It is difficult to imagine a more substantial and continuous connection that an out of state defendant could have with the state.

The Supreme Court said that is insufficient. There's no



general jurisdiction over the railway in Montana. The rationale in part was we need to give defendants some certainty about -- so they can know where is it that they can be sued for anything.

So based on that case, and the cases that we cite in our briefs, there is no general jurisdiction over Sidley, whose comings and goings in Ohio do not remotely approach the significant and essentially permanent contacts that the railway had in the Supreme Court case.

Then finally, Plaintiffs suggest in their opposition brief that maybe the result would be different because Sidley is formed as a partnership as opposed to a corporation. They don't cite any authority for that proposition and we're not aware of any.

Again, in this recent <u>BNSF Railway</u> case, the court pretty strongly rejected a similar argument and it said that the Fourteenth Amendment due process constraint that we're talking about quote, does not vary with the type of claim asserted, or the type of business enterprise sued. So for that reason, there's no general jurisdiction over Sidley.

The case regarding David Hoffman is much simpler. As the complaint alleges, he lives and works in Chicago, Illinois and simply visiting Ohio for work is clearly insufficient to say that an individual is subject to general jurisdiction in the state. As the Supreme Court in the recent, relatively recent

<u>Daimler</u> case that we cite said, the paradigm for general jurisdiction over an individual is the individual's domicile and there's no reason to deviate from that paradigm in this case.

So that's all I have on general jurisdiction unless the Court has any questions.

THE COURT: No, sir.

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MR. HENTOFF: So moving onto specific jurisdiction. I want to start with an important point, which again relies on a recent Supreme Court case, because the Supreme Court has been actively involving itself in the law of personal jurisdiction in recent years to provide guidance to courts and litigants.

An important point about specific jurisdiction as opposed to general jurisdiction, and that's under the purposeful availment test, which is a three-part test that in the Sixth Circuit of Ohio is known as the <u>Southern Machine</u> test, but I'll call it for shorthand the purposeful availment test.

The Supreme Court in June in the <u>Bristol-Myers Squibb</u> case underscored the important point that if the defendant's contacts with the state are not related to the defendant's claim -- I'm sorry, not related to the plaintiff's claims, then they're disregarded. They just don't count in the personal jurisdiction analysis. It's only the contacts that relate to the plaintiff's claims that count.

So in the Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Superior Court case,

the Supreme Court held that there was no specific personal jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers over the claims of out of state residents who claimed that outside of California, they had taken the drug Plavix and had suffered injury. The Supreme Court noted again Bristol-Myers Squibbs' substantial contacts with the state of California, which included it had 410 employees in California. It had five research facilities in California. It had a lobbying office in Sacramento and over the course of six or seven years, it had generated \$900 million in revenue from selling Plavix to California residents.

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The Supreme Court ordered that the case should be dismissed for lack of specific jurisdiction because the plaintiff's claims had nothing to do with those extensive and substantial California contacts.

So again, the much more intermittent unrelated Sidley contacts that Plaintiffs talk about have no bearing on the personal jurisdiction analysis.

We explain in our brief why there's no personal jurisdiction, there's no specific personal jurisdiction over any of the five Plaintiffs but I'm going to treat the Plaintiffs in two separate groups. The first group is the four Plaintiffs who do not live in Ohio and have not alleged -- they've alleged some connections to Ohio but I'll say they have not alleged any substantial connection to Ohio. So you've got Colonels Dunivin and Banks, and Doctors Behnke and Newman.

At the time the lawsuit was filed, Colonel Dunivin lived in DC. She, according to an affidavit, she's now moved to California. Dr. Newman lives in California. Colonel Banks lives in North Carolina. So these are the four Plaintiffs who do not have -- that do not live in Ohio.

Then the second, the way I'm grouping the Defendants (sic), we have Colonel James, who lives in the Dayton area. So although we argue and will demonstrate that Colonel James, the Ohio resident, also is not able to establish specific jurisdiction over Sidley. Even if he could, the law is also clear that the other four Plaintiffs don't get to exercise — have the state exercise specific jurisdiction over Sidley just because there's another Plaintiff in the case who is able to do that.

That was the key holding of that Supreme Court that I just mentioned, the <u>Bristol-Myers</u> case. Essentially, there were a lot of California residents who took Plavix and alleged that they were injured in a case with a lot of plaintiffs. There was no problem there. Those plaintiffs' case was permitted to proceed.

But there were also a lot of out of state plaintiffs who had sued in California in that case and the Supreme Court said that the mere fact that in this case there were California residents who had established personal jurisdiction quote, does not allow the state to assert specific jurisdiction over the

non-residents' claims, unquote. So my point is each Plaintiff has to establish Ohio's personal jurisdiction over their own claims and I'm going to treat the four non-Ohio residents together.

So we have a specific jurisdiction case in which the Plaintiffs allege that Sidley purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Ohio in essentially two ways. So these are the contacts that Plaintiffs say are the relevant and sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction.

The first is publication by virtue of Sidley's role in publishing the report that's at issue in this case. The second is investigation, that in the course of doing the investigation for the report, Sidley had contacts with the State of Ohio. So I'm going to address those two types of contacts separately.

So a defamation case in which the allegation is the defendant purposefully availed the privileges of doing business in the state by virtue of publishing something from outside of the state into the state, which is what we're talking about here, as we've stated in our briefs, the legal analysis for that kind of purposeful availment by publication has been set forth by the Supreme Court in the <u>Calder v. Jones</u> case in 1984, and that was a case involving the publisher of "National Enquirer" who was sued by an actress in California about an article the "National Enquirer" published alleging that she had a drinking problem and it affected her professional career in

California.

So that test has been applied several times by both the Ohio Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit in cases that cite and rely on each other. The two cases that I'm going to talk about to illustrate this analysis are Reynolds v. IAAF, which is a Sixth Circuit case from 1994, and Kauffman Racing Equipment v. Roberts, which is an Ohio Supreme Court case from 2010.

Here is the test. This is the <u>Calder</u> test that courts in Ohio and the Sixth Circuit apply. To begin with, the mere fact that an allegedly defamatory statement is published or republished by others into the state, in other words, there's been a publication, the statement's in Ohio, that mere fact is insufficient to satisfy due process over defendants. That's not good enough.

Instead, the courts look to see whether the state, in this case Ohio, qualifies as the focal point of the defendant's allegedly defamatory out of state publication. To boil down this focal point test, it requires a plaintiff to show that the out of state defendant intentionally targeted the state because of writing about the plaintiff's activities in the state and the plaintiff feeling the brunt of the harm in the state, thus making the state the focal point of the defendant's activities.

So here's a quote from the Ohio Supreme Court in Kauffman that boils down this idea, and this is at -- actually, I don't have the page number for this one, but this is a quote. This

analysis quote necessitates, necessitates conduct calculated to cause injury in a focal point where the brunt of the injury, the brunt of the injury is experienced. The court goes on to say in the context of the internet, while the effects of internet conduct may be felt in many forums, the intent requirement allows the court to find a particular focal point.

So having said all that, in talking first about the four non-Ohio Plaintiffs, under this focal point analysis which has been conducted time and time again by courts in Ohio and the Sixth Circuit, the four Plaintiffs who are not Ohio residents cannot satisfy even any part of the focal point analysis in Ohio because their claims do not have in any respect Ohio as a focal point.

The way I would like to finally conclude this analysis is to talk about the <u>Reynolds</u> case in the Sixth Circuit, and then apply its analysis to the four non-Ohio Plaintiffs and then to the one Ohio resident Plaintiff.

Reynolds was a track star who lived in Ohio. He ran in a meet that was run by the defendant, the IAAF and it was in Monaco. They applied -- they gave him a drug test, he failed the drug test, and the -- this International Athletic Association issued a press release telling everybody that he had failed the drug test. I think it's important that it was a press release because the defendant in that case was asking everybody please circulate what we're saying. A press release

is telling the press please republish this.

So the plaintiff sued and he alleged that the

International Association had made defamatory statements about
him and he said that Ohio had specific jurisdiction over the
association because they knew he lived in Ohio and that he
would suffer harm there. Indeed, he alleged extremely
substantial reputational harm in the State of Ohio
specifically. He said that he had lost corporate endorsements
and appearance fees in Ohio alone that were worth \$4 million.

So the Sixth Circuit held that there was no specific personal jurisdiction over his defamation claim against the association even though he was an Ohio resident. The court gave the following reasons, which I will then apply to the Plaintiffs in this case.

So the first two points are related. The court said the press release about the Ohio resident concerned his activities in Monaco, not in Ohio. This ends up being a critical fact in all the cases where courts either hold that there is no personal jurisdiction or hold that there is, that the focus of the communication that's at issue was activities in a different state.

So here, for the four Plaintiffs who don't live in Ohio, this -- to the extent the Sidley report talks about their activities, it's not in Ohio. It's in another state. So they can't satisfy that part of the analysis.



So now let's talk about Colonel James who lives in the Dayton area. It's the same for him. The report talks about conduct throughout the 2000s and there's no allegation in the complaint, there's no statement in Colonel James' affidavit that says the Sidley report was talking about my activities in Ohio. So he too is in the same situation as the sprinter whose activities outside the state were the subject of the, in that case, the press release.

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The related point that the controversy over the press release was from a drug sample that was taken and analyzed in Europe and that's essentially the same point that I just made that the Sidley report is about Washington DC, the federal government, and the conduct of the federal government overseas.

So the next point in the <u>Reynolds</u> analysis is that Reynolds is an international athlete whose professional reputation is not centered in Ohio. So even though he was an Ohio resident, the court held he did not have a reputation where the brunt of the harm is felt in Ohio.

So for the four non-Ohio Plaintiffs, that's self-evident. They have not alleged that the brunt of any reputational harm was felt in Ohio and nor can they. So there, Colonel James departs from the non-Ohio Plaintiffs. He has alleged that the brunt of his reputational harm is felt in Ohio. And so that does distinguish him from the other Defendants (sic).

What I would say, however, is I looked at the complaint



and I looked at paragraph 38 of the complaint, and I won't take the Court's time with it, but it's paragraph 38 of the complaint and that paragraph talks about Colonel James' career and the substantial international activities and activities in Washington DC and Hawaii for which he is known.

So, next the <u>Reynolds</u> court said, well the International Association did not publish or circulate the report in Ohio. Ohio periodicals disseminated the report. In this situation, again, it was a press release asking these publications to do it. The same situation here as to Sidley.

As the complaint alleges, Sidley delivered the report to its client, the American Psychological Association, a Washington DC organization, knowing that APA intended to make it public, that others would publicize it, and that it would be circulated all over the country and discussed all over the country. But Sidley did not do the publishing.

So and most certainly just to be as clear as I can, Sidley was certainly not intentionally targeting Ohio of all places in the United States and was not making Ohio the focal point when it delivered the report to its client. So here again, that's another part of the analysis that the four non-Ohio Plaintiffs just can't satisfy. They can't make Ohio the focal point of Sidley's activities for the report. In this regard, Colonel James is in the same boat as the other Plaintiffs.

So finally, the court said although Reynolds lost -- well,



that Reynolds had significant reputational harm in Ohio in the form of the lost endorsements, defendants didn't know that so they weren't targeting Ohio to suffer the brunt of the harm.

Finals, the final part of the analysis. For the non-Ohio Plaintiffs, it's the same situation. They can't say that the brunt of the reputational harm was suffered in Ohio. And here, again, as I said, that is something that Colonel James can allege.

So where that leaves us is under the focal point analysis, the non-Ohio Plaintiffs don't have anything to argue about.

They can sue somewhere else, but there's no personal jurisdiction over there claims in Ohio.

Then with regard to Colonel James, he does have some parts of the analysis in his favor in discussing personal jurisdiction, but where his claim fails is that he doesn't allege and he can't allege that the focus and the targeting by Sidley was on his activities in Ohio. Instead, when it discussed him, he doesn't allege it was about activities elsewhere and again, Sidley did not publish the report into Ohio. Others did.

So that leaves Colonel James in essentially the same situation as Reynolds, and also the same situation as the plaintiff in the <u>Cadle</u> case, that's C-A-D-L-E, which is a Sixth Circuit case in which the plaintiff had loan collecting activities. It was an Ohio plaintiff and it was an Ohio

company, and an attorney made derogatory comments about this

Ohio company about its loan collecting activities in

Massachusetts. It's very simple. Ohio plaintiff but

activities that were discussed were in Massachusetts and the

Sixth Circuit held that's insufficient for specific personal

jurisdiction.

I have one final point on publication before I turn very briefly to investigation. Plaintiffs have cited a Supreme Court case called Keeton v. Hustler, and that's a case that the Supreme Court issued in tandem with the Calder case, which is what we've been talking about. It was issued -- they both were written by Justice Rehnquist and they both were issued on the same day.

Keeton is irrelevant to this case. It is about a publication that was in the business of exploiting in that case the State of New Hampshire by -- on a regular basis, on a monthly basis, its business was to send large quantities of the magazine into the state to exploit business in the state every single month. The case of action, defamation cause of action in that case, arose from this regular business activity by a publication in the state.

That has no relevance to the claim against Sidley. As I said, Sidley was not in the business of selling a magazine on a regular basis in large quantities in Ohio. It delivered a report, not to Ohio, but to its client in Washington DC.

The second reason why <u>Keeton</u> has no application here to any of the Defendants is that a number of courts have first of all recognized the fact that it was issued on the same day as <u>Calder</u> and <u>Calder</u> provides the test that the courts have followed, that <u>Keeton</u> is limited to the facts that I've described. In our reply brief on page 9, we talk about a case that recognizes that Keeton is limited to its facts.

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I've taken a lot of time, Your Honor. I'll very briefly talk about the investigation. What Plaintiffs allege separately is that Sidley purposely -- purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Ohio because it conducted some interviews of people who lived in Ohio. At least two interviews were in person, including collecting documents, and other interviews were on the phone.

Now, as the Plaintiffs acknowledge, Sidley interviewed about 150 people and they interviewed them in some cases where they were. The principal case that we rely upon in this regard is the Sixth Circuit case of <u>Calphalon Corp. v. Roulette</u>. That was a case in which the plaintiff was an Ohio company. The defendant was a sales rep who did work, you know, did work for the company's markets in other states. He did not work in Ohio. As part of their relationship, for the convenience of the plaintiff in Ohio, the defendant sales rep would come into Ohio and talk to them and have communications.

What the Sixth Circuit said was the sales rep was not



1 exploiting the privilege of doing business in Ohio. That just happened to be where the company it worked for was and the 2 3 court characterized those contacts as quote, precisely the type of random, fortuitous, and attenuated contacts that the 4 5 purposeful availment requirement is meant to prevent from 6 causing jurisdiction, unquote. So in brief on this point, the 7 interviews are just not nearly substantial enough to justify 8 personal jurisdiction. 9 I won't get into the forum non-conveniens argument because 10 of the time that I've taken. But I would just point out again 11 that there is a forum in which this case can go forward as to 12 every Plaintiff and that is Washington DC. 13 Does the Court have any questions for me? 14 Is there -- is this in the alternative? THE COURT: 15 Are you saying either dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction 16 or grant out motion for forum non-conveniens? 17 Yes, Your Honor. MR. HENTOFF: 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. HENTOFF: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Thank you. 21 DEFENDANT APA'S ORAL ARGUMENT 22 Good morning, Your Honor. MS. WAHL: 23 THE COURT: Good morning. 24 MS. WAHL: Barbara Wahl on behalf of American

Psychological Association. I just want to note that with me in

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court today is not only my co-counsel, but a representative of the APA, Jesse Raben, who is with the general counsel's office.

So I'll try not to duplicate anything that Mr. Hentoff has said, but APA is a different Defendant and the allegations in the complaint pertaining to APA are actually quite different.

APA is a scientific organization that is dedicated to the furtherance of the field of psychology. It's a 501(c)(3) charitable organization. It's incorporated in the District of Columbia. It has its principal place of business in the District of Columbia. It operates entirely out of its offices in the District of Columbia. It has no office, no phone number, and no real activities in Ohio.

In 2014, it retained the law firm of Sidley Austin to conduct an investigation and Mr. Hentoff has described what the focus of the investigation was. The retainer agreement has been referenced in not only the complaint, but it's also attached as Exhibit I to Plaintiff's Newman's affidavit.

The retainer agreement makes abundantly clear that APA has hired Sidley to conduct an independent investigation. In fact, it was rather unusual in not only referring repeatedly to this work that Sidley was supposed to do as an independent investigation, but it made clear that Sidley was operating entirely independently. It was to follow the evidence wherever it led and that APA intended to release the results of the report, whether favorable or unfavorable, to the public

following the completion of the report.

The retainer of Sidley was a good thing. Sidley is a well-respected Illinois law firm with offices throughout the world. Mr. Hoffman was to head up the team. He had impeccable credentials. Yale undergraduate, University of Ohio law school, Justice Rehnquist law clerk, a former prosecutor. He had conducted and participated in many, many investigations.

So Sidley got started on its work and it completed that work sometime in July of 2015. As Mr. Hentoff said, Sidley provided the report to APA. APA did the following things following its commitment to the public and to its own members. It took the report and first released it in a limited release to its board and council of representatives. Now, just so Your Honor has some comprehension of -- council is like a very large board of directors. There's about 170 people who occupy council and they are elected to that position. And then there is the board, and they function like an executive committee of a board of directors.

So the first thing that APA did was a limited release on a secure website to first its board and then its council members. In order to access the report, one had to go online, use a special passcode that was provided, and then from wherever you lived, whether it was in California or Ohio or elsewhere, you could access the report if you choose to do so. It was not emailed to anyone.

After the report was initially -- was released in that limited fashion, APA again following its commitment, released it in a broader disclosure. It put it on its website. The APA website, APA.org, is available to anyone in the world. You don't need to do anything. You just need to log on. But again, you as the reader have to do that. You have to take activity. You have to put your own fingers on the keys or on the mouse and reach in and go to the APA website.

The report was not in and of itself interactive. The report was simply posted. APA then tweeted a link to the report on its Twitter feed. Now, I'm sure the Court is probably familiar with how that works, but in order to receive something from APA's Twitter feed, you have to again access APA. The reader has to reach in, become a follower of APA, and then you can read whatever APA tweets.

On Twitter, you're limited to 140 characters. So APA did not tweet the report itself to its followers. It tweeted the link. So anyone who wanted to read it had to first become a follower, go and see what was tweeted, and then press on the link.

After APA -- or I should say slightly before APA released the report, it was leaked by someone, we don't know who, to the "New York Times." APA had nothing to do with the "New York Times" putting the report on its website or reporting about the report.

After APA tweeted the report, there were others who retweeted it. APA had nothing to do with those retweets. That was done by individuals who chose to do so. Its website remained, of course, available to everyone.

So let's talk for a minute about what this report looked like. The report is massive. I think someone has alluded to the 500 pages, and then another 1,000 pages of exhibits. In it, Sidley concluded among other things that certain individuals within APA had collaborated with members of the military to ensure that APA policy would be consistent with what the military wanted in connection with enhanced interrogations of detainees following 911.

The report never mentions Ohio. The report never mentions any activities in Ohio, and to the extent that anyone from Ohio is referenced in the report, the fact that anybody lives, works, or has an affiliations in Ohio is never mentioned in the report.

As Mr. Hentoff said, we have here only one of the Plaintiffs who has a connection to Ohio, that's Plaintiff James. Although he has indicated -- or I should say the Plaintiffs have indicated that he has also lived in other jurisdictions, Louisiana and Hawaii among others. He's also referenced those many other places where he's lived in his book, "Fixing Hell," which is available on Amazon. I'm giving Plaintiff a plug for the \$24.99 for the book.

So all the other four Plaintiffs, there's no indication that they have had any connection to Ohio, that they feel any connection to Ohio, or that there would be any result or any effects of the report related to them in Ohio.

But really the focus on the Plaintiffs is a bit unnecessary here because the case law is abundantly clear that for purposes of jurisdiction, whether it's general or specific, the focus really must be on the Defendant and whether there is sufficient contacts between the Defendant and the forum so that they can be expected to be haled into court here based on their activities.

So I will briefly address general jurisdiction because this one's easy. There isn't any. There isn't even any plausible argument for APA to -- for there to be general jurisdiction over APA in Ohio. Under the <u>Daimler</u> case, which has been referenced in the parties' briefs, there really are only two jurisdictions where a defendant is at home under the paradigm, that's principal place of business or state of incorporation, neither one of those is applicable to the APA.

There is an exception in our jurisprudence where once the Supreme Court said okay, you, Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, have moved your operations during World War II to the State of Ohio and so we're going to say that even though you're not incorporated in Ohio, and your principal place of business isn't in Ohio, because you're really effectively functioning

1 and conducting all your operations in Ohio, we're going to let Mr. Perkins sue you as a general jurisdiction matter in Ohio. 2 3 That's not our case. APA does not have operations in Ohio. 4 There's no reason for that Perkins exception to be applicable. 5 Plaintiffs, recognizing that general jurisdiction is not a safe ground for them, has creatively argued that there ought to 6 7 be two reasons why the Court should exercise general 8 jurisdiction over APA anyway. The first is they say APA, while 9 it's a corporation, is really sort of a membership 10 organization, which is true. APA has over 115,000 members, but 11 that doesn't mean it's not a corporation. It is still a corporation and that means it is still bound by the paradigm of 12 13 the Daimler case. 14 And in fact, the very language that Mr. Hentoff, stealing my thunder, has quoted to you from the BNSF Railway case, May 15 16 2017 Supreme Court case, says that jurisdiction doesn't matter 17 for general jurisdiction purposes with the type of claim 18 asserted or the business enterprise sued. So even if APA were 19 considered a membership organization, or however the Plaintiffs 20 want to characterize it, that's not enough for general 21 jurisdiction (indiscernible). 22 Plaintiffs also claim that well, APA consented to 23 jurisdiction because it registered as a charity with the Ohio 24 Attorney General. That is true, it did register, but

Plaintiffs are wrong with regard to what that means.

25

preliminary matter, there's nothing in the Ohio statute that says that by registration, a charity subjects itself to general jurisdiction. It doesn't say it in the statute and there is no case in Ohio that so holds.

Plaintiffs say well, wait a minute, there is a Delaware that held under a different statute under different circumstances that someone who registers to do business with the state is consenting to general jurisdiction. A couple of problems with that. The first -- and they cite, by the way -- the case that their citing is Acouple of problems with that. One is that that was reversed on appeal. The federal circuit did not address that when it found jurisdiction. It said in fact that registration was a factor but not the factor. Instead, the court found that jurisdiction was predicated on specific jurisdiction.

In addition, the Ohio statute is completely different from the Delaware statute that was at issue in the Acorda case. The Ohio statute essentially says that as a charity registered to do business in Ohio, APA has to file an annual report, it has to provide some documentation, and maintain records of its activities. In the event that the Ohio Attorney General decides that there is something to pursue in terms of investigation of contributions, that APA would have to participate and cooperate. That's never happened, but it's a much more limited statute. So in sum, there is no basis for

general jurisdiction over APA in Ohio.

With the Court's indulgence, I would like to talk about next the only other type of jurisdiction available and that is specific jurisdiction. With regard to the four non-Ohio Plaintiffs, as Mr. Hentoff said, one is a North Caroline resident, two at the time of the filing of this lawsuit were District of Columbia residents, and the fourth is a California resident. Stated bluntly, the Plaintiffs have alleged no connection between those four individuals and activities of APA in this jurisdiction.

As Mr. Hentoff said and we'll discuss, I will discuss more fully, the analysis for specific jurisdiction focuses on the Defendant's contacts in the jurisdiction for constitutional purposes. What's fair? Why should the Defendant be expected to be sued in this jurisdiction? There has to be connection as Justice Thomas said in the Walden v. Fiore case.

There are three things that the Court needs to consider when you're looking at specific jurisdiction. I think of it as sort of a triangle. You've got the relationship between the defendant, the jurisdiction, and the litigation. What are the allegations? In that triangle, the Plaintiffs are not even mentioned. But those three factors have to be analyzed. With regard to the four non-Ohio residents, there's simply nothing alleged in the complaint that connects them, the APA, and this jurisdiction. Nothing at all.

Plaintiffs, more or less recognizing that there is no specific jurisdiction over the four non-Ohio residents creatively attempted to argue that well, it's good enough for there to be jurisdiction over Plaintiff James. They know Plaintiff James and they've got the same kind of claims as Plaintiff James. So if you buy Plaintiff James having a claim in Ohio, then you should accept the other four because it makes sense to do it all here at the same time, it's more convenient, and why not.

2.5

There are good reasons why not. There's no legal basis to do that. Plaintiffs essentially are arguing that with regard to the four non-Ohio residents that the Court should assume a creative yet not recognized theory of sort of pendent personal jurisdiction. There's no such thing as that that would operate here.

As the Supreme Court said in the <u>Bristol-Myers</u> case that Mr. Hentoff talked about, and in other cases, in fact every jurisdiction that we've been able to find that's addressed the topic, the courts have all said each plaintiff has to establish its own jurisdictional basis. You can't glom onto somebody else who has jurisdiction. You have to establish it for your own claims against the defendant.

One thing I wanted to make sure the Court was clear on that I think bears focus is that in the Bristol-Myers case, and this was the case that the parties separately talked about in

supplemental briefing because it came out in June 2017, what was at issue with this Plavix claim was that there were California residents, but then there were 70 non-California residents who, like the California residents all took Plavix, all had the same complaints, all wanted to sue Bristol Myers Squibb, and the Supreme Court said you can't do that. You have to establish -- as the plaintiff you have to establish jurisdiction over Bristol-Myers Squibb for yourself. You cannot hook onto the California residents.

Accordingly, we submit Your Honor that there is no jurisdiction over the American Psychological Association in this court by the four non-Ohio Plaintiffs.

Last and absolutely not least, I want to address the specific jurisdiction asserted by Plaintiff James. Mr. Hentoff referred to the well-recognized Southern Machine three-part test. The parties have all briefed this and I've sure the Court has already seen how much ink we've spilled on this so I won't belabor the law on each of these three points. But essentially it's a three-part test.

The first is maybe the most important and that is that the defendant has to have purposefully availed itself of the privileged and honor of doing business in Ohio for there to be specific jurisdiction. The second is that the cause of action has to arise out of that specific contact with the jurisdiction and the third is that there have to be substantial enough

connections between the defendant and Ohio for the court to recognize and exercise jurisdiction.

There was a point raised by the Plaintiff in the brief about whether we concede long-arm jurisdiction is found because we've been focusing really on the minimal contacts and the fairness test. We do not concede that there is long-arm jurisdiction. We didn't separately brief it because it becomes abundantly clear when you talk about these other issues that there is no transaction of business by APA in Ohio. There is no injury in the forum by actions outside the forum, et cetera. But, for the purpose of today's argument, I would like to focus on the due process aspects of this as the parties have done.

So let's first address the purposeful availment question. I think Mr. Hentoff did a good job of describing the case law. The <u>Calder</u>, it used to be called the effects test, now it's really called the focal point test, and the subsequent case law that narrowed it, the <u>Walden v. Fiore</u> case in the Supreme Court and an abundance of Ohio cases and Sixth Circuit cases that talk about what purposeful available is. And boiling it down, it basically means that you cannot as the defendant be seen to have purposefully availed yourself of the privilege of transacting business or undertaking activities in the jurisdiction if what you've done is more or less spread your activities all over the place. You have to do something to focus on and target Ohio in order for there to be purposeful

availment in Ohio.

There's a bunch of cases on this and I won't bore the Court with them, but there's the Cattle (phonetic) case, or Cadle case, the Huizenga case, and other Sixth Circuit, including a number of defamation cases, which is important because the Plaintiff I think is laboring under a misunderstanding that because something is a libel case, it gives Plaintiffs special rights in some way to attain jurisdiction where it might not otherwise be able to do so. That is absolutely not correct.

An intentional tort like defamation or any other intentional tort or any tort is analyzed under the same set of factors. There's nothing special about a libel case. This has been held repeatedly by our jurisprudence including in the Sixth Circuit.

But going back to purposeful availment, I think -- I won't belabor what the cases specifically say. We've talked about that. But I want to focus on what are the facts here. APA did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of doing business in Ohio with regard to this report. As I described a minute ago, how did it release this report? It did it on its website to everyone in the world, including anybody who happened to be accessing it from their home and/or desk in Ohio. But certainly it didn't, APA did not reach into Ohio and focus, target Ohio residents.

It released it on its Twitter feed, which, again, it's the opposite. Followers have to reach over to APA to ask permission to follow APA. It's not the other way around.

Again, there may be Ohio Twitter followers of APA, but APA sent this tweet out to all of its followers without focusing on Ohio.

It did nothing with regard to this report that focused on anyone in Ohio, nor is there any allegation that the report was specifically focused on Ohio. Instead, there really are only two contacts that the Plaintiffs allege are relevant here to demonstrate APA purposefully availing itself of the jurisdiction.

The first is that they contend that the special committee -- so I'll back up one minute. Once their -- once APA hired Sidley to perform this report, it set up a special committee who would interact with Sidley. This is a fairly common thing. It's the representative of the organization.

One of the members of the special committee was Dr. Nadine Kaslow and Dr. Kaslow, speaking on behalf of the special committee, sent out dozens of emails, letters, to witnesses that Sidley might want to interview asking for the witnesses to cooperate. No question that she did that.

Plaintiff James says that he received an email from Dr.

Kaslow asking for him to cooperate. However, in his affidavit
he does not say where he received that request and the request,

which is attached to Dr. James' affidavit, doesn't show where it was addressed. Even if he received it sitting at his kitchen table in Dayton, it was completely fortuitous and that should not be held to be a contact by which APA purposefully availed itself of the jurisdiction.

We don't actually know where Dr. Kaslow sent an email to Dr. James. He could have been accessing it in his phone anywhere. We don't know. So that is fortuitous. It should not be counted as a purposeful availment and certainly is a fairly, in the scheme of things, insignificant contact given the 150 witnesses, the many, many communications that went back and forth.

The second contact which the Plaintiffs note is that Dr.

James reviewed the report online. Again, he choose -- from -he contends, or he alleges, and we have no reason to doubt
this, he says that he read the report online from his home in
Dayton. Again, that was his choice, not APA's. The case is
very clear that if one -- if the Court is going to predicate
specific jurisdiction on contacts, it has to be the Defendants'
contacts, not those of the Plaintiff, not those of a third
party, and it makes sense. Again, it's the question of whether
it's due process for the Defendant, not what the Plaintiff did.

The third factor is not an activity that was undertaken by APA, but one undertaken by Sidley and that is that Sidley interviewed Plaintiff James and perhaps others in Ohio.



Plaintiffs allege well, Sidley was acting as your agent and so you are tied to whatever Sidley did. That is as a legal matter not correct. The retainer agreement, again that's Exhibit I to Plaintiff Newman's affidavit, makes abundantly clear that this was an entirely independent investigation. Sidley did what it wanted where it wanted. There was no request that Dr. James or anyone else be interviewed in Ohio. There was simply a request for cooperation.

There's a few other allegations along these lines about why Sidley's activities should be imputed to the Plaintiff, but they are as flimsy as the other. One is the general notion supported by absolutely no case law that a law firm's actions are imputed to its clients. I think that would turn malpractice cases on their head. There is not a single case provided by the Plaintiff that cites a law firm being tied to its client such that whatever the law firm does, the client is bound by that.

Plaintiffs also allege that the special committee oversaw the activities of Sidley, whatever that means. That has been alleged in paragraph 162 of the complaint but again, we don't know what that means. Overseeing doesn't necessarily mean that — there was no allegation that they went in, they said yes, do this, go do it in Ohio. It's just a verb they stuck in there. There's nothing in the record indicating that the special committee directed Sidley to conduct any activities in

Ohio.

And Plaintiffs also alleged that Dr. Kaslow made statements about the report indicating that she on behalf of APA was ratifying the report. By Plaintiffs' own statement, this doesn't hold water because they've alleged in the complaint at paragraph 252 that the statements made by Dr. Kaslow were personal. It says at paragraph 257, after the report was published, Dr. Kaslow made her personal views about the allegations against the Plaintiffs clear to the media. Again, those are her personal views.

There are other contacts that are alleged by the Plaintiff that APA has had with Ohio, but they are not in any way, shape, or form relevant to the report, relevant to the Plaintiff James, relevant to any other Plaintiff in this case.

The second <u>Southern Machine</u> prong is whether the claims arise out of Ohio contacts. We can make short shrift of this one because there really are no Ohio contacts. The claims of the Plaintiffs cannot arise out them. Even Plaintiff James doesn't allege that the interview that was conducted by Sidley is the basis for his claims. He claims that the report defamed him, but not the interview per se. There are no other claims — there are no other contacts with Ohio.

Last prong of <u>Southern Machine</u> is whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable in Ohio under these circumstances. Again, Mr. Hentoff talked about the focus test



that was first articulated in Ohio -- excuse me, in <u>Calder</u> and was recently reiterated in -- very recently actually since the parties finished their briefing, by a case called <u>First</u>

<u>Franchise Capital v. Jack in Box</u>. This is 2000 -- I think it was August 1st, 2017, Southern District of Ohio case where again they say the focal point has to be this triangle. The defendant, the jurisdiction, and what are the allegations.

Here the focal point is not Ohio. Ohio, as nice of a place as it is just not where things happened in connection with this report. Really the focal point here is the District of Columbia because that was where APA, the client, hired Sidley, that's where many of the meetings that are addressed in the report took place, that's where the APA board met, that's where many of the witnesses, two of the Plaintiffs, and many of the documents reside, and I believe even Plaintiff James lived and worked in the District of Columbia area for a period of time during the issues relevant here.

So as the <u>First Franchise</u> case has made clear and others, another Sixth Circuit case, that <u>Calphalon</u> case that

Mr. Hentoff referred to, it's the quality of the contacts at issue, not their quantity. We would submit to the Court that not only is there relatively few contacts with Ohio, but certainly their quality is insignificant in the scheme of this sprawling case with 150 witnesses, a 500-page report, et cetera.



So in sum, we would submit that there is no basis for the Court to exercise jurisdiction here over the American Psychological Association. There are insufficient minimum contacts between APA and the jurisdiction. We would request that the Court dismiss the case.

THE COURT: Counsel, when did these activities take place, the alleged collusion to get the APA to endorse enhanced interrogation techniques? Is that over a number of years?

MS. WAHL: Yes.

THE COURT: A considerable number of years?

MS. WAHL: Yes. The report, and the complaint makes this clear as well, really the activities were kicked off in roughly 2004 and as alleged in the complaint and in the report that's at issue, APA put together a presidential task force and everybody referred to it as PENS, P-E-N-S. That's an acronym for presidential task force. APA put together this task force to come up with a policy about how the organization was going to react to ever increasingly public criticism of what was going on supposedly on black sites with detainees.

There were articles in the "New York Times." There was a book published by a "New York Times" reporter that really pushed things forward. That wasn't until later. But rumors were starting to circulate that there was torture going on at these black sites. APA was pressed into and anxious to make a statement about having a policy.

1 So it put together this task force that had a number of members, prominent people related to psychology, several of the 2 3 Plaintiffs were also involved, and the task force met in 4 Washington DC in 2005. So it really kicked off in 2005. 5 were the beginnings of it, how the committee was selected, et 6 cetera is referenced in the report that started in 2004, but 7 this -- the activities at issue in this report roughly span 8 2005 to 2014 when Sidley was hired. 9 And all those activities are in places THE COURT: 10 other than Ohio? 11 MS. WAHL: That's correct, Your Honor. Other than maybe -- were there 12 THE COURT: 13 videoconferences or phone conferences where psychologists from 14 various places in the United States would talk with one 15 another, maybe in a meeting that was chaired or originated out 16 of Washington? 17 MS. WAHL: I am not --18 THE COURT: Or do you know anything? Or are they 19 all --20 MS. WAHL: I am not aware and the record -- I'm sorry. 21 I didn't mean to interrupt you. 22 Do you know anything about that, I should THE COURT: 23 say? Physically where these -- or were these all in person 24 meetings in Washington or at sites where APA might have been 25 having conferences or annual meetings, things like that.



you have any information on that?

MS. WAHL: I do, and I don't want to go beyond the record or what's publicly available but what I can say is that the activities that are referenced in the report and are the subject of the complaint as well, the PENS task force met in Washington. There were subsequent phone calls and there were — there was a list surf. So in cyber space and by phone line they did communicate. There were no activities as the record reveals related to the PENS task force in Ohio.

The Plaintiffs allege that during the time of the PENS task force, there were two board members, APA board members who lived in Ohio. But there's nothing in the record that shows that they had anything to do with the activities of the PENS task force. They were simply on the board.

Similarly, the Plaintiffs allege that there were two Ohio board members in 2015 when the report was released, but there's nothing in the record that shows that they had anything to do with the release of the report. In fact, so many of the board members had to recuse themselves that it's highly questionable that they actually had anything to do with the voting on the release of the report or its publication.

Your question about whether there were APA meetings where people connected in from Ohio, there's nothing in the record that reveals anything of that sort. There is a division, a separately incorporated division -- so APA has sort of, I don't

- 1 want to call them chapters, they are divisions. Some of them
- 2 | are geographic and some of them are subject matter related.
- 3 There is an Ohio-based separately incorporated division, that's
- 4 | not a subsidiary. It's its own corporation. Other than that,
- 5 | there is literally nothing in the record that connects APA with
- 6 any activities in Ohio pertaining to the report or the
- 7 complaint or the investigation.
- 8 THE COURT: Thank you.
- 9 MS. WAHL: Thank you, Your Honor.
- 10 THE COURT: It's about five minutes until 11. Let's
- 11 take a ten-minute recess.
- 12 THE CLERK: All rise. The court is in recess.
- 13 (Recess taken)
- 14 THE CLERK: All rise. The court is again in session.
- 15 THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. Ms. Forrest,
- 16 do you wish to proceed?
- 17 PLAINTIFFS APA'S ORAL ARGUMENT
- 18 MS. FORREST: Thank you, Your Honor. Good morning
- 19 again.
- 20 THE COURT: Morning.
- MS. FORREST: Before I start, Your Honor, I want to
- 22 clear up where there were a couple of factual issues that you
- 23 asked questions on and there were -- I'm sure Mr. Hentoff and
- 24 Ms. Wahl didn't mean to mistake any facts, but I think it -- I
- don't want it to feel like I'm going down the rabbit hole here,



but I think they're important.

So the first one, the minor one, none of my clients are affiliated, nor Mr. Free's client with the CIA. And black sites is a term of art, and enhanced interrogation techniques refer only to the CIA. That's really important because one of the problems with the report is that is conflates those issues and as Your Honor may know, in fact there are two psychologists who are non-APA members who are affiliated with the CIA doing something completely different that had nothing to do with this case, okay?

So it's very important to understand, Your Honor, in this case, the Department of Defense was operating under different legal guidance from as late as 2003 and into 2004, and certainly by 2005 when these events started taking place.

Something else. Ms. Wahl represented to the Court that in fact the report doesn't mention Ohio. In fact, on page 7, in one of the only physical searches that the report calls out, it says quote, we also met with the former APA president at his home in Ohio, at his home, as in at home of APA at that point, and searched his electronic and hard copy files to collect relevant documents.

Now, a couple of other points, Mr. Hentoff said, he used the word they collaborated. You know, if Mr. Hoffman would have used that word in the report, we probably wouldn't be here. In fact, at the insistence of the accusers, and we can

play the tape for Your Honor today because Mr. Hoffman was hired and signed the engagement letter with APA on November 20th, Your Honor.

On December 2nd, right after Thanksgiving, his first interview was with Nathaniel Raymond. He was one of four accusers, one of which is based in Ohio, who has repeatedly and as recently as last year attacked Colonel James, all of which has been adjudicated by the psychology board in Ohio and the courts in Ohio. All of the basis, all of the allegations, much of which are similarly rehashed in the report were found to baseless Your Honor in Ohio.

In fact, what's alleged in the report, and this was the narrative supplied by Mr. Raymond, and the video says, we hope that this is what the report does, that it will be used to supply a RICO violation, racketeering influenced corrupt organization. In fact, most of the material in here had already been submitted to the Department of Justice, the FBI, the Senate Arms Service Committee, the Select Intelligence Committee, and all of it was found to be not a reason to have a cause of action for criminal conduct.

So that's an important point. This isn't about just hanging out together, or Colonel James hanging out with his buddies. In fact PENS doesn't stand for presidential task force. It stands for psychological ethics in national security. What happened in late 2004 and 2005 is Ron Levant,

Dr. Levant, who you had an affidavit from who is here in Ohio and other people on the basis of an article in the "New York Times" said you know what, we're going to convene a task force not to determine Your Honor if psychologists should be involved in national security investigations, it was about how they were going to do that.

The report basically has three sections, Your Honor. In 2005 and 2006, you have the actions of the task force. In fact, many of those communications did take place by email.

There was only one two-day meeting during that PENS task force which was in DC.

From 2006 to 2009, which is the middle part of the report,

Your Honor, those events took places -- and that's how APA is

different. It's a membership organization and its members

acting, including from Ohio, including Colonel James from Ohio,

including two board members from Ohio. Okay?

The next period that is lopped on at the end starts in approximately 2007 and goes from 2014. That is really a rehash of the ethics complaints including those against Colonel James that had already been litigated and adjudicated in Ohio, all of which Dr. James told Mr. Hoffman, none of which found its way into the report, a narrative which was supplied by Dr. Trudy Bond from Ohio, and she was one of the people that Mr. Hoffman interviewed. Now, we don't know if that interview was in person or by phone, but we know because she cited 47 times in

the report, Your Honor, that it was important and that's only second to one of the other accusers in the report.

So those are just some basic facts. Two overall questions before I get into my argument, Your Honor, that I think might be helpful for grounding because this is a really fact intensive case and it can be at times sort of a who did what when. So two import -- I think these are two important questions that are helpful for me when I go through the case.

What's the test in Ohio with respect to defamation?

Defendants in their paper talk about targeting. They talk about targeting the Plaintiff, and targeting the forum. They state that's the test and I'm going to talk to you about those cases at the appropriate point of my argument and why I think that isn't the test in Ohio as announced by the Ohio Supreme Court both in Fallang v. Hickey and in Kauffman Racing. You didn't hear targeting much today. You heard focal point.

They're sort of moving away from that.

I think the second question, Your Honor, is who published what to whom and when. There's 12 counts in the complaint, nine of those concern the report. There were three versions of the report. You heard not about a draft I don't think today. You did hear about a report from July 2nd to the final report and you didn't hear about the revised report.

I want to clear up in case Your Honor's not on Twitter, I don't want to presume anything, that you don't have to be a

follower to go on somebody's Twitter feed and see a report. If just means that it shows up in my feed in the morning. I go and search on Twitter every morning for something related to this case by just putting in torture or some of the key words. Being somebody's follower only means I get that fed to me, but anybody can go view that and if you put in the key word or the hashtag, which these folks learn to use, you get torture and APA or Hoffman. There are a couple key words that people use to follow those. Minor facts. Let's step back at the bigger picture for a moment.

Before I start to talk about jurisdiction, I really want to take just a very brief moment to tell you what's at stake for my clients and Mr. Free's clients, and Mr. Gosnell's clients, all of whom are here today. They were doing the right thing, Your Honor. They were putting policies in place to prohibited abusive interrogations of detainees and working with their professional association, APA, to craft those policies so that military psychologists could bring them to bear in the field, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo.

They could have played it safe. It was a highly contentious area, but they stepped up. Indeed, the two former Army Surg -- U.S. Surgeon Generals, one of whom Mr. Hoffman interviewed, said they didn't have to do this. We looked at this extensively and they volunteered and stepped up for their country and for their profession. For that, they've been

accused of enabling torture.

So let me turn to jurisdiction. This action was properly initiated in Ohio by all of the Plaintiffs, including Colonel James, who is a psychologist licensed in Ohio. He works at Wright State University, and you heard reference to some emails that were sent by Dr. Kaslow to him at Wright State University. In fact, that's in the email address. In fact, Dr. Kaslow knew that Dr. James was at Wright State University because he had invited her to speak at the graduation for his school. And that statement, Dr. Kaslow still has it on her Facebook page, you can go read about that, when she came here to speak at the graduation.

Dr. James lives in Montgomery County. This is in paragraph 38 Your Honor of the complaint and paragraph 59 talks about Colonel James being licensed in Ohio. There were six interviews of Ohio residents. Colonel James picked up

Mr. Hoffman and his associate at the airport and they drove to

Mr. -- Colonel James' office at Wright State where he was interviewed for six hours and there were subsequent phone calls.

Along with his colleagues, they were all falsely accused in the Hoffman report of participating with Colonel James in this collusive joint enterprise that I discussed earlier. When the Hoffman report was circulated and read in Ohio, all the Plaintiffs' reputations were damaged and that's a key point.

Everybody was damaged in Ohio.

This Court has at least three grounds, Your Honor, to exercise jurisdiction over this case and all the claims and those encompass both specific and general. First, Your Honor, both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ohio Supreme Court have stated unequivocally as recently as the case you heard about Bristol-Myers Squibb, and if you look at the supplemental authority and what we responded, they quote Keeton in that, that if you circulate a report in the jurisdiction, everybody's harmed.

If you go online, Your Honor, and actually listen to that oral argument or if you pull up the transcript, page 34 to 38, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Ginberg, and Justice Kennedy all say defamation is sui generis. It's peculiar. It's different. Why is that? Because everywhere the document or the statements are made is published, the Supreme Court as recently as in BMS has affirmed that plaintiffs are injured. In fact, Keeton holds, issued on the same day as Calder, that a New Hampshire resident could go sue -- I'm sorry, a non-New Hampshire can go sue in New Hampshire if there's circulation there. That's the key distinction in terms of the law that the Plaintiffs are making versus the Defendants.

It's not about targeting the forum. Okay? And if you look at all these cases, Your Honor, or if you go look at law journal notes, you'll see a continuum. Defendants want this

Court to adopt the minority position which has been adopted by the Fourth and the Fifth Circuits, but even they, if you look at the cases, they're not even comfortable with it. Okay?

It's really about and Ohio Supreme Court has operationalized this for His Honor very simply. If there is evidence in the record that Ohio residents read the report, which there is here, the Court can exercise jurisdiction.

Second, even if the publication to and reading by Ohio citizens, Your Honor, was not enough, which we believe it is under the Ohio Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court standard, we've provided affidavits to demonstrate that Sidley, Hoffman, and APA had sufficient additional contacts with Ohio to create jurisdiction consistent with due process. I'm going to go into those.

Third, this Court has jurisdiction over APA and Sidley and therefore, Hoffman, which was acting both as Sidley's agent and APA. Both Sidley and APA are registered and there is very valid law in Ohio, some of it cited in the reply brief by Sidley, holding that registration in the state in fact does confer general jurisdiction and you don't even have to go into the specific or general jurisdiction analysis, Your Honor. We're going to talk about that in a minute.

In the next few minutes, I'm going to go into a little more detail about the grounds for asserting jurisdiction, Your Honor, over all the Defendants and I'll respond to some of what

I'll believe are the key cases that they dealt with, specifically <u>Reynolds</u>. They spent a lot of time on that. I'm going to distinguish that like the <u>Kauffman</u> court did and the Ohio Supreme Court. I'm also just going to touch very briefly on the forum non-conveniens argument.

Two preliminary points. First, the Ohio long-arm statute. We briefed that not extensively but APA didn't mention it in its first brief. Mr. Hentoff says he doesn't contest it. 2307.382 and civil rule 4.3, we think especially after Fallang, if you intend -- if you commit an intentional tortious act, you're subject to jurisdiction. That's not really contested in Ohio. We're happy to brief that more or talk more about that, Your Honor, if the Court so desires.

Second, at all times, Hoffman was acting in his capacity as an agent of both the limited liability partnerships of Sidley, and there's at least eight -- excuse me, there's at least seven, there were eight, all registered to do business in Ohio, and APA. APA expressly engaged Hoffman and Sidley to conduct the investigation. The engagement letter is in evidence.

APA board members, Dr. Nadine Kaslow and Dr. Susan

McDaniel, oversaw the activities of Hoffman and Sidley and Dr.

Kaslow emailed witnesses to ask for their cooperation with

Hoffman. Throughout Hoffman and Sidley's contacts with all the

witnesses, including the Plaintiffs, Mr. Hoffman repeatedly

used Dr. Kaslow's name and APA's name to gain access to people's homes and offices.

That agency was further established, Your Honor, by APA's ratification of the report after its completion. Now, at one point in their brief they say it wasn't accepted, but at the beginning of their papers they say it was endorsed.

Let's look at their actions. When APA accepted the report, they posted it on their website. They also posted a revised report. They acted on it immediately to fire Dr. Behnke. It adopted those activities as its own. They never questioned it. In fact, they sent a copy of the report, which is still on APA's website, to the Senate Armed Services Committee lauding Mr. Hoffman's investigation on their behalf.

Let me turn now to the application of the three-part Southern Machine test, which I'm sure Your Honor is very familiar with, purposeful availment, arising from, and reasonableness.

First as to purposeful availment, <u>Kauffman Racing</u>. Let's go back to that for a moment, Your Honor. The Ohio Supreme Court stated that purposeful availment is present when the defendant's contacts with the forum state proximately results, so I can think back to my first year of law school, from the actions by the defendant that create a substantial connection, and that connection such that defendant -- such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate of being haled into

court here. That's Kauffman at 49 to 51.

In fact, Mr. Hentoff was talking about <u>Kauffman</u> earlier and he made another quote. His actual -- he couldn't remember the paragraph number. Actually, it's paragraph 66 he was quoting from and that's when the <u>Kauffman</u> court actually talks about <u>Calder</u>. It adopts <u>Calder</u>, and it says there are detractors. The quote referenced by Mr. Hentoff is actually when the main portion of the opinion is talking about weaknesses of the test they'd go onto adopt.

Under that standard of purposeful availment, defendants each purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of acting in Ohio. Now, Ms. Wahl also made reference, Your Honor, to transacting business. This is tortious conduct. We're not talking about unintended negligence, and if you go to the contracts cases, Your Honor, contracts cases take a little more than just a single fortuitous contact.

It actually -- in torts though and especially in defamation, the Supreme Court has said all you need is one act and that's enough. So <u>Calder</u>, <u>Keeton</u>, <u>Fallang</u>, and <u>Kauffman</u>, those cases establish that given the special nature of the tort of libel, purposeful availment occurs when defamatory statements are published into a jurisdiction.

As <u>Calder</u> stated, what matters, Your Honor, is where the effects of the defamation are felt and where the statements are read by third parties. I can even talk to you about that test



and how it's stated in Kauffman, again, gave this

Court a really important way to operationalize the idea of

where the harm is suffered, and more importantly where the

report when it involves the internet is published. If Ohio

residents read it, it's published in the jurisdiction. They

said the Zippo test that Defendants talk about in their papers

doesn't really work in a non-commercial context and we're going

to do it this way in Ohio.

Here purposeful availment has been amply demonstrated by the multiple publications in Ohio. Again, three versions of the report nine times. First, Hoffman first published a draft of the report to the APA board, his client. At that point, the board included two Ohio board members. So the minute they got the ability to read that report, it was published in Ohio.

Then the APA published the final report into Ohio on several occasions. It gave electronic access to members of the APA council, who included Ohio residents. It published it on the APA website where it was read and commented on actively by Ohio residents.

Ms. Wahl alluded to it being tweeted to Twitter followers, 1392 of those, Your Honor, were Ohio residents. The report was given to the "New York Times" and again, we've alleged in the complaint that Mr. Hoffman, when he urged the board to bring in two of the most vocal accusers of Plaintiffs and he knew that they were collaborating with the "New York Times," they just

published an article two months before on the front page of the "New York Times" with James Risen, whose allegations had sparked the whole thing. Yet, they knew it would be given to the "New York Times."

It wasn't a question -- you could even take out the word leaked, Your Honor. It was of not if it was going to the "New York Times," it was a question of when. Everybody knew this report was going to go to the "New York Times." Hoffman interviews Risen. You don't ever read about any about that interview, but Hoffman interviewed Risen, the "New York Times" whose whole investigation sparked this and his book chapter.

Hoffman then distributed a revised report to the APA board, again to two Ohio board members, and APA posted that version again on its website. If you go to the APA website today, you find two versions of the report. There was supposed to be a third version of the report, Mr. Hoffman was rehired, and that was due June 8th, and it's never surfaced. That was done because APA acknowledged there were problems.

Finally, there's also a videotape Your Honor that's alleged in the complaint. I'm not going to spend much time on that. That was Dr. Kaslow, that was tweeted to 1,500 residents of Ohio, where she says that the collusion that is described in the report, and I'm paraphrasing Your Honor, enabled psychologists to be involved where there were enhanced interrogation techniques and abuse of interrogations.

Now, overall, just a partial tracking, Your Honor, of the publications of the report into Ohio reveals that it was circulated to over 40,000 residents. A publisher of a defamatory restatement is libel for all foreseeable publications.

Let me now address, Your Honor, one of the Defendants' central arguments. Contrary to Defendants' assertions, in cases with facts analogous to this one, the Ohio Supreme Court has not said that you have to target the plaintiffs. This goes back to the question I said keep in mind when I'm describing the publications. In fact, they use the word target and they describe it as describing the Reynolds case. The Reynolds case never uses the word target or targeting.

In <u>Kauffman</u>, the Ohio Supreme Court as we've talked about reiterated the effects test, and the five Ohio residents who read it established publication. In fact here, even though it's not discussed much in their papers, only three of the nine publications alleged in our 12 counts involve internet publications, Your Honor. The other six involve publications by Hoffman to the board, his client, or counsel by sending an email to Ohio board members who entered a code and accessed the report, much as somebody would tear open an email, Your Honor.

<u>Fallang</u> said all you need is one letter and that's enough to establish good jurisdiction, consistent with the due process clause. In fact Fallang, which Kauffman later cites, went on

to say it takes a high degree of unfairness to construct a barrier from the constitution to jurisdiction.

Some of the cases, Your Honor, second, the Defendants rely on themselves make it clear that their holdings don't apply to libel cases. We talked about that a little bit about transacting business, contract cases don't apply. Some are other jurisdictions. We talked about the Fourth and the Sixth Circuit. Those are -- if you go in and look at that, those are listed as minority jurisdictions. Others, clearly distinguishable on the facts.

For example, the BMS case, <u>Bristol-Myers Squibb</u>, the Supreme Court just looked at, they even cite <u>Keeton</u> and circulation. But more importantly, think about it Your Honor as a judge. If you got somebody and you don't know where they took the pill, Plavix, it's a blood thinner, it's very hard to hold somebody liable if you don't know where it was manufactured, you've got a stream of commerce theory, and the plaintiffs' injuries are all going to be different.

In fact, the plaintiffs, over 600 in that case, you couldn't establish them as a class. Why? Because they weren't typical. There was no typicality. Okay? We've got a different case here and products liability is very different, as the Supreme Court said during that oral argument.

Finally, those cases from Ohio or the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals were decided prior to Kauffman, which distinguishes

both <u>Reynolds</u> and the other cases on which the Defendants rely,
Your Honor. Since the Defendants rely heavily on <u>Reynolds</u>,
page 1120 in particular, Your Honor, I want to spend a few
moments on that.

Three points. The source for the report of Reynolds' drug tests was a sample taken in Monaco, analyzed in France, and confirmed by arbitration in Germany. Hoffman had six sources in Ohio. Again, I'm on page 1120 of Reynolds. The defendant distributed its press release in London, England, not in Ohio, and that release in fact did not contain any defamatory statements. The other publications did.

Each of the Defendants here distributed three versions of the report in Ohio on several occasions. There was no evidence, Your Honor, that the defendant knew of the Ohio origin of the contract that the plaintiff in Reynolds lost as a result of the defamatory remarks.

So in other words, if you've got an international athlete, which Butch Reynolds was, he was a track star, okay, and you're talking about Butch Reynolds, and you don't even know his affiliation with Ohio, that makes sense that it's unfair to bring him into Ohio. But not Mr. Hoffman, he interviewed Colonel James at his office six hours, and five other witnesses, one of whom supplied a good portion of his false narrative.

Two points about that. Dr. Bond, whose continually



- 1 attacked Colonel James, supplied part of the narrative.
- 2 | Another non-party named is Dr. Soldz. Dr. Soldz supplied a
- 3 good portion of the narrative and in fact, if you go to page --
- 4 | to paragraph 173 of our complaint, Your Honor, that contains a
- 5 | videotape which is still online of Ms. -- of Dr. Soldz joking
- 6 that when Mr. Hoffman needed a document, he called Dr. Soldz.
- 7 In fact, Dr. Soldz had been targeting Colonel James for quite
- 8 some time. He even said in an interview online that Dr. James
- 9 got his job at Wright State because he was black and he was
- 10 lazy, and basically doesn't show up to work.
- 11 At one point, literally fights almost broke out, the
- 12 rivalry among the accusers and their targets was so bad.
- 13 Indeed, paragraphs 43 and 44 of our complaint allege that the
- 14 Plaintiffs were targeted. Paragraph 62, and I won't restate
- 15 Mr. Hentoff's statement of our burden of proof, we don't
- 16 believe targeting is the standard but even if it wasn't, Your
- 17 Honor, paragraph 62, it's couched in terms of Dr. James' harm,
- 18 but it applies equally to all the Plaintiffs.
- 19 The statements were published in the "New York Times" and
- 20 on the APA's website to be circulated, viewed, and read
- 21 | nationwide including by residents of Montgomery County, Ohio.
- 22 We alleged that they were targeted, and that they were targeted
- 23 in Ohio when the report was published in Ohio. We're entitled
- 24 to all reasonable inferences.

25

Cadle, you heard that briefly discussed. That was about

an attorney in a Manhattan -- or sorry, a Massachusetts debt collection practice, Your Honor. All the comments were related to Massachusetts and he was trying to sue in Ohio. The same thing with <u>Oasis</u>, the Oklahoma residents. Again, those were both distinguished by the Kauffman court.

<u>Calphalon</u> didn't mention each of the plaintiffs. Here, each of the Plaintiffs was mentioned as a key player by name, mentioned by name. The <u>Calphalon</u> case talked about you guys. Nobody was named.

Now, I'll turn to the second prong, Your Honor, the arising from. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, Your Honor, this doesn't require much. It's a lenient standard. Only that the claims have a substantial connection with the defendants' in-state activities. Given that test, like the others, Plaintiffs' causes of action all arise from the Defendants' activities in the forum.

First, Hoffman's team, during the investigation, entered

Ohio at least three times to interview two witnesses in person

and examine that computer we talked about earlier. It also -
the team conducted telephonic interviews and follow up

interviews of Ohio residents.

One of those interviews, Your Honor, as we talked about was Dr. Levant, also named as a key player in the collusion, the APA president when it issued the PENS guidelines, and he was operating from Ohio, the focus of the report's most



significant allegation.

We've talked about the important Hoffman places on this interview. He doesn't ever mention the District of Columbia as being one of the places he visits, but he does mention Ohio, and he does mention that he searched Dr. Levant's computer. Dr. Bond we've also talked about and the fact that she was quoted 47 times.

Second, Colonel James' activities described in the report, Your Honor, span a longer period than any of the other military officers targeted as having colluded with APA to enable -- and this allowed Hoffman to expand the scope and the years the investigation covered so that it could be used to counteract what was perceived as a statute of limitations problem under RICO.

Hoffman could not have construed the entirety of his narrative without alleging Colonel James' participation in that joint venture and he couldn't have claimed as does to have claimed -- as he claims to have done a thorough investigation. Again, Dr. James and Dr. Levant, both Ohio residents, were both named as key players.

Third, we've talked about the APA board and council number of members in Ohio. The board and the council has continued to act on the report with their members acting from Ohio. This is not an organization where everybody gathers in DC. In fact, we have an affidavit, Dr. Strickland's affidavit said nobody was

in DC. There's nobody in DC, Bonny. Staff's there, but everybody was scattered. That's why they had to send an email to us to get access to the report.

So even if the publication to Ohio readers alone was not enough, Your Honor, these other contacts are more than sufficient to exercise jurisdiction consistent with the due process clause. Fallang held that even a single purposeful contact is enough to satisfy the requirements for jurisdiction when you're talking about intentional conduct targeting.

That's at page 108.

Now, let me turn briefly to the grounds that establish jurisdiction for all the claims, not only those, Your Honor, of Colonel James. First, given the jurisdictional standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Keeton, this Court has grounds for exercising jurisdiction over each of the Plaintiffs' claims, Your Honor.

Keeton held that a state's interest in redressing torts occurring within its borders could properly extend to torts committed against non-residents. That's a really important point. You can be a non-resident of the forum and go -- and sue in another state.

Indeed, in the opinion in <u>Bristol-Myers Squibb</u>, which we quote in our notice of supplemental authority response, Your Honor, the court talked about <u>Keeton</u>, concluding that specific jurisdiction was present.

We relied principally on the connection between the circulation of the magazine in New Hampshire and damage allegedly caused with the state. We noted that false statements of fact harm both the subject of the falsehood and the readers of the state. This factor amply distinguishes Keeton from the present case for here the non-residents' claims involve no harm in California and no harm to California residents.

So the focused on publication and the fact that in Chief Justice Roberts' view, defamation is sui generis. It's different.

Now, as the supreme court has held, once an Ohio, once an Ohio court acquires personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant for claims arising in Ohio, 18(a) permits joinder of related claims of that party's that do not arise in Ohio.

Okay? That's the U.S. Sprint v. Mr. K's Foods case.

Whereas here, Your Honor, a defendant purposefully touches a state with its activities we believe, and that's not about pendent jurisdiction, which may or may not arise in the federal courts, this Court has the power and the ancillary authority to determine all claims and issues directly connected with those activities. That's actually from a Supreme Court case, Goodyear Dunlop Tires.

Here, Plaintiffs are all properly joined with respect to



20(a). You've got a common nucleus of facts. You've got common issues of law. One joint venture, one investigation, everything arising from the same publications.

2.5

Finally, with respect to the third prong of the due process analysis, the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court over the Defendants is imminently reasonable. As the Sixth Circuit and other courts have found, when the first two elements of a prima facie case are satisfied, then an inference arises that this third factor is also present. In Kauffman, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, as did Fallang, you've heard me reference earlier, that a high degree of unfairness is required to erect a constitutional barrier against jurisdiction, Your Honor.

Deciding if it's reasonable requires this Court to look at three factors. First, what is Ohio's interest in the controversy? If Ohio's going to spend its tax dollars, why should they do that and open the doors of the courtroom to these plaintiffs? Both Ohio and U.S. law consistently confirm that a state has a compelling interest in adjudicating injuries and especially intentional torts, which occur within its borders. This instance is even greater here, Your Honor, where these matters have been partially adjudicated by the Ohio Board of Psychology, and the magistrate who reviewed that finding, and those findings were accepted by the Ohio court, and that decision was not disturbed.

Second factor, burden on the Defendants. Litigating in Ohio won't be a significant burden on them. Travel from DC, pretty easy. Same thing from Chicago. It's where I flew in from yesterday, a 40-minute flight. You can drive it.

Defendants will well be able to bear the cost.

Plaintiffs on the other hand, two of whom are without full time employment because of these events banded together with Colonel James, their fellow colluder according to Mr. Hoffman, to maintain this lawsuit to clear their names. This is the Sixth largest military town in the country, Your Honor. It's especially important for Colonel James to clear his name here.

In a case cited by Defendants, <u>Wilts v. New Jersey</u>, page 11, it specifically states in fact that the Sixth Circuit has made it clear that specific jurisdiction may be proper even when the defendant is compelled to travel. That's in APA's reply brief at page 11.

Moreover, the events have no center of gravity in DC.

Again, as Your Honor picked up on, most were conducted by email or telephone by APA members who hale from states including

Ohio. Hoffman interviewees and the witnesses Plaintiffs will depose, most of them are not located in DC. I think that's important.

In fact, at one point, they allege that the Department of Defense is in DC. It's actually in Virginia and that will come later when we talk about applicability of law, but it has a

mailing address in DC, a post office box, because it's required to by the federal government. But it's actually located in Virginia. So for choice of law purposes, there's actually very little relation of this case to DC.

And finally, I want to read something from the Ohio Supreme Court.

We decline to allow a non-resident defendant to take advantage of the conveniences of modern technology, those convenience that affords and simultaneously be shielded from the consequences of intentional tortious conduct.

You can't use the internet to distribute something and then say you're not subject to jurisdiction because it was on the internet. Plaintiffs have met all three prongs of the due process analysis.

General jurisdiction. Relatively quick, Your Honor,
Sidley. <u>Carden v. Arkoma</u>, the Supreme Court has said limited
liability partnerships, sorry, not corporations. Not the case.
In fact, and I'm going to get back to this in a minute, we
cited <u>Price v. Wheeling</u>, also a case that says good law,
registration in Ohio, valid basis for jurisdiction.

APA, a professional organization, current board member in Ohio. At almost times of the events described at least one board member in Ohio. 2,800 members here, we allege only 1,500 in the complaint. The archives of psychology, the home of

psychology is considered Akron, Ohio. It certifies programs here. It accredits programs here.

Now, let me go again to jurisdiction. Sidley cites on page 2 of its reply a case <u>Grubb v. Day to Day Logistics</u>, Your Honor, and you heard both Mr. Hentoff and Ms. Wahl talk about the <u>BNSF</u> case, which was recently decided by the Supreme Court. In that case, on page 12, the court actually leaves open the question of whether registration and consent is still good. They decline to consider it because it wasn't brought up in the lower court. In fact, if you go to the case that Sidley cites in its own papers, the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, specifically on page 7, stated that consent by registration after <u>Daimler</u> was still good law in the Sixth Circuit.

The court in <u>Grubb</u> then collected cases, acknowledged there's a split among circuits, and said this court is convinced that under the laws of this circuit, the designation of an agent under the Freight (sic) Motor Carrier Act which requires designation of an agent for service of process for registration to do business in the state operates as consent to be sued in each state where it is filed. Again, <u>Grubb v. Day to Day Logistics</u>, page 2 of the Sidley reply.

APA. To do business here and to solicit members here, if you call the Ohio State Attorney General, they tell you that you have to register to solicit members here and designate a

service agent.

Sidley partnerships. This is not entered into evidence but if Your Honor wishes to explore this, we will happily provide certified copies or do a 30(B)(5) deposition of a Sidley partner. Seven limited liability partnerships.

Nobody's incorporated or organized in DC at Sidley. It's actually organized under Delaware and Illinois and all of those partnerships are qualified and registered as foreign limited partnerships in Ohio.

Let me touch briefly on forum non-conveniens. Even if the Court accepts personal jurisdiction, Defendants have argued that you should dismiss this case under the doctrine of forum non-conveniens, Your Honor. But the Ohio Supreme Court has said the plaintiffs' choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.

Now, a couple of tests. Burden on Defendants, I think

I've covered that. I won't belabor the point. Not

inconvenient for witnesses. In fact, much less expensive and
this is much more centrally located. Nothing in the nature of
this case can overcome Ohio's interest, Your Honor. We need to
adjudicate this once and for all in Ohio.

Defendants want it in DC because they want to apply DC procedural law and in fact, Ohio courts have said we don't have that law here and we're not free to apply that and we're governed by the Ohio rules of civil procedure and the Ohio

law.

In summary, Plaintiffs believe that this Court has multiple grounds of exercising jurisdiction over the Defendants that are absolutely consistent with due process, Your Honor.

We ask that Plaintiffs' choice of forum not be disturbed.

We also request that His Honor lift the stay on discovery so that we may be allowed to answer the Defendants' next motions for summary judgment, which are before this Court.

Alternatively, if the Court believes we haven't established a prima facie case, we would ask leave to file a formal motion for limited jurisdictional discovery. I'm prepared to argue that today or I can have the motion filed by Monday morning.

For example, if you want more evidence about the Sidley partnerships or APA doing business, although their allegations have no weight today. Your Honor, may say I need more evidence on that, Ms. Forrest, and I want to know more. If this Court decides not to exercise jurisdiction, we talked about a case (indiscernible) where we asked respectfully that it do so with conditions to ensure that Plaintiffs have access for a forum.

We ask that these actions be stayed until we can find counsel there. Although Mr. Free has an address there, he is actually physically located in Wilmington, Delaware.

We thank you Your Honor for your time. We understand this isn't an easy case, and our clients thank you for the

1 opportunity to be heard. Thank you. It's 12 noon, so we'll recess 2 THE COURT: 3 for lunch and we'll have rebuttal arguments at 1:15. 4 MR. HENTOFF: Thank you, Your Honor. 5 MS. WAHL: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor. 6 MS. FORREST: 7 All rise. The court is in recess. THE CLERK: 8 (Recess taken) 9 THE CLERK: All rise. This is court in Montgomery 10 County is again in session. 11 THE COURT: Thank you. Please be seated. Defendants, 12 any rebuttal argument? 13 MR. HENTOFF: Thank you, Your Honor, yes. I'll go 14 first for Sidley and then Ms. Wahl will go for APA. 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 DEFENDANT SIDLEY'S REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 17 MR. HENTOFF: Before I start, Your Honor, does the 18 Court have any questions for me? 19 THE COURT: No, sir. 20 First, the Plaintiffs' counsel spoke in MR. HENTOFF: 21 her presentation about what various third parties did to 22 Colonel James in Ohio and frankly in other states by filing 23 ethics complaints against him, which related to his time

several years earlier overseas. None of those states undermine

anything that we've said in our brief or our argument about the

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insubstantial contacts of Sidley with the forum in the case.

The most important thing that I'm going to say in rebuttal is that Plaintiffs made one very important misstatement of the law of defamation and personal jurisdiction. Quoting the Supreme Court, or referring to the Supreme Court Keeton case, possibly quoting it, and the recent Supreme Court Bristol-Myers case in which the court distinguished Keeton, Plaintiffs' counsel said that mere evidence that people read the report in Ohio is sufficient for personal jurisdiction. That is an incorrect statement of the law.

What <u>Keeton</u> simply said, when it -- what <u>Keeton</u> said, when an allegedly false and defamatory statement is published in a state, there's been harm in that state. That's what <u>Keeton</u> says, and what that means is that it has set off -- the plaintiff has set off on the first step of the jurisdictional analysis, not the last step. The first step, that there has been some harm in the forum. Neither <u>Keeton</u> nor <u>Calder</u> ends the analysis with the mere fact of publication in a forum. If they did say that, <u>Keeton</u> and <u>Calder</u> would both be one sentence long and I would have memorized both cases.

What <u>Keeton</u> on its own facts, and then <u>Calder</u>, <u>Kauffman</u>, and <u>Reynolds</u> and the test that we talked about this morning, all do is they then go to the next steps, which are what we talked about in the morning. Again, it's so important where <u>Calder</u> talks about as part of its test that the Court has to

look at where the brunt of the harm is felt. Well, if any harm being felt was sufficient for personal jurisdiction, <u>Calder</u> would never had said it.

Bristol-Myers, a recent Supreme Court case, we both talked about it. It nearly distinguished Keeton on that first step. In other words, it just said well, in Keeton, there is a harm in the jurisdiction, but that doesn't mean there's personal jurisdiction in the state. It just means there's a harm and you can go to the next step of the jurisdictional analysis. Therefore, it is not in any respect contrary to Calder or the other focal point cases that we have cited.

Counsel noted that the <u>Bristol-Myers</u> court also talked about the <u>Keeton</u> connection, the connection that "Hustler" had to the forum and all that was referring to was is what I was talking about this morning, "Hustler's" connection to the forum with their regular large quantity publication of magazines every month.

Finally on this point, the Court does not need to listen to the <u>Bristol-Myers</u> Supreme Court oral argument to decide whether or not defamation cases are special because our briefs rely on defamation cases. That's what our personal jurisdiction argument is based on.

Fundamentally, we and the Plaintiffs disagree on what the key Ohio and Sixth Circuit cases say about the focal point test for personal jurisdiction. You know, the Court will decide

who's right about that. I'll just say every one of these cases either expressly says or is consistent with the proposition that a defendant must intentionally focus on the plaintiff's activities in the forum or the court will find there's no personal jurisdiction.

6 THE COURT: Could you repeat that?

MR. HENTOFF: Sure. Under the focal point test, the Plaintiffs have to show that the Defendants' publication focused on the Plaintiffs' activities in the state.

THE COURT: Plaintiffs' activities?

MR. HENTOFF: Yes. In other words, it was an article about the plaintiff and the article was about what the plaintiff did in the state as opposed to somewhere else.

MS. WAHL: Defendant.

MR. HENTOFF: So for example, Plaintiffs' counsel talks about the <u>Fallang</u> case as meaning one email into the jurisdiction can be sufficient. But <u>Fallang</u> is consistent with our test. It's a letter into Ohio allegedly making false and disparaging statements about the conduct of an Ohio surgeon at an Ohio hospital. So it fits completely with the test that the Ohio Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit talk about.

Plaintiffs make what I believe is a brand new allegation on general jurisdiction that Sidley limited partnerships I suppose within the overall Sidley partnership exists and have registered in some fashion with Ohio. Importantly, none of

them are Ohio limited liability entities. They are not Ohio entities, so the Supreme Court case law that we talked about still prevents the exercise of general jurisdiction.

Ms. Wahl, and we did a tiny bit of preparation on this issue over lunch, but I know from this issue coming up with regard to the APA that Ms. Wahl talked about jurisdiction were merely registering to do business does not mean that the state requires you to consent to general jurisdiction.

So we found a case in Ohio called Avery Dennison Corp. v. Alien Tech Corp., that's 632 F.Supp.2d 700. In talking about Ohio law, the case says the mere designation of an agent in compliance with the service of process statute does not automatically eliminate the requirement of minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction. That is our on the fly response to this discussion of Sidley limited liability partnerships.

Counsel said that Sidley published the report into Ohio because two APA board members reside in Ohio. I have two points about that. The first is the complaint doesn't say that. The Plaintiffs are entitled to have us credit the factual allegations of their complaint, but not go beyond them. The complaint alleges that Sidley provided the report to the special committee and to the board, but it doesn't allege that Sidley directly sent the report by email to board members wherever they were. That's just not allegation in the

complaint and it should not be credited.

In fact, Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from a board member, at least one, who described how he accessed the report and he didn't say that Sidley sent him the report. Finally, even if that had happened or had been properly alleged, it's still not Sidley purposefully availing itself of Ohio. Its client is in Washington DC. It's the APA. It's up to the client to determine who's going to be on the board of directors. That's not taking advantage of the State of Ohio.

Counsel also says that the complaint alleges that David

Hoffman recommended that the APA give the report before

publication to two APA critics knowing that they might leak it

to the "New York Times." That's not a publication by David

Hoffman or Sidley if they allege he didn't take care enough to

prevent third parties from leaking to the "New York Times."

Bless you.

Next, Plaintiffs' counsel says that <u>U.S. Sprint</u>, an Ohio Supreme Court case, supports joining the personal jurisdiction claims of the other Plaintiffs with Colonel James. The <u>U.S.</u>

<u>Sprint</u> case is not a case about multiple plaintiffs. It's just a case about one plaintiff who had multiple claims. So it does not support the proposition that Plaintiffs do not individually have to establish their own case for personal jurisdiction in Ohio.

To the extent that counsel cites state statutes or rules



of procedure in Ohio, they don't trump the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. That's why the inquiry doesn't end if a plaintiff can satisfy the state long-arm statute.

I believe that counsel uses the <u>Fallang</u> case to create the impression that for a defendant to defeat a showing of personal jurisdiction, the defendant must show a high degree of unfairness. I believe that that language from <u>Fallang</u> comes in the third prong of the <u>Southern Machine</u> test where reasonableness is the issue and we have not relied on the, at least Sidley has not relied on the third prong in making its argument.

So finally, Your Honor, we don't believe -- one more thing. Plaintiffs' counsel said that what's coming up next are summary judgment motions. You know, the Court and the parties, we have an agreed schedule of what's coming up and its motions to dismiss. There are a variety of motions to dismiss that are in the process of being briefed and will be submitted.

But there is no reason to reopen discovery. The reasons that caused the Court to stay discovery in the first place are still 100 percent in place. We are proceeding along the schedule we all agreed upon and if we get to any other motions and if there's a basis for the Plaintiffs to seek limited discovery in connection with that motion, I think the Plaintiffs can meet and confer with us, file a motion for appropriate limited discovery if it's a motion as to which

discovery is appropriate, but there's no basis to deviate from the plan that we've agreed to and the path that we're on.

Finally, we don't agree that it's necessary or appropriate to open up the personal jurisdiction prima facie motion to discovery. If the Plaintiffs can't make a prima facie case where we are agreeing with all of their factual allegations, and they've put in 15 affidavits that we haven't rebutted, they just can't make a prima facie case and this is a case that should proceed in the District of Columbia.

Unless the Court has any questions, I'm done, Your Honor.

12 THE COURT: Thank you.

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MR. HENTOFF: Thank you.

DEFENDANT APA'S REBUTTAL ARGUMENT

MS. WAHL: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

16 THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MS. WAHL: Having listened to Plaintiffs' presentation,

18 I think there are two fundamental problems with their argument.

The first is that they rely heavily on the fact that libel is special and in fact, if I wrote the quote down properly, I

21 believe Ms. Forrest said quote, defamation is sui generis per

22 Chief Justice Roberts, and I believe she said she got that from

23 listening to the argument on a recent case.

I don't know if he said that, but I do know that if he did, or anyone did, it would be contrary to long-standing



Supreme Court law because <u>Calder v. Jones</u>, back in 1988 said at page 790 to 91, quote, we have already declined in other contexts to grant special procedural protections to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to the constitutional protections embodied in the substantive laws.

In other words, there's nothing special about defamation cases. They are what they are, like other intentional torts. The same level of proof is required for establishing jurisdiction.

The second fundamental problem with Plaintiffs' argument is that they repeatedly said just posting something on the website is enough. That may not be the exact words, but that was the tenor of the comments. That is actually contrary to well-established law, including Kauffman, which they cite and rely on, the Oasis case, the Reynolds case, the -- I have a hard time with this one, Huizenga case. All of those cases said otherwise. It is not enough to simply post something on the website. There has to be some additional activity. There has to be some focus, targeting, whatever language you want to use on the forum.

The <u>Kauffman</u> case is a perfect example of this. In the <u>Kauffman</u> case, which is a 2010 Ohio Supreme Court case, the defendant was angry at Kauffman for selling him what he thought was damaged goods and not taking them back and so he posted on multiple websites statements to the effect that your product is bad, you ripped me off, I'm going to get you, I'm going to make

you suffer in Ohio. I want damage to be done to you where you do business in Ohio. The record is abundantly clear. The court found that in that circumstance, the defendant absolutely reached out and targeted the plaintiff in Ohio. No question.

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You take the almost identical case, this is the Oasis case, and the defendant in that case did pretty much the same thing. They had -- they opened up a hate website, established a hate website. They too felt they had been mistreated in connection with a fire that was caused by Oasis' product. claim that the Oasis water cooler was responsible for burning down the building that they occupied and they couldn't get recompense, so they started a down with Oasis website, or something to that effect. The key difference being that they never said Oasis, we're going to get you. All they did was saying in their website Oasis is bad, they ripped us off. haven't been able to get recompense. In that case, almost identical, the court said no jurisdiction over the defendant. Same kind of thing, a website posting. But the difference from Kauffman is that in Kauffman, the defendant specifically said I'm going to get you in Ohio.

So just posting is not enough. That has been shown not only in the two cases I described, but the much talked about case here, the Reynolds case and I won't belabor that. I'm sure the Court has now heard enough about that.

I want to correct a few of the -- or respond to a few



other statements that Plaintiffs' counsel made. There was a comment about this wasn't just a report. There was a draft report, and a report, and a revised report, all of which were available in Ohio. That's true. That doesn't mean that any of those reports targeted people in Ohio. They were all established — or I should say they were all published by APA in the same fashion. They were put up on a website.

Plaintiffs made the point about the Plaintiffs here are doing the right thing but they are being accused of enabling torture. Your Honor, nobody said that here. This is a motion to dismiss on the basis of jurisdiction. It's not a referendum on the merits, whether these are good people or bad people. It's simply not at issue and we don't think that the Court needs to go there. This is a question of whether the Court should be exercising jurisdiction over these parties.

Ms. Forrest said that the Kaslow email, one of perhaps the only direct tie that the Plaintiffs contend was done by APA into the jurisdiction, Ms. Kaslow's email to Plaintiff James was sent to him at Wright State and that shows that APA intended to utilize the jurisdiction. That is incorrect.

Exhibit A to Plaintiff James' affidavit is the email that Dr.

James received. It is from Nadine Kaslow to Nadine Kaslow at Emory Edu. It doesn't show any address for Dr. James or anyone else for that matter. That's Exhibit A, Your Honor, to the James Affidavit.

There was much discussion about the registration in state and whether that confers jurisdiction. I won't belabor it and I applaud Mr. Hentoff's lunchtime research. I will say only this, that the Plaintiffs seem to be conflating general jurisdiction with -- and registration to do business with registering as a charity. The only thing that APA has done is registered as a charity. It has not registered to do business. It's different. Those are different statutes and it has not consented to be available for jurisdiction.

Ms. Forrest made a point about how that's still an open question. I would beg to differ based on Mr. Hentoff's case, but she specifically said that the Supreme Court case, the BNSF Railroad case, left open that question and I think she said something to the effect that including that the Sixth Circuit would recognize that jurisdiction could be predicated upon consent. Actually the BNSF case said that the parties said that BNSF has consented to personal jurisdiction in Montana. The court does not address this contention. We do not reach it. That's all they said. They certainly didn't say anything about yes, we allow that, it's all good.

There was discussion by Ms. Forrest about pendent personal jurisdiction. She made some comment about she didn't know whether -- if I heard her correctly, she doesn't know whether it's allowable or not in federal court or otherwise.

Regardless of -- clearly we would all agree that pendent



jurisdiction related to state versus federal claims is something that happens and is discussed in federal court. That's not what they're doing here.

What they're attempting to do is rely on the joinder rule, rules of civil procedure, to say that if it arises from a common nucleus of operative fact, that's enough for the Court to accept jurisdiction over the non-Ohio residents. There's not a single case that says that. The joinder rules are specifically predicated on the notion that there is separate jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, over a party before they can be joined.

This was made abundantly clear in the case that I can't pronounce, the <u>Huizenga</u> case, and also in the <u>Bristol-Myers</u> case, where defendants -- sorry, where the court said specifically in those cases not -- that's not a concept we accept. In fact, in the <u>Huizenga</u> case, the court specifically said that where there are non-residents who are seeking to utilize the court's jurisdiction, the forum actually has diminished interest in helping them because they are not residents of the forum.

Ms. Forrest said I believe that all the Court needs is one act and that's enough to predicate jurisdiction. It's actually not correct. Otherwise, the other cases that we've cited, Reynolds, et cetera, those would not exist. There would have been jurisdiction and in each of those cases, the court didn't

allow jurisdiction.

We also agree with Sidley that there is no reason for the Court to entertain discovery, lift the stay on discovery. I believe the way Ms. Forrest phrased it was if the Court doesn't believe — believes that there is further evidence that we should supply to state a prima facie case, please allow us to open up discovery. Plaintiffs have submitted five inches of paper. We, as Mr. Hentoff said, have not contested whether that's objectionable on the basis of hearsay, whether it's authentic.

It's not for the Court to tell the Plaintiffs how to put on their case. That's for the Plaintiffs. If the Plaintiffs have not been able to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction, and we believe they have not, it's not the Court's role to tell Ms. Forrest I hereby recommend and advise that we reopen discovery so that you can make a better case. It's not -- that's the Plaintiffs' role.

Last, what I'd like to do with the Court's indulgence is use the flip chart, if I may, to just highlight a couple of points.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. WAHL: So, while Ms. Forrest was speaking, I took down -- I took notes, and I hope they are correct, about what she cites as -- I think she cites as contacts by APA with the forum that would demonstrate that there is a reason for the

Court to exercise specific jurisdiction.

So the first one that she talked about was something about an interview with Nathaniel Raymond. I don't know what that has to do with this case. It had nothing to do with APA. It didn't happen in Ohio. So that one's out.

I believe she said that in 2006 to 2009, there were board members in Ohio. That's APA board members. What she doesn't say and there's nothing in the record is whether any of those board members have anything to do with anything in this case. It's certainly not a predicate for general jurisdiction and there's nothing in the record that shows that it had anything to do with anything that would give rise to specific jurisdiction.

She talked about board members in 2015. Same thing. No indication that those board members had any role in releasing or authorizing the report. So that one's out.

She said that there were ethics complaints filed against Dr. James in Ohio. To be clear, these ethics complaints were not filed by APA. They were filed by a private party and as I understand from the Plaintiffs' statements, she filed these complaints in Guam, New York, Louisiana, and also Ohio. But that had nothing to do with APA. That's out.

Ms. Forrest talked about a fellow named Stephen Soldz and he gave an interview. I truly was not really able to follow what that was about, but there's nothing in the record that

indicates that that was in Ohio. Mr. Soldz lives in Boston and
he was not acting for the APA at the time he gave his
interview. At least, there's certainly nothing in the record

that indicates that. So that's out.

- Ms. Forrest talked about the archives of psychology being in Ohio. That's true, they are. But I believe she left the wrong impression. APA does not run, operate, or do anything with regard to the archives of psychology except like lots of other people and organization, they give some money. That's not a basis for specific jurisdiction and that's got nothing to do with the report.
- She talked about certification. I am advised by

 Mr. Raben that APA actually doesn't certify. So that's

 actually not even applicable. APA does accredit and there have

 been perhaps some accreditation of classes, courses, et cetera

 in Ohio, but that's got nothing to do with this case. So

 that's out.
- So on the basis of all of the contacts that have been enumerated by the Plaintiffs, we would submit, Your Honor, that there is no basis for specific jurisdiction. Thank you.
- THE COURT: Thank you.

Thank you counsel. The Court will take the matter under advisement at this time and I'll provide a written decision to all the parties by virtue of the service of counsel. Thank you for your appearances.

1	MS. FORREST: All rise.
2	MR. HENTOFF: Thank you, Your Honor.
3	THE CLERK: The court is adjourned.
4	(Proceedings concluded at 1:52 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE

I, JONNA LINKE, Transcriptionist, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages, 1 - 92, constitute a full, true and accurate transcript, from electronic recording, transcribed by me, of the proceedings had in the foregoing matter, LARRY C. JAMES, ET AL. VS. DAVID HOFFMAN, ET AL., Case No. 2017-CV-839, on the docket of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court, a court of record, and all prepared to the best of my skill and ability.

SIGNED and dated this 24th day of September, 2017.

JONNA LINKE

Transcriptionist

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